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
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THE  
REFORMED CHURCH  
REVIEW.

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YE SHALL KNOW THE TRUTH, AND THE TRUTH SHALL MAKE YOU FREE

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# CONTENTS

ARTICLE.	No. 1.	PAGE
I.—The Cross. By R. LEIGHTON GERHART . . . . .		1
II.—Germany and the Formative Forces of the Great War. By RICHARD C. SCHIEDT . . . . .		19
III.—The Rationalistic Element in American Literature Previous to 1860. By CHARLES EDWARD MEYERS . . . . .		49
IV.—Modern Life and Pastoral Work. By FREDERICK A. RUPLEY. . . . .		71
V.—A Comparative Study of Ancient and Mediæval Missions. By LEONARD L. LEH . . . . .		80
VI.—A Review of "The Problem of Christianity." By RAY H. DOTTERER . . . . .		109
VII.—Can We Know God? By HENRY GEKELER . . . . .		125
VIII.—The Church and the Social Order. By THEODORE F. HERMAN. . . . .		130
IX.—Notices of New Books . . . . .		148
	PENNSYLVANIA IN SONG: <i>Pennypacker</i> : The Snow Shoe Trail and other Poems; <i>Pennypacker</i> : Pennsylvania, The Keystone; <i>Schaeffer</i> : The Supreme Revelation—A Study in the Synoptic Gospels; <i>Conn</i> : Social Heredity and Social Evolution—The Other Side of Eugenics; <i>McKeever</i> : Training the Girl; <i>Dunlap</i> : A System of Psychology; <i>Ranck</i> : The Life of the Reverend Benjamin Bausman, D.D., LL.D.	
	No. 2.	
I.—John Huss and the Reformed Church. By JAMES I. GOOD. . . . .		161
II.—A Comparative Study of Ancient Mediæval Missions. By LEONARD L. LEH . . . . .		172
III.—Eugenics. By CHARLES P. STAHR . . . . .		198
IV.—The Gospel and the Heathen Dead. By HIRAM KING . . . . .		230
V.—The Realization of the Social Ideal of Jesus. By FREDERICK C. NAU . . . . .		242
VI.—Notices of New Books . . . . .		264
	<i>Schaeffer</i> : Our Home Mission Work; <i>Clough</i> : Social Christianity in the Orient; They who Question; <i>Hillis</i> : The Story of Phædrus; <i>Hoyt</i> : Vital Elements of Preaching; <i>Richard</i> : God's Paths to Peace; <i>Streeter</i> : Restatement and Reunion; <i>Calkins</i> : A Man and His Money; <i>Woods</i> : Our Spiritual Skies; <i>Fosdick</i> : The Assurance of Immortality; <i>Dorchester</i> : The Sovereign People; <i>Bowers</i> : Safeguards for City Youth at Work and at Play; <i>Eliot</i> : The Juvenile Court and the Community; <i>Slosson</i> : Fated or Free? <i>Painter</i> : The Philosophy of Christ's Temptation; <i>Gill</i> : The Psychological Aspects of Christian Experience; <i>Peabody</i> : The Christian Life in the Modern World; <i>Anderson</i> : The Man of Nazareth; <i>Black</i> : The Open Door; <i>Locke</i> : A Man's Reach or Some Character Ideals.	

Rev. Ellis N. Kremer



ARTICLE	No. 3.	PAGE
I.—Jesus' Messianic Consciousness. By ELMER L. COBLENTZ.		287
II.—The Aim of the Sermon. By ROBERT F. REED . . . . .		303
III.—Truth. By N. C. SCHAEFFER . . . . .		318
IV.—The Newer Orthodoxy. By PAUL B. RUPP . . . . .		324
V.—The Logos Doctrine. By WILLIAM C. SCHAEFFER . . . . .		341
VI.—The Philosophy of Evil. By PAUL J. DUNDORE . . . . .		357
VII.—Contemporary Sociology. By A. V. HESTER . . . . .		392
VIII.—The Stars not Inhabited. By A. T. G. APPLE . . . . .		405
IX.—Notices of New Books . . . . .		414
<i>Schaff</i> : John Huss—His Life, Teachings and Death after Five Hundred; <i>Johnson</i> : Captain John Smith; Getting a Wrong Start; <i>Hughes</i> : The Bible and Life; <i>Ward</i> : Variety in the Prayer Meeting; <i>Hughes</i> : A Boy's Religion; <i>Schwarze</i> : John Hus, the Martyr of Bohemia, a Study of the Dawn of Protestantism.		
No. 4.		
I.—The Facts of the Past and Reflections Thereon. By A. E. TRUXAL . . . . .		421
II.—Miracles and Christianity. By RAY E. DOTTERER . . . . .		442
III.—Modern Dogmatics. By THEODORE F. HERMAN . . . . .		464
IV.—Evangelical Piety. By W. D. HAPPEL . . . . .		489
V.—Why I Believe in Christianity. By E. E. KRESGE . . . . .		499
VI.—Application of the Doctrine of Moral and Physical Evil. By PAUL J. DUNDORE . . . . .		519
VII.—The New Apologetic. By GUSTAV R. POETTER . . . . .		536
VIII.—The Place of Socrates in the Development of Philosophical Thought. By PHILIP VOLLMER . . . . .		542



# THE REFORMED CHURCH REVIEW

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No. 1.—JANUARY—1915.

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## I.

### THE CROSS.

R. LEIGHTON GERHART.

The moral order, as it comes to light in the religious history of the world, is the revelation of a redemptive process; a process of lifting man above imperfection, ignorance and sin into communion and fellowship with God; a process in the spiritual sphere which reveals itself in successive stages as history advances. The creative, impelling force of this process is the Power making for righteousness in the world, the imminent and transcendent God. Standing in this order, its highest exponent is the Lord Jesus, in whom the redemptive process of all preceding history culminates, and from whom, upon a supreme plane, the redemptive forces issue anew.

The cross is the symbol of the redemptive process, the sign of a law governing the development of the spiritual life of humanity. As such it neither originated nor had an end in the crucifixion of our Lord. If this were not true, Jesus never could have been spoken of as "the Lamb slain from the foundation of the world," nor could the seer on Patmos have beheld in apocalyptic vision "a Lamb as it had been slain" as the sign of power on the throne of God. Nor are we to conceive



of "the Lamb slain from the foundation of the world" simply as a prophecy of an event to come, or as a potential power existing in the world, but as a power continually manifesting itself throughout all history in forms answerable to the type finally and fully revealed in our Lord. From innumerable passages setting forth the presence and activity of Jehovah in Hebrew history we quote the following: "For he said, Surely they are my people, children that will not lie: so he was their Saviour. In all their affliction he was afflicted, and the angel of his presence saved them: in his love and in his pity he redeemed them: and he bare them and carried them all the days of old (Isaiah 63:8-9). Again, "The eternal God is thy refuge, and underneath are the everlasting arms: and he shall thrust out the enemy from before thee" (Deut. 33; 27). In the prophets and in the Psalms alike the constant thought of God is of "a present help in time of trouble"; of One who is a continual source of strength; of One who is constantly manifesting himself as the Saviour and Redeemer of Israel.

The redemptive Power works very specifically through and by means of that ethical element in man which impels him to give himself in absolute surrender to God for the benefit, the good, the salvation of his fellowmen, and in that act of self-surrender find spiritual satisfaction, fellowship with God and perfection of life.

That this self-surrender may have true spiritual value it must find its ground not in feeling, nor in independent self-determination, but in an authority which the man recognizes as the source of all wisdom, righteousness, love and life. Once this is clearly discerned, the man perceives that back of every noble, virtuous and self-sacrificing act there is an impelling necessity to so direct his conduct if he would be true to himself, avoid self-humiliation and moral self-destruction. So general is this the rule that countless numbers, on becoming conscious of having failed, through temporary weakness, or even sluggishness of perception, to take advantage of the opportunity for loving and self-denying service, invariably ex-



perience a sense of having failed to measure up to their ideal and of having fallen from their better selves. Thus while the purpose may be wholly the good of another, there is associated with the act the assurance that in its performance the man finds truest and highest satisfaction. This satisfaction, growing in depth and richness with the wholeness of the act of self-abnegation and the reality and truth of its inspiration, constitutes the state of mind and heart which Jesus pronounces blessed. Into this state no man enters except by the path of self-denial and suffering.

That men should be moved to perform such deeds of self-sacrifice in order to satisfy the inner demands of their own life is not exceptional in the sense of being wholly and distinctly Christian. Such actions spring from the nature of man as man. Of the truth of this the heroic and self-denying deeds of men of every nation and every age amply illustrate. This distinction must, however, be drawn: through Christ Jesus and through him alone man enters into normal relations with God, is placed on a basis of right adjustment to his fellowmen, and begins that life which tends, as he progresses in holiness, to bring him into harmony with himself. As a result of this, the motives and deeds of the believer in Christ are more fully in conformity with the will of God, the spirit that animates him is that of his Lord, and the inward experiences are of a distinctly higher type and vastly more truly blessed. On the other hand, in the darkness of pagan ignorance of God, impelled by the inherent impulses to self-sacrifice which though native to man are profoundly debased, self-sacrifice frequently exhibits itself as a wild, unreasoning mania, in abnormal and terrible forms, by means and instrumentalities inhuman and horrible.

## 2.

The law governing the redemptive process, symbolized by the cross, is the formative force in the spiritual history of mankind; not of history as inaugurated by our Lord, but of all history preceding the coming of our Lord. It reveals itself



as a creative, uplifting energy, ever working toward the realization of that ideal of humanity revealed in our Lord.

All along the path of history we behold the good, the noble, the God-fearing and the God-serving acting in the capacity of the burden-bearers of the world. Whatever moral and spiritual progress is made is achieved by them, and this is always accomplished by devotion to the highest interest of others through self-denial, suffering, humiliation and, in many instances, death. These men are the sources of the world's moral and spiritual inspiration and strength, the resuscitators of decadent peoples and nations.

While in the pagan world this appears in a broken and fragmentary way, it comes out with startling clearness in the heroes and prophets of Israel. They are Jehovah's representatives, whole-souledly devoted to him and to his purposes, and passionate lovers of their own people. As instruments of revelation, as teachers, as intercessors with Jehovah in behalf of their people, they stand as mediators between God and man. Beholding the immorality and wickedness of their times, conscious of the false purposes animating rulers and people alike, knowing well the certain end of such a course, in their love for their own they bear the burdens of their nation on their hearts. The lamentations of Jeremiah, the woes of Joel, the sorrows of Ezekiel simply express in clear language the sorrows of all the prophets. The prophets are all suffering men. Teaching what their people will not hear, warning of judgment to come which their people will not accept, espousing purposes antagonistic to the ambitions and passions of their age, they are at best but temporarily successful. Steadfast in their purpose as they must be, for the burden of the Lord rest upon them, the anger of the nation is roused against them and increases to such an extent that many of the prophets come to be regarded as the enemies of the state, and opposers even of the God whom they so devotedly serve. Condemned by their own and apparently forgotten of God, they perish for the sins of others. Wrought to repentance by the coming of the foretold judgment, which



when foretold it would not believe, the nation is revived, regenerated and rebuilt by the lives and teaching of the very men who when they walked the earth had been despised, rejected and mercilessly slain. As from a death of shame they thus rise to honor and influence, we behold them making their graves with the rich. "Ye build the sepulchres of the prophets, and your fathers killed them," said Jesus. Figuratively speaking, "They see their seed." Thus the prophets have in this present world their resurrection in spirit and power as redemptive forces of the world. They are infinitely more effective after death than during their earthly existence.

This is not only true of the Hebrew prophets, it is no less true of all really great men, but especially is it true of the great founders of moral and religious movements. The ascent to greatest influence, to the zenith of their power, is always after death. Death is for them the great liberator. Such a transition from and through death to power could not but have transpired in the life of Jesus. That such a supreme personality, such a mighty spirit, such a marvelous revelator of the nature and purposes of God and the nature, aspiration, needs and possibilities of man, so universal in his sympathies that, though born a Jew, all men, of every race and nation on the earth, can find themselves in him: that such an one should come in the greatest moral and religious crisis of history, when the foundations of faith were broken up, when universal social dissolution impended; that Jesus should come and pass away without inaugurating a vast religious movement, simply because he had died on the cross, would have been one of the most inexplicable anomalies of history. The Lord Jesus was superior to time; he was of that which is eternal. Although overwhelmed by doubt and consternation at his sudden and terrible death, his disciples might begin to scatter, yet it was inevitable that under the impelling force of the Lord's transcendent spirit and the power of the truth he had committed to them, they should return and go forward with the work he had entrusted to them.



In the unfolding of the process of redemption, the law governing the development of the spiritual life gradually formed a type of men, the noblest, the most purely devoted, the most exalted which preceded the coming of the Lord;—a type of men in mental constitution, spiritual temper, emotional state, sorrow, disappointment, shame strikingly in accord. With thought based upon great spiritual truths, minds intent upon definite problems, which from age to age reproduced themselves under varied conditions and varying forms, their energy, fired by consuming devotion and fervid aspiration, went out in the effort to achieve a clearly marked and definite end.

Given these conditions in any sphere of life, revelations flow into the mind, a capacity for prevision is developed and foresight leaps into prophecy. For the faculty to prophesy is one of the native endowments of man. In every sphere of human activity men of high mental organization are enabled to interpret the shadow cast by coming events and forecast the future with astonishing precision. The whole of life is, in fact, prophetic. Prophecy is a necessary condition of progress. "Where there is no vision the people perish."

This does not mean that prophecy is wholly or even in the main explicable. The origin of thought, and especially of creative thought, is one of the profoundest mysteries. Thoughts rise from the subconscious life like meteors from a pit of darkness; and while we may know much of circumstances and conditions, the only answer probably that can be given is the answer of Newton to the inquiry as to how he made his great discovery: "By intenting the mind." It is inspiration, and the source of all inspiration is God. But even the purest flame of inspiration is never unrelated to mental and spiritual endowment, education, experience, general environment and more special and particular conditions.

The marvelous fifty-third chapter of Isaiah contains a prophecy born of a knowledge of a series of historical facts, profound meditation on the course of providence and deep, soul-searching experience. From the very beginning persecution, rejection,



sorrow and shame had been the portion of the prophets. This together with the experiences of suffering love, defeated, yet in the end triumphant, at last burst forth in vivid portrayal, in exalted poetic figure, of One to come, who though sorrowing, suffering, dying, should yet be the Redeemer of his race.

In this figure we have Isaiah's solution of the perplexing problem of the suffering of the righteous, so contradictory to the deepseated conviction of the Hebrew that health, prosperity and power were the portion of the righteous.

As we study the composite picture of the saints and heroes of biblical history, we see emerging the lineaments of the Christ. Conspicuous in the group forming this composite picture, certain men appear who are commonly spoken of as "types of Christ." The prevalent view obtaining of these typical personages is that of the unrelated and incidental. It conceives of them as the exceptional creation of Providence, working in a manner akin to the miraculous. Whereas, it is through the operation of the profoundest of all the laws affecting the spiritual development of man, working in circumstances and under conditions favorable to its manifestation, that these "types of Christ" are formed. They are all bound together and related to one another by a law. Of this law they are, in varying degrees of perfection, the expression. Instead of being in any manner abnormal, they are the individuals who most closely approximate the normal.

### 3.

The death of Jesus on the cross was not an historically isolated event. It was not an event simply foreshadowed by sacrifices and foretold in incidental prophecies, however far back in the past that line of prophecy may be traced. The death of Jesus on the cross was the event in which the law governing the spiritual development of man came to full expression.

The distinction between Jesus and those who preceded him is seen in the Lord's supreme insight into the law governing



the spiritual life of man; his capacity for gathering up and expressing universal human need and the fullness of his endowment with the Holy Spirit. This endowment was so complete that in thought, word and deed—in his whole being—he set forth the essential nature of God and God's purpose for man. Jesus is thus both the Son of God and the Son of Man; the expression in life of man in the fulness of his ideal possibilities and the perfect manifestation of God as our Father in heaven.

As our Lord's life and teaching are completed in his death and resurrection, the cross, for the first time in the whole history of the world, is set up and established for all time and for all eternity as the true law of human development and spiritual progress. What had in the ages before confused and distressed the prophets, the suffering of the innocent and the afflictions of the righteous, is now revealed in the full light of day as necessarily involved in the service of God and in the aspiration for spiritual perfection and communion with God; is revealed as the law of progress from which none can escape. The alternative of obedience to this law is eternal death. It is the sacrificial law, and those who live in obedience to it, live the sacrificial life.

No thought bearing on conduct is so strongly emphasized by the Lord as that set forth in the saying: "Whosoever will come after me, let him deny himself, and take up his cross and follow me. Whosoever will save his life shall lose it; and whosoever will lose his life for my sake shall find it" (Matt. 16: 24-25). The lesson of the seed, which the Lord spoke first with reference to himself: "Verily, verily, I say unto you, Except a corn of wheat fall into the ground and die, it abideth alone: but if it die, it bringeth forth much fruit," is applicable to all men. It is thoroughly in accord with the above quotation from Matthew, and is immediately followed by the words: "He that loveth his life shall lose it; and he that hateth his life in this world shall keep it unto life eternal. If any man serve me let him follow me; and where I am there shall also my servant be."



In the parable of judgment contained in Matt. 25:31-46, the command: "Come ye blessed of my Father," is addressed to those who by the love and care which they show the poor and afflicted reveal the presence in them of the Christ-like spirit of cross-bearing. They are called by the Lord, not simply because they have performed deeds of charity, but because, from love to Christ, they have devoted themselves in self-sacrifice to relieving the suffering and afflicted, thus showing the presence in them of the very spirit of the Master himself. On the other hand, those who called him "Lord," but were indifferent to the suffering and sorrow of others, are rejected because they in no true sense possessed the spirit of Christ. In their aspiration for salvation, their thought was wholly centered in themselves.

In "Mornings in the College Chapel," under the heading "Dying to Live" occurs this striking and beautiful paragraph: "Just in proportion as self-seeking dies, life begins. A man goes his way in self-assertion, self-display, the desire to make an impression, and he seems to achieve much. He gets distinction, glory, the prizes of life. But one thing he fails to do; he fails to quicken spiritual life in others. His work is stained by self-consciousness, and becomes incapable of inspiration. It is life to him, but death to the things that are entrusted to him. Then some day he absolutely forgets himself in his work. He buries himself, as we say, in it. His conceit and ambition die, and then out of the death of self comes the life of the world he serves. This is the paradox of life. Life is reproduced by sacrifice. The life that is lost is the only life that is saved. The dead self is the only life-bearer. Only the man who thus sinks himself in his cause is remembered as its apostle."

It is the law of the cross, that as we lose ourselves in the Gospel we become instruments of salvation to others. Goodness that consists in abstinence from evil, in simply keeping the hands clean, is as barren of results as a harvest field smitten by a drought. But goodness that in addition to personal up-



rightness, in the name and spirit of Christ, reaches out to console, to warn, to help, to instruct, to save, to the extent that it is self-forgetful, creates goodness in the hearts of others; and to the extent that it is creative, it is redemptive. All goodness born in us through faith in the Lord Jesus and devotion to him carries in it redemptive efficiency. For it is the product of the word and spirit of Christ, and presents the Gospel as a living reality and present active force to the minds and hearts of men. One so inspired, so living, makes God real to the minds and hearts of men; he presents goodness as an existing fact; he makes love and righteousness an uplifting, conquering force; he opens the eyes of men to redemption as a reality; unveils the spirit of heaven, and reveals the essential nature of that life which is eternal. Of such an one, to quote the words of Phillips Brooks: "You can say nothing more than this—he is the life-giver, He comes and things have life."

The suffering entailed by wrong doing, we say, is penal; the afflictions which, in the course of nature and the ordinary events of life, come upon the Christian, we say, are disciplinary; but the suffering entailed by the effort to live the Christ-life, to overcome evil, to advance the kingdom of God on the earth, to save men is neither primarily penal nor corrective; it is primarily redemptive. And men and women who suffered under these conditions are filling up of what remains of the sufferings of Christ. For what Paul said of himself is true of all who suffer in a like spirit and for a like cause.

#### 4.

In the study of history we meet the following correlated facts, illustrative of the law of the cross:

First: The progress of every nation and of the world at large, is, to a marked degree, the achievement of the few, and, in many instances, of single individuals.

Second: This progress is achieved in the face of endless toil, temptation, opposition, poverty, mental and physical suffering and often violent death.



Third: Definite requirements must be met and fulfilled or success is impossible. Paderewski must meet the law demanding facile skill and power of expression in the fingering of the keys, or whatever other qualifications he may possess as a performer on the piano, he fails. The law is rigorous; it can neither be bent nor broken, nor held in suspense, nor in any manner evaded; it must be obeyed, in letter and spirit fulfilled.

Fourth: Following upon achievement comes exaltation to honor, power, influence, and, in material things, frequently wealth. In the case of Columbus, Shakespeare, Mozart and others the ascent to the throne of honor and power follows, not immediately, but eventually, after death.

Fifth: The full benefit of the achievement, whatever it may be, spiritual truth, scientific knowledge, political freedom, invention, discovery, succeeding generations receive as a free gift. But no matter what the gift may be, the acceptance of it in no manner whatever renders unnecessary the need of thought, labor and energy on the part of the recipient. If the gift is accepted and not wisely and energetically used, it tends to demoralize and destroy those who have received it.

Sixth: Those who appropriate these benefits, thus conferred upon them, are by the act of appropriation, released from the superstition, ignorance, oppression, limitation and hinderances of the past. They are born to a new freedom. They are raised to a higher moral, intellectual, political or material plane of living. They are redeemed, if you please, by the toilers and sufferers of the past from the burdens and restrictions of the past.

These correlated facts bring to light one of the greatest of all the laws governing human progress; a law rooted in the very constitution of man's intellectual and spiritual being; so interwoven and knit in with the fiber of his life that to nullify it would involve the destruction of man and the disorganization of the physical universe. In all the operations of this marvelous law we see without effort the crimson line of sacrifice. Progress is achieved by sacrifice; without sacrifice there is no progress.



In the Lord Jesus this law is revealed with such force and completeness that all of its special features are outlined with marvellous distinctness. We may regard the workings of this law in subordinate domains as nothing more than analogies. In reality, they appear to be far more than analogies. It is the same law operating in the one as in the other, differentiated by need and by the particular field of its operation. In every sphere possible benefits only become actual benefits by acceptance and use. In the domain of the spiritual the benefits are appropriated by faith, repentance and the whole-souled surrender of self in obedience to the lordship of Jesus. Coincident with this there goes forth from the infinite Father, through the medium of the Holy Spirit, a release from the penalties of sin, elevation above preceding moral and spiritual conditions and the gift in potentiality of righteousness and eternal life. Through Christ the believer enters into the relation of a son to his Father in heaven. Through the achievement of Jesus humanity is lifted above its previous condition into a new and higher condition, entering into the enjoyment of blessings which it could not have secured for itself.

In the correlated factors of this law, as they are exemplified in the life and death of the Lord, we find the basic elements of the atonement theories of the Reformation period, crystallized in the familiar phrases, "vicarious sacrifice," "satisfaction of Divine justice," "substitution" and kindred expressions. These are interpretations of the great law, pervading the whole of life, through the medium of medieval conceptions of civil and criminal law modified by Hebrew and pagan beliefs concerning the significance of animal sacrifice as means of atonement and propitiation. These terms have been so linked in with the whole theological conception of a past age and have been so literally understood and so formally applied as to render it impossible to use them without exposing one's self to the danger of misapprehension. Moreover, the theological conception lying back of these terms is artificial, in that it conceives of the Lord's life and death as an extra-human event, a divine



expedient to remedy a disastrous situation. So conceived, Jesus is in no true sense an historical personage, nor is his life fully bound up with the life of humanity.

In opposition to this view, this great law is truly organic, uniting the whole of humanity. Its phenomena are those of life, in its highest expression, of the spiritual life. It is of the very essential of goodness; it is of holiness, holy; apart from the operation of this law justice and righteousness are cold and formal. As man rises in spiritual power his life becomes more and more the exposition of this law. The man approaches more nearly the standard of the ideal, he becomes more perfectly human and is raised into more complete fellowship with God. This is the reason why the Master makes the losing of one's life for his sake the condition of salvation. A perfect character is not salvation, but a Christ-like character which is the condition of fellowship and communion with God the Father. Salvation is attained as we rise through Jesus Christ into fellowship with God.

##### 5.

Revelation is coincident with growth and development. We know the insect, the plant, the animal, the man as each unfolds from the incipient stages of its life to full maturity. In the moral and spiritual development of man, as one of its necessary conditions, are temptation, sorrow and trial. The man advances by conquest. But temptation and trial are not simply conditions of spiritual progress. They are also the occasion and media of revelation. So we come to know the worth of love, hope, faith, meekness, courage, righteousness and justice by the temptations, sorrows and sufferings which the individual endures in the effort to maintain his spiritual integrity. To gather it all up in one word—through death. Death in this sense is the great illuminator.

No doubt, under perfect conditions, life in its fullness, in its beauty and power will come to be known more perfectly through peace and joy, than through conflict and suffering. It



is impossible to believe that love is eternally limited to suffering for its highest and truest manifestations. There must come a time, it seems, when life in its fullness can be revealed through the medium of joy, unhindered, unclouded. Even here joy is a great revealer of the essential nature of love and truth. From certain truths we are forever debarred except we approach them through joy. "The pure in heart shall see God." But in this world, under present conditions, we come to know men by the fiery tests through which they have passed. "Now I know," said the angel of the Lord to Abraham, "that thou fearest God, seeing thou hast not withheld thy son, thine only son from me."

We say of Jesus that in his birth he took upon him our nature, that he became man, true man; so truly man as to be called "the Son of Man." Did Jesus in the onward movement and unfoldment of his life fulfil and obey the strictly human law of spiritual growth and development? Was his achievement first in himself and through himself for the world? Were the spiritual conflicts through which he passed the necessary condition of advancement to complete union and fellowship with the Father? Was the end the actualization of that which at his birth was potential?

The incarnation is a spiritual, not a physical, event. What was potential in the infant Christ is in the mature man actualized on the cross. The assumption of the human, on the one hand, by the Divine, and, on the other, the assimilation of the Divine by the human, is a process wrought out to completeness by the Christ during his earthly life. It begins with his conception and birth, is completed in the final struggle on the cross and revealed in full force and splendor in the resurrection and ascension. The union of man and God in the person of Jesus Christ is both a creation and an achievement. The redemption of the world is thus accomplished first in the person of Christ himself, and from him, raised into absolute and eternal union with the Father, the redemptive forces stream out upon humanity, and all who believe in him are through the Holy



Spirit lifted up into fellowship with the Father and the Son. From Christ perfected by his life of humiliation and suffering, culminating in his cruel but triumphant death,—“For it became him, for whom are all things, and by whom are all things, in bringing many sons to glory, to make the captain of their salvation perfect through sufferings”—from him flows the power of the new spiritual life; from him comes the power to regenerate every one who draws near to him in repentance and faith; through him, the Son of God, every one so repenting and believing is lifted up into sonship with his heavenly Father. But this fellowship with Christ, this life with him, must be lived in obedience to the law of his own life, the law of loving self-sacrifice for the welfare, the spiritual and eternal welfare, of men. Suffering belongs to the Christian's life. He is not to be surprised that sufferings come; he is not to think it strange that when he strives to live nobly for Christ he is compelled to endure affliction. On the contrary, he is to regard suffering as belonging to his vocation. It is his vocation to suffer. For if he hopes to reign with Christ, he must during this earthly life also suffer with him. Salvation, eternal life, is thus both a gift and an achievement.

St. Paul, the great exponent of justification by faith, is the one who, more impressively than any other of the sacred writers, calls upon believers in Jesus to strive to make their calling and election sure. He it is who presents the Christian's life under the figure of a race course. His is the imagery of the soldier clad in celestial armor doing battle for Christ. And he alone of all the sacred writers ventures to intimate the possibility of his own ultimate failure. “And every man that striveth for the mastery is temperate in all things. Now they do it to obtain a corruptible crown, but we an incorruptible. I therefore so run, not as uncertainly; so fight I, not as one that beateth the air; but I keep under my body and bring it into subjection, lest that by any means, when I have preached to others, I myself should be a cast-away” (1 Cor. 9: 25–27). As to the teaching of the Master,



from the parable of the Sower and the Seed to the parables of judgment the emphasis is continually laid on the need of faithful, active service. In the so called Sermon on the Mount one injunction follows another from beginning to end.

It does not follow that, if there had been no sin in the world Christ would not have suffered. Temptation and trial are the conditions of moral and spiritual development, and these conditions would have existed even though man had never sinned. But the sinfulness of man, which deadened the conscience, blinded heart and mind, gendering greed, suspicion, envy, hatred and all malice infinitely magnified temptation and trial of every kind, creating conditions which are of the very nature of sin itself.

The state in which man lived was the consequence of his sinfulness, and so his punishment. If we regard this punishment as the manifestation of the wrath of God, and it is difficult indeed to find a more suitable word, we can make some approach to an understanding of what is meant when we speak of Jesus bearing the wrath of God against the sins of all the world. He, the One of infinite understanding of the beauty and power of holiness, the utter repulsiveness and horror of sin, with a love for man and depth of sympathy for him beyond our power of conception, entered into the world lying under the dominion of sin, and under these conditions maintained himself in unbroken communion with his Father, made known his Father's name and perfectly fulfilled his Father's will. To fully accomplish the work committed to him, he endured all the ordinary ills of this life and the hatred of men even unto death. What that all may have meant to the spotless Son of man, we may well seek long to understand.

Speaking in general terms, Jesus suffered with man and for man, but not in man's place or in the stead of man. But when we say this, let us not forget that love and sympathy are endowed with a most marvellous capacity for identification, and that the capacity of Jesus in this respect cannot be measured by any simple human standard. But we say, he



died for man but not in man's place. By dying for man he made escape for man possible, not simply because he had died for man, but because through his life of humiliation culminating in the temptation and agony of his death on the cross, he wrought perfection in human nature, raising it in himself into absolute union with God. Thus "being made perfect, he became the author of eternal salvation unto all that obey him."

But Jesus has accomplished something far greater than the deliverance of man from sin and death, great as such a deliverance is. He has lifted man from the generation of the first Adam, who was made a "living soul," into the generation of the second Adam, who was made a "quickening spirit"; from the generation of that which was of the earth earthly, into the generation of that which was of the heavens heavenly. It is a new creation. The building has not simply been renovated, but has had a new story added to it; one indeed for which the edifice had originally been designed, but one which had never before been erected. This new story completes the edifice. Through the creative act of the Lord from heaven man enters the final stage of his existence.

## 6.

Shortly before his crucifixion Jesus prayed, "Father glorify thy name," and, we are told, there came a voice from heaven, saying, "I have both glorified it, and will glorify it again." Jesus had been glorified by the multitudes who followed him; glorified by his wonderful words and deeds; glorified in the transfiguration; glorified by the shouting crowds when he rode in triumph into Jerusalem. Now there was to come a new glorification; it was to be a glorification of moral and spiritual splendor,—the glorification of the cross.

Whatever Jesus had said of the need and exercise of faith, he here revealed as possessed by himself and exercised under conditions of such an appalling nature as to warrant the loss of faith. Whatever he may have taught of love and forgiveness, are here manifested under circumstances so revolting as



to justify vengeance instead of compassion. Beautiful are the words he speaks of humility, meekness and long-suffering, but transcendently more beautiful are these graces as exhibited by him in his death agony. Whatever he may have said of the need of obedience, is surpassed by an actual obedience which leaves no jot or tittle unfulfilled.

Truly, here is a glorification surpassing all the glory that had preceded it! a glorification which has exalted Jesus above all earthly dignitaries, and crowned him with a glory new in the heavenly world. And yet, as from the cross we survey the whole life of the Lord we see that it is, like the seamless robe he wore, all of one piece; and it is this spiritual completeness as wrought out on the cross which has drawn all men unto him.

The cross is the supreme achievement; it is the supreme revelation. We may study it under many different aspects:—the cross as a revelation of faith; the cross as a revelation of love; the cross as a revelation of holiness; the cross as a revelation of the graces and moral qualities of perfect manhood; the cross as a revelation of sin and judgment; the cross as a revelation of the significance of temptation; the cross as a revelation of God's dealings with men; the cross as a revelation of the hearts of men; the cross as a revelation of the way of life; the cross as the instrument and means of communion and fellowship with God; the cross as redemption; the cross as the emblem of victory, and where will our studies end? The more we study, the more we learn, the more fully does the cross come to be the most illuminating event in history, the mystery of the ages and the paradox of life. If ever the time comes when we can say we understand the cross in all its richness and fullness, in its length and breadth and height and depth, we shall know all of earth and all of heaven, and there will be nothing more to learn. For we shall have reached an open-eyed vision of Him who dwelleth in light unto which no man can approach.

LEWISBURG, PA.



## II.

### GERMANY AND THE FORMATIVE FORCES OF THE GREAT WAR.

RICHARD C. SCHIEDT.

I do not rush into print in order to defend Germany, for Germany does not need my defense; she is fully able to defend herself. Nor shall I retaliate the vituperations heaped upon Germany by almost the entire American press. Never in the history of the world has there been such a systematic, ruthless onslaught against a belligerent nation on the part of a neutral power as we witness at the present time in this country. Never have newspaper scribes searched a nation's history for the purpose of finding real or supposed defects as our gallant knights of the quill are doing just now. It almost seems as though this wholesale attack on Germany had been deliberately organized and set in motion by the entire anti-German press long before the war actually began, so systematic and effective is the alignment of the forces. It would be futile on my part to enter upon any discussion of newspaper rhetoric. I shall confine myself to certain incontrovertible facts<sup>1</sup> which deal with the immediate and the remote causes of this disastrous and appalling war and for this purpose group my arguments under the following heads: (1) The occasion for the war (2) Russia and Germany. (3) France and Germany. (4) England and Germany. (5) The Belgian Invasion.

#### THE OCCASION FOR THE WAR.

Without discussing the age-old oriental question, which after all is the focus whence all bellicose heat has radiated

<sup>1</sup> Based upon the various official documents and diplomatic correspondences.



within the last century, I turn to the immediate occasion for the war which according to all parties concerned was the assassination of Archduke Francis Ferdinand, successor to the Austrian throne, and his wife the duchess of Hohenberg by the revolver shots of a member of a Servian band of conspirators, named Gabriel Principe, on June 28 last. The Austro-Hungarian officials who investigated the crime discovered that the plot to take the life of the Archduke was planned and promoted in Belgrade with the coöperation of official Servian individuals and was carried out with weapons from the Servian government depot. The crime was not directed against Francis Ferdinand personally, for he was known to be the best friend of the Servians and the Slav cause; it was directed against the Austro-Hungarian monarchy by the Pan-Servian propaganda, the ultimate object of whose policies was to revolutionize gradually and finally to bring about a separation of the southwestern region of the Austro-Hungarian monarchy from that empire and unite it with Servia. The repeated efforts of the dual monarchy to establish good, neighborly relations did not change this trend of Servian politics in the least because the Servian propaganda believed herself supported by Russia in her endeavor. After the Balkan wars Russia favored a new Balkan League under Russian patronage whose activities should be directed against the existence of the Austro-Hungarian monarchy, which stood in the way of Russia's ambitions in Turkey. Servia should cede to Bulgaria the section of Macedonia that she had won in the last Balkan war and offset the loss by the acquisition of Bosnia and the Herzegowina at the expense of Austria, while Bulgaria was to be made pliable and Rumania was to be chained to Russia.

In view of these circumstances Austria could no longer look on at the operations on the other side of the border without taking action. She presented her case to her ally Germany and the latter gave her an entirely free hand in her action against Servia, because a weakened and crushed Austria would make the position of the Germanic race in Central Europe untenable.



Servia was therefore asked by Austria to punish the parties guilty of the murder at Serajevo. The Austrian ultimatum demanded as a guarantee for the carrying out of the proceedings participation in the investigation on Servian territory and the definite dissolution of the various Pan-Servian societies carrying on an agitation against Austria-Hungary. Belgrade was willing to yield completely to its great neighbor but at noon time of the day on which the ultimatum was to end, a cipher telegram from St. Petersburg arrived, and the message of the Russian government to the Servian reversed the mood of the little kingdom. The bellicose Servian crown prince, standing in his automobile, drove jubilantly through the excited crowds on the streets, and a few hours later a refusal was sent to Vienna, which would mean nothing but war, for the Russian Empire was to back little Servia against its foes and Austria could not and would not back down. War was officially declared on the 28th of July. Germany, notably the emperor, devoted all their efforts to localize the war. Austria had given assurance on July 26 through her ambassador in St. Petersburg that she had no plans of conquest, but only wished to have peace at last on her frontiers. Russia replied that in case the Austrian army were to cross the Servian boundary the military districts facing Austria would be mobilized. England's premier, Sir Edward Grey, suggested that the differences between Austria-Hungary and Servia be laid before a conference of the ambassadors of Germany, France and Italy with himself presiding over the sessions. To this suggestion Germany replied that while they approved Sir Edward Grey's tender, they could not take part in such a conference because they could not call upon Austria to appear before a European court in her controversy with Servia, since that was purely an Austro-Hungarian affair unless the conference should also include the relations between Austria and Russia. By that time hostilities had begun. Russia had mobilized her troops on the German frontier as well as on the Austrian and on July 27 the first reports of preparatory measures by France arrived.



Nevertheless Germany continued her efforts for mediation together with England. As late as the 30th of July Germany transmitted an English proposal to Vienna, which established this basis of negotiation, that Austria after succeeding in marching into Servia should dictate her terms there. But Russia, not accepting this basis of negotiation, ordered a general mobilization, after the Czar's government had given its solemn pledge of honor that no such measures were taken. Russia was bent on war, and Germany followed suit in ordering her mobilization.

The fact that the German emperor was calmly sojourning in Norway and the government officials, including the German ambassador to the United States, were on their vacation, together with the printed documents which prove the sincere effort of Germany to maintain peace, demonstrate conclusively, on the one hand, that Germany did not want war and, on the other, that she could not prevent Russia from entering upon it. The surety for peace was in Russia's hands *but Russia was bound to wage war.*

There is further evidence of Germany's honest conduct in the recent Russian *Orange Book*, an analysis of which appeared in the London *Economist* of September, 12, and is all the more curious coming as it does from an organ of Russia's ally. I quote from it as follows:

"The reason of the Russian mobilization is somewhat surprising. According to the *Orange Book*, the general mobilization orders were signed in Austria on July 28, whereas according to Baron de Bunsen, our Ambassador in Vienna (*White Paper*, 127), general mobilization was ordered in Austria on August 1. Since the necessity of the Russian mobilization was based on the Austrian mobilization, and since the general Russian mobilization was the direct cause of the German mobilization—which made war inevitable—it would seem to be important that this point should be cleared up. A further telegram in the *Orange Book*, from Berlin, describing the issue of German mobilization orders some time before it actu-



ally took place, suggests that the Russian envoys were occasionally mistaken in their information."

That Germany wanted this war is so generally accepted that it is interesting to read what the Belgian Charge d' Affaires at St. Petersburg, M. de L'Escalle, wrote to his government at Brussels July 30 in an exhaustive report on conditions in the Russian capital, in part as follows:

"The days of yesterday and today have been spent in the waiting for events that must follow the declaration of war by Austria-Hungary on Servia. *What is incontestible is that Germany has striven here, as well as at Vienna, to find some means of avoiding a general conflict.*"

"This morning an official communication to the newspapers announces that the reserves have been called under arms in a certain number of governments. Knowing the discreet nature of the official communication, one can, without fear, assert that mobilization is going on everywhere."

"England began by allowing it to be understood that she did not want to be drawn into a conflict. Sir George Buchanan (British ambassador) said that openly; today one is firmly convinced at St. Petersburg—one has even the assurance of it—that England will support France. This support is of enormous weight, and has contributed not a little to give the upper hand to the war party."

#### RUSSIA AND GERMANY.

The question arises, *why should Russia want war with Germany?* We come now to the remote causes of the war. Germans and Russians had fought side by side on many a battlefield, since Frederick the Great had made peace with Czar Peter III, his friend and admirer, in the treaty of St. Petersburg in 1762. For over one hundred years the most amicable relations had existed between Russia and Prussia, and when Prince Bismarck became the leader in German politics it was his chief aim to maintain these friendly relations at any cost. After the Franco-German war the situation changed.



A united Germany was not to Russia's advantage and France put forth all her efforts to undermine these former relations and to persuade the Czar's government into a Franco-Russian alliance. Prince Bismarck skillfully utilized the policy of personal sympathy, entertained by Alexander II out of gratitude to the service which Frederick William III and IV of Prussia had rendered to Russia, not only to strengthen the friendship between the Czar's government and Germany but also to reconcile the two estranged powers of Russia and Austria, and to bring about the alliance of the three emperors of Russia, Germany and Austria. However, his keen insight into international affairs did not deceive him for a moment in the belief that the irreconcilable antagonism between Austria and Russia would never be settled without conflict, especially when the conditions in the Balkan Peninsula became untenable in 1872. It was this antagonism in the Orient which finally led to the dissolution of the triple alliance. The Russian prime minister, Prince Gortschakow, declared at a peace conference held in Berlin in 1875 when war between Germany and France was again "in sight" that the interests of Russia forbade a further decrease of French influence and power in Europe. Russia was, indeed, not yet ready to enter upon an alliance with France, but such an alliance was possible, if France should make further progress in its rapid recovery from the disaster of 1870. In order to avert this danger Bismarck opened the Pandora box of the Oriental question the crux of which was and always had been Russia's desire for the possession of Constantinople and an outlet to the Mediterranean. Prince Gortschakow clearly foresaw that if he would directly attack Turkey he would arouse the antagonism of all Europe; he therefore aimed on the one hand at the extension of Russia's rule in Asia, in order to threaten Turkey from that direction, and on the other hand at undermining the Sultan's influence in Europe with the aid of Russian money and the diplomatic shrewdness of Ignatiev, the Russian minister of foreign affairs. In order to prevent England from



helping the Sublime Porte pressure was to be brought to bear upon Afghanistan and Persia which would tie Great Britain's hands. The German Chancellor looked on with apparent indifference. He wrote in 1875, when Emperor Francis Joseph of Austria had made a slavophil speech in Dalmatia and thereby encouraged the insurrection of the Balkan states against Turkey: "Mighty Germany has great tasks above all to keep peace in Europe. This is my chief consideration even in the Oriental crisis. I do not intend to interfere if there is any way to avoid it, for such an interference might cause an European conflagration, especially if the interests of Austria and Russia should clash in the Balkans. If I should take the side of one of these powers France would immediately join with the other and an European war would break out. I am trying to hold two mighty beasts by their collars, in order that they may not tear each other to pieces, and in order that they may not combine against Germany."

The upshot of the Balkan insurrection was finally the Russian declaration of war against Turkey in 1877, in which the military inefficiency and fearful corruption of the Russian government was lamentably exposed. The defeat at Plewna, which without the help of Rumania would have led to the complete annihilation of the Russian army, showed to the world the weakness of the northern colossus. Austria was too generous to utilize its opponent's downfall in her own interests and when the final fall of Plewna reversed the fortunes of Russia the arrogance of the latter knew no bounds scorning every possible interference. However, the peace treaty dictated by Russia at San Stefano in 1878 which reduced Turkey to a minimum of its European possessions, was annulled again by England and almost led to war between the latter and Russia. Through the mediation of Germany at the Berlin congress of 1878 peace was finally established. Montenegro, Servia and Rumania became entirely independent, while Bulgaria and eastern Rumelia became vassal states under Christian governors and Bosnia and the Herzegowina



were placed under Austria's permanent sovereign administration. The German Chancellor had clearly recognized that if Europe would allow Russia to dictate terms of peace in Constantinople, it would become the mistress of the Orient and the establishment of Slavic principalities under Russia's protectorate would inevitably lead on the one hand to the disintegration of the related nationalities of the Austrian monarchy and on the other to such an increase of Russia's power that France would seek an alliance with her at the first opportunity. The Russian National party felt a keen disappointment and chagrin when the treaty of San Stefano was declared null and void and Gortschakow was bitterly denounced for having robbed his country of the fruits of their victory. The Russian Premier put the blame on Bismarck, who had frankly told the Czar that, if Russia would not yield, she would have to face the whole European coalition, in a new and terrible war. But Russia's wrath against the "honest broker" of Germany knew no bounds, and the triple alliance between the three emperors had reached its sad ending.

From that time on the relations between Germany and Russia have become less and less cordial. At the same time a new friendship sprang up between Austria and Germany which culminated in the Austro-German defensive alliance, perhaps the most decisive factor in European politics. Ever since then Russia's policy has been to establish cordial relations with all slavic states and elements and to form a great pan-slavic alliance under Russia's protectorate. On the other hand Austria and Germany have persistently striven to uphold the German interests in the east as the only bulwark against the Slavic invasion of western Europe. The result of these two antagonizing tendencies was to drive Russia first into an alliance with France and finally into an understanding with England. Her modern watchword is "the road to Constantinople leads through Berlin"; because Russia cannot conquer Austria unless she conquers Germany. For years this war has been planned. In 1912 when the Balkan con-



flict began the Russian aggression was expected and Germany and Austria made preparations to meet it. Galicia resembled a military camp and in Silesia and West Prussia the bridges were being guarded and castles and schoolhouses selected for hospitals. In the East Prussian forts the guards reported Russian searchlights, but Russia was not yet ready, the mobilization of the army which was without heavy artillery and strategic railroads would have taken too long and France had no reliable powder. France promised the money and railroads were projected, the war was prophesied for 1916, first against Austria, from whom Russia expected to take Galicia. But the relations became more and more strained, especially when Austria strove to reconcile the Ruthenians and Germany allowed its officers to enter Turkish service as military instructors. The newspapers and the war party did their utmost to hasten the rupture, and the assassination of Francis Ferdinand and the Austrian ultimatum furnished a convenient pretext. Grand Duke Nikolajevitch, Savonow and Iswolsky are the trio that started the ball rolling.

#### FRANCE AND GERMANY.

The strained relations between France and Germany date back to the time of Louis XIV, more specifically to the year 1680 and the following decade, when the sun king decreed that all the lands which once had been under Frankish rule must again be incorporated into France. Alsace and Lorraine were invaded and occupied. 50,000 French troops under Montclas and his still more devilish general Melac entered the Palatinate and devastated 25 of the most flourishing German cities, among them Trier, Worms, Speyer, Mannheim, Heidelberg, etc.; in fact they reduced all habitations along the Rhine, more than 1,200, to ashes. The ruins of the beautiful castle of Heidelberg are still witnesses of the horrible deeds of Louis XIV's soldiers. Colmar, Schlettstadt, Strassburg and other independent Alsatian cities were transformed into French dependencies; the Protestant cathedrals were turned over to the



Catholic bishop and all people who would not become Catholics had to flee—and all this just at a time when the wounds of the thirty years war had hardly begun to heal. Thousands upon thousands of homeless sufferers turned to Holland and by way of England to America—they are now known as the German Pilgrim fathers, the founders of America's agricultural empire. In the century-long struggle for German unity Alsace and Lorraine formed again and again the pivot of controversy. After the wars of the Spanish succession, when the German empire under Francis II, after fighting for England at Blendheim and Malplaquet, were deprived by her of the rightful claims to the French borderlands and again in 1815 at the close of the Napoleonic wars, when England again interfered for selfish reasons, until the new German states in 1870–71 saw their agelong dream of a united Germany realized and Alsace and Lorraine were returned to the rightful owners. In those days the best Americans rejoiced in Germany's victory over France and Professor Cramb, late of Oxford University, says in his much-talked-of book on *Germany and England*, published a year ago: “*No war in history was ever more just than the war which Bismarck and Moltke waged against France.*” Yet today our newspapers are full of all sorts of fairy stories about Bismarck having forced the war upon France, and that France had a perfect right to retake her lost provinces. Those who knew Alsace and Lorraine before 1870 and have seen it in these later years unanimously acknowledge that these two provinces have been completely transformed under German rule. The poor village of Strassburg has become a beautiful city with magnificent streets, parks and buildings and what is true of Strassburg is true of the whole of Alsace. And the people who were looked down upon by the Parisians and treated as the Yankees used to treat the “Pennsylvania Dutch” are today among the most loyal patriots of Germany. Over 150,000 young Alsacians and Lothringians volunteered their services in behalf of the German cause during the first week after the outbreak of the present war. Does



that show any support of the French claim or endorsement of our critics? These critics go further and say that we stole the Danish provinces in 1864, when as a matter of historical fact, Schleswig and Holstein which had been independent duchies whose reigning house had died out, rebelled against Danish aggression and demanded to be retained by the North-German Confederacy. Is American judgment actually so fickle as to believe all such nursery stories?

As Bismarck had foretold that it would take at least 50 years of armed peace to hold Alsace and Lorraine and even then only another war still more disastrous for France would make those provinces integral parts of Germany, so it has happened.

It is interesting to note the correctness of another prophecy found in the correspondence of two of the most brilliant minds of the times, viz., David Friedrich Strauss and Ernest Renan. The former wrote to the latter shortly after the first German victories on French soil: "We considered the war against France, as the result of the events of the year 1866, as unavoidable. We did not want the war, but we knew the French people sufficiently to know that they would want it. For the same reason was the seven years war the result of the two Silesian wars. Frederick the Great did not want the war; but he knew that Maria Theresa would want it and would not rest until she had found allies for it. No ruler nor people renounce so easily their traditional supremacy. France has been accustomed since the days of Richelieu and Louis XIV to play the first rôle among European nations and through the first Napoleon they were confirmed in their belief. The first condition for the maintenance of this supremacy was the weakness of Germany which was divided while France was united, disrupted by dissensions while France was harmonious, heavy and slow in its movements while France was quick and agile. But every nation has its time, and if it is worthy, not only once. Germany produced thinkers and poets which were more than the equals of the French classicists of the seventeenth



and eighteenth centuries. Germany had assumed the intellectual leadership in Europe while France still continued although latterly only in conflict with England to lead politically. Each age trains its own men, provided that the younger generations always furnish the right type of personalities to displace the older at the right time and the right place. Bismarck was such a man of such caliber and his position in the Frankfurt parliament the right place to look into the innermost source of the German misery. France had allowed the events of 1866, hoping to gain from the inner dissensions of the neighboring German states; when she was herself deceived in her calculations, she could not hide her chagrin.

France has changed her constitution three times since the fall of the first Napoleon. Germany never dreamed of interfering; she always respected the rights of her neighbor to construct the interior of her house according to her needs and comforts, or her moods. Have we done anything more since 1866 in Germany? We demolished some of the partitions in our hitherto notoriously uninhabitable dwelling, we removed some of the joists and built new walls; has all that brought any damage to our neighbor's house? Did it threaten to deprive her of light and air? Did it expose her to the dangers of a conflagration? Nothing of the kind. This neighbor wanted to have the most beautiful and the highest house in the whole street; especially ours was not to be any too substantial; we were not allowed to lock it and the neighbor was to have the privilege, as she had done formerly, to occupy some of its rooms whenever she saw fit. France is not willing to surrender her European primacy. We Germans have learned in the hard school of misfortune and disgrace, in which largely your countrymen were our harsh schoolmasters and disciplinarians, to recognize our fundamental national defects; our dreaminess, our slowness and above all our inner dissensions, as what they really are, viz., impediments to our national prosperity. We have, therefore, endeavored to get control over ourselves, we have fought against these defects and have tried



to get rid of them one by one. On the contrary the French national defects have been nursed and developed by a number of French rulers, centuries of success have inflated them and misfortune has never diminished them. The desire for glory and glitter, the tendency to gain it not so much by quiet, persistent labor from within, as through loud-mouthed, adventurous undertakings against the outer world, the arrogant claim to stand at the head of nations, and the eagerness to boss and exploit them; these defects which are specifically Gallic just as the above-named are German, have been nursed by Louis XIV, by the first and now by, it is to be hoped, the last Napoleon, in a manner which has profoundly injured the national character. The success, for which we struggle, is nothing more nor less than the equality among European nations, the assurance that henceforth no longer any restless neighbor shall disturb us, whenever she sees fit, in our labors of peace, nor deprive us of the fruits of our industry. For this we must have security."

Of Renan's answer which followed after Napoleon's capture I shall give some of the salient sentences: "The great misfortune in the world is that France does not understand Germany and Germany does not understand France and this mutual misunderstanding will now become still worse. In 1866 we—I speak in the name of a small group of truly liberal men—sincerely rejoiced, that Germany began to establish herself as a first-class power—Emperor Napoleon III learned of Bismarck's plans in 1865 and agreed to them. He honestly hoped Germany's unification would take place in friendly co-operation with France. . . . The victory of Königgrätz came, and nothing was agreed upon. The emperor whose vision had been dimmed by the boastful talk of the war party and the reproach of the opposition, allowed himself to be persuaded that this event, which he had wanted and brought about and which he ought to have considered a victory, was a defeat for him. . . . But Prussia owed our emperor and France gratitude and sympathy and should not have been so severe in the



Luxemburg affair . . . it would have moderated public opinion which in a land with universal suffrage is necessary. . . . The war which is being waged at the present moment was not unavoidable. France did not want it. Such things must not be judged by newspaper phraseology or Boulevard shouting. France at the bottom of her heart loves peace; she desires to occupy herself with the exploitation of the immense sources of her wealth, wants to find an answer to the questions of her democratic and social future. The weakness of our constitutional institutions, the sinister counsel, which glory-mad officers, ignorant and vain diplomats gave the emperor; here you have the real causes of the war, and the only ones. Two opinions are now heard in France: 'Let us finish this disagreeable business as soon as possible. Let us yield to everything that is asked for, cede Alsace and Lorraine; sign any peace compact; but then, implacable hatred, unceasing armament, alliance with anybody who wants it; unconditional granting of all Russian wishes; our only aim and the only moving force of our national life: the war of annihilation against the Germanic.' Thus one party talks. The other says: 'We must save France's integrity, improve our constitution, lay aside our weaknesses, and instead of dreaming about revenge for a war which was started by us as the unjust aggressors, let us enter upon an alliance with Germany and England, which will lead humanity to the high goal of moral freedom.' Which of these two policies will gain the upper hand depends upon Germany—the strongest security for peace you will have if Europe should forbid the change of the present boundaries of France. Any other solution will end in the never ceasing desire for revenge."

On the 2d of October, Strauss answered: "We count upon the victor's spoils and do not believe that we can reconcile France by lenient treatment. A nation that wanted satisfaction for Sadowa, the defeat of a people foreign to her, will cry ten times louder for revenge for Wörth and Metz, for Sedan and Paris, even though we had done them no other harm than that of having defeated them so often."



Renan's final reply after the peace of Frankfurt was: "The action of the Prussian statesmen has had this effect, that France sees only one aim before her: the reconquest of the lost provinces. *Our position compels us to inflame the hatred of the Slavs against the Germans, to flatter panslavism and to serve without fail Russia's ambition.*"

When Bismarck saw Louis Napoleon for the last time before the great war, a marshall of France said at the table to the Prussian: "One day we shall cross bayonettes. The French rooster cannot tolerate that another rooster shall crow louder than he. Your rooster has crowed too loud at Sadowa." Here lies the gist of the whole matter. In spite of the infusions of German and Roman blood the French have remained Gauls and when France's nobility fell under the guillotine and the masses began to rule, the Gallic character ascended the French throne, a character which has not changed since the days of Julius Caesar. In spite of Germany's relentless efforts to reconcile France the echo of Renan's words has reverberated again and again through speeches and newspapers. France had a chance to grow into a great world power and become the strong member of a continental alliance against British arrogance if she had accepted the decision of the God of War. But the Gallic spirit could not do that.

In March, 1907, at a dinner given in honor of Colonel Goepp of the 26th French infantry, just retired, the guest of the evening said: "You see me sad because I must retire after 35 years of service without having participated in the war of revenge, which was expected every day. Two years ago the great hour seemed to have come. But my old dream failed again of realization. *The war must come.* Now I can only count on the younger generation of France's brave youth. The 26th regiment will show the Germans that our regiment is equal to the task." General Bailloud, the commander of this corps, had answered: "The colonel has reminded us that war was immanent in 1905. That is correct. The same cause or a new pretext will perhaps soon force us to fulfill this patriotic



duty. War will come. And I have the confidence that your regiment, Colonel, will do its share in returning to France the lost provinces and to you, your home." This happened at Nancy in the officers' mess. The speeches were repeated in the newspapers and brought before the French parliament. The Secretary of War called the general to account but received him with open arms and the president of the French cabinet declared openly: "I share the feelings of the General and have told him so openly, but only parliaments have a right to declare war against a certain country for certain purposes." Germany paid no attention to the agitation; and Emperor William was called "L'empereur pacifiste et timide."

But the agitation continued in newspapers and schoolbooks, jingo meetings, etc. The climax was furnished by the book *On Our Next War*, published three years ago by Monstrat, general-in-chief of the Army of Chalons, in which he outlines the march of the French troops along the Belgian frontier and declares without the least compunctions or even reference to neutrality relations that the decisive battle must be fought on the old field of Waterloo. A great deal of harsh criticism is heard in England, France and America about German militarism as embodied in General von Bernhardi's book on *Germany and the Next War*, but not a word about French militarism as exhibited in Monstrat's book or of English militarism paraded in Homer Lea's diatribes.

No one in his sane mind will doubt for a moment that France's one idea has been for years revenge for 1870, the reconquest of Alsace and Lorraine. Therefore, when Russia had been assured of England's help to France the latter rejoiced in the opportunity of the hour. On July 27, the first reports of preparatory measures by France arrived in Germany. The 14th corps discontinued its maneuvers and returned to garrison duty. In reply to the German request whether France would remain neutral in case of war with Russia, France replied that she would do what her interests seemed to warrant. A few hours later, at 5 P.M. in the afternoon, the complete mobilization of



the entire French army and navy was ordered. The hour of revenge had come.

#### GERMANY AND ENGLAND.

When I turn to England's relation to Germany I can hardly refrain from becoming irritated, for the more I do look into the matter the more I am convinced that the chief culprit in this great disaster is England. To justify her unparalleled attack on Germany England has resurrected Treitschke and Bernhardi. Professor Cramb gives us in his above-mentioned book some glimpses into the causes for the attitude of the Berlin professor and the Prussian general which do not redound to England's credit. Speaking of Treitschke's antagonism to England he says: "And not without justice he delineates English policy throughout the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries as aimed consistently at the repression of Prussia as soon as English politicians discovered the true nature of that state and divined the great future reserved for it by destiny. Had not England been Prussia's treacherous but timid enemy in 1864 and 1866 and again in 1870-71? That which Treitschke hates in England is her pretentiousness, her overbearing middle class self-satisfaction as expressed in her national hymn, "Rule Britannia":

"The nations not so blessed as thee  
Must in their turn to tyrants fall  
Whilst thou shalt flourish great and free  
The dread and envy of them all."

One hundred and sixty years have passed since Frederick the Great—it was the day of Hastings and later the day of Wellington's death—wrote to Duke Karl of Brunswick: "These people (the British king) want me to betray France and be satisfied with the glory of having saved their Hannoverian lands, which does not concern me at all; they either want to make a fool of me or they are fools themselves and of a ridiculous arrogance." He had looked into the archives, which were afterwards the chief historic sources of Ranke, Droysen and Treitschke, and knew full well what had happened in



his century. Why was Alsace not returned to Germany by the peace of Rastatt in 1714? Because England did not want it, because Queen Ann, King George and Lord Stanhope were satisfied with the Utrecht concessions which gave them the Hudson Bay, New Foundland and Nova Scotia; they did not expect Louis XIV, who had been so obliging to them, to surrender also Strassburg, just to please their poor German cousin, although they had pledged their royal word of honor that this should be done. Ever since electors of Hannover occupied the English throne the special antipathy against Prussia had become more and more pronounced, not only after the second George, after the war of the Austrian succession, but every time when a Prussian king was unwilling to use his power in their behalf against France or Russia. At first Germany was to be humiliated (Ranke has proved it for the thirty years war), now Prussia was to be weakened. For this reason Louis XIV was protected by Wellington's grenadiers on his way to the Tuilleries, and Alsace and Lorraine were not returned to Germany although this was agreed upon by the three monarchs before the second French Restoration. England did not want to impose that sacrifice upon the king of her choice because such disaster would make the position of the Bourbons impossible. The idea that Prussia might control the important commercial city of Leipzig was so intolerable to Lord Castlereagh, that he peremptorily refused to listen to Hardenberg's proposition to entrust temporarily the administration of Saxony to Prussia. When Frederick William III of Prussia could not be persuaded to break with Czar Alexander, France and Austria were entreated and urged to form an alliance against Prussia and English money and soldiers were promised. The same Castlereagh had shortly before advocated an Austro-Prussian alliance against France and had written in the days of the Vienna congress to Chancellor Hardenberg that justice required that Saxony, "the chief tool for the disintegration of Prussia," should be assigned to the crown of Prussia. It is even asserted that without England's duplicity or directly



hostile policy the wars of 1866 and 1870 would not have been fought. The treaty of the third of January, 1815, which fostered old aspirations of Austria, France and the German central states and created the secretly continuing "entente cordiale" of the Western Powers, was not a transient event. "According to the purpose of its real author Talleyrand," says Treitschke, "the treaty (Talleyrand, Metternich and Castlereagh had signed it) was undoubtedly made for the express purpose to crush with superior forces exhausted Prussia and to deprive her of her newly acquired position as a great power." That was 1815. Four decades later, Lord Palmerston said, England would and must see to it that Denmark retain the duchies of Schleswig and Holstein. In January, 1864, John Russell, Palmerston's successor in the Foreign Office, tried his best to draw France, Russia and Sweden into a coalition for the protection of Denmark. Louis Napoleon refused and England lost courage, but in the month of May in the same year the House of Lords cheered Lord Grey's absolutely untrue statement that the Danish fleet had destroyed the Austrian fleet at Heligoland. The combinations changed, but the distrust of Prussia and Germany remained. And yet Frederick William IV constantly wooed for England's friendship. But the fatherland remained the chief object of ridicule at Victoria's court; it was the land of beer-drinkers and uncouth sour-kraut eaters, and the German mercenary soldiers in the English army were called in the House of Commons a pack of degenerate loafers. In the war of 1870 England preserved indeed the appearance of neutrality but secretly she favored France. Whatever Crown Prince Frederick, Victoria's son-in-law, in his easy-going way wrote to British royalty or discussed with British war correspondents concerning German war plans was immediately communicated to Paris or to the French headquarters. And Lothar Bucher mentions a case in which England broke the international law in order to please France. "A German merchant marine had been captured by a French warship near Beechy Head, *i. e.*, within the



three-mile limit from land. But no one ever heard that the reclamations of the German government ever had the slightest effect; in fact the English government never demanded from the French the surrender of the prize. The Whigs then ruled the British Empire. But Lord Granville had made it known that D'Israeli planned an anti-German alliance with Russia. Nor must it be forgotten that Germany's colonial enterprises had to suffer from England in the very start, how she constantly supported the revolts of the Hereros and the Hottentots, England who boasts so proudly of the burden of the white man and his right to rule. Hendrik Witbooi, the Herero leader in the revolts against the Germans, knows how much he owes to the good graces of England. "Politics are not governed by sentimentality," said Lord Palmerston, and Germany never had any reason to be thankful to Great Britain for any such sentimentality as friendship, but a hundred reasons to fear her with the fear of a man who knows no trembling. England is tremendously strong, the greatest empire known to history, and her people are not the shopkeeper souls and sporting dudes as which they are often described. She was first in all the finer arts of modern civilization and naturally looked with disdain upon the cramped conditions of poor Prussia and her once provincial inhabitants. But those days are passed. To-day owing to the initiative of Emperor William Germany has outstripped old England in all spheres of civilization and culture, in literature, in music, painting and sculpture, in trade and industry. Her universities and technical high schools are more thorough, her railroads and steamboats are more reliable and equipped with greater comfort; bridge builders, hydraulic engineers, and chemists can learn a great deal more in Germany than in England and above all German manufacture and commerce has long ago outstripped the British rivals. Without the highly organized credit system of the German Banks this enormous progress would have been impossible. England called this system provincial and continental, but to this day she is still without a single industrial



bank. In 1880 the German export amounted to nearly three billions marks, the import was slightly less. In 1907 the export had risen to over nine and one-half billions marks, the import to nearly seven and one-half billions. While the entire trade of England increased from 1890 to 1907 from fifteen to twenty-three billions that of Germany rose from eight to seventeen billions. While the entire British trade still exceeds that of France by 100 per cent. and that of the United States of 70 per cent. it exceeds that of Germany only by 40 per cent. It was this rapid advance of Germany which turned the former English condescension and ridicule into alarm and fear. Germany must be curbed. Edward VII, the shrewdest politician since Bismarck, resolved to paralyze his nephew's realm by diplomatic means. He travelled from one European capitol to the other and by skilful manipulation of the various aspirations of the European states succeeded in isolating Germany, politically at least. The result was the Triple Entente. The age-old policy of England to control the balance of power on the continent was revived while the mistress of the Sea sought to complete her schemes of world empire. Germany needed constantly new markets for her goods, she contrived the brilliant plan of building a railroad into Asia, the Bagdad railroad, which would open up western Asia for German trade. England grew frantic, because her own private plans seemed to be in danger of failure. She had occupied Egypt in 1882; this act placed the keystone in the great arch of the British empire which encircled the Indian Ocean. But as a strategic position it is very vulnerable in as much as it can be attacked from Asia Minor and Syria by land, therefore her fear of the Bagdad railroad. She therefore contrived a scheme by which Arabia and the land of the ancient Euphrates and Tigris should be incorporated into her Indian Empire and the great English hydraulic engineer, Wilcox, submitted a plan of canalization for these ancient lands in order to furnish protection for Egypt and a continuous land route from the Nile to the Indus. A railroad from Cairo to Calcutta was to crown this gigantic



undertaking. Parallel with this Asiatic project went another, which aimed at a continuous connection between Cairo and the Cape. The impediment to the former was the Arabian Irák, to the latter German East Africa. Great Britain therefore determined to crush Germany. Formerly her weapons took the form of ridicule, when we find Lord Palmerston writing in 1861 of the Germans: "They may sail with the clouds or build air castles, but they never had the genius to cross the ocean or even to sail on small rivers."

Winston Churchill in a speech of February 9, 1912, in Glasgow, speaking of English and German fleets, assumed quite a different attitude:

"Between the English sea power and the sea power of our friend the German empire there is this difference, that the fleet is for us a necessity while from many points of view it is only a luxury for the Germans. If our supremacy on the sea would be endangered all the possessions of our race and our land, all the wealth accumulated through centuries of labor and sacrifice would perish and be swept away. Our government is determined to maintain the supremacy on the sea which it possesses."

More than 250 years before that time Lord Albemarle, Cromwell's admiral, said when a reason was to be found for a renewed attack on their commercial rival the Hollanders: "Any reason will do. What we need is a portion more of the commerce which Holland has now." The same policy has been used against France as is apparent from the letter of Charles II to Louis XIV and later from a statement of Pitt when he said: "It is a pity that France has been allowed to retain the power of rebuilding its fleet." But most clearly is England's position stated in an editorial of the *London Saturday Review* of September, 1897, where we read:

"England with her long history of successful aggression, with her marvelous conviction that in pursuing her own interests she is spreading light among nations dwelling in darkness, and Germany, bone of the same bone, blood of the same



blood, with a lesser will force, but, perhaps, with a keener intelligence, compete in every corner of the globe. In the Transvaal, at the Cape, in Central Africa, in India and the East, on the islands of the Southern Sea and the far northwest, wherever (and where has it not?) the flag has followed the bible and trade has followed the flag, there the English bagman is struggling with the German peddler. Is there a mine to exploit, a railway to build, a nation to convert from bread fruit to tinned meat, from temperance to trade gin, the German and Englishman are struggling to be first. A million petty disputes build up the greatest cause for war the world has ever seen. If Germany were extinguished tomorrow the day after tomorrow there is not an Englishman in the world who would not be the richer. Nations have fought for years over a city or a right of succession, must they not fight for 200 million of commerce?"

"What Bismarck realized and what we, too, may come to see is that not only is there the most real conflict of interests between England and Germany, but that England is the only great power who would fight Germany without tremendous risk and without doubt of the issue. Her partners in the Triple Alliance would be useless against England; Austria because she could do nothing; Italy because she dare not lay herself open to attack by France. The growth of Germany's fleet has done no more than to make the blow of England fall on her more heavily. A few days and their ships would be at the bottom or in convoy to English ports; Hamburg and Bremen, the Kiel Canal and the Baltic ports would be under the guns of England, waiting until the indemnity were settled. Our work over we need not even be at the pains to alter Bismarck's word to Ferry, and to say to France and Russia: 'Seek some compensation; whatever you like, you can have it.'"

Therefore—"Germany must be destroyed."

Still more brutally frank was Sir Arthur Lee, the civil Lord of the Admiralty, who said in a public speech on February 3, 1905: "The pendulum of sea power in Europe is swinging



away from the center, we must concentrate our attention no longer on the Mediterranean but—with caution if not with fear—on the North Sea. If unfortunately it should come to a war the English fleet could then, properly stationed, deal the first blow, before the other party will have time to read in the newspapers that war has been declared.”

In the fall of 1904 when the Russian fleet on its way to eastern Asia had the unfortunate encounter with the fishing boats at Hull, Germany was charged by England with having warned the Russians against a possible attack by Japanese torpedo boats in the North Sea and with having its warships in readiness to make hostile demonstrations against England. The official *Army and Navy Gazette* said: “It is unbearable that England should be forced through the existence of the German fleet to take precautionary measures which otherwise would not be necessary—we have once before exterminated a fleet of which we had reason to believe that it could be used to our detriment. We consider the existence of the German fleet as the only real danger against the maintenance of peace in Europe. May that be as it is, suffice it to point out that the present moment is especially favorable for our demand that this fleet shall not be further increased.”

In answer to this the *London Daily Chronicle* wrote:

“If the German fleet would have been destroyed in October, 1904, we would have had peace in Europe for 60 years. For this reason I consider the statements of Mr. Lee, provided they were made by order of the cabinet, a wise and peaceful declaration of the unchanging intentions of the mistress of the sea.”

But England solemnly declares that she would not have opened hostilities against Germany, if the latter had not violated the treaty of Belgian neutrality entered into by France, Belgium, England and Prussia in 1839. I only call your mind to the fact that at the beginning of the present hostilities a labor member of parliament, Mr. J. Ramsay MacDonald, rose in his place, able and fearless, and, on the basis of the *White Paper* published and put in the hands of the British



public, attacked Sir Edward Grey for having committed Great Britain in advance to both Russia and France, that in spite of the representations of the German ambassador, he dared not discuss the question of neutrality. He, with 37 other members of parliament belong to the anti-war party, like John Burns and Lord Morely, who resigned from cabinet rather than condone iniquity.

Mr. MacDonald said that in his opinion this talk about the violation of Belgian neutrality from the point of view of British statesmen is absurd, because as long ago as 1870 the plans for the use of Belgium both by France and by Germany—in other words the violation of its neutrality—were in the British war office and that Mr. Gladstone rose in his place and said he was not one of those whose opinion was that a formal guarantee should stand so far in thwarting the natural course of events as to commit Great Britain to war, and that has been the announced and avowed policy of Great Britain all the way down since 1870 and that therefore talk about the violation of Belgian neutrality is a mere pretext. That MacDonald was right is borne out by the diplomatic documents. The following quotations from the British *White Paper* speak for themselves:

“Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Goschen, London Foreign office, August 1, 1914.

“*Sir*: I told the German Ambassador today that the reply to the German government with regard to the neutrality of Belgium was a matter of very great regret, because the neutrality of Belgium affected feeling in this country.

“He asked me whether, if Germany gave a promise not to violate Belgium's neutrality, we would engage to remain neutral. I replied, that I could not say that; our hands were still free.

“The Ambassador pressed me, as to whether I could not formulate conditions on which we would remain neutral. *He even suggested that the integrity of France and her colonies might be guaranteed. I said that I felt obliged to refuse defi-*



*nitely any promise to remain neutral, and I could only say that we must keep our hands free."*

Since Great Britain insists that she went to war for the sake of neutrality of Belgium I submit another quotation from the British *White Paper* as follows:

"Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie. (Telegraphic.)

"London, Foreign Office, Aug. 2d, 1914.

"After the cabinet this morning I gave M. Cambon the following memorandum:

"I am authorized to give an assurance that, if the German fleet comes into the Channel or through the North Sea to undertake hostile operations against French coasts or shipping, the British fleet will give all the protection in its power. This assurance must not be taken as binding his Majesty's government to take any action until the above contingency of action by the German fleet takes place.

"M. Cambon asked me about the violation of Luxemburg. I told him the doctrine on that point. He asked me what we should say about the violation of the neutrality of Belgium. I said we *were considering whether we should declare violation of Belgium neutrality to be casus belli.*"

We learn from the quotation that England was still balancing the "opportunity" after having refused on August 1 to protect as suggested by Germany either Belgium or France, or even to state terms on which it would remain neutral. It is therefore clear that Great Britain went to war in accordance with her old tradition printed in an English pamphlet of 1694.

"It is of special interest to England to maintain the European balance for the purpose of holding the scale in its own hands and of being able to turn it to whatever side it desires. That is our only possible means of not only keeping intact the Empire of the seas, but of also enabling us to decide about the success of the war and about the conditions of peace."



## THE BELGIUM INVASION.

The invasion of Belgium by Germany has furnished to sensation-mongers and caricaturists alike a fruitful field for venting their spleen. The Germans have been called barbarians and Huns and Emperor William is constantly compared with Attila. Such an outbreak of madness in high places as we have witnessed in this country within the last five months the world has never known. It is therefore refreshing to find a few high-minded representative Americans who have kept their senses. Professor Burgess of Columbia University, one of the leading authorities on international law and a noted cavalry captain of Civil War fame, declares, in a published article, that from a strategic point of view it was not only necessary for Germany to invade Belgium but also to occupy it. Unwittingly the English Foreign Office endorses this action in an explanation of England's seizure of two Turkish government battleships, just built in Great Britain at the outbreak of the war, which opened as follows: "*In accordance with the recognized principle of the right and supreme duty to insure national safety in time of war, etc.*" I quote further from the British *White Paper* as follows: "Germany has consequently to disregard Belgian neutrality, it being for her *a question of life and death* to prevent French advance"

Anyone familiar with European political movements and conversant with the press of the various countries must acknowledge that the Belgian newspapers have been fully as loud in their denunciation of Germany as the French. Aside from the open declaration of the French general Monstrat that the next war with Germany must be fought on Belgian soil the German government knew the intentions of her opponents and the situation of Belgium which as a matter of fact owed to Germany her existence. It was Bismarck who saved Belgium from Louis Napoleon's greedy desire of conquest. The publication of the letters which passed between the French envoy Benedetti and the German Chancellor before the war of 1870 reveal the intentions of the French emperor in regard



to Belgium. He proposed to Bismarck that in lieu of his neutrality during the Austro-Prussian war of 1866 France should be granted the right to annex the little kingdom on the Scheldt while Prussia should find a compensation elsewhere. The iron chancellor refused to listen to any such proposition. Moreover it was Germany who patronized Maeterlinck and made Verhaeren known to the world while France had only a condescending smile of approval for their semi-French poets and dramatists. Only a little more than a year ago Verhaeren was received in Germany with open arms, they put his dramatic productions on the stage and Verhaeren declared that only the fatherland appreciated him to the fullest; he would return home and interpret the great Teuton Empire to his fellow countrymen who entertained only hatred for their greatest commercial customer. Today both Maeterlinck, who once called Germany the conscience of Europe, and Verhaeren, heap only the vilest calumniation upon their quondam benefactor. Aside from the declaration of the German government that absolutely unimpeachable information of the plans of the French general staff to attack Germany across Belgium and of their offer to the latter to compensate her for any and every damage done if they would allow the German army to march through that country documents have been found which conclusively prove that both England and France were in league with Belgium in case of war between France and Germany as the following statements found in the archives of Brussels conclusively prove:

#### EVIDENCES FROM BRUSSELS.

Important documents were discovered by the German military authorities in the archives of the Belgian General Staff at Brussels, documents found in a portfolio inscribed: "Intervention Anglais-Belgique." One of these documents is a report to the Belgian Minister of War, dated April 10, 1906, which gives the result of detailed negotiations between the Chief of the Belgian General Staff and the British Military Attaché at Brussels, Lieut. Col. Bernardistou.



This plan is of English origin and was sanctioned by Lieut. Col. Sir James M. Grierson, chief of the British General Staff. It sets forth the strength and formation, and designates landing places for an expeditionary force of 100,000 men. Continuing, it gives the details of a plan for the Belgian General Staff to transport, feed and find quarters for these men in Belgium, and provides for Belgian interpreters. The landing places designated are Dunkirk, Calais and Boulogne.

Lieut. Col. Bernardistou is quoted as having remarked that for the present Holland could not be relied upon.

Another confidential communication declares that the British government, after the destruction of the German navy, would send supplies and provisions by way of Antwerp.

There is also the suggestion from the English Military Attaché that a Belgian system of espionage should be organized in the Prussian Rhineland.

A second document is a map showing the strategical position of the French army and demonstrating the existence of a Franco-Belgian agreement, and a third is a report from Baron Greindl, the Belgian minister at Berlin, to the Belgian Foreign Office, dated December 23, 1911.

The discovery of these incriminating documents follows within six days of the denial made by the London official press bureau—not the Foreign Office—that England had stored ammunition at Maubeuge prior to the outbreak of the war. To this denial was added the statement, that “the determination to dispatch an expeditionary force to the Continent was not reached until Germany had violated the neutrality of Belgium, and Belgium had appealed for aid.”

All this proves conclusively—and the proofs are multiplying from day to day—that Belgium is herself responsible for her present appalling disaster that has befallen her. In coöperation with France and England she had first violated the neutrality compact of 1839. That the atrocities supposedly committed by the German army are pure inventions has been fully



demonstrated by the five American war correspondents who published their investigations first in the *Chicago Tribune*. Mr. James Bennett declared in a letter to that paper published on October 6, 1914: "I came to Germany anti-German. But London lies and German dignity and solidity have about brought me over to the German side. Certainly the Germans are getting a rotten deal from the rest of the world in the press reports of the war. I hope America will not be inflamed by those reports with the idea that it ought 'in the name of humanity' to mix up in the trouble." In a similar vein writes Mrs. Herbert Adams Gibbons, Paris war correspondent to the *Philadelphia Evening Telegram*, in a letter dated December 25, 1914.

In conclusion I repeat what Professor Burgess said in regard to the causes of this war. These are three: English jealousy, French desire for revenge and Russian Panslavism. And I may add, if England would not have assured both France and Russia of her help with men and means this world-wide disaster would not have occurred. Germany is fighting "a holy war of self defense," as every letter from the other side assures me. Her geographical position is such that she has been forced into the situation of an armed camp for over a century at least and the invasion of Belgium was merely a necessary phase in the struggle for her very existence. Under such conditions treaties indeed become mere scraps of paper and the breaking of pledges a necessity.

LANCASTER, PA.



### III.

## THE RATIONALISTIC ELEMENT IN AMERICAN LITERATURE PREVIOUS TO 1860.

CHARLES EDWARD MEYERS.

Rationalism may be defined as that method of criticizing religious thought in which the strict application of the rule of reason is held to be the criterion of truth. In this view, when one gives the matter just consideration, most philosophic interpreters of religion, whether they be the most zealous protagonists or the most radical antagonists of a given orthodoxy, are rationalists, only so in either case they adhere faithfully to their premises and proceed logically to their ultimate conclusions. Not all fastidious reasoning with respect to religious truth is to be imputed to those who are usually omitted from the honor-roll of the defenders of a faith. St. Paul and St. Augustine and Thomas Aquinas and Peter Anselm and John Calvin and Jonathan Edwards were no less insistent and subtle, and occasionally, perhaps, no less specious in their logic, and, therefore, according to this definition, no less rationalistic in applying the rule of reason in the elaboration of their theological systems, than were Arius and Gottfried Leibnitz and David Strauss and George Berkeley and John Locke and François Voltaire and Thomas Paine and Ernest Renan in theirs. In the exact meaning of the term they were all rationalistic in that they rigidly adhered, in the development of their thought systems, so far as they all had thought systems, to their elemental propositions.

In modern usage, however, dating from about the middle of the eighteenth century with the translation into German of Matthew Tindal's "Christianity as Old as the Creation" and the publication of Johann Semler's critical works and Im-



manuel Kant's philosophy, the term rationalism has a more limited meaning. Instead of signifying logical procedure from assumed fundamental stand-points and advancement from inference to inference to a complete thought-structure, it signifies the application of the rule of reason to those fundamental stand-points themselves. It regards premises also as legitimately amenable to verification in conscience, reason and understanding. It proceeds on the assumption that you can find truth on the end of a syllogism only in proportion as the component parts of the syllogism may find ratification in concrete, tangible evidence. Every proposition of religion shall find substantiation in knowledge more or less scientific. Eliminating as unworthy of acceptance, because, according to this criterion of judgment of truth, they are unsatisfactory to the demands of reason, the ideas of a non-evolutionary revelation, of a transcendence of nature in miracle, of tradition and secondary testimony, of direct inspiration, and every other sense of truth, if there is any, except that of intellectual conviction, faith to the rationalist is a matter of individual experience. In this sense rationalism is a distinct school of thought.

Without venturing a critique upon it as thus defined, since this is a bibliographical rather than a philosophic paper, it will be sufficient for our purpose to observe that, historically, rationalism is a by-product of Christianity. It manifests itself in the most ancient literature that essayed to set forth and interpret the life and teachings of Jesus. In the twenty-fifth verse of the twentieth chapter of the gospel by St. John is a portrait, very brief but very effective, of the first rationalist: "Except I shall see in His hands the print of the nails, and put my finger into the print of the nails, and thrust my hand into His side, I will not believe." From this earliest assertion of the rationalistic spirit down to the present time, rationalism has not failed of exponents; some, pre-eminently worthy and capable, and, like St. Thomas, actuated solely by the purest motives and most genuine sincerity, have proved themselves progressively constructive in bringing to light new truth;



others, due to their presumption and incapability, have been perniciously destructive in both purpose and effect. All in all it is a generally accepted fact that among those nations in whose civilizations Christianity has, at least up to the present, been the prevalent moulding force, rationalism has found abundant expression, much to the enhancement of the effectiveness of the Christian religion, and, with the exception of America alone, in whose case it is only partly true, remains a corporate and valued part of their literatures, because of both its content and its art.

In searching out the rationalistic element in American literature one is confronted at the outset with the very important general fact that it found expresison in a two-fold manner. The temptation is always present to relate every distinct literary and philosophic mode with antecedent conditions and endeavor to make it a natural sequence in an integral process of literary and intellectual evolution. From one point of view, the student of the subject is justified, in the particular instance of American rationalism, in succumbing to such a temptation, and asserting, as he will find apparently sufficient warrant to do, that, in the main, it was a natural manifestation and evinced itself as a perfectly normal issue, an inevitable reaction against the ultra-Calvinistic thought and life of Puritan New England. There is undoubtedly a very significant suggestion in the facts that Unitarianism, Transcendentalism and Christian Science should take their rise in Calvinistic New England, and that from a New England printing house the first American rationalistic publication, the work of a staunch New Englander, should be issued. But, on the other hand, what must be regarded as the most pronounced and radical instances of rationalism of any note that have yet appeared on this side of the Atlantic are difficult, if not impossible, of association with any prior movement and stand out pre-eminently as isolated expressions of individual personality and private opinion. It is under this category, at any rate, that the earliest rationalistic productions in American literature are to be placed.



These are the works of Ethan Allen and Thomas Paine. As pioneer American rationalists, like our own contemporary philistine, Elbert Hubbard, these two men stand alone, notwithstanding there were rationalists before and have been since they gave their treatises to the public. They are not lineally related to any movement that went before them, and only remotely and indirectly, if at all, to any rationalistic movement that has come after them. Although they are both intensely polemical at times and make more or less forceful thrusts at the established standards of religion, dogmatic and ethical, the reader cannot but feel that their recorded opposition is more the expression of constitutional pugnacity than sincere antagonism of an established order. Further than this, neither are they in their ideas nor their literary excellencies or defects related to one another. Allen never saw Paine's book, having died ten years before that publication appeared, and Paine more than likely never saw Allen's, owing to be destruction, with the exception of less than a score of volumes, of the entire edition. Most certainly, if we know the man aright, Allen was not acquainted with the latest European philosophic innovation, and although Paine was, the honor of being its recognized dispenser in America is conceded to others. As rationalists, Ethan Allen and Thomas Paine are entitled to consideration only as highly individualized characters; to which it is only just to add that, of the two, Paine was the more brilliant. For intellectual shrewdness of a certain kind he was among the most brilliant men of the revolutionary period. But both of them are none the less quite interesting.

From the pen of Ethan Allen there comes down to us a volume, or more correctly described, a collected series of pamphlets on a diversity of religious themes, under the title, "Reason the Only Oracle of Man, or a Compendious System of Natural Religion." This is but an abbreviated title of the work. Like most authors of the colonial period, Allen followed the custom of stating his theme at as much length as the space of the title page afforded, making it a single-sentence



epitome of the contents to follow. The book is very rare, and cherished among American bibliophiles as an especial treasure of no little monetary as well as historical value. It is accessible to the public at the University of Vermont, to whose librarian the writer is indebted for the copy that he was permitted to examine. It appeared in but a single edition, the greater portion of which was destroyed by the burning of the printing establishment from which it was issued.

In examining such external data as can be had on the "Oracle," the critical student is interested and considerably amused to find a colossal error in respect to it on the part of one of Allen's biographers. Two biographies of Allen are extant; one by Jared Sparks, himself holding a high place in the history of American literature as its earliest biographer of literary worth, is to be found in Volume I of the "Library of American Biography," New York, 1834; the other is that of Henry W. DePuy, "Ethan Allen and the Green Mountain Heroes of '76," New York, 1860. Referring to the publication of the "Oracle," DePuy says: "Previous to the admission of Vermont into the Union, Ethan Allen was actively engaged in the maintenance of the rights of the people he loved so well, and of the state which his exertions had been so greatly instrumental in founding. *After that event, he retired to private life, and in the intervals of relaxation from business, wrote a work entitled 'Reason the only Oracle of Man.'*" Now, Vermont was admitted to the Union, March 4, 1791; so that if Allen wrote his work subsequent to that date, its publication could not have been effected earlier than the latter part of 1791 or the beginning of 1792. DePuy seems to have forgotten that Ethan Allen died of apoplexy in 1789, and that, therefore, the composition of his work at any rate, if not the publication of it, must have a date prior to 1789. Jared Sparks is more reliable in his dates. Apparently, when he wrote about it, he had Allen's book before him, a supposition supported by quotation and paraphrase from Allen's preface. When Sparks fixes the publication of the "Oracle" at 1784, five years before



Allen's death, and states that the preface is dated July 2, 1782. we are assuredly more inclined to accept these dates than to accept those that bury the author first and have him write and publish his books afterward. Sparks is right; the volume is dated 1784 on the title page, 1782 in the preface. Of DePuy it is not uncomplimentary to say, if the error here is indicative of his general trustworthiness, that, after the manner of James Anthony Froude, he was scrupulous of his English, but careless of his facts.

More important than the date of Allen's work is the question of its motive. After all the motive of a book has much to do with its acceptability. Sparks says the work "was written for the purpose of subverting Christianity." DePuy reiterates Sparks's statement by saying that its "aim was to controvert the truths of revealed religion." To my mind both of these characterizations do Allen an injustice. That he did not believe in most of the dogmas of revealed religion, and particularly not in the dogmas of the kind of revealed religion represented in the austere Christianity of the Mathers and Jonathan Edwards, is undoubtedly correct; but when one peruses Allen's book, irrespective of such occasional outbursts as might seem to indicate an unwarranted spirit of intolerance, and notwithstanding that Allen's natural disposition was well fitted in two directions—his self-asserting but inoffensive egotism and his controversial spirit—to undertake to achieve the "subversion of Christianity," one feels, despite these facts, that such was not his conscious aim at all. Ethan Allen was in many respects a rare soul, one who could not shake off, even for convention's sake, the demands of his peculiar mentality. And quite contrary to any wish to undermine the basic principles of unencumbered Christianity, he advocates them in their simplicity, asserting again and again that their eternal truth had found convincing demonstration for him in the world about him and in conscience. Generous and noble on the one hand, he was martial and polemical on the other. All his life he was a fighter; and when he had no more opportunity to fight the



governor and courts of New York in an effort to maintain the rights of the New Hampshire grants, which later became the state of Vermont, and when he had no more opportunity to fight the British, and no more opportunity to fight the Continental Congress in his endeavor to have Vermont admitted to the Union, when there was nothing else left for him to fight but religion, it does seem, from one point of view, to have been an impossibility for him to settle down in peace. In justification of Sparks and DePuy, it does seem that Allen simply had to make an outlet, in some rationalistic composition, for his pugnacious spirit. But this is only half the truth. Thinking much about religion, because constitutionally he was of a religious turn of mind, as well as polemic, and jotting down his meditations at random, he wrote with the primary aim of formulating his own faith for his own satisfaction; and if, as he does at times, he appears critically antagonistic to the orthodoxy of his day, he does so with an obviously fine and gentlemanly spirit; the controversial feature of his work is only incidental, an unavoidable form of expression of his own credal tenets as they contrasted with those of others, such as one should expect to find in the writings of a life-long warrior, turned, in his latter years, and for his own instruction, investigator of religious truth. It is always a great detriment to the progress of knowledge and a violation of the privileges attendant upon the endowment of personality to anathematize those whose conceptions of truth differ from our own and charge them with the sinister motive of wanton destruction. Ethan Allen wanted to believe the best that Christianity contains, but he found great difficulty in believing it in the form in which it was served in his day; it conflicted with his reason. But the fact still remains that, although he could not accept it in that form, and although he makes frequent references to Christian sects, some even in the nature of chivalrous assaults on their faith, he is reasoning primarily with his own highly individualized self, not with any one else or any organization's dogmas. He is setting forth his own religion, the best he could think



out for himself after considering, pro and con, the reasonableness of that which was offered to him by others. To do your own thinking in proportion as God has given you intelligence, and to do it with piety, is not subverting Christianity. In respect to originality and the spirit of heroic initiative Allen's book is a splendid, though primitive example, one of the best examples in early American literature, of that kind of writing that grows out of what Crashaw calls "the subjective impulse," the incentive to write down the emotions and concepts that rise up within a man, he knows not how.

The content of the "Oracle" may be summed up in the general statement that it is an argument, with a decided homiletic tone, for the being of God and the immortality of man, for the idea that men are bound to each other and to God by the law of moral obligation, and that in proportion as man fulfills this law of obligation will he receive in the life after death either punishment or reward. The following two paragraphs will suffice for illustration.

"We should so far divest ourselves of the encumbrances of this world, which are too apt to engross our attention, as to acquire a consistent system of the knowledge of our duty, and make it our constant endeavor in life to act conformably to it. The knowledge of the being, perfections, creation, and providences of God and the immortality of our souls is the foundation of our religion.

"As true as mankind now exist and are endowed with reason and understanding, and have the power of agency and proficiency in moral good and evil, so true it is that they must be ultimately rewarded or punished according to their respective merits or demerits; and it is as true as this world exists, and rational and accountable beings inhabit it, that the distribution of justice therein is partial, unequal and uncertain; and it is consequently as true as that there is a God, that there must be a future state of existence, in which the disorder, injustice, oppression and viciousness, which are acted and transacted by man in this life, shall be righteously adjusted, and the delinquents suitably punished."



Surely the most orthodox Puritanism of Allen's day could not have found fault with the promulgation of such ideas. They are entitled to the approval of the most consistent evangelicalism. In fact they epitomize both the larger part of modern conservative theological standards and at least one contention of the newer theology—that of the inequality of opportunity among men to realize their spiritual potentialities—and its legitimate corollary of the “larger hope.” Indeed, all that the author says in these excerpts can be found in the New Testament.

In what, then, is the much censured rationalism of Ethan Allen? In a sentence, it is asserted to lie in his premises rather than in his conclusions, in his assumed source of religious truth instead of in his practical interpretation of it. Allen found the attributes of God, the duty of man and reward and punishment in the nature of things as interpreted by reason without the assistance of direct revelation. His assumption is that there is no necessity for direct revelation, and that none is to be recognized as valid except such as from time to time is made in the enlightening, evolutionary processes of common life experience, conscience, and intelligence. God reveals himself in nature and in human nature,—especially did He reveal himself in human nature as it came to perfection in Jesus, but in His case, as in universal human nature, it was a revelation harmoniously in keeping with the normal processes of natural law so far as we can recognize it, comprehend it and systematize it. The rationalism of Allen's relation lay in his insistence that it was to have no mystery in it, that it should be a natural religion as over against a supernatural in the matter of the revealing processes necessary to arrest the attention of men. It was to have nothing in it beyond the touch, taste and handle sphere; it was to be intelligibly demonstrable in all of its tenets.

Concerning the literary value of Allen's production the only thing that can be said is that there is not much to it. In the way of art he is in no sense to be classed with the long list of



other writers of English works similar to his own. While he is not crude, he certainly is not elegant. There is a certain ruggedness of style to his composition and a certain degree of simplicity and spontaneity, the result, no doubt, of rapid writing; but of the refinement of literary art there is nothing. Nevertheless, despite its literary defects, "*Reason the only Oracle of Faith*" deserves consideration in a complete history of American literature. It is a pioneer book, and though homely in its form of presentation, deserves recognition as a first hand and inoffensive statement, by an American writer, to a painfully straight-laced orthodoxy of not a few fundamental truths that were heresies in 1784 but are well nigh orthodox in 1915. Besides, not to be overlooked is its value as an historical document reflecting the personality of a character bright with heroic romance and always actuated by the spirit of truth and nobility.

The next American rationalist was Thomas Paine. Like Ethan Allen, Thomas Paine rationalistically stands alone, but in several points of difference stands in marked contrast to Allen. Paine spent the years of his maturer life in Europe, most of them in Paris, where, imbibing the generally rationalistic atmosphere prevalent on the continent and in England in the eighteenth century, he became to a certain extent both the product of that rationalistic movement and its popular medium, in a crude fashion, to post-revolutionary America. Moreover, whereas Allen wrote with reverence and with a sense of the dignity of the theme that he was treating, keeping in mind always as his audience the more stable, if humble, intelligence of a worthy middle class of readers, it is patent that, consciously or unconsciously, Paine wrote for the ribald rabble. It is undeniable, irrespective of whether he had a real grasp upon truth or not, that he bears many unmistakable ear-marks of the demagogue. To direct half-truth arguments to the passions of men under the guise of appealing to their reason never results in good literature either in form or substance.

The widely circulated rationalistic work of Paine was the



“Age of Reason, Being an Investigation of True and Fabulous Theology.” It was published April 8th, 1794, exactly a decade after the publication, at Bennington, of the work of Allen. Dedicated to his “fellow citizens of the United States of America,” he put the work under their protection, proclaiming its purpose in the statement that “the most formidable weapon against errors of every kind is reason.” It made no small furore and no mean impression at the time of its appearance, but looked at even in the utmost charity, it is impossible to avoid the conclusion that the author’s reputation for fine spirit and good sense would have been immeasurably augmented if he had let its publication be an unborn purpose.

The title of Paine’s book was admirably chosen. In Europe and also in America, to a wide extent, during the latter half of the eighteenth century, conditions were such, socially and religiously, as to bear out the characterization implied in the phrase, “Age of Reason.” Those conditions were coming with constantly increasing rapidity for the previous five hundred years. From that early day, until the wave of revivalism under Wesley, Whitfield and Edwards spread over England and America, the history of religious thought in Europe, like the history of Europe’s politics, with which it was so closely intertwined, is a tale of almost unintermittent conflict. By the middle of the eighteenth century there was such a universal stir of intellectual dissatisfaction as could result only in philosophical reaction and drive men to the most radical freedom of thought. Beginning with Hobbes, when he published the “Leviathan” in 1651, there appeared successively Berkeley, 1685–1753, Voltaire, 1694–1778, Hume, 1711–1776, and Gibbon, 1737–1794, all of them rationalistic giants, whose thought-systems became the vogue of Western Europe. It was an “age of reason” sure enough, and it is not surprising that a man of Paine’s originality and philosophic and philistine inclinations should fall in line and write his book. The pity is that in doing so he could not bring to his task,—at least he did not—the lofty motive and the transcendent ability of his rationalistic exemplars.



Turning to the book itself, I dare say the test of it is to be found in its spirit. Convincing as its logic may be here and there, its spirit is avowedly iconoclastic and generally bad. And what is more, contrary to the evidence that it furnishes of the author's wide reading, it was written out of much misinformation and misconception of theological theory and practice. The truth is that Paine was unequal to the labor he undertook; he was not fitted for it. A first-class diplomat, an astute politician, and a real patriot in secular things, in some directions even a moderately good philosopher, as a thinker on things religious, and especially in the tactless and negative manner of presentation of what for him was truth, he was a clumsy bungler. Far from being a systematic treatment of religion and a creditable representation of the genuine and usually constructive rationalistic attitude, the "Age of Reason" is a loose piece of sneering and wanton scholastic vandalism. On close examination it is found to be a rapidly-running, promiscuous comment. It is very doubtful whether the author knew where he was going to arrive after he was half way through. The impression a reader gets on wading through it is that Paine was chuck full of an almost infinite assortment of undigested critical and historical data, which he essayed to set down without any effort at classification and systematization, except such as suggested themselves as he wrote. The latter part of the treatise might just as well have been done first and placed first as the first might just as well have been done last and placed last. In like manner, also, you may read them in this manner, if you choose, without losing the connection or suffering much mental confusion.

Beginning with a discussion of revelation, inspiration and the person of Christ, paying his especial compliments, with evident impatience, to the doctrines of incarnation and resurrection, the author goes on at random through all the books of the Old and New Testaments, concluding with something of an exposition of deism that in its frequency of unsupported assertion lays itself open to the same criticism that he so bitterly applies to theism generally and Christianity in particular.



A few paragraphs taken at random reveal both his content and his style. Speaking of the ten commandments he says: "When Moses told the children of Israel that he received the two tables of the commandments from the hands of God, they were not obliged to believe him, because they had no other authority for it than his telling them so; and I have no other authority for it than some historian telling me so. The commandments carry no internal evidence of divinity with them; they contain some good moral precepts such as any man qualified to be a law-giver, or legislator, could produce himself, without having recourse to supernatural invention."

Examining this statement closely, with the exception of the assertion that the commandments contain only "some" good moral precepts, which certainly implies that they contain some moral precepts that are not good, an assertion with which we cannot agree, and, possibly one other assertion, every other statement of fact here made could be assented to by any conservative biblical student. But suppose one should carry Paine's reasoning out to its logical conclusion, what would be the result? Certainly the cause of truth would suffer most disastrously. Unless I go on the assumption that, after all, there have been some honest men in the world, and am safe in believing, as a general rule, what somebody else tells me, I am robbed of the largest source of every kind of information. In that case I could not possibly know that such a man as Thomas Paine had lived a hundred and twenty-five years ago. No one is living now who saw him and the man who printed the "Age of Reason" may have been a prevaricator, attaching the name of Paine to the work, whether Paine actually existed or not. That George Washington was a real personage, that such a man as Benjamin Franklin lived in Philadelphia, a contemporary of Washington, that Abraham Lincoln is not a creation of fiction, are all matters of fact to me in proportion as I attach credibility to other men's testimony. The reality of past history is, in a larger measure than we are ordinarily conscious of, a matter of faith. If faith is eliminated as a



factor in the transmission of knowledge, the past is practically a blank, and we are left with nothing but the very often misleading process of deduction from existing things as our only source of truth. Reason is not the only oracle of man to the extent that Paine would have it; the best rationalism does not hold it to be so. We simply have got to supplement our reason and our tangible evidence by faith, however it may have led us in the past, and may lead us still, into occasional credulous extravagance. It is an essential contingent of our intelligent relationship to the past and to our present relations man to man. But Paine had no place for it whatever in his thinking. To him faith and credulity were synonymous. Any writer of by-gone ages who set forth anything apparently outside of the operations of known law was not to be trusted. To him all priests and prophets, Jewish, Turkish, Catholic and Protestant, were connivers at falsehood, exploiters of myths, parasites of society, impostors and fanatics in direct ratio to the exact scientific demonstrability of their preachments. That was the nature of his rationalism.

As a second illustration, take Paine's footnote to the paragraph quoted above. He says, apropos of his commendation of the commandments: "It is, however, necessary to except the declaration which says that God visits the sins of the fathers upon the children, it is contrary to every principle of moral justice." Well, now is it? And if so, how does Paine know? What ethical system ever succeeded in searching out the ultimate standards of divine justice? In this statement Paine falls down in two particulars. He seems to assume that he knows all about divine justice, an assumption not characteristic of the best rationalism, and he seems to forget that, according to his own doctrine of the holiness and integrity of God, God must at least be consistent with the law of cause and effect. Cause and effect is the whole law of nature, and man is a part of nature, and whether it is morally just or unjust, salutary, though sad, or destructive and apparently unmerited by many of those who suffer by it, the law of heredity is a fact,



and every law is God's law, whatever you make God himself out to be. The fathers eat sour grapes and the children's teeth get on edge, and who will say that such an arrangement may not be beneficent? Are we put to the unmitigated necessity, even as a matter of cold logic, of assuming that because the law of natural transmission works hardship to the innocent as well as to the guilty, therefore it is vicious and vicious only? Man as a race may save himself by his collective punishments as well as by his individual punishments, and seeing, as we most emphatically do, that no moral law is arbitrarily imposed by God, whatever our definition of Him, isn't it just as reasonable to believe that both nature and God, who certainly can't be otherwise than in harmony in their ultimate purpose, make all things work together for good? At any rate, make of it what we will, like it or dislike it, berate God for it, or believe in His wisdom in it, that "the sins of the fathers are visited upon the children unto the third and fourth generation of them that hate him" is a fact. It is written large in the vital statistics of every community. But Paine's age was not an age of statistics; it was an age of as many and as unreasonable abstractions and speculations as those he condemns; it was an age of moral license; it constructed its conceptions of God out of an inadequate knowledge of that selfsame nature with which it was so zealous to be in conformity; it constructed its conceptions of moral law out of its rebellious desire to be privileged to live out sensuous endowment to the full without paying the price for its sin. We may not be able to reconcile today, as Paine could not in his day, the seeming inconsistency between the predicated justice of God and the operation of his moral law, but surely it is just as reasonable, in the face of the facts, to be resignedly optimistic as to be rebelliously pessimistic, as that is the temper of the "Age of Reason."

To get back to the main theme, a word as to the quality of Paine's prose. In many instances it is especially meritorious from a literary point of view. It ranks among those examples that are above the average American prose composition of the



time and would be regarded as very acceptable today. It is a great improvement on that of Ethan Allen. Its arrangement of material is poor, but for effective sentence structure, in which he goes over the entire field of rhetorical device, for raciness and directness, and to a certain extent, imaginative vividness, he is well worth reading. Of sneering satire of a more or less inartistic kind, the book contains a good deal, but it is not without a sense of goodnatured humor, although frequently this descends to plain facetiousness. On the whole, from the view-point of form, critics may be justified in giving him a place in the history of American literature; from the view-point of thought-content he has long since been superseded by more capable and higher-toned rationalists, and that largely because Paine was destructive only, while his successors have had the recommendation of attempting to be honestly constructive. He tore down without having the capability, and perhaps, also, the inclination and concern to build up again. One of the most foolish things in the world to do is to attempt to destroy, out of the motives of cynicism and hatred, somebody else's religion, especially if it is a religion that in its noble achievements for civilization, far outweighs its failures and defects. As is always the case with books of the nature of the "Age of Reason" its final assignment is to the limbo of the remotest shelf, where its chief devotees are silverfish and bookworms. It is interesting to note that there is in existence in Philadelphia at the present time a Thomas Paine club, whose common bond of fellowship seems to be the propagation of rationalistic thought, but it is just as interesting also to note, as I learned from one who knows the nature of the proceedings of the club, that Paine's reasoning in the book under consideration is held to be markedly fallacious, and the book as a whole for use as a rationalistic text of very little value.

When Paine had finished the first draft of his manuscript and was preparing to put it in final form for the printer, he submitted it for criticism to Benjamin Franklin, whose acquaintance he had made in London ten years previously. After reading it Franklin wrote to Paine as follows:



“I have read your manuscript with some attention. By the argument it contains against a particular Providence, though you allow a general Providence, you strike at the foundations of all religion. For without the belief of a Providence that takes cognizance of, guards, and guides, and may favor particular persons, there is no motive to worship a Deity, to fear his displeasure, or to pray for his protection. I will not enter into any discussion of your principles, though you seem to desire it. At present I shall only give you my opinion that, though your reasons are subtle, and may prevail with some readers, you will not succeed so as to change the general sentiments of mankind on that subject, and the consequence of printing this piece will be a great deal of odium drawn upon yourself, mischief to you, and no benefit to others. He that spits against the wind spits in his own face.

“But were you to succeed, do you imagine any good would be done by it? You yourself may find it easy to live a virtuous life, without the assistance afforded by religion; you having a clear perception of the advantages of virtue, and the disadvantages of vice, and possessing a strength of resolution sufficient to enable you to resist common temptations. But think how great a portion of mankind consists of weak and ignorant men and women, and of inexperienced, inconsiderate youth of both sexes, who have need of the motives of religion to restrain them from vice, to support their virtue, and retain in the practice of it till it becomes habitual, which is the great point of its security. And perhaps you are indebted to her originally, that is to your religious education, for the habits of virtue upon which you now justly value yourself. You might easily display your excellent talents of reasoning upon a less hazardous subject, and thereby obtain a rank with our most distinguished authors. For among us it is not necessary, as among the Hottentots, that a youth, to be raised into the company of men, should prove his manhood by beating his mother.

“I would advise you, therefore, not to attempt unchaining the tiger, but to burn this piece before it is seen by any other



person, whereby you will save yourself a great deal of mortification by the enemies it may raise against you, and perhaps a great deal of regret and repentance. If men are so wicked with religion, what would they be if without it?"

It is very evident from this advice, however it may savor of expediency, even if we could not know it from many other things in his life, that Benjamin Franklin was a far wiser man than Thomas Paine, possessing none of the latter's fiery impetuosity, having a fine sense of comparative values, in addition to a fine spirit of toleration.

Apart from the more or less detached rationalism of Allen and Paine, the period of American literature before the Civil War was marked with one expression of rationalism that partook of the proportions of a movement. It was a much nobler type of rationalism than that of Allen and Paine, not to be classed with theirs at all, but yet having something in common with it, namely the rise and growth of Unitarianism. Of course it is not to be understood that this movement is to be characterized as rationalistic simply because, as its name implies, in its chief tenet, that of the humanity of Jesus, it is antithetic to trinitarianism. There is a great deal more to it than that. Our interest in it, so far as this paper is concerned, is more in the latitudinous application of the principle upon which it proceeds and arrives at its chief doctrine, and especially as the application of this principle resulted in the production of contributions to American literature. The fundamental principle of Unitarianism is identical with that of Allen and Paine in that it affirms that you can have an efficient and satisfying religion without any mystery or extraordinary inspiration or direct revelation, and that, in the last analysis, every religion, and especially the Christian religion, must rely for its acceptability on the reasonableness and demonstrability of its doctrines as gauged by human intelligence and experience. It can be readily understood how the assertion of such an idea among the descendents of the Pilgrim Fathers would result in some composition and printing, if not some literature, on both sides of the question.



Unlike the individualistic rationalism of Allen and Paine, the rationalism of Unitarianism was organically connected with certain preceding conditions. To get at its real origin it is not too remote to revert to the year 1703. In that year were born, one in England and one in America, John Wesley and Jonathan Edwards, in whom when they became public figures, English and American Protestantism, particularly that division of it marching under the inspiration of John Calvin's "Institutes of the Christian Religion," reached one of its climaxes. The result was that there was a severe reaction. The strain got too heavy, and when the break came, that which issued from the collapse was something more than a little liberalization of the old-time conservatism manifested in one or two individuals. It was a diffused rationalization of the religious thought and life of a community.

In fact the whole history of religious thought in America, as elsewhere, rationalistic and otherwise, is a record of reactions and reactions, reformations and counter-reformations, overdevelopments and breaking strains, disintegrations of thought-systems and reconstructions of them. The Unitarian movement, which was not after all a religious movement with some intellectual features, but an intellectual movement with some religious features, was a reaction against a reaction. We are accustomed to think of it solely as a reaction against the revivalism or new measure movement known as the "Great Awakening." It was that, but that is not the whole fact of the matter. The Great Awakening was itself a reaction against the apathy and frigidity of New England's formal Puritanism on the one hand and on the other an almost universal outcropping of infidelity and ribaldry that very definitely characterized American life. In a word the order of reactions was as follows: first there was the original Puritanism of the Pilgrims, reaching its consummation and already becoming less strenuous in the last of the Mathers; this was followed by a reaction that brought with it a general secularization of New England life and a kind of apathetic rationalism more or less



widely dispersed throughout the colonies; as a reaction to the last came the Great Awakening, which in turn produced another reaction in the rise and growth of Unitarianism and its side issue Transcendentalism.

The first appearance of Unitarianism as a recognizable tendency in American religious thought came with the Arian views of the person of Christ as set forth by Jonathan Mayhew, shortly after the Great Awakening had spent its force, about 1744. Arianism, of course, is that theory of the person of Christ which interprets Him as being different from other men only in degree and not in kind, asserts his human nature to be the only nature He possessed, denies his pre-existence and assigns him a genesis similar to all mankind. It is a rationalistic advance on the old "homousian-homoiousian" controversy in that it rejects both ideas of Christ's identity with and similarity to God and makes pre-eminent the idea of his similarity to man, the idea of his son-of-man-ship as over against his son-of-God-ship. As a manifestation of rationalism, it followed immediately upon the appearance in New England of Arminianism, which emphasizes the freedom of the will, and which in this respect struck at the very heart of Calvinism. Already Mayhew's father before him and two or three other preachers of equal note had done considerable pamphleteering in the interest of a sort of cross-breed theology combining some of the elements of both Arianism and Arminianism. The chief opponents of Mayhew were Jonathan Edwards' son, Joseph Bellamy, quite noted in his day, Samuel Hopkins, the formulator of what was labelled the "Hopkinsian Theology," Nathanael Emmons, and the president of Yale University, Timothy Dwight. From 1744 on to the thirties and forties of the nineteenth century the Unitarian movement continued to gather impetus, its history in the interval marked by such names as James Freeman, who exercised the functions of a clergyman without ordination, Henry Ware, who became Hollis professor of divinity at Harvard and by his teachings drove the Congregationalists out of that University by 1805,



Joseph Stevens Buckminster, who was an admiring student and American advocate of Priestly and who regarded a goodly portion of Unitarianism as not being sufficiently rationalistic to suit his tastes, and William Ellery Channing.

Now, of these four outstanding advocates of Unitarianism, with the exception of William Ellery Channing, not much remains of intrinsic worth as a corporate part of American literature. Two of them, Freeman and Ware, may be dismissed with the mere mention of their names. For Buckminster it will suffice to say that he was an eloquent preacher, that he wrote in a style which for many features entitles him to recognition, and that as a man he was of a sincere and beautiful character. Of William Ellery Channing, however, it must be said that he holds a really distinguished place in the history of American literature. Possessing an exquisitely sensitive nature and a clear, keen mind, he took a peculiar position between the rationalism of Unitarianism and the mystical interpretation of things as later crystallized in Transcendentalism. With very little consideration for the chief orthodox doctrinal standards of Christianity he expounded its vital features as applicable to social life in a body of addresses and essays that are models of clearness and beauty. His prose is characterized by not a little of the wordiness and formalism of the prose of the generation that preceded him; nevertheless, it is decidedly elegant and in many other respects delightfully pleasing. In the matters of unduly long sentence structure and uniform effort at perfect rhythmical balance, in which he sometimes approaches the poetic form, he becomes, when read at length, just a bit tedious, and would today be out of fashion; but in his own day he was widely admired and regarded as a desirable model. I think it is Thomas Wentworth Higginson in his "Letter to a Young Contributor," written when he was editor of the *Atlantic Monthly*, who says that there was a time when every young writer who has ambitions in the directions of authorship tried to write like William Ellery Channing.



Among Channing's works, which in quantity are very considerable, the two productions that are looked upon with highest favor as exemplifying both his thought and style, are the essays on "Self-Culture" and "Spiritual Freedom." Probably not much more than the titles themselves are necessary to demonstrate his views of religion. To him religion was comprehensively summed up in the attainment of character through the practice of Christian morality and benevolent service. For other men's views he always maintained a sympathetic regard and toleration, but his well poised rationalistic mind would not permit him to go beyond predicating the existence of a supreme Being, the worship of Him to consist of high thinking and virtuous living. If it is permissible to judge a man's thought-system entirely on the basis of his own character as the norm of the excellency of it, William Ellery Channing's brand of Unitarianism must hold an exalted place in the estimation of all of us. His chief significance in American literature, all in all, lies in the fact of his being a transitional thinker and writer between the more radical form of Unitarian intellectualism and the more or less orphic and mystical Transcendentalism.

There remains but one more author of literary note whom it is necessary only to mention as among American rationalists previous to 1860, Oliver Wendell Holmes. We may have a feeling of antipathy for Thomas Paine, benevolently tolerate Ethan Allen and esteem William Ellery Channing, but surely we cannot but love the "Autocrat of the Breakfast Table." His type of mind among any people is an earnest, devoutly to be cherished, of their ultimate freedom and peace in the possession of truth, his art an effective stimulus to culture and beauty of life.

PHILADELPHIA, PA.



## IV.

### MODERN LIFE AND PASTORAL WORK.<sup>1</sup>

FREDERICK A. RUPLEY.

In preparing to teach a recent Sunday-School lesson, I came across a suggestive paragraph which is not altogether amiss as one approaches the discussion set for us this morning:

“Suppose your grandfather or great-grandfather died in the year 1875, what were some of the things that you have seen, which he never saw? Automobiles and trolley-cars? Yes; the only street traffic that he saw was horse-cars; and, when he went driving, a good trotter was his best motive-power. He never rode up a thirty-story office-building in an elevator, because there was no such building, and no elevator. He never rang up on a telephone and talked with a man five hundred miles away, or turned on the lights of a whole house with one twist of a button. He never saw gifts to education amounting to more than \$50,000,000 in one year. He never bought a twenty-four page newspaper, with information gathered from all around the world, for one cent. There are more remarkable things than these, which he never saw. He never saw the sale of liquor prohibited in one-half the territory over which the Stars and Stripes fly. He never saw many scores of the finest educated University men and women of the land going out as foreign-missionaries, every year. He never saw great Christian schools, hospitals, and churches in China and

<sup>1</sup> This paper was read, January 26, 1914, before the York Interdenominational Ministerial Association. In response to the Association's action, it is offered for publication. Large indebtedness is acknowledged for help in preparing the paper, given by the late Doctor Charles Cuthbert Hall through an article on *The Ideal Minister*, published in *The Atlantic Monthly* for October, 1907, pp. 448-458.



India. He never saw a great social settlement, like Hull House, in Chicago."

Indeed, it is the merest commonplace to observe facts and conditions in our modern life which indicate efficient activity, ranging over wide fields of human interest.

And, when one pauses to reckon up this range of interests, one can readily trace the movement through mechanical inventions, through the spread of general intelligence, through a greatly stimulated industrial productiveness and rivalry, through the serious re-consideration of economic and political theory that has been inherited from the past, if not through the actual adoption of changed systems of wealth-production and wealth-distribution, and of civil government.

As for the fields into which our Lord and Savior Jesus Christ looked with unique insight, and concerning which He was moved to say "they are white already unto harvest," we who are carrying real responsibilities as servants of Jesus Christ in the midst of this modern age of the world are compelled, by the complexity and novelty of the situation confronting us, to study anew the opportunities for service which we find in the prevailing social order.

There is a point of view which may justify one in re-stating the subject of this paper. It is the point of view which takes account of the specific meaning of the phrase "Pastoral Work." The two functions which have always been associated with the ministry of the Gospel are teaching and pastoral visitation. If one is disposed to treat one's topic within the limits strictly set by the terms used, one may now suggest that the present task is an analysis of the prevailing social order, for the purpose of discovering its attitude to that group of its members who find themselves called and commissioned by Jesus Christ to cultivate friendly relations with their fellow-men, individually, in the hope of winning them to friendship with the Friend of Sinners.

A calm analysis of his experience and observation emboldens the writer to declare, with enthusiasm, his persuasion that



there is in the present-day order of society all the room for Christian service, in the form of pastoral visitation, that any man can crave, who goes to pastoral work in answer to a call from Jesus Christ, and not merely to eke out a living. The conviction grows upon one, as he adds year upon year of effort to win friends to Jesus Christ, that the chief consideration for the servant of Jesus Christ who is called to normally relate the task of public teaching and the task of teaching from house to house (Acts 20: 20) is not simply the amount of time given to the round of visits, but, rather, the attitude held toward individual people, as the actual objects of the redeeming love of God in Christ Jesus.

I am not quite prepared to rebuke the joke about ministers' spending their afternoons gossiping. I have sympathy with the high-minded young man who finds no attraction to the ministry of the Gospel that grovels on the level of idle pastime, of any sort. But, I am assured that it is a rare man who has found his way into the ministry of the Gospel, cherishing the hope that this ministry will most directly lead to the "house by the side of the road," where he can "be a friend to men," and who has had to turn from the ministry disappointed on that score. If your motive and mine be to prove ourselves the friends of individual men and women, boys and girls, in order that our friendship with them, if possible, may lead on to their being the friends of Jesus Christ, we can keep faithfully at work, fully assured that most people need friends, at some time or other. We can keep diligently on cultivating the exquisitely fine art of discerning when the people within our ranges of service do actually find themselves in need of the holy friendship we have been seeking to recommend through all our fellowship.

But, to re-assert the divine source and the abiding human need of our high pastoral ministry is not, by any means, to put beyond question changes in the social order vitally affecting the manner and method in which our ministry is to seek fulfillment in the midst of modern life. And, if we are to be



workmen needing not to be ashamed, we surely must take account of these changes and of their significance.

The coming in of an age of democracy has put every social institution under new strain. Kings, peers, and priests no longer are sheltered by ancestral privilege from public criticism. If we are wise in our love for our ministerial ideal, we will pray that, at all cost of sentiment and tradition, it may so change, with the changing generations, that it shall keep close to co-temporary human experience. It ought not to be, in any respect, an outworn survival, but an immediate and indispensable force in the life of men.

In the history of the Christian Church, the idea of priesthood has contributed a large measure of formative power and official authority. It has impressively encouraged the growth of reverence in the minds of the followers of Jesus Christ in the past. Its appeal to the imagination, its influence over the lay conscience, its power to bind and loose, its liberal reserve of grace to meet deficiencies in the average man, its privileged insight into mysteries, its secure hold on the covenant mercies of God,—these and other attributes of priesthood put it among the primary forces that have shaped the religious history of fifteen centuries.

The psychology of this idea explains its compelling power in ages of apparently exceptional faith. Man has two deep-seated social instincts: the instinct of control, and the instinct of submission. It is in his nature to lay hold on inferior lives and project upon them the authority of his own. It is equally in his nature to be governed by that which touches him from above the level of his own experience. These social instincts appear in the life of primitive peoples. The instinct of control is written large over the ancient East. Every village has its head man. Every bazar has its tribute-taking over-lord. Every valley has its hill rajah. In the beaten track of immemorial submission, the people plod on, accepting the situation with a salaam or a sigh, as the case may be. It is instinct. Out of this instinct emerges organized society. The powers



that be are ordained of God. Submission to authority is the first condition of social order, as well as the first instinct of average humanity.

Looking back over Christian history, one can see how these instincts of control and submission reflected themselves in the unfolding of the Church's life. At first, and so long as the simplicity of Christ's example prevailed over men's memories, they who were set to rule in the Church exercised their authority as in no degree above their brethren. One of the greatest of the leaders accounted himself to be "less than the least of all saints." The end of earthly leadership and authority was simply that all things might be done decently and in order. In the same spirit, the laity submitted themselves to every ordinance, for the Lord's sake, esteeming very highly in love them that were over them in the Lord. But, as the Church moved into the sunlight of imperial favor, passing beyond the condition of a little, persecuted flock, the ministerial ideal took on different colorings. From precedents set both in Judaism and in non-Christian faiths, it assimilated the idea and donned the insignia of priesthood. It claimed that to it were committed the keys of the kingdom of heaven. It undertook to be the arbiter of conscience, the mediator of destiny, the dispenser of holy mysteries, the vessel of hidden grace.

It is not hard to understand the absorbing fascination of these ideas, alike for minds sincerely believing themselves to be invested with these powers, and for those sincerely yielding their homage to these claimants. The segregation of a class, for special intimacy with God and authority over man, is in harmony with the tendencies to control and submission that flourish in an age of imperialism and public ignorance. If we feel this fascination waning in the present day, it is not so much because men put it from them voluntarily as because the spell of the idea tends to wear off in the atmosphere of democracy and popular education. Its temporary survival in such an atmosphere is due, in part, to the persistent inertia of



custom; in part, to emotional self-persuasion and devout refusal to weigh pious theory against fact.

It is unwarranted to suppose that the Protestant Reformation was, or was intended to be, the abolition of the priestly idea from the Christian ministry. The Reformation did, indeed, seek to cut off certain excesses and abuses that had developed in the notion of priesthood. But the heart of the idea, which is the enduement of men with power of special intimacy with God and spiritual authority over their brother-men, passed, with modifications, into the reformed churches. Theoretically, it was abandoned by the dissenting sects. Practically, it clung to the ministerial ideal. But the ultimate issue of the process of decay that is breaking down the priestly conception of the ministry is foreordained, under the laws of the human mind. Less and less, can men bow down to their brother-men, believing them to be other than themselves, or, in any sense, custodians of the mysteries and grace of God. And this is not irreverence. It is, in part, the postponed reversion of nature to spiritual reality; in part, the useful outcome of scientific study in the field of personality.

It is quite possible, therefore, my brethren, for us to make a grievous mistake, if we attribute to irreligion alone the breaking away from Church life of large numbers of intelligent and pure minded persons in our modern social order. Whatever proportion of this is due to lax morality or to the love of pleasure, there is also much that arises from a vague sense of unreality in the position and claims of the ministry. People have studied the psychology of religious experience. They have looked out more broadly upon the world. They have faced the phenomena of spiritual life appearing outside of Christian boundaries. They have sought and found communion with God unmediated by sacerdotal permissions and authorities. Their lives have, in consequence, grown away from a ministry hedged about with unnecessary survivals of unproven theory. Really, there is nothing new in this. It is as old as mysticism. It is, however, more general to-day than



ever before. True mysticism, which rests on belief in immediacy of access to God, has found a powerful ally in true psychology. Moving into a larger freedom of the Spirit, the enlightened consciousness, with comparative ease, escapes from the hold of ecclesiastical custom that seems no longer essential to reality.

But, nothing could be farther from the truth than to assume that the decay of the idea of priesthood is the passing out of the ministry. It is rather the falling away of a provisional and temporary interpretation of the ministry, serviceable in the past, but unsuited to the present. The thing that remains when priesthood passes is the thing that many have marked as the phenomenon of this age, which persistently contradicts the suspicion that the ministry is losing its power. Wherever a man arises, of such simple excellence that his fellows dare to trust him, and wherever such a man preaches, without ecclesiastical accent, the Gospel of the living God that really touches human life at its points of living experience, and wherever such a man offers an interpretation of life that leads men to the living God,—that man never lacks an audience, an influence, and an answer from human souls. The common people hear him gladly, as they heard his Master. The pre-occupied ear of culture is arrested by his words. The blood of high-minded youth leaps to highest hopes and to most heroic adventures in response to his message. The storm-swept heart of sorrow listens and finds peace.

What is the meaning of this phenomenon,—this hungry response that people give to whosoever, coming in the name of Christ, unites with a just and manly life the power of interpreting God to man and man to God. It means that, as artificial and provisional conceptions of the ministry dissolve before the searching realism of an age of democracy and an age of science, the ministry itself is justified by the unstudied verdict of human experience. Humanity outgrows its priests, but not its prophets. The ministerial ideal is the prophetic ideal. As such, it has its basis, not in an act of ecclesiastical



authorization, but in a vocation and endowment of the Spirit. This is the call: the prophetic sense of obligation to speak, in the name of God, to man, and, in the name of man, to God. Order and decency of procedure justify ecclesiastical authorization; but ministers, like poets, are born, not made. They arise as parts of the essential structure, as manifestations of the progressive action of human society. And, however many there may be of us unblessed of God and rejected of men, where one arises, having the true vocation, the hearts of men answer to his influence. Thought, in the modern world, seems to be moving toward a clearer view of what the ministry is. It is coming to be seen in its relation to humanity, rather than in its relation to an ecclesiastical organization. Heretofore, the minister has been too much regarded as the official and creature of the Church. And young men with promising gifts and glorious aspirations have often halted at that thought. But, when the ministry is seen as, first of all, a part of the essential life of humanity, an answer to a yearning need in the soul of the world, a prophet's voice, offering for men what they have not offered for themselves, and showing men a glory in God which they have not seen for themselves,—then choice young men, with the sense of this calling born within them, will hesitate less, and the prophets of the Holy God shall be multiplied. They shall be known among their fellows by their simplicity, their unselfishness, their humanness, their hopefulness, their reverence.

“There are hermit souls that live withdrawn  
In the place of their self-content;  
There are souls like stars, that dwell apart,  
In a fellowless firmament;  
There are pioneer souls that blaze their paths  
Where highways never ran;  
But let me live by the side of the road,  
And be a friend to man.

“I see from my house by the side of the road,  
By the side of the highway of life,  
The men who press with the ardor of hope,  
The men who are faint with the strife.



But I turn not away from their smiles nor their tears,—  
Both parts of an infinite plan;—  
Let me live in my house by the side of the road,  
And be a friend to man.

“I know there are brook-gladdened meadows ahead  
And mountains of wearisome height,  
That the road passes on through the long afternoon,  
And stretches away to the night.  
But still I rejoice when the travellers rejoice,  
And weep with the strangers that moan,  
Nor live in my house by the side of the road  
Like a man who dwells alone.

“Let me live in my house by the side of the road  
Where the race of men go by;  
They are good, they are bad, they are weak, they are strong,  
Wise, foolish. So am I.  
Then why should I sit in the scorner's seat  
Or hurl the cynic's ban?  
Let me live in my house by the side of the road  
And be a friend to man.”

YORK, PENNSYLVANIA.



## V.

### A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF ANCIENT AND MEDIÆVAL MISSIONS.

(PERIODS—ANCIENT: FIRST AND SECOND CENTURIES; MEDI-  
ÆVAL: SIXTH AND SEVENTH CENTURIES.)

LEONARD L. LEH.

Even a superficial reading of the history of the Christian church in the first thousand years of its existence will reveal two periods of intense missionary zeal. The history of the subsequent nine hundred years also furnishes two such periods: one following upon the discovery and colonization of the western world, and the other that of the present day. The fact that we are in an extensive missionary movement at the present time makes it a work of practical interest to investigate the missions of past ages. This paper aims to confine itself exclusively to the first two great periods, the one of which followed immediately upon the founding of Christianity itself, and the other, which grew out of the ascendancy of the Teutons in Europe.

A fact which strikes the student as soon as he enters this field, is that of the wide difference between the methods, messages, and results of the two periods. Viewing both from the modern standpoint, he is inclined to dwell on the excellencies of the ancient activities, discounting the value of those of the mediæval period. Indeed it is possible to make a good case in trying to show the superiority of the former. It is a question, however, whether it is just to judge either by an absolute standard. Fifty years ago, perhaps, writers could have specified, without any twinges of their scientific conscience, what true missions consist in; but, with the prevalence



of the historical spirit today, we are not so ready to define exactly which is the right method and which the wrong. Ancient mission methods would have been impossible in the Middle Ages. Indeed, ancient Christianity itself would have been impossible. Each age has its own peculiarities, and therefore its own problems and institutions. The only just method in our study, then, is to treat the missions of each period in the light of that period generally, showing how each was best adapted to its time.

Keeping, therefore, this position in mind, we find that the subject naturally falls into three divisions. All three consist in contrasts. The first is a contrast of the fields; the second, of the forms of Christianity itself; and the third, of the resulting missions. It is only after the first two questions have been treated that we are ready to consider the third, or main, problem of our thesis.

### I. THE DIFFERENT FIELDS.

Christianity was born into an old civilization. The people with whom it was to deal for the next two centuries belonged to one great empire, which included all the geography that men knew, or cared about. This empire was dotted with large, prosperous cities, which were bound together by constantly-traveled traffic lines, both land and water. The government was well-knit and far-reaching; the dispensation of justice was regular and universal. Law had become an established science. Military operations had been reduced to an art. The people delighted in literature, in the fine arts, and in the plays of the theatre. There were schools and universities for the youth; every town of size had its bookshops, where the latest poem or novel might be had for a price no greater than we pay for such literature today. The age could boast of a heritage of poets, dramatists, and philosophers whose brilliancy has not been equalled in any period since. All classes indulged in philosophic conversation; traveling rhetoricians made a good living from their wordy wares. Rich folk had their winter



and summer homes. A regular exodus took place each hot season from the cities to the sea-side resorts. Men delighted in travel; many spent a great part of their life in various countries abroad. A high degree of culture, that was very sensitive in its tastes, existed generally among the better classes and was not entirely absent in the lower strata of society. Men were keen in their detection of vulgarity wherever it appeared.

The Græco-Roman world witnessed a cosmopolitanism not unlike that to be found in Europe to-day. If anything, modern Europe is the more provincial of the two. In the Empire, a man would be almost equally at home wherever he went. The old national barriers had been broken down. Every civilized country had been brought into the pale of the Empire. The aggressive Romans had not been slow to apply their amalgamating influences. Roman roads, Roman officers, Roman justice, and Roman building operations opened the way; Roman fashions and Roman ideas followed. Latin and Greek were spoken in every city. Thus were the nations weaned away from their old patriotism and made to turn their faces with one accord to Rome. With the disappearance of the old patriotism, faded their zeal in the old national religions. Rome was never able to acquire to herself more than a small fraction of the devotion that those old national religions once inspired. Another element faded out of the people's lives: their hatred of foreigners. Who were foreigners now that the whole world had united together to bow to Rome? All who came and went, no matter how far they were from home, still remained under their own government, were judged by their own laws, and conversed in their own language. Thus merchants and travelers passed to and fro in constant streams, and every city of size presented a medley of nationalities such as can be paralleled only by some great metropolitan city of today.

The Roman conquest brought to the world a measure of peace such as it had not seen before. The hundreds of petty nationalities could no longer make war upon each other, for



they had all been brought together under one strong head, who insisted on settling all quarrels herself. With peace came industry and trade, and the resulting riches and comfort. More riches were brought in by the conquests. The time was ripe for the growth of a capitalist class. Millionaires grew like mushrooms. Luxuries multiplied by geometrical progression. The poorer classes, who had always been oppressed, felt the oppression more badly, for it had become systematic. The flooding of the slave market drove free labor, to a great extent, out of business. Thus the poor freemen were compelled to depend upon the state for a living, or else draw it out of the rich by quackery. Politics and other national interests, which had fed the life-force in men of old, were out of the average man's range. Rich and poor alike found themselves idle, with no vital interest to stir them into self-forgetful action. The rich whiled away their time in luxurious entertainments, in intrigues, or dipping into philosophy; the poor fell into the ways of vice. Such a life cannot long retain its zest. Consequently a deep-seated world-weariness pervaded the Empire. Men's souls languished, while they plunged deeper and deeper into luxury and vice, or nervously turned from philosopher to philosopher seeking that which they could not find. Philosophy, indeed, had become generally popular. But the golden days of Plato and Aristotle were past. Philosophy had, to the average dilettante, taken on the same superficial character that all the rest of his life had. Indeed, the appreciative audience of some famous lecturer often thought more of the words than the ideas which they were supposed to express. A sentence from Walter Pater's *Marius the Epicurean* will give us an idea of this listless spirit: "These amateurs of beautiful language, with their tablets for noting carefully all the orator's most exquisite expressions, were ready to give themselves wholly to the intellectual treat prepared for them; applauding, blowing loud kisses through the air sometimes, at the speaker's triumphant exit from one of his long, skilfully modulated sentences; while the younger of them meant to imitate every-



thing about him, down to the inflections of his voice and the very folds of his mantle."

Rome was not opposed to the national religions; it encouraged them rather. But the supports had been taken away from under them. Men had become world-citizens, and their old national gods had come to look correspondingly small and provincial. The old faith was therefore no longer possible. Philosophy had made further inroads upon that faith. Lucretius had proved that gods were but bugbears to frighten people. Lucian made them the laughing stock of cultured circles. Even Rome herself found it impossible to keep her people's faith from slipping out of their hands. Far-sighted statesmen fought hard to keep the old "religion of Numa" intact, for they realized what an influence for good it used to be in Roman life, but they failed. Perhaps there were sincere men in some of the ancient families who still performed the old rites seriously, but, even with these, the religious glow their fathers had felt was gone. To quote again from Pater: "By them, the religion of Numa, so staid, ideal and comely, the object of so much jealous conservatism, though of direct service as lending sanction to a sort of high scrupulosity, especially in the main points of domestic conduct, was mainly prized as being, through its hereditary character, something like a personal distinction—as contributing, among the other accessories of an ancient house, to the production of that aristocratic atmosphere which separated them from newly-made people." As the faith in the old national gods waned, superstition grew. The world was full of dispossessed deities. Very few men were prepared, as was Lucretius, to discredit the whole army of them altogether. Faith was shaken, but it was not destroyed. So, as the philosophical-minded tasted all the various philosophers that came into their range, the credulous tried the various religions, giving each its share of belief. The air, the sea, the landscape, thus became full of gods, which demanded all kinds of outlandish practices, and which spoke to men in all kinds of signs, auguries, and omens. This, of course, was degen-



eration pure and simple. The people got little satisfaction out of it, and they felt it.

The old religion had been a simple, joyous affair, which was an expression of the fullness of the worshippers' life. This spontaneity was gone. In consequence of the dreary aspect life had taken, religion found a new direction. There came to be a universal quest for salvation. Oriental religions, with their secret rites and pessimistic world-view, came much into vogue. The cult of the Egyptian Isis, the Orphic mysteries of Greece, the magic cures of Æsculapius, the Persian Mithra cult, were popular throughout the Empire. Shrines of these gods were to be found even in distant Britain. The ruling idea in all of them was that they promised salvation. The curious rites and initiations offered much excitement to the restless seeker, but it is to be doubted whether he received any deep-seated satisfaction. The result was, after all, only superficial. Apuleius, in the story which he called "*The Golden Ass*," gives us a long description of his wanderings and initiations. All that they did for him, apparently, was to leave him a smooth-talking man of letters, "in whose pages," as Glover says, "bandit and old woman, ass and Isis, all talk in one Euphuistic strain."

The age was one of jaded, world-weary spirits. The primeval struggle for life was no longer necessary—there was peace, and organization, and material riches. It was a situation that left men free to turn to their own personal comfort. How worthless a thing they found that comfort as soon as they had attained it! They heaped luxury upon luxury, but the coveted satisfaction was constantly vanishing before them. They plunged into a recklessness that is license, disregarding both the will of the gods and the customs of men, but they found that vice leaves nothing but emptiness and pain in its wake. They read books of philosophy and listened to the army of traveling rhetoricians, aiming to get hence that which would put content into their lives, but in vain. They turned back again to religion, they tried every new cult that came into their



ken, yet their souls did not find peace. The trouble with the age was its artificiality and superficiality. Everything had the aspect of listlessness. There was nothing to reach down into the very roots of the people's lives and stir their whole being. Life had no real interest to make it worth living. The barbarians were far away on the frontiers, where also veteran legions were stationed; nature had been conquered and reduced into productive bondage; the government had slipped from the people's hands and was now all done for them from the Emperor's office: nothing new had come in of sufficient moment to take the place of these. There was sad need for an enthusiasm, that life might have a zest again. It was to fill this need that Christianity came.

A survey of the mediæval mission field is not so easily made as that of the ancient field, because of the scarcity of sources. In many cases we have to be content with Christian sources, as frequently the first records we have date from after the time of the conversion and were made by monks and bishops. Since no religion is able at once to transform an entire people, these records are valuable for our purpose. The previous condition of the people is in evidence on every page. With the aid of these sources, we are able to draw enough of a picture to show how the mediæval field was vastly different from that before the ancient missionaries, three or four hundred years before.

Externally, the most outstanding feature of the difference was the multitude of nationalities as over against one single, well-organized empire. Historic Italy had become the home of the Lombards and the Ostrogoths; in Spain were the Suevians and the Visigoths; in North Africa, the Vandals; in Germany and France, the Franks, the Burgundians, the Frisians, the Saxons, the Alamanni, the Thuringians, and a number of other nations, some of which the Franks were fighting hard to bring under their subjection; and England had become the seat of half a dozen kingdoms. There was plenty of national spirit, not artificially bred or springing out of selfish interests, but coming from primitive tribal loyalty and aversion to foreign



encroachments. Fierce wars were raging constantly. Communication was no longer free and easy as it had been under the Empire. Instead of one Emperor, a dozen barbarian kings had to be reckoned with now, and thousands of still more barbarian underlings, who frequently had no scruples in their conduct toward strangers. Travel had become a dangerous business: the old Roman roads had fallen much into disuse; many of them had disappeared. Besides these difficulties, numerous varied languages and dialects had taken the place of the once universal Latin and Greek. Men no longer considered themselves citizens of the world, but felt themselves bound in by the narrow limits of their own territory, much as was the case in Europe before the great Empire of Rome had come into existence. Save for the occasional trader, whose enterprise scorned every risk, the various pagan kingdoms lived in isolation, foreign contact coming almost exclusively in the shape of inter-royal alliances and wars.

The race with which the mediæval missionary had to deal for the most part was the Teutonic. In Germany, in Gaul, in Britain, the new lands of promise, it was Teutonic ideas and Teutonic characteristics that the missionaries had to face. These ideas and characteristics were fundamentally different from those prevalent among the old Græco-Roman peoples. The Greeks and the Romans, and the Kelts after them, had a passion for social grouping, for cities and organization and law and empire—they loved the forum, the theatre, and the public ways where they could gather. They valued thought only as it could be shared with others in conversation; solitude was, for them, unbearable. The Teuton, on the other hand, was individualistic. The growth of cities went but slowly in Germanic countries even after they had come into full contact with the old Roman civilization. Their former home had been in the dismal forests of central Europe, where scattered clearings with rude huts were the only signs of man's presence. After they had come to possess the well-cultivated lands of the Roman provinces, those lands also became wild again. There



was no order, no organization, no passion for grouping. Each man, from the lowest rank to the highest, was sufficient unto himself; when individuals did band together there was not one of them lost his own sense of importance or forgot his rights. Richard, in his *History of German Civilization*, says: "The Teuton had no true idea of government. He was very jealous of what he gave up to the state." This can be seen as a Teutonic characteristic down to the present day: every act of the ruling power is questioned, and every advance toward autocracy or absolutism actively resisted. The Teuton was not afraid of being alone. His work consisted mostly in the hunt and war. When not so engaged he passed the time carousing at the hall of his chief. More frequently, however, he was to be found at home. Richard graphically describes this feature of Teutonic life, drawing some interesting conclusions: "For days the free German would lounge on bear-skins in front of his hearth-fire, doing nothing but sleep and 'think.' Here we have the source of his intense individualism. He was compelled to fall back upon himself, and, if there was an active mind within him,—and his language shows that there was,—the habit of introspection, the development of his inner and emotional life, must have followed as natural consequences." From these considerations we can see how individualism and proud self-sufficiency, with a strong impatience at the bonds imposed by highly organized institutions, were natural to the race. The great number of constantly warring nationalities into which the race was divided at the beginning of the Middle Ages, while being traceable largely to these traits, also furnished an effective condition by which they were perpetuated and deepened. Richard attributes to this trait of individualism the major cause of the failure of Roman influence to impress itself strongly upon German life before the latter part of the Middle Ages.

A second reason for this failure was "because German intelligence was not strong enough to assimilate a civilization so far above them." We must, however, look deeper in this case than



the mere lack of intelligence. True enough, the German intelligence was primitive, as the Germans were a barbarian people, and it could be expected that they were unable to grasp the fine points of civilized thought. But back of their primitive intelligence was a more youthful life than the Romans knew. Much of the Roman civilization had developed in a period when the original life-force of the people was sadly waning. Naturally a strong, young, vigorous race like the Teutons could have little sympathy with these developments. The Teutons found the life within them on the ascent rather than in decadence, as among the Romans. They were healthy-minded and strong of body, constantly in contact with nature, possessing an almost unlimited freedom, hard-fighters and hard-drinkers, aggressive in every move, and formidable even in repose. They knew somewhat of the joy of living, and did not stop too often to ask questions. They had just entered into their new lands of promise, boundless vistas of greater things had opened up before them: their souls were bent upon possessing them, making them fully their own, and enjoying them. What taste could they have had for the whinings of a worn-out culture, even though it was far above them? The original Christianity itself, understood as it was in the early times, as the religion of redemption from the evils of this world, the religion of love and the lowly and the persecuted, would scarcely have made any impression upon them. Says Richard: "Indeed, the crucified teacher of suffering and humility made small sympathetic appeal to the Germans, to whom assertion of one's self is the essence of life to an extent which was probably far beyond the imagination of the oriental founders of Christianity." The vigor of the Teutonic mind is seen in the very prayers of the Christian converts. A specimen of this form of devotion, dating from the 6th century, has been preserved. Chilperic, the Meroving, in a hymn in honor of St. Medardus, prays for "power and personal assertion," and deprecates the "false humility which takes the food from the one who eats and the sweetness from the brave." Even Bible



stories were transformed to fit to this assertive mood. In the German epic *Heliand*, dating from about 822, Christ is represented as the senior and the disciples as his thanes. "With delight the author dwells on passages like that where Peter, 'the swift warrior,' cuts off Malchus' ear. . . . We look in vain, on the other hand, for the verse that teaches us to offer the left cheek when the right has been smitten."

If the life that flowed in the veins of the Teuton was in the vigour of youth, his institutions and ideas naturally were primitive. In true barbarian fashion, the men despised hand labor, which fell to the lot of the women and slaves. Agriculture maintained but a languishing existence among them. Building was rude and primitive. The men, as incessantly on the hunt or the war-path as the American Indian at the time of the colonization of our country, knew more about the forest than about the arts of man. Their thoughts were correspondingly limited, and they were credulous to the extreme. While often keen judges in practical matters, sometimes even putting the Romans themselves to shame, when it came to anything that had a suspicion of the supernatural or the magical about it, they were filled with an awe that paralyzed their reason. The strongest social tie was still that of kinship. Individuals had not yet differentiated themselves entirely from the family-group, but felt themselves responsible for the crimes of the various members of their own relation, as well as for the measuring out of justice to those who had inflicted injury upon one of the group. The primitive tribal relationship, such as we can see in Arabia today, had not yet died out. In the course of the wars of the invasions, strong leaders had developed into kings. These kings had come to have great power, and were upheld by intense loyalty. The allegiance of the people, however, was largely voluntary. The king's person was not inviolate. If the strong men of his rule decided that he was not good enough for his position, they simply attacked him in his tent or hall and killed him, setting up another. The king had no officials save the members of his own household, whose



authority among the people was unstable and irregular. There were no taxes, the court officers received no pay, and the army served for nothing. Even the king had to depend on his private estates. We see, accordingly, that among the Teutons life, thought, and institutions were as simple and rude as we should expect in the case of any barbarian people.

When we come to their religion, we find the same thing true. Nowhere can we discover anything beyond a primitive stage of nature-worship. This worship was centered about sacred trees, groves, and springs. Usually there were no temple structures at all; and, where there were, they were of the most primitive type. There was no regular order of priesthood, like the Druids among the Kelts, though there were a few professional priests, who also served as interpreters of oracles and weavers of magic spells. The sacred offices, however, were not confined to professional priests, but could be performed by almost anyone, especially old men and women. The principal gods were Tyr, Thor, and Odin, and the earth-mother Freya. There was no well-developed pantheon. The various gods, greater or lesser, were not definitely differentiated from each other. Tyr, Thor, and Odin were all war-gods, of different rank and importance at different times and places. About these gods there was a luxuriant growth of mythology. The form in which we have that mythology today, however, was not completed till about the tenth century. Neither dread nor formalism entered as important elements into Teutonic religion. The gods, indeed, were supposed to be angry at times, and cause famine and plague and defeat, but, as a rule, they were objects of trust and affection, while their acknowledged favoritism was not imputed to them an injustice. The religion was as the life of the people, spontaneous, primitive, joyous, without a conscience, and as far removed from the morbid broodings of Augustine as the warrior-king Clovis was from the effeminate sun-priest Elagabalus.

Among the people of the new nations there was no spontaneous religious quest. There is not the least evidence that



there was any dissatisfaction with the prevailing religion, or any reaching out after some higher form of worship or belief. In fact, men usually had other things than religion to engage their attention. Whenever there was a call for it, the old would do well enough. If it had depended upon the Teuton's own awakening to the sense of need for a new religion, the Christianization of Europe would probably have been delayed for many centuries. But there were other influences at work which made his acceptance of the new religion only a matter of time. These influences were not so much the religion itself as the culture and power it represented. The barbarians were impressed with the former grandeur and sway of Rome. They admired its magnificent buildings, its far-reaching organizations, and its ancient culture. In the presence of these things, they felt like awkward school-boys. Traders were constantly bringing them articles of luxury from the southern wonderland; wars and embassies likewise brought them in touch with the greater civilization. They realized that the old power of Rome had fallen; but, instead of that, there had sprung up a mysterious order of priesthood, which was everywhere penetrating into the courts of kings, and, though never a sword was found in its possession, it yet wielded an immense power. The barbarian nations of Europe were not blind to these facts; and they were ambitious. They had long ago cut their old moorings, what they wanted now was more power and more life. They were willing to learn, willing to adopt everything that was necessary to this end. The political scheme of Europe favored Christianity. So the missionaries found a fruitful field.

## II. THE DIFFERENT FORMS OF CHRISTIANITY.

The study of primitive Christianity holds for us a perpetual charm: there is so much in it rings true and genuine, that will appeal strongly to every age. But primitive Christianity also includes some elements that do not appeal so much to us. Like the actual religion of any period of time, it was a



mixture of the good and the questionable, and, to an extent, of the bad. However this be, primitive Christianity was eminently fitted for the times, and made its way to triumphant success against tremendous odds.

Religion has been described as a driving force in the life of men not unlike that of the life-stream itself. A study of the evolution of culture bears out this proposition. As in the case of other vital powers, we may expect that the force of religion grows in intensity at times, while at others it wanes. Such a period of intensity we may almost with certainty find in a form of religion when it has just come into being. This was the case of Christianity in the first and second centuries: it was a vital power in the freshness of its youth. The Church then was still close to the personality of Jesus. The quality of influence a strong personality has over those who come into immediate contact with it, cannot be estimated. But we know that life begets life, and that that again transmits itself, and so on in an endless chain. Thus the life of Jesus was still the master power in the persons of his followers. As over against the insipid existence of the pagan world at the time, the Christians were filled with an intense enthusiasm. Even the Alexandrian Clement, the cultured Greek and long-winded philosopher, felt it above all else. One whole book of his (the *Protrepticus*) resolves itself into a song. He writes jubilantly of the divine love of men, warm and active, "cleansing, saving and kindly," which offers freedom instead of slavery, and salvation instead of death—a salvation which, "though one should measure out all Pactolus, the mythic river of gold, he could not pay a price equal to it." Christians everywhere were filled with a calm earnestness that none but philosophers had previously attained. They met great crises with a confidence that astounded the pagan onlookers. When it becomes a common thing for even slaves to attain the spiritual balance and self-possession that wise men have often striven for in vain, it is a sign that there is a vital power working within them. But the effects of this new power were seen not only in the direc-



tion of culture—they went decidedly beyond the culture limit. The early Christians delighted in ecstasies. This may be attributed to their soul-possessing enthusiasm. Inspired addresses, prophecies, prayers and hymns, speaking with “tongues,” visions of the Spirit, and casting out of dæmons—these things were common everywhere, and often were attended with a good deal of turmoil. Many Christians measured their religion by these tumultuous manifestations. To the credit of the sound religion within the Church, however, it must be said, all the wiser minds looked upon them with suspicion, insisting strongly upon moral regeneration as the final proof of true discipleship (see Paul, Didache, Clemens Romanus, Barnabas, Shepherd of Hermas, Aristides). Christian morality was so thorough and widespread that the pagans frequently remarked about it. Our best two pagan authorities concerning the early Christians, Pliny and Celsus, agree in their testimony on this point. The commandment of love that Jesus had given to his disciples was being obeyed with zeal. A system of benevolences rapidly developed that impelled even selfish Rome to follow tardily Christianity’s example.

The Christian religion of the first and second centuries was a religion that found its expression in the lives of men. At first there was no outward organization at all. The organization only gradually grew, according as the needs of the rapidly increasing social groups demanded some external bond. Still at the end of the second century was the place of the individual first—the Church had not yet usurped that place. A man was a Christian by virtue of his relation with Christ, not because he was connected with the Church. Christianity reached deep then. There was no hand of outward constraint as in later days, but an inner spiritual power which entered into the depths of a man’s soul and transformed his whole life. It meant much to be a Christian then—sacrifices beyond the reach of our imagination—so it could not help but be prized as a personal possession for its own sake. Well might they rejoice in all their tribulations, for they had attained to, at one grand



flight, all that the blundering quest of centuries had failed to bring to the restless, world-weary heathen! Theirs, with joy-giving certainty, was the one living God, in whose presence all other deities were but dæmons or shadows; the great loving personality of Jesus as Saviour and only Judge, whose resurrection had made the bliss of eternal life an unchangeable reality for them; and the central ruling Spirit in their hearts that made the peace and self-control which the pagan vainly sought come into being as though without effort! As in the later Church, the early Christians also had their authority which they fell back upon. They demanded an unquestioning faith in Christ and the apostles. Yet it was not an authority maintained by an iron hand; rather one that was followed because it was loved, because it had already done so much for men that it could be trusted in every circumstance. Harnack says that Christianity was a *complexio oppositorum*. On the one hand, it demanded a blind faith; on the other, it was constantly maintained to be "the reasonable service of God." From Paul on, through the long line of apologists, all Christian writers delighted to show how the new religion abounded in intellectual truth and lucidity, and how polytheism was beside it as darkness, from which Christ came to deliver men. While Christianity was maintained to be above reason, or rather to transcend reason, it was shown to be not contrary to reason. The Christians held themselves strictly apart from what they regarded as the contaminating influences of the world. The inwardness of their religion manifested itself in every act of their daily lives. Their homes were havens of peace and joy in the midst of a world of discontent and vice. What impression one of them could make upon an open-minded pagan as he first found himself under its benign influence, is described in Pater's *Marius*: "As he passed through the various chambers, great and small, one dominant thought increased upon him—the thought of chaste women and their children; of the various affections of the family life amid its most natural conditions, but developed, in devout imitation of some



sublime new type of it, into great controlling passions. There reigned throughout, an order and purity, an orderly disposition, as if by way of making ready for some gracious spousals."

The early Christian Church was not of carefully-tended hot-house growth. The new religion had to stand on its own feet, it had no aid but that of its own intrinsic merit in making its way. It came in a time, too, when men regarded it with critical eye, comparing it with the cultural abundance they already had. Not only did Christianity not receive any external aid, but it soon met with strenuous opposition. There were times when the adherents of the new religion were persecuted beyond the limits of ordinary human endurance. It could not hope to gather converts into its fold through any prestige or favor of the powers-that-be. It could offer neither riches nor high position: often it could promise only persecution and sacrifice. But these conditions served but to strengthen its own inner life: persecution and martyrdom deepened the hunted ones' spirituality; the uncertainty with which they held their worldly possessions schooled them in the unimportance and vanity of property; the constant abuse to which they were subjected for their conscience's sake taught them the lesson of long-suffering even as Christ had learned it. Thus to the vitality of youth, and the spiritual inwardness was added the power that comes from having to force one's way through difficulties. Such was the religion that went out to meet the decadent paganism of the first and second centuries, with the aim to supply its most urgent need.

The Christianity of the early Middle Ages was an entirely different institution from that of ancient times. It was no longer new, and had lost much of its youthful force. In the old days it had come as a stranger, begging admission into a field already over-supplied with occupants. Now it was in the field, and had crowded out its early rivals. Every citizen of the state was in the fold of the Church as a matter of course. To the many, Christianity had reduced itself into a custom, whose different observances belonged to the ordinary course of



life just as did eating and sleeping and obedience to the edicts of the government. In this respect it was not unlike the ancient national cults before the great religious unrest had set in. There was no more opposition to it; it had stepped into the first place among the institutions of men, and no one dared, or thought about questioning its primacy. Already back in the reign of Theodosius (about 390 A.D.), the last visible vestiges of paganism had been destroyed, and whoever now desired to continue under its darksome influence had to do so under cover of loyal membership in the Christian Church. When Hypatia, a woman of great eloquence and rare modesty and beauty, combined with remarkable intellectual gifts, had the courage to stand up in the face of the Christian world and proclaim a pagan philosophy, even though it was of an exceedingly refined nature, she was torn to pieces by a mob of the streets. The well-organized Church was possessed of a high authority. The word of the bishops was heeded more readily than that of the magistrates. The state itself, as such, backed it in every move. The old national religions used to have the support of the political institutions, but never had a religion the strength of secular power attendant upon it to enforce its decrees as did the Christian hierarchy of the Middle Ages.

It was but natural that this importance of the institution of the Church had grown only at the expense of the free personal religion of the individual. Instead of a deepening of spirituality, such as immediate relations with Christ and God are bound to foster, the energy of men was directed to the outward developments of religion, thus perfecting the dress at the expense of the soul. We must say, however, that this development of the outward expressions of religion was beautifully and thoroughly done. It can scarcely be called a decline *in toto*; religion does not seem able to exist long without some outward forms that are definite and reasonably permanent. Especially was this true in the age of which we are speaking: men were entirely incapable of maintaining any spirituality at all without some external guide to lean upon. In the three



great departments of religious activity, organization, belief, and ritual, the advance toward definition and fixity had been made. From the position of elderly advisors and presiding officers, the bishops had grown to be men of power, who were the rulers of extensive ecclesiastical organizations, administering their properties, determining their policies, directing their work, and maintaining an unquestioned sway over every detail in the lives of the numerous members. Belief had been crystallized into a series of dogmas, which every member had to accept as his own or be liable to the charge of heresy. The ritual had been elaborated and fixed into definite form, given a large measure of significance and efficacy, and put entirely in the hands of properly ordained officers that its correctness might be assured. The ministry had come to be an order of their own, representative of God rather than of the body of believers, and dependent upon themselves alone for its perpetuation. The duties that remained for the lay members were obedience to the ministry and faithful attendance at the ritual services. Naturally, in this development, which was all from the internal to the external, the Church received great aid from the lingering paganism that was still in the hearts of most of its people. Neo-Platonism and the beliefs out of which it grew furnished two elements without which Roman Catholicism would have been impossible. The first of these was the idea of mediation. This opened the way for the interposition of a priestly hierarchy between the people and their source of salvation, and made room for the worship of saints and the Virgin Mary. The second element was that of magic. It was this belief alone which enabled the Church to make its sacraments the central point in religious worship, convincing the people that they were the sole means of grace. It was this latter hold that enabled the Church to dictate to all Europe for a thousand years what it was to do and what it was to abstain from. Thus Christianity had become institutionalized, externalized, and paganized. The Church was far away from the simple religion of Chris-



tianity's Founder. Personal religion had, in the meantime, fallen into corresponding decay. There was still considerable piety to be found among such as made that a specialty, but even that lacked naturalness and spontaneity. The enthusiasm and ecstasies so prevalent among the common Christians of the ancient Church were gone. Vestiges of the old moral test remained, but the rule was almost as much of a divorce between religion and morals as had been the case among the pagans. What use was there in emphasizing morals when the sacramental system was all-sufficient? The fascinating personal influence that had attracted so many pagans when Christianity was still new also was gone. Instead, there was a new influence, and one, we are obliged to say, which was a far greater attraction to the heathen conquerors of Europe than the other could have been—that is, the influence exerted by the Church's external magnificence. After the Western Empire had fallen, its splendor was transferred to the Church. As the Empire had been aforetime, so now the Church loomed up in grandeur above all other institutions. And, even like in the Empire, this grandeur extended into every detail where organization and elaboration could be applied.

Of course, it is to be expected that such an institution should have an immense prestige. From the time of Constantine, the Church had maintained a close relationship with the state. Churchmen were the highest advisors of the emperors and kings; many of them held important state positions. After the barbarian conquest of Rome the same situation continued: the rude Teuton Emperors always had their bishops at their elbows, highly respecting them for their superior intelligence as much as for their religious office. For young men of ambition, there was no sphere so promising as that of the Church. To quote Richard: "Outside of the Church there was no prospect of advancement; whoever wanted to be somebody had to be a Christian." Further, it is to be said, whoever wanted to command any power in the state, unless he should happen to be of a royal line, had to do it from the bishop's chair. The



church revenues, by dint of careful administration and continual accessions, had grown to an immense property, so that, by the beginning of our period, the Church had become the greatest landowner in all southern Europe. In general, promotion to a bishop's stool meant merely entry into a large fortune. One of the historians significantly speaks of an Italian bishop as "country gentleman, philosopher, and bishop." Too often the office was sought for the political power it granted to the one who held it. Owing to his position at the seat of the old Roman Empire, and the distance which separated him from the powerful eastern bishops, and his own pretensions, the bishop of Rome had gradually come into a position of leadership in Western Europe. He had come to take the place, to a large measure, of the Emperor of old time. Consequently a regular king's court had grown up around him, and considerable business of state was transacted there. Embassies from secular courts were received, and delegates sent back to them. All this was very unchurchly, according to our conceptions. It was so to some contemporaries. The writer Ammianus Marcellinus waxes scornful over the episcopal splendor and extravagance at Rome. Nevertheless, the fact remained the same that the Roman pope was a political power, and that his influence reached out into every country of Europe that put any pretensions to civilization, especially so in the West. Those who were still outside the Christian pale were not blind to this fact.

### III. THE MISSIONS.

The first missionaries of the ancient Church were the apostles. The zeal within them drove them to preach the new faith soon after the Master had disappeared from their midst. Before many years had passed they had spread far and wide, traveling over a large portion of the Empire. For a long time, they remained what we might call the official missionaries of the Church. However, they were not official in any strict sense. Their mission was self-appointed, save in so far as they



were obeying the commands and the spirit of their now-departed Master. But, if they were not sent out by any home board or ecclesiastical authority, they were nevertheless looked up to with great respect by all the groups of Christians that sprang up in the various parts of the Empire, and their sayings were heeded with much care. We have every reason to believe that all of the apostles were constantly active in this work until the time of their several deaths. That tradition assigned to them, almost without exception, the death of martyrs, is of itself an indication in this direction. Martyrdom, in the early period, was in almost every case preceded and provoked by intense activity in the work of the Gospel. Of the details of most of the apostles' work, however, we have little authoritative information. There is only one whose missionary career we can trace with any degree of definiteness throughout its whole course, and he did not happen to be one of the original Twelve. But we must remember that it is to a large degree Paul's own writings that enable us to do this, and that the author of the one New Testament historical book, "The Acts," happened to be one of Paul's own personal friends. The Twelve whom Jesus had gathered about himself were anything but men of letters; nor was literary activity a matter of primary importance in the early days, when men were influenced in favor of the new religion largely by personal contact. Accordingly, it is perhaps too hasty a judgment to consider Paul as uniquely the "missionary apostle," as many have done. It would have been impossible for a movement, which sprang so quickly into prominence in all parts of the Empire, and that almost simultaneously, to have been the work of one man. Rather, we should give to all the apostles each his share of the credit, assuming, as tradition indicates, that they went out severally as opportunity offered, though possessed with the same spirit and zeal.

But the apostles were not the only missionaries. In the first years of Christianity, all Christians were missionaries. They were filled with zeal for the "Good News," and, naturally,



they had to tell about it to their friends and neighbors. Much of the pioneer work was done by these lesser lights of the Gospel, the greater number of whom are entirely unknown to us. At Antioch, where we are told the disciples were first called Christians, there was already a church before any of the apostles reached it. Likewise at Rome there grew up a church as a result of the work of these unknown laborers. When Paul reached the capital city for the first time, he found himself in the midst of a communion of Christians. So, we may suppose, were the beginnings in many another city, whose early church history we do not have, not even in hints or fragments. In connection with the work of Paul, we learn of a number of prominent and influential missionary workers, as Barnabas, Silas, Apollos, Aquila and Priscilla, Mark and Timothy. Had it not been for their connection with the work of Paul, it is not likely that we should know anything about these individuals. And still, all these notices are incidental: there are indications of numerous other co-laborers with Paul who are not mentioned by name at all. For instance, during the lifetime of Paul there grew up in the Province of Asia a church of considerable extent, as is shown by the apostle's letters to the Ephesians and the Colossians, and by the later extent of those churches. This must have been the work largely of fellow-workers of Paul, since the two years that he is reported to have spent at Ephesus would hardly have been sufficient to evangelize the whole province. From these facts we may gather that, while the apostles served as leaders in the missionary movement in the early church, the bulk of the work was done by others, of less fame to our day, but of similar spirituality and enthusiasm.

As before indicated, at the beginning every Christian felt himself called to be a missionary. It was not long, however, until there came about a differentiation between those capable of carrying on an active propaganda and those not so gifted. The large body of the Christians in any place continued in their accustomed occupations and daily round of life, only



coming together at stated intervals for their common worship; while those who had proved themselves fitted for the larger work were pressed into the field of constant missionary activity by their own inclinations or the urging of their fellow-Christians. Thus there grew up an itinerant missionary "hierarchy," ordered according to their several gifts as "first apostles, secondly prophets, thirdly teachers." These men traveled from place to place, performing the double function of making new converts and preaching to the church already gathered. There was nothing like system in this work; there was no central authority to determine who the ministry should be or which of them should constitute the various orders, or to map out the itinerary of any one of them. A man's standing was determined largely by his fame for piety and power, or the authority with which he had been clothed by collaboration with some apostle. The local churches, however, needed some officers who could take permanent charge of their affairs: we learn of elders or presbyters being appointed for this work even in the early ministry of Paul. Their work for a time remained chiefly administrative. Gradually, however, they absorbed also the teaching functions. By the end of the second century the local officers, who had now become differentiated into the orders of bishops, presbyters, and deacons, were the sole ministry of the Church, and the wandering missionaries had been displaced. Extensive mission work had now, for the most part, ceased, although there was still an active intensive work carried on by the local ministry.

The missionaries of the early Church came from various ranks and conditions in society, though, as a rule, from the middle or well-to-do class. Many of them had a good education, as Paul and Apollos, and some had considerable means. It is not likely that many of the missionaries came from the lowest classes, though Christianity as a church received many recruits from this source. Nor do we know of any of high rank until late in our period. In general, we may suppose, the missionaries were men of such standing that people of all



ranks felt free to listen to them without compromising their dignity, and yet such as did not give them undue influence of the type that high position brings. Preeminently, we may say, the early missionaries were men who could talk to men as men, bringing a message which made its appeal to their humanity alone. It was an age of culture and thought, when people considered the inner reasons of things rather than their outward glamour. Men with a message were eagerly listened to, no matter who they were. The Christian missionaries were men with a message, and for that reason alone did they gain attention. The spirit with which they came fitted admirably to the situation: they had little desire to attract attention to themselves; their aim was rather to serve as pointers, directing men to the "Good News."

This leads us to the question of the motives of the early missionaries. As said before, they were not officially sent out, as our missionaries to-day, or even those of medieval times. They went of their own accord, impelled by an inner motive force, answering to the call of God and the need of their fellow-men alone. They went with no idea of wordly gain, for the living they gained was but meager, while, on the other hand, the career was filled with risks and hardships. Nor could they go with the confidence bred by the backing of a mighty visible institution, whose name they were fighting and to whose glory they were to add, as could the medieval missionaries. Men always seem to be able to fight better and more heroically if they represent some invincible power and if they have something tangible to struggle for. But these missionaries had little moral support but that which the Spirit put into their hearts and they had little hope but for that which the Spirit would work in the hearts of those who should hear them. Consequently we find in these simple preachers of the Word a singular purity of motive. Paul writes to the Corinthians: "Wherefore we also make it our aim, whether at home or absent, to be well-pleasing unto the Lord. For whether we are beside ourselves, it is unto God; or whether we are of sober



mind, it is unto you. For the love of Christ constraineth us." Here we have the soul-stirring motive of the early missionaries. They were the possessors of new truth which they could not keep to themselves; they were filled with a new life whose glory they needs must speak about to others. Like all great pioneers of mankind's advancement—Confucius, Zarathustra, Socrates, Wiclif, Huss, Savonarola, Copernicus, Galileo, Columbus, Zinzendorf, Lessing, Tolstoi, and the rest—their motive was an all-absorbing idea, whose essence was their very life, and which urged them into the stream of the world's movement no matter what the cost.

Of the message these missionaries brought, Harnack says: "On the one hand, it was so simple that it could be summed up in a few brief sentences and understood in a single crisis of the inner life; on the other hand, it was so versatile and rich, that it vivified all thought and stimulated every emotion." The content of this message has been admirably analyzed by the same author. It proclaimed "the only God, the spiritual power upon whom all things depend; Jesus Christ, God's son, who had come from heaven, died for man's sins, rose, and brought us salvation, freedom from demons, sin and death, and gave life eternal; protested against idols, the belief in blind fate, and atheism; and declared the uselessness of all sacrifice, temples, and all worship of man's devising, implying the futility of a present life which lies exposed to future judgment." This message brought to men all that the age was so eagerly looking for: news of the one living God, of salvation, and of freedom from the horrors of a superstition which, as Cicero says, "follows you up, is hard upon you, pursues you wherever you turn." It brought to the listless world a new enthusiasm to stir the soul, something real to live for, to die for, if necessary. Christianity came to men looking upon them as sick of soul, and offering renewal for that soul. The great attractive power of the new religion lay in the fact that it offered certainty of salvation. The message of the missionaries was preeminently that of salvation—salvation of the



soul by union with Christ the undying one, salvation of the world by the coming of the millennial Kingdom, salvation of the mind by freedom from superstition and the active casting out of "demons," and salvation of the body by healing. There was something attractive for all: whether the rich or the poor; whether the philosophic or the men of simple mind. All were in need of salvation in some form, and Christianity stood ready to provide them all. The impression this new message made upon the heathen is characteristically described by Uhlhorn: "In the barren wilderness of Heathenism where men had sought and dug for water so long that at last they were in despair of finding any, now welled freshly forth the fountain of living water springing up into everlasting life, and thus many a soul among the heathen thirsting for truth, many a seeker after wisdom in the schools of the philosophers, in the temples of gods the most diverse, or in Jewish houses of prayer, found here his deepest longing satisfied."

The Church grew up in the midst of a people homogeneous with its own, and therefore was itself the greatest missionary influence. Men who were still heathen came into daily contact with the Christians; often their own friends and relatives, or even their boon companions of former times, were counted among the strange group. They met them in business relations, at their daily work, on the roads of travel, at times of persecution. All had opportunity to see what the new life meant to the converts. They could see everywhere evidences of a changed life—of a people who had gained their life quest, who had gained a calm satisfaction, and a lasting peace. A new morality had developed, as it seemed, spontaneously; the pure, consistent morals of the converts were a source of continual wonder to thoughtful pagans, who had written book after book on the subject of conduct, and yet found it a difficult, if not impossible, task to live out their precepts. Now and then they gained a vision of the beautiful home life of the Christians, where love, purity and sobriety blended in a charming harmony. Those who found admission to their common



gatherings were impressed by the chaste zeal there displayed. After the conflict of Christianity with the Empire had begun, the pagans had further opportunity to observe the quality of the new religion. The martyrs from the highest rank down to the very lowest, displayed a steadfastness, a confidence, and even a calmness which were incomprehensible to the onlookers. Officiating soldiers, executioners, some of the judges themselves, are reported to have been converted at this moving sight. Then there were still other influences, all of a subtle character, which contributed their share in the winning of those who were on the outside. There were the continual deeds of kindness and the systematic charity for the poor and the suffering which men could not but admire. The marvels of healing which were frequently accomplished by Christian leaders attracted many. The mysteries of baptism and the Lord's Supper, which gradually developed into some elaborateness, also made their appeal; for mysteries of similar nature in the pagan religions were popular. The kindly influence of love itself must not be forgotten. Many a man found himself in difficulty; it may have been that he had lost his way in his soul's quest, or it may have been merely a matter of material environment or bodily ailment: the Christians were ever ready to help him. Even if it was an enemy, if once he was down in distress himself, willing hands came gladly to his aid. That counted in the making of new converts. Lastly, we may consider the prospect of an ever-enlarging Church which was constantly before the pagan's eye. Celsus saw it, and feared for his country; Aurelius remarked it, and set about to suppress it. But there were also many whose candid minds forbade hasty condemnation. Where there is a movement of such cumulative success, there must be something of real value underlying it—this is a natural thought. Consequently the fair-minded set about an investigation, hoping that haply they might find something there that would be of value also to themselves. Many were started on the new road in this way. All these factors may be regarded as unconscious influences in



the Christianizing of the Roman Empire, for, while not entirely unconscious always, they were influences over and above that swayed by the men who went out on a distinctly missionary errand.

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(To be concluded.)



## VI.

### A REVIEW OF *THE PROBLEM OF CHRISTIANITY*.

RAY H. DOTTERER.

This recent book from the pen of Josiah Royce, professor of philosophy in Harvard University, contains in two volumes a double series of lectures delivered at Manchester College, Oxford, and repeated in part before the Lowell Institute in Boston. The work is written in fulfilment of a promise made in the author's volume on *The Sources of Religious Insight*, to apply the principles there laid down to the special case of Christianity. It is the result of studies whose first outcome appeared in 1908 in *The Philosophy of Loyalty*. The metaphysical basis is essentially the same as that defended in Professor Royce's earlier works, notably in *The World and the Individual*. The author protests against the usual classification of himself and kindred thinkers as "Hegelians," affirming that he might with more truth be called a disciple of Schopenhauer than of Hegel. Furthermore, he tells us<sup>1</sup> that he owes more to our American logician Charles Peirce, to whom as the "Father of Pragmatism," William James also acknowledged himself to be indebted, than even to the common tradition of recent idealism.

In the preface of the work under review the following are stated as some of its principal theses:

I. "Christianity is, in its essence, the most typical, and, so far in human history, the most highly developed religion of loyalty."

II. "Loyalty itself is a perfectly concrete form and interest of the spiritual life of mankind."

<sup>1</sup> Preface, p. xi.



III. "This very fact about the meaning and the value of universal loyalty is one which the Apostle Paul learned in and from the social and religious life of the early Christian communities, and then enriched and transformed through his own work as missionary and teacher."

IV. "Whatever may hereafter be the fortunes of Christian institutions, or of Christian traditions, the religion of loyalty, the doctrine of the salvation of the otherwise hopelessly lost individual through devotion to the life of the genuinely real and Universal Community, must survive, and must direct the future both of religion and of mankind, if man is to be saved at all."<sup>2</sup>

In the introduction the author names as the "leading and essential" "Christian Ideas": I, "The Idea of the 'Community' (historically represented by the Church)"; II, "The Idea of the 'Lost State of the Natural Man'"; III, "The Idea of 'Atonement,' together with the somewhat more general Idea of 'Saving Grace.'"

As the entire work includes over nine hundred pages, it is manifestly impossible in the space at my disposal to summarize its contents by chapters even in the briefest manner possible. I believe it will prove more satisfactory if I restrict myself to a discussion of the author's three "leading and essential" Ideas, as given above. This discussion will take the form of an exposition of the author's thought, together with some words of criticism and appraisal, which may at least serve to set forth the chief positions of our author in clear relief.

#### I. THE UNIVERSAL COMMUNITY.

The first of the "Christian Ideas" is that of "The Universal Community." An historical embodiment of the community is the church; but, in Royce's opinion, the historical church is only one form of the community.<sup>3</sup> Any cause to which a man devotes his life in coöperation with others, even such a cause as scientific research, is for him a religious cause,

<sup>2</sup> Preface, pp. xviii, f.

<sup>3</sup> II, pp. 430 ff.



and the association of devotees is a church. The author nowhere clearly says so, but it would seem to follow that a labor-union, a socialist local, a fraternal order, in fact any organization which evokes loyalty, might be called a religious organization.

The doctrine of the Universal Community depends upon the psychological hypothesis of Wundt and others that a group of men—as, for example, a nation, an athletic team, a well-trained orchestra—possesses a common mind, and is thus a personal self in exactly the same sense as any individual is a self.<sup>4</sup> There are thus, affirms our author, "two levels of human existence."<sup>5</sup> On the lower "level" is the consciousness of the individual,—my mind and thy mind and the minds of our neighbors. On the higher "level" is the consciousness of the community, which transcends and yet includes and somehow thinks in and through the ordinary human consciousness.<sup>6</sup> In a quite literal sense, the consciousness of the community is thus superhuman.

In his last book—*The Pluralistic Universe*—William James adopted the hypothesis of the "compounding of consciousness." According to this hypothesis, just as each cell in the human body, or at least each cell in the cerebral cortex, may be assumed to possess a consciousness of its own, and these little minds, so to speak, may then be assumed to be compounded in order to produce the consciousness of the individual man, as we know it; so the minds of the members of a group, and indeed of the whole Universal Community may be assumed to interpenetrate and thus to produce a higher mind which includes them all. In his *Psychology* James had strenuously opposed this "mind-stuff theory," as he called it, but just before the close of his philosophic career, influenced by Fechner and Bergson, he adopted it as "in certain cases an empirically verifiable fact,—or, at all events, an irresistible hypothesis."<sup>7</sup>

<sup>4</sup> I, pp. 64 f.; II, pp. 26 ff.

<sup>5</sup> I, pp. 164 ff., 405.

<sup>6</sup> II, 29.

<sup>7</sup> II, 31 ff.



This view may be expressed in a somewhat different way as follows: In each person we may distinguish a subconscious from a conscious mind. The conscious mind feels itself to be distinct from all other conscious minds; but subconsciously all are one with each other, and with the Universal Mind that transcends and yet is immanent in them all. It might seem to the ordinary reader, unaccustomed to nice philosophic distinctions, that there is little difference between this view and that of Royce. Yet he refuses to commit himself to the doctrine of the compounding of consciousness, which he calls "a mystical doctrine." He asserts that the "Community," in his sense of the term, is not "mystical." It is not a fusion of selves at the present moment,<sup>8</sup> but rather consists in a common recollection of past experiences and a common expectation of future experiences. Men are associated in "communities of memory" and "communities of hope."<sup>9</sup>

The author illustrates this doctrine by a discussion of Paul's use of the resurrection as a means of clarifying the social consciousness of the churches.<sup>10</sup> The common recollection of the resurrection of Christ constituted each congregation a "community of memory," and the expectation of a common resurrection or transformation of all its members made of it a "community of hope." Not then by a breaking down of the partition walls between individual consciousnesses, but by an ideal extension of each into a common past and a common future is Royce's community to be constituted. The essential point is that each shall know himself to be a member of a larger self, which he feels to be of greater value than himself, and toward which he entertains the sentiment of whole-hearted, thoroughgoing devotion which our author calls "loyalty." The community is thus a creation of "interpretation."

Four chapters—the heart of the second volume—are devoted to a discussion of the metaphysical basis of the Universal Community. This discussion, important though it is, must be treated very briefly.

<sup>8</sup> II, 35.<sup>9</sup> II, 36 ff.<sup>10</sup> II, 69 ff.



The theory of knowledge has been dominated by the contrast between perception and conception. According to Plato conception is the higher form, while according to Bergson conceptions are only a sort of credit currency which derives its value solely from the possibility of exchanging it for the cash of perception. Idealists and empiricists have been at one in emphasizing the contrast between these two cognitive processes, and in refusing to admit the existence of any other. Royce, however, following Charles Peirce, affirms the existence of a third cognitive process, which he calls "interpretation." Only by interpretation, in this sense, can one understand the meaning of what comes to him from beyond the boundary of his own mind. Peirce's process of "interpretation" is essentially the same, under social conditions, as the process of comparison within the mind of the individual. The latter, in fact, represents the limit which the former seeks as its goal, but never reaches. The goal of interpretation is to unite various minds into a community of understanding comparable to the insight which unifies various ideas in the mind of the individual.

Recognition of the existence of other selves implies such an act of interpretation. The world is such an interpretation. It cannot be perceived, or deduced from concepts, but like another self, is known only by interpretation. In fact, Royce holds that the existence of the Universal Community, in the sense of a mind which transcends and includes all finite minds, is as capable of verification as the existence of other finite minds beside my own. Both indeed must be verified by the same process of "interpretation."

It may seem a little surprising that in enumerating the "leading and essential" ideas of Christianity our author omits the idea of God. This omission is only apparent, however; for, although Royce does not in this work lay very much stress on the thought, I believe we are safe in saying that the "Community" is in his philosophical terminology equivalent to "God" in our ordinary way of speaking. At any rate the "Spirit of the Community" is identified with the Holy Ghost



of the Apostles Creed.<sup>11</sup> Whether true or false, however, I fear that such a conception of God, as the Absolute Mind, is too *attenuated* to be of much value in the religious thinking of most men, and the chief value of Royce's doctrine of the community will be found to consist in the basis which it gives for the gospel of salvation through loyalty. Whether or not we can think of the Universal Community as we have been wont to think of God; whether or not we are willing to admit the validity of the hypothesis of a community even of more limited extent in the Roycean sense of a Superhuman Self, or a "higher level of human existence" (and the hypothesis is of doubtful validity, to say the least), we may profit by his eloquent advocacy of the virtue of loyalty to family, to church, to country, to the various causes to which men ought to devote themselves.

## II. THE LOST STATE OF THE NATURAL MAN.

While our author has probably carried most of us with him in his general doctrine of the community (excepting perhaps some of its theological and metaphysical implications), he seems to part company with modern thought in his doctrine of the "Lost State of the Natural Man." He himself suggests more or less seriously as a definition of the term "modern man," "One who does not believe in Hell, and who is too busy to think about his own sins."<sup>12</sup> The modern mind has reacted against the Puritan tendency to brood over sin, and it is indeed a little surprising to have one of our foremost thinkers, who is neither a theologian nor a Christian apologist, affirm a doctrine sounding so similar to the traditional doctrines of "Original Sin" and "Total Depravity." To be sure, when in the heading of a chapter he gives the doctrine the more philosophic name, "The Moral Burden of the Individual," the similarity to the traditional doctrine is not so evident; for this phrase suggests merely the idea of the imperfection of the individual

<sup>11</sup> II, 14.

<sup>12</sup> I, 236.



*qua* individual. The individual's "burden" is the task of becoming a loyal member of the community. The preliminary statement of the doctrine is as follows:

"The individual human being is by nature subject to some overwhelming moral burden from which, if unaided, he cannot escape. Both because of what has technically been called original sin, and because of the sins that he himself has committed, the individual is doomed to a spiritual ruin from which only a divine intervention can save him."<sup>13</sup>

The point of attachment to Pauline Christianity is found in those statements in the Epistle to the Romans of the manner in which "the law" causes "transgressions" "to abound," and causes "sin" to be "known." This is true, of course, not of transgression or sin as measured by some objective standard of duty, or as defined by utilitarian considerations, but of sin in the subjective sense, as a conscious falling short from the standard which one has set for himself. Social experience proves that "the law" is a factor in the development of self consciousness.<sup>14</sup> The social cultivation of the conscience is a training in self-will.

Primitive morality, although from the objective standpoint almost perfect, was from the subjective point of view well-nigh unconscious, or, to use the current term, subconscious. The individual did not so much act, as *he was acted by* the family, the clan, or the tribe. Accordingly in primitive morals,—as shown, for example, in ideas of blood-revenge,—the group rather than the individual was held responsible for any act of aggression. Individualism in the modern sense was unknown among primitive peoples. In the nations that made history, however, as Greece and Israel, individualism after a time began to displace the primitive subconscious collectivism.<sup>15</sup> When once the individual has become conscious of self, occasions frequently arise in which he is aware of an opposition between his will and the will of the group to which he belongs. The

<sup>13</sup> I, 111.

<sup>14</sup> I, 145 ff.

<sup>15</sup> I, 146.



group will is the law; the feeling of opposition to it is the sense of sin. In proportion as the group is driven to formulate its demands upon the individual, the sense of sin deepens. Thus "the law" causes "the transgression to abound." Through "the law" men learn to know "sin." Primitive peoples conform almost perfectly to their standards of morality, but the practice of civilized and enlightened peoples lags far behind their ideals. Now the principle which Royce emphasizes, and which is the basis of Paul's view of the law, is the principle that the cultivation of conscience, and the attempt to lead self-conscious and intelligent men by means of ideals, constantly increases the burden of sin which the individual must bear. The more conscientious and intelligent the individual becomes, the heavier grows his burden.<sup>16</sup>

One of the characteristics of modern civilization is a tendency toward collectivism. This tendency is not, as might be supposed, due to any weakening of the self-will of the individual.<sup>17</sup> Rather is the opposite the case. The stronger and more assertive the wills of individuals, the more exacting the social will. Each advocates laws and ordinances intended to bind his neighbor. Thus are forged the fetters by which all are bound.

"What Paul's psychology, translated into modern terms, teaches, is that the moral self-consciousness of every one of us gets its cultivation from our social order through a process which begins by craftily awakening us, as the serpent did Eve, through critical observations, and which then fascinates our divided will by giving us the serpent's counsels, 'Ye shall be Gods.' This is the lore of all individualism, and the vice of all our worldly social ambitions. The resulting diseases of self-consciousness . . . increase with cultivation. The individual cannot escape from the results of them through any deed of his own."<sup>18</sup>

"What is the remedy? What is the escape? Paul's answer

<sup>16</sup> I, 157.

<sup>17</sup> I, 152 ff.

<sup>18</sup> I, 156 f.



is very simple. . . . Salvation comes through loyalty to a certain divinely instituted community. Loyalty involves an essentially new type of self-consciousness,—the consciousness of one who loves a community as a person. Not social training, but the miracle of this love, creates the new type of self-consciousness."<sup>19</sup> Loyalty is the only cure for the natural warfare of the collective and of the individual will,—a warfare which no moral cultivation without loyalty can ever end, but . . . only inflames and increases."<sup>20</sup>

### III. THE IDEA OF ATONEMENT.

"The human aspect of the Christian idea of atonement," says our author, "is based upon such motives that, if there were no Christianity and no Christians in the world, the idea of atonement would have to be invented, before the higher levels of our moral existence could be fairly understood."<sup>21</sup> Professor Royce takes as the starting point in his discussion of Atonement the "problem of the traitor." Two conditions determine what constitutes a traitor.<sup>22</sup> The first condition is that a man must have "had an ideal, and loved it with all his heart and his soul and his mind and his strength." The second condition is that he must "in at least one voluntary act of his life, have been deliberately false to his cause. So far as in him lay, he must, at least in that one act, have betrayed his cause." By this "deed of treason the traitor has consigned himself . . . to the *hell of the irrevocable*."<sup>23</sup>

This does not imply the condemnation of "the traitor or any one else to endless emotional horrors of remorse, or to any sensuous pangs of penalty or grief, or to any one set of emotions whatever."<sup>24</sup> This is, however, "the essential meaning which underlies the traditional doctrine of the endless penalty

<sup>19</sup> I, 157 f.

<sup>20</sup> I, 159.

<sup>21</sup> I, 271.

<sup>22</sup> I, 278.

<sup>23</sup> I, 263.

<sup>24</sup> I, 264.



of wilful sin. This deeper meaning is that, quite apart from the judgment of any of the gods, and wholly in accordance with the true rational will of the one who has done the deed of betrayal, the guilt of a free act of betrayal is as enduring as time." The traitor says to himself, "Such was my deed, and I did it."<sup>25</sup> No repentance, no pardoning power can deprive him of the duty and the precious privilege of saying that of his own deed.

"Can there be any reconciliation between this traitor and his own moral world?"<sup>26</sup> As he pronounces judgment on his own case the traitor can derive no satisfaction from the "penal satisfaction" theory of atonement. "Penal satisfaction?" "That," he will say, "may somehow interest the 'angry God' of one or another theologian. If so let this angry God be content, if he so chooses. That does not reconcile me. So far as penalty is concerned:

*"I was my own destroyer and will be my own hereafter! I asked for reconciliation with my own moral universe, not for the accidental pacification of some angry God. The 'penal satisfaction' offered by another is simply foreign to all the interests in the name of which I inquire."*<sup>27</sup>

Neither can the so-called "moral" theories help our traitor. "He discounts all that you can say as to the transforming pathos and the compelling power of love. . . . He knew love before he became a traitor."<sup>28</sup> "He is no mere prodigal son. His problem is that of the sin against the Holy Ghost."

The problem of the traitor may be viewed from a different standpoint,—from the standpoint of the injured community. "Can a genuinely spiritual community reconcile itself to the existence of traitors in its world?"<sup>29</sup> It is not a question of the remission of penalty, or even of the restoration of faith in the traitor's loyalty.<sup>30</sup> If the traitor's future attitude is of

<sup>25</sup> I, 267.

<sup>26</sup> I, 279.

<sup>27</sup> I, 286.

<sup>28</sup> I, 290.

<sup>29</sup> I, 295.

<sup>30</sup> I, 297.



the right sort, love may be restored, "but alas! this restored love will be the love for the member *who has been a traitor*." "The community cannot undo the traitor's deed, and cannot simply annul the now irrevocable fact of the evil which has been accomplished."<sup>31</sup> "The community, then, can *find* no reconciliation. Can it *make* one?"<sup>32</sup>

Our author holds that through the deed of a suffering servant, in whom the spirit of the community is incarnate, atonement may be made for the deed of the traitor. The atoning deed must be of such a kind that you can say, first, "This deed was made possible by that treason; and, secondly, *The world, as transformed by this creative deed, is better than it would have been had all else remained the same, but had that deed of treason not been done at all.*"<sup>33</sup>

A biblical illustration of such atonement is furnished by the story of Joseph and his brethren.<sup>34</sup> The family is broken by a wilful treason. Years go by and that very treason becomes the means of exalting its victim. He thereupon uses his power to provide for the welfare and honor of his family, and by his loving treatment of his brethren so brings together the shattered community, that all is seen to be better than it could have been if there had been no treason at all.

Our author maintains that in modern life it is quite conceivable, that just the loss and suffering occasioned by the deed of a traitor, might fit the victim of the deed of treachery to serve his community more efficiently, than he could have done, if he had not been made to suffer.

The Roycian doctrine of Atonement is ingenious, but hardly satisfactory. In the first place it must be said in all fairness that it is not identical with the Atonement of Christian tradition, because it does not attach any central significance to the work of Christ, or, in fact, to any particular event in history. With his customary accuracy in the use of words

<sup>31</sup> I, 302.

<sup>32</sup> I, 304.

<sup>33</sup> I, 308.

<sup>34</sup> I, 365 ff.



the author uniformly speaks, not of "*the* Atonement," but rather of "Atonement." Atonement is accordingly a process eternally continuing, a special aspect of the divine overruling of evil for good,—if, indeed, it is not to be equated absolutely with such providential overruling; while what tradition has known as "the Atonement," that is the saving work of Christ, or more narrowly viewed, His death upon the cross, is only a symbol, or a typical case of the more general process. The life of humanity has been characterized by such atoning deeds. In them the life of the Beloved Community culminates.

Atonement in the sense in which the term is employed by Royce differs further from the Atonement of Christian tradition in that it seems to have no application to the mass of men, but only to those rare individuals—*moral geniuses*, we may fairly call them—who are qualified to become traitors. It might I think be argued with a great deal of plausibility that no man who has found a Cause which he loved with "all his heart and all his soul and all his mind and all his strength," as our ideal traitor is supposed to have done, *could* conceivably thereafter turn traitor to this cause. At any rate for the mass of men, those who have not yet found their Cause, the only "Atonement" required, if Atonement of any sort is needed in their case, is that described by the so-called "moral" theories.

In regard, furthermore, to the argument based upon the case of the traitor, my mind is not clear in regard to at least two points. First, assuming the reality of atoning deeds, it is not at all evident why the traitor himself might not perform the atoning deed required for his own case. Are there not many instances in which a man's usefulness to his community has been immeasurably augmented by his own experience of sin? As in the hypothetical cases instanced by Royce himself, this could in no one particular case be affirmed as a certainty, just as we cannot with perfect certainty point out any deed of treason. But take the case of John B. Gough, for example. It is not difficult to suppose that his early life of drunkenness,



and even his lapse, after he had found his Cause, made him a more effective Apostle of temperance than he could otherwise have become. It seems likely also that some of our greatest artists and novelists were "made" by the sins of their youth. I see no reason, therefore, to deny the possibility that an act of treason, if such there has been, with its ensuing experience of regret and self-condemnation—the descent into the "hell of the irrevocable"—might not be just the experience required to fit a man for the most efficient service in some difficult crisis, so that "*the world is made better than it would have been had that deed of treason not been done at all.*"<sup>35</sup>

Secondly, it is not clear that the theory proposed when tested by the author's own criteria, really gives us a genuine atonement. It is not clear how the deed of a "suffering servant of the community," or of any one else, even though it would have been impossible without the act of treason in question, and though the net result of the whole process, beginning with the act of treason, is to make the world better than it could otherwise have been, can in any very significant sense be considered an "atoning deed."

The essence of the traitor's problem lies in the fact that his deed of treason is irrevocable; that, no matter how God or man may come to regard it or him, as he looks back over his life he must always say with reference to this deed, "I can never forgive myself for having done that!" This is the traitor's "hell of the irrevocable." But now let us suppose that the so-called "atoning deed" has been performed. The treason itself has made possible a deed of such surpassing value that the world is now really better than it could have become, if the deed of treason had not been done. As a direct consequence of the sin of his brethren Joseph has been made ruler of Egypt. But how does that, with all that it implies and makes possible, alter the case of our introspective traitor? As the brethren look back at their deed of sin, they must still say, "Our deed was evil, and only evil. Regardless of what

<sup>35</sup> I, 308 (condensed).



Joseph has become, in spite of his forgiveness, notwithstanding the graciousness of God in bringing good out of our treason, treason it was, and treason it remains. We can never forgive ourselves for that deed." It should be said, indeed, that our author does not look for a complete atonement but only for one that shall be "tragic" and "imperfect."<sup>36</sup> But I am unable to see that his theory yields what can be called in his sense of the term a genuine atonement; for, in spite of the so-called "atoning deed," the traitor is as much in the "hell of the irrevocable" as before. "The moving finger" has not been "lured back to cancel half a line."<sup>37</sup>

Indeed, in my opinion, unless we can content ourselves with the "moral" theory of the atonement, we may as well give up the attempt to find a solution of the problem; and cut the knot by concluding that no atonement, either in the traditional or in the Roycean sense, is *necessary*. No angry God demands a propitiatory sacrifice of any kind; and, our author to the contrary notwithstanding, all that is necessary,—in fact all that is possible,—is to repent, and, trusting to God's help, begin anew. Instead of encouraging our traitor to meditate upon the irrevocable aspect of his deed of treason, we had better, with Matthew Arnold, advise him to quit his morbid brooding, and seek "to get rid of" his sin.<sup>38</sup>

I cannot help surmising that Royce's objection to Arnold's counsel is based upon a confusion between two senses of the word sin. Royce is thinking of a particular act of sin, which as a matter of course is irrevocable and cannot be "got rid of," except, indeed, as it may be forgotten or treated as non-existent; while Arnold is thinking of a habit of sin, or of the general attitude of the sinner, which can certainly be changed. And just *because* the treasonable deed is irrevocable, it is perfectly futile to brood over it, or to devise means of making atonement. That deed is done; it cannot be erased from

<sup>36</sup> I, 281.

<sup>37</sup> I, 261.

<sup>38</sup> I, 217 ff.



Time's score; all that can now be done is for the erstwhile traitor to put away his former heart of treason, and to take to himself a heart of loyalty and love.

A word may be said in conclusion with reference to a point made by some of Royce's critics. It has been objected that Royce has no right to call his religious philosophy "Christian." Our author's method, as he himself informs us, is that neither of the apologist, nor of the opponent of Christianity, nor yet of the sceptic who professes indifference. His attitude is that of the scientist who offers a dispassionate solution of a problem. His problem is to determine the relation between Christianity and the "modern" mind. In order to do this it is necessary to frame a definite conception of Christianity. Our author approaches his task neither from the standpoint of "Orthodoxy," with its infallible records and definite creedal statements, nor yet from that of "Liberalism," with its portrait of a human, but humanly perfect Founder. He thinks that the evidence at hand is insufficient to justify us in regarding very much as definitely known about the life of Jesus, but he is inclined to believe that most of the sayings and parables attributed to him are the work "of some single author concerning whose life we probably possess some actually correct reports."<sup>39</sup>

In seeking then to determine what Christianity is, he does not content himself with a study of what its reputed Founder did and said. He affirms on the contrary that not Jesus, nor yet Paul, but rather the early Christian Community was the Founder of the Christian religion. A study of the developing church is accordingly more important than a study of the life of Christ. Christianity did not find complete expression in the teaching of the Master,—perhaps He Himself expected a further development and unfolding of His gospel,—but it came to fulfilment in the life of the Pauline Communities.

Our author, accordingly, takes the religion of the Pauline epistles as typical and normal Christianity. It is questionable whether even his own fundamental postulates justify this pro-

<sup>39</sup> Preface, p. xxix.



cedure. If, as we may be willing to grant, the sayings of Jesus are not to be taken as final and by themselves authoritative, but are to be studied in the light of their historical unfolding in the subsequent life of the church, in which the Divine Spirit dwells, there is no reason why a student of Christianity should stop with Paul, and not also take into the account Augustine, Aquinas, Luther, Martineau, or any of the leading moderns.

We may therefore doubt whether our author took the best means of discovering the essence of Christianity when he took Paul for his guide and almost sole authority. It is very questionable also whether he has given us a true interpretation even of the Christianity of Paul. Rather does he seem, on the basis of a few somewhat incidental remarks of the great Apostle, to have read his own philosophy of religion into the Pauline writings, where a more unbiased exegesis would never have discovered it.

This much must, however, be said for our author. While his version cannot be considered the typical form attained by our religion after nearly nineteen centuries of development under the guidance of the Divine Spirit, his religious philosophy is yet Christian, as distinguished, for example, from the Hindu mode of thinking. Traditional Christianity is at least one of its sources.

In a recent account of Tolstoy's "Religion," it is said in substance that at one period of his life he was more Christian than he thought he was.<sup>40</sup> He did not sufficiently recognize his indebtedness to the traditional faith. Such a charge can not be brought against Professor Royce. He at least makes adequate acknowledgment of his debt to Christianity, though his specific version of it can be regarded as only one among many genuine varieties of Christian philosophy.

BALTIMORE, MD.

<sup>40</sup> *Open Court*, January, 1914, p. 3.

## VII.

### CAN WE KNOW GOD?

HENRY GEKELER.

There are two extremes to be avoided. One is cocksureness about all things divine. Some persons know too much. They could not know much more about what God thinks, if they were as omniscient as God himself. They can diagram the divine mind as satisfactorily—to themselves—as we used to diagram a sentence in school. Josh Billings' caution is applicable to such: Better not know so much than to know so much that isn't so. Modesty is a pretty good indication of real attainment. Our theologians do not pronounce so confidently on all points as their grandfathers did. Perhaps they are the better theologians for it.

But too extreme ignorance of the things of God is also possible. And when such ignorance becomes boastful it is insufferable. One might agree with the agnostic that he does not know many things about God; but one demurs when the agnostic becomes militant and dogmatic and insists that others do not know, and can not know, more about these matters than he knows. The biggest piece of dogmatism ever perpetrated, and the most arbitrary, is the agnosticism that calls God the Unknowable. He who asserts that must know all things to back up his assertion. Greater modesty would be fitting in this case also.

Good sense lies between these two extremes. The most devout may confess to a certain wholesome agnosticism, and not feel that his dignity is compromised when he says of many things, "I don't know." When Job 11:7 is quoted, "Canst thou by searching find out God?" it is quite customary to stop in the middle of the verse; the balance of the question reads,



"Canst thou find out the Almighty to perfection?" Evidently we can know some things about God even when we put in a disclaimer about knowing it all. It is a far cry from Job to Paul, but this Christ-instructed man had apparently not struck bottom when sounding the depths of God. Hear him exclaim (Romans 11: 33, 34): "O the depth of the riches both of the wisdom and the knowledge of God! how unsearchable are his judgments and his ways past tracing out! For who hath known the mind of the Lord? or who hath been his counsellor?" But Paul's agnosticism was not blank, stark ignorance. "Now I know in part," asserts the contrary. In regard to God's relation to the problem of evil, the great question that troubled Job, Paul says positively, "We know that all things work together for good to them that love God."

From nature we may see that a quality of God is power. As we see an infinite variety of things interlocking and conspiring together in harmony, we may conclude that God is wise and orderly. We need not wait for some other sphere of existence to decide that "order is Heaven's first law." Even the idolatrous Greeks called the universe a cosmos, that is a system that was beautiful in its working. God is no mere builder, but an architect, the Artist in whom all beauty inheres. "How beautiful is God!" was Kingsley's dying exclamation, a truth that one might infer from the beauty of God's world.

From human nature we might learn still more. We recall Pope's utterance and cite it approvingly, even if we dissent from his back-handed slap at the theologians and creed-makers: "The proper study of mankind is man." Fortunately some of our students of human nature also retained their interest in the study of religion, with the happy result that our theology has been humanized. Comparing man with the rest of creation we see he is a person, a responsible moral being; things and even animals may have individuality, but man only has personality. If personality is the distinguishing quality of the highest type of the creature, shall we err in saying that

God is a person, any more than when we inferred that God is powerful, wise, orderly, beautiful? We use the pronoun He—not It—to describe God. Pantheism has become again a temptation to man, especially to some of our present-day philosophers. But we believe a sane study of nature—especially human nature—will establish the belief in God's personality, a view that the Bible holds from Genesis to Revelation.

History is the study of human nature on a large scale. From it one can learn something of the ethical qualities of God. From history, doubtless, Matthew Arnold drew his definition of God as "that power, not ourselves, that makes for righteousness." Another great thinker must have caught a glimpse of the same truth when he said, "the history of the world is the judgment of the world." This is a valid conclusion, not only from what we call sacred history, the history of the Bible, but also from what we may call world history. "There is a Providence that shapes our ends," and the God who guides human affairs is just, righteous, holy.

Great names of men, who are accounted the religious teachers of the race, are written high on the scroll of history. Hebrew history is especially rich in such names, though other races have not been altogether destitute of them. God's method of progress seems to be to raise up great men, who put on their seven league boots and walk with what look like leaps to the ordinary man. We average mortals run after and strive to catch up with such men, and thus the whole race forges ahead. This general law of progress affects religious progress, too. Heredity had something to say in producing our religious geniuses. But obeying certain spiritual laws had more to do in making some men better acquainted with God than other men were. "The secret of the Lord is with them that fear Him." In this connection we do well to cite Christ's own word, "He that willeth to do the will of my Father in heaven, he shall know of the teaching."—And let us remember that the condition, by whose observance a religious genius learned to know God and divine things, must also be the condition



observed by us other persons who would profit by the religious genius's leadership. How foolish it would be in material things to decline the help of such experts as Newton and Franklin and Darwin and Bessemer and Edison! Would it not be equally foolish for us to ignore such religious geniuses as Moses and David and Isaiah and John and Paul?

I need to verify by a personal experience what my religious teachers tell me about God. "Now we believe," said the Samaritan woman's townsmen, "not because of thy speaking; for we have heard for ourselves and know that this is indeed the Savior of the world." A similar method must be pursued in learning to know God. Let it be noted that the object sought is acquaintance with God, not merely knowing things about Him. It is this knowing God that is eternal life. Coming to God, speaking to him, listening to Him—this will go farther in making us acquainted with God than all the prayerless philosophizings of the world.

It is generally accepted that Jesus Christ is preeminently The Teacher, revealing the Father to men. His preeminence in this respect is due to his progressive obedience to God's will as rapidly as that will was recognized by him. "Obedience is the organ of spiritual knowledge." Therefore to know "the God and Father of our Lord Jesus Christ" is to know God in the innermost essence of God's being, for He made himself known to Jesus as He could not to one less trustful and obedient than Christ was. So unique was Jesus' consciousness of God and of the experience out of which that knowledge grew, that he could say this: "No man cometh unto the Father but by me." Jesus was either the most monstrously conceited person in the world or—he told the truth!

Knowing God is chiefly spiritual, not intellectual. Yet I know nothing that will quicken mere intellect as communion with God will. A scientist might tell me a thousand things about my friend, scientific facts that I never expect to fully know, yet I know my friend better than the scientist does, for friendship is more spiritual than intellectual, however quick-

ening to my intellect our friendship may be. I talk with my friend, am in his society as much as I may be, and finally I say with no misgivings, I know him. Thus Abraham the friend of God knew God. Thus disciples of Christ are not so much servants as friends of the Lord, and, through that friendship, friends of God. Our knowledge of God is like the child's knowledge of his father. It is not scientific knowledge; it is something better, it is spiritual, a matter of trust, of sympathy, of obedience. God wants us to know Him in this filial fashion. "To know God and enjoy Him forever,"—a child can do this; a philosopher can do no better than this.

INDIANAPOLIS, IND.



## VIII.

### THE CHURCH AND THE SOCIAL ORDER

THEODORE F. HERMAN

Three great miracles challenge the faith of the Christian believer. The first is the creation of man, the first Adam; the second, the gift of Christ, the second Adam; and the third, the promise of a redeemed humanity. These events are miracles because they are signs of the existence, the power, and the presence of God in the universe. And the greatest of them is the last, the promise of a redeemed humanity. It is the greatest, if for no other reason, because it is as yet unrealized. The other two are past miracles. Man has been upon the earth for ages, and it is getting to be a joke, even in scientific circles, to call man the last hatching of a Godless evolution, who came into existence through a fortuitous concourse of atoms. The only adequate explanation of man, of his rational and moral nature, is found in the creative activity of a living God, whose likeness he reflects. Similarly, Jesus Christ has been a fact and a force in history for nineteen centuries. Men still debate concerning the precise definition and relation of his divinity and humanity, but there is agreement among all believers that Jesus Christ is the gift of God. He is Immanuel, "God with us."

But what about the third miracle, the promise of a redeemed humanity? That is so far from past or present realization that multitudes of men deny it. They call it a beautiful fancy of deluded dreamers that will never be fulfilled. There is a new school of literature, called "realism," that attempts to show us man as he really is, and this real man, as depicted by modern dramatists and novelists, certainly shows no promise

of eventually becoming a member of redeemed humanity. And there is a modern school of philosophy, represented by Schopenhauer, the pessimist, that denies the value and the worth of life, and proclaims the melancholy gospel of extinction.

It must be confessed that there is much ground to-day for this pessimistic attitude. A recent writer reminds us that authentic human history goes back about five thousand years. For fifty centuries mankind has been engaged in agriculture, in manufacture, and in building, and yet vast multitudes of men are still hungry, naked, and homeless. Each century has had its prophets of a new social order, of righteousness, peace and joy, and yet these prophetic dreams have never been fully realized. And the last nineteen centuries have been dominated by the divine prophet of Nazareth. His gospel of the kingdom of God has been preached throughout the world. But to-day Prof. Ferrero, living in the seat of ancient Christendom, writes historical books in which he compares and contrasts the age of the Cæsars with the present age, and his sober verdict is that the progress of mankind in these nineteen Christian centuries has been scarcely appreciable. And there is none to gainsay him. If a few months ago we had been disposed to challenge his historic conclusions, to-day our protesting voices would be hushed by the roar of the cannons of the embattled armies of Christian Europe. I repeat, therefore, that there is not a little justification for pessimism. The world is still full of greed, intemperance and licentiousness. Swords and spears are not yet beaten into plow-shares and pruning hooks. Ancient wrongs, which the Hebrew prophets denounced, still flourish among us. The gods of antiquity, Bacchus, Moloch, and Venus, still have their altars and devotees in Christendom. The masses of men are vexed and burdened, and the age is full of social discontent and of widespread unrest. The day of a redeemed humanity seems far off, and the consummation of that vast hope appears to be nothing else than a great miracle. Only those can cherish that hope who have faith in the presence, power, and purpose of the living God. That divine pur-



pose consists in the establishment of the kingdom of God in which men shall manifest the filial and the fraternal spirit of trust and love in all their relations and conduct. That purpose runs through all past ages and points towards its future consummation—the one, far-off divine event towards which the whole creation moves. In every age there have been prophets who saw it dimly and who voiced it feebly. But in the Gospel of Jesus that divine purpose has found its fullest and noblest expression. And the Church of Jesus Christ faces the social problem with an unshaken faith in the divine purpose and power revealed by the Master.

The social problem that confronts us to-day is not a new problem. It is as old as humanity. Moses knew it and grappled with it, to go no further back in the history of mankind. Moses saw the oppression and the exploitation of his people. And he faced Pharaoh with the divine mandate, "Let my people go,"—let them go into a larger, fuller, freer life. And since then every age has had its Moses-like men, champions of the oppressed and emancipators of the enslaved. They are a motley throng, including Hebrew prophets, Greek philosophers, Christian Apostles, Iconoclasts, and revolutionaries. One of the latest of them is Bebel, the Moses of the masses.

But, while the social problem is old, it assumes a new form in every age. In our time it has two distinctive features. In the first place, it has found a voice. In other days it was mute, but in our time it is vocal. We hear its voice welling up from the submerged classes in our cities; we hear it from the lips of frenzied revolutionaries, and in many serious and sober lay sermons. It publishes pamphlets and books, and it conducts an intelligent propaganda from the platform and through the press. And the second distinctive feature of the social problem in our day is that this new voice is a threatening voice. It is not a child asking for a gift, or a beggar pleading for alms, but a man demanding his rights. That person is blind who attempts to live and work to-day as though nothing had hap-

pened since the sixteenth century. The world has been democratized since then. Demos, the common man, has come into his own. He has revolted from his autocratic masters, and he has boldly protested against their denial of his human rights, of his mental and moral qualifications for self-government. In the exercise of his rights he has studied earth, sky, and sea, past and present, things sacred and secular. The result has been a new science and a new philosophy. He has climbed the heights where kings and popes stood, in proud defiance of the rights of individuals. He has questioned their *jure divino* authority, and their vested rights, and the result has been republicanism and protestantism. Since the time of the Reformation there has been one revolt after the other, in religion, in philosophy, and in politics. Last of all, in the nineteenth century, came the widespread revolt in the industrial sphere that is confronting us to-day. And the one constant factor in all these revolutions is the common man asserting his human rights against tyrannical authority. That man spoke through Luther when he destroyed the spiritual tyranny of the pope; that man spoke through Kant when he demolished the tyranny of materialism; that man spoke through Robespierre when he overthrew the tyranny of kings; and that same man speaks through Marx and Bebel when they protest against economic slavery and fratricidal competition. We are to-day in the very midst of the last of these great revolts, in which the common man asserts his human rights in our complex industrial and economic life. And his voice is imperious and threatening. He does not beg or plead, but he demands, he indicts, he legislates. He summons our present social order before his tribunal and there he arraigns and condemns it as unjust.

Obviously this modern social problem has many phases. A detailed program of social amelioration or reformation would include many topics, such as the slum, vice, crime, disease, child labor, the wage problem, the woman question. These various problems are important and they demand the attention of the Church. But there is one aspect of the social problem which



is of paramount importance to the Church. That is our general attitude towards it, our responsibility to aid, if not to lead, in its solution, and our present opportunity to assume this leadership. Let the Church awake to this aspect of the problem, and she will find ways and means for the study and solution of the numerous specific social problems. My chief purpose in this paper is to discuss this paramount problem. I wish to consider the urgent need that is upon the Christian Church, in the presence of the social problem, to recognize her grave responsibility and her great opportunity to bring about a solution of it that will meet the human need and, at the same time, fulfil the divine purpose.

Can the Christian Church face the modern social problem squarely and without flinching? Have we a message and a ministry for those multitudes that clamor with a menacing voice for a new social order wherein dwelleth righteousness, peace and joy? Have we any inspiration for them in their struggle? Have we a distinctive mission to perform and a unique contribution to make? More than once, in past ages, the Church has faced a new social order. And in every transition from the old to the new, she has been capable of adapting herself to the changing life of the world. In every crisis of history she has successively and successfully met the demands that were made upon her resources of insight and uplift. Thus she passed from the Jewish world into the Greek; from the Greek into the Roman; and from the medieval into the modern. Each new age brought new opportunities to the Church to adapt her message and her mission to its peculiar needs. Hitherto she has been equal to every emergency. Will history repeat itself in our age?

There are multitudes of men to-day who deny this question. They are outside of the Church and indifferent to it. Some of them may still attend Church services occasionally, or they may continue to use its various ministries as a decorous sanction of birth, of marriage, and of funerals. But they live their life apart from the Church and they seek their aspira-

tions and their inspiration elsewhere. For their life centers in a passionate hope of social and economic amelioration, and they are indifferent to the Church because they claim, right or wrong, that the Church is indifferent to their social welfare. Again, there are masses of men that are not only indifferent but frankly hostile to the Church. The proletariat of the world belongs to this class. In their struggle for a new social order they have marked their enemies and their allies. Their indifference has been turned into hostility because they deem the Church not only indifferent to their social aspirations, and impotent to bring about an amelioration of their condition, but because they regard the Church as an active ally of the rich. That is as true of Protestant Germany and England as of Catholic France and Italy. And in the United States we are facing the same fact, the growing conviction of workingmen that the organized Church is hostile to their class interest. We see masses of working men drifting into hostile alienation from the Church. Recently one of the prominent leaders of organized labor in America said, "We have come to regard the Church and her ministers as the apologists and defenders of the wrongs committed against the interests of the people." That is a bitter saying, not representative by any means of workingmen as a class. But it would be futile and idle to deny that it voices the attitude towards the Christian Church of many of those who toil.

That attitude accounts for the phenomenal growth of Socialism in our times. Socialism is the religion of masses of men to-day. It is preached and propagated with the fire of religious enthusiasm, and it is practiced with the fervor and loyalty of a deep religious conviction. These men are turning toward Socialism for the same reason that they turn against the Church. They believe sincerely that Socialism offers the solution of the social problem, for which the Church, in their judgment, possesses neither sympathy nor a solvent. It is high time for churchmen to form an intelligent conception of Socialism. Socialists very properly demand of us that we



should take time to study the movement before we criticize and condemn it.<sup>1</sup> Socialism is neither communism nor anarchy. It is neither "the synthesis of all errors," nor a summary of all truth. Like all great practical movements in history, it rests upon underlying principles, viz., upon "a philosophy of the effective production and distribution of wealth and of the results thereby produced on all social institutions." This economic philosophy of life forms the essential element in Socialism. Then, secondarily, it is also a practical movement that seeks to bring about the conditions demanded by its philosophy. Being primarily a philosophy, Socialism does not publish definite programs of social reformation, but it promulgates great principles of thought and action. Its goal is a reconstructed social order in which every man shall contribute according to his ability to the welfare of all and, in turn, be assured of an equitable (not equal) share in what is produced. But it does not expect to reach this goal to-day or to-morrow, by the sudden and violent overthrow of the existing social order. It relies upon evolution, promoted by intelligent agitation and legislation, rather than upon the methods of revolution. It is true, of course, that many definite programs of reform are preached and published in the name of Socialism, and that some individual Socialists advocate violent measures. Yet it would be manifestly unfair to blame the movement, as such, for the indiscretions and excesses of many of its followers. The recognized leaders of Socialism do not publish programs. They proclaim great principles.

This fact makes Socialism so alluring to many gifted men, and, at the same time, so menacing to the Church. Here is a great movement, possessing a splendid organization and intelligent leaders, that pits its philosophy of life against ours. Its followers are indifferent to the Church, or even hostile to it, because they claim that the Church is indifferent to the social welfare of mankind and impotent to redress their grievances. They claim that the future belongs to them; that we must de-

<sup>1</sup> Venner, *Socialism and the Ethics of Jesus*.

crease while they will increase. They assert that they alone possess the key that shall unlock the closed portals of that golden age of which the dreamers and prophets of mankind have spoken. And they proclaim this new religion of humanity persuasively and successfully.

What shall the Church say to these men who are indifferent to her and alienated from her; who doubt the willingness of the Church to solve the social problem and who deny her power? It seems to me our answer must be twofold. It must be vocal and vital, spoken and acted, a creed and a deed. So far as the former is concerned, our spoken answer, our creed, it seems to me that the Church owes it to herself, to her divine Master, and to her mission in this world, to say to these men who doubt her social passion and who deny her social power that they are mistaken; to say so emphatically and unmistakably, as indeed we are beginning to say in many places and in various ways. We ought to say to them that we regard the social discontent of our times, not as a symptom of disease in a decaying social body but rather as a sign of health in a growing organism. We ought to assure them that their longing for a fuller, juster, and freer life finds sympathetic interpretation and active co-operation within the Church. And to prove to them that this answer is more than mere words we should point them to the ancient records of our faith, to the Founder of our religion, and to the past history of the Church. The Bible is charged with a social message from cover to cover. The roots of it reach back into the Old Testament. The prophets of Israel were champions of the poor and oppressed. They preached a gospel that was ethical and social. They proclaimed the coming of a kingdom in which righteousness should be triumphant. Jesus Christ was more than a social reformer, and yet, he shared the social passion of the Hebrew prophets. He had the same vision and he confirmed and fulfilled their social aspirations. His gospel was revolutionary in its social effects. It contained the germs of a social order founded upon love, service, and equality, and not, as was the existing order,



founded upon force, exploitation and inequality. And we can point to the history of the Christian Church. Not only has the Church never been hostile to the social amelioration of mankind, but, from the primitive era to the present time, she has furnished many valiant champions and immeasurable power to the cause of social betterment. And, last but not least, we can point to the social awakening that is taking place at present in the Christian Church. The most significant movement within organized Christianity in our day is represented by the Federal Council of the Churches of Christ in America. It would be difficult to frame a statement that sets forth the social passion of the Christian Church more clearly, and states her earnest desire to assist in the solution of the social problem more emphatically than was done in the social creed that was adopted by the Council at its session in Chicago in December, 1912. It reads as follows:

“The Churches must stand for—

“The protection of the family, by the single standard of purity, uniform divorce laws, proper regulation of marriage, and proper housing.

“The fullest possible development for every child, especially by the provision of proper education and recreation.

“The abolition of child labor.

“Such regulation of the conditions of toil for women as shall safeguard the physical and moral health of the community.

“The abatement and prevention of poverty.

“The protection of the individual and society from the social, economic, and moral waste of the liquor traffic.

“The conservation of health.

“The protection of the worker from dangerous machinery, occupational diseases, and mortality.

“The right of all men to the opportunity for self-maintenance, for safeguarding this right against encroachments of every kind, and for the protection of workers from the hardships of enforced unemployment.

“Suitable provision for the old age of the workers, and for those incapacitated by injury.

“The right of employees and employers alike to organize, and for adequate means of conciliation and arbitration in industrial disputes.

“A release from employment one day in seven.

“The gradual and reasonable reduction of the hours of labor to the lowest practicable point, and for that degree of leisure for all which is a condition of the highest human life.

“A living wage as a minimum in every industry, and for the highest wage that each industry can afford.

“A new emphasis on the application of Christian principles to the acquisition and use of property, and for the most equitable division of the product of industry that can be ultimately be devised.”

But more is needed than this social creed to convince those who are indifferent and hostile to the Christian Church, because they deny her social interest, that they are mistaken. More is required of us than merely a verbal answer to convince the alienated masses that the Church has a social message, a social ministry, and the power to make both effective. In addition to this social creed we need social deed. It is still true that by our fruits we must be known and judged. And therefore we must learn to translate our theory into practice, to express our creed in deeds. I say we must LEARN to do it, because as yet we have never done it nor are we doing it to-day.

Far be it from me, even in appearance, to join the ranks of those who heckle the Church. In an age when the Church is spoken against by many and condemned by not a few, I wish to honor and exalt her as the body of Jesus Christ. And I wish to do that not as a blind and bigotted partisan, but as an intelligent student of her history. And as such I should like to ask the defamers and detractors of the Christian Church, her judges and executioners, what this world would be like if one could subtract from its varied life to-day all those forces and influences which, directly or indirectly, date back to Jesus



Christ. I should like to ask them, who they were, in the last nineteen centuries, that have broken tyrannies, big and petty, that have made life sweeter and saner for men, women and children, in factories and on farms, in mills and in mines. To call their roll would be to mention the names of apostles, martyrs, saints and confessors of the Christian Church. And if we follow their footsteps they would lead us, one and all, into the presence of him whom they confessed as Master and worshiped as Saviour. It is Jesus Christ who for nineteen centuries, by his living spirit incarnate in men, has poured vast tides of regenerative life into the ocean of humanity through the channel of the Christian Church. And if it should require nineteen millenniums more to make this world what it ought to be, even as it has taken nineteen Christian centuries to make it what it is to-day, still, I am profoundly convinced, that it will have been the Church of Christ that was the means of its regeneration, and not any other organization whether industrial, educational, or political.

But it is precisely because I hold this exalted opinion of the Church that I wish to see the facts as they are, without flinching. And the facts are that the Church has never yet succeeded in translating her social creed into social deed. And, moreover, she has never even tried to do it. That social creed, in substance, is Jesus' Gospel of the Kingdom of God. That is what the Founder of the Church proclaimed, and that is what he intended: a transformation of society, radical and complete, from center to circumference, from the inward springs of human action to outward conduct in all its phases. This Gospel has been preached and practiced for nineteen centuries, but it has never been realized upon the earth. Where is the Kingdom of God to-day? Where is a community of men and women that have learned to live together as brothers? What sphere of human action or endeavor has been permeated through and through with the filial and fraternal spirit exemplified in the life and teaching of Jesus? Why is it that the beatitudes of Jesus, the blessings which he pronounced

upon the meek and merciful, the poor in heart and the peacemakers, sound like platitudes to the millions that are engaged in the war that devastates Europe? Why is it that our social order, after nineteen centuries of organized Christianity, is still so radically unchristian and unchristlike?

The answer to these questions is perfectly plain to any student of Church history. These things are so because, as yet, Jesus' Gospel of the Kingdom has never been thoroughly tested and tried in any age or by any group. Instead of saying that Christianity has failed, it is far truer to say that, as yet, it has never had a full and fair trial. No past age has succeeded in translating the great social creed of Jesus into social deed. Even Socialists are telling us that. Some time ago this remarkable scene took place at Lille in France. A deputation of English Socialists attended a French Congress of Socialism. Their leader, Keir Hardie, made the confession that the most powerful impetus which he had ever received and the impulses which kept him at his task were derived from Jesus of Nazareth. That confession was received with tumultuous applause. And when the English Socialists sang "All Hail the Power of Jesus' Name," their French brethren joined in the chorus. This was surely a remarkable demonstration. Here were hundreds of workingmen, representative of hundreds of thousands like them, who rail at the Church while they reverence the Founder of the Church. It means that these men realize that the Gospel of Jesus Christ is greater than any expression or interpretation of it in the past or present.

But we require no Socialist to tell us that. We know it, and we confess it freely. What is more, we know the reason for that failure, which Socialism does not seem to understand. And the reason is not that the Church has ever repudiated the Gospel of Jesus, or even neglected it wilfully. The true reason is that this Gospel of Jesus was so divine that no past age has been able or prepared either to apprehend or to express it in its heights and depths. Jesus spoke the language of heaven when he proclaimed the establishment of the Kingdom of God as the



ultimate purpose of his Father in heaven. It has taken many ages to translate this language into the vernacular of earth. Men had to do it line upon line and precept upon precept. Often, during his lifetime, the Master said to his disciples "Have ye understood all these things?" and often he lamented, "Oh, ye of little faith." So it has been throughout the Christian ages. The Spirit of God had to take the things of Christ and show them unto us. And as we follow the Lord through the ages he becomes ever greater, his purpose ever diviner, and his Gospel ever more glorious. That new day for humanity which Jesus Christ ushered in did not fade away into endless night, but neither did it begin at noon. Like all our days, it passed from glorious dawn, through troubled morn, to high noon.

But this is high noon in the history of Christianity. The Spirit of God did not resign his office at the time of the Reformation. He has been active and operative in the Church since then. He has taken the things of Christ and shown them unto us. And we believe, humbly but firmly, that we understand these things of Christ a little better and a little more than did our fathers. We believe that it is the purpose of God, not to save only the elect from the consequences of sin, but to save this whole world from its guilt and power. We believe that it was the purpose of Jesus Christ, not merely or primarily to found an institution, but to bring an inspiration that should permeate and transform the life of humanity. We believe that the Church is not a close corporation, a trust of and for saved souls, but a trustee of God which is to hold and to dispense the power of God for the redemption of mankind. We believe that it is the business of the Church, not only to get men into heaven when they die, but to introduce the order, the purity, the life of heaven into society here and now. That is our social creed and it is our business to translate that creed into deed. We must learn that to be a Christian means more than to sing sonorous hymns and to preach unctuous sermons. We must learn that we are saved to serve mankind in the spirit of

the Master. The miracle of the healing of the palsied man is the parable of modern life. Our social order is palsied and we should be its friends who will carry it to Jesus, that it may feel the healing touch and the helping hand of the Master. And we are learning to do these things. That is the finest and most significant symptom in the life of modern Christianity. We see the great social problem; we have a quickened social conscience; we feel a rising social passion; we are studying all the varied phases of the problem; and we are training personalities, imbued with Jesus' spirit, who will aid in their solution.

But I must speak of another class. I have raised the question, has the Church a message and a ministry for this age of social discontent; I have spoken of those who deny it. They are outside of the Church, for the most part, and indifferent and hostile to it. They turn to Socialism for that inspiration and direction in their efforts of social amelioration which they say the Church is impotent to give them. And I have said that our answer to them must be both a social creed and social deed.

But there is another class that demands our attention. They are inside the Church, not outside; friends and not foes of the Master. They are intensely loyal to the Kingdom and sincerely devoted to it. They are our Christian brethren, often members of our own household of faith. And yet they disagree with us. They refuse to endorse this social creed of Christianity and to assist in translating it into deed. They tell us that we are diluting the Gospel of Jesus Christ into mere humanitarianism; that we are preaching and practicing a vague and weak philosophy, instead of redemption, through repentance and faith in Jesus Christ. They say that what is true in this social gospel is not new, and what is new is not true. Some of the leaders of certain denominations have gone so far as to urge upon their churches the Christian duty of withdrawing from the fellowship of the Federal Council, as a



protest against its principles and program. What answer shall the Church give to these?

In the first place, we must be profoundly grateful to them. They point out a genuine danger that threatens the great social awakening in the Christian Church; the danger, namely, of aiming at social amelioration instead of social regeneration. They warn us against putting poultices on the social sores of humanity instead of curing its radical evil, which is sin. Those who believe in the social mission of the Church do not want to become mere quacks that cure the superficial ills of mankind, leaders of reform movements, or propagandists of this or that ism. They want to be and remain preachers of the Gospel of Jesus Christ. This differentiates them from Socialism. Socialism is a philosophy. It relies upon education, agitation, and legislation, for the establishment of the new social order. But Christianity is a religion. It relies upon God for the establishment of the Kingdom of God upon the earth. It proclaims that the one cause of all our social ills is sin, and that the one and only cure for sin is repentance; turning from sin to the God whom Jesus Christ has revealed. It proclaims aloud to mankind that there is more in this world than money and matter, than mind and morality; and greater things than can be bought by money, devised by the mind, or produced by the moral passion. Its message is that at the very heart and center of the universe there is a living Spirit, a personal God of perfect goodness and holiness, whom Jesus Christ has revealed to us as our Father in heaven. He made the first man, Adam; he gave us Jesus Christ, the second Adam, in whom all the latent glories and possibilities of man were realized. And as God was incarnate in Christ, so now he seeks to become incarnate in humanity. He is making Jesus Christ the corner stone of a new race, of a new temple of humanity in which all men shall be what Jesus was, sons of God and brothers of man. And it is only as men surrender to this God, as the alienated come to him in repentance and faith, as all men accept his spirit and share his purpose, that they will find

that kingdom of righteousness, and peace, and joy, which their social prophets proclaim. Let us by all means hold fast to that; for it forms the heart of our message and it constitutes the power of our mission. Let us be profoundly thankful to all those who warn us against the danger of losing it in the tide of social interest and passion that is sweeping through the Church to-day. "Seek ye first the Kingdom of God and His righteousness," that is our abiding message. Righteousness belongs to God. Men can find it only in Him. Only in this God of the Christian revelation can mankind find the spiritual power and the moral strength needed for the realization of their social ideals. It is the great business of the Church to take this world, palsied by sin and selfishness, and to carry it through Jesus Christ to God; that it may find in Him the ultimate ground of all its aspirations of brotherly love, the full sanction of all its hopes of social justice, and the source of adequate power.

But something further must be said to our brethren who criticize and condemn the social passion of modern Christianity. They differ from us in certain premises, and, therefore, inevitably, in their conclusions. We are confronted to-day by two conceptions of Christianity, of its essence and of its ultimate aim and purpose. The one conception is apocalyptic and the other is evolutionary. The former regards this world as hopelessly corrupt. It believes that God established the Church to save individual men out of this corrupt world. Its message is, "watch and pray that you may be ready for the return of the Lord." And it proclaims the speedy coming of this Lord for the final judgment of mankind. The other conception maintains that this is God's world, and that God is seeking to save it from sin. It believes that He has lodged within the bosom of mankind redemptive forces that are slowly, gradually, but surely, transforming it into a kingdom of God. It does not stand on tip-toe of expectation, looking for a returning Lord, because it does not believe that this Lord ever absented himself. He has been present in Spirit, even according to his



promise, in all ages. It does not bid men watch and pray for the returning Lord, but rather coöperate with the present Lord in his redemptive ministry. Its aim is not to save individuals out of a world that is corrupt and doomed to judgment, but to transform mankind into children of God.

Those Christian believers who accept the latter view of the essence and aim of the Christian religion can only point to Jesus Christ himself as their great prophet and Lord. They get this faith from him and they derive their inspiration from his spirit. They see one great divine purpose running through the ages—the redemption of the world from sin. Dimly men saw it, feebly they proclaimed it, gradually they discerned it. Then Jesus came. And he proclaimed this divine purpose in its fullness, as it has never been proclaimed before or after him.

“ Oh, little town of Bethlehem, how still we see thee lie,  
Above thy deep and dreamless sleep the silent stars go by;  
Yet in thy dark streets shineth the everlasting light.  
The hopes and fears of all the years are met in thee to-night.”

They believe that in that holy night when Jesus was born all the fears of mankind were forever destroyed, and all their hopes crowned and consummated. And they wish to consecrate their lives to the realization of these hopes of mankind, in the assurance that the great miracle of a redeemed humanity will surely come to pass. It will come to pass, not because men are agitating and legislating, hoping and working for it, in many ways and under various names, but because one and all, in the Church and outside her pale, these prophets of a new social order are proclaiming and promoting the eternal purpose of God. Ultimately, He is the architect and builder of that new temple of a redeemed and regenerate humanity.

It is not my purpose, in this paper, to speak of the tremendous social awakening that is taking place at present in the Christian Church. Its scope is almost, if not altogether, coterminous with organized Christianity, and its depth is sufficiently indicated by the work of the Federal Council, and by

the Social Service Organizations, the methods and programs for local churches and groups of churches, which have been worked out by the various denominations that are the constituent bodies of the Federal Council. One of the significant signs of our time is the literature devoted to social service. Pamphlets, magazines, and books, covering every phase of the complex problem, are pouring into the market in an ever swelling tide. Among the vast number of publications a few will be found especially useful, both for information and inspiration. For general orientation, in a vast field, one may turn to *A Year Book of the Church and Social Service*, by H. F. Ward, and for a fine combination of the spiritual passion of the Church and the social passion of Socialism one may profitably study and ponder the volumes from the pens of Profs. Walter Rauschenbusch, Henry C. Vedder, and Francis G. Peabody.<sup>2</sup>

One word in conclusion, a word of caution and a word of courage. Let us not expect too much of the social awakening. The movement is new and, like all great historic movements, it requires time to show its power, to manifest its purpose, and to achieve great results. It is unreasonable to expect great results in the near future. But we *do move*. "He has sounded forth the trumpet that shall never sound retreat." Signs are not wanting that more and more the Church of Jesus Christ is recognizing her social responsibility and is seeking to realize it in her message and in her ministry. It is enough if the historian of the future will say that in our time and generation the Church of Jesus Christ blended in one mighty forward movement the spiritual power and the social passion found in His Gospel for the regeneration of the world.

LANCASTER, PA.

<sup>2</sup> *A Year Book of the Church and Social Service* (Revell Co.), by H. F. Ward; *Christianity and the Social Crisis*; and *Christianizing the Social Order* (Macmillan), by Prof. Rauschenbusch; *The Gospel of Jesus and the Problems of Democracy*; and *Socialism and the Ethics of Jesus* (Macmillan), by Prof. Vedder; *The Christian Life in the Modern World* (Macmillan), by Prof. Peabody.



## IX.

### NOTICES OF NEW BOOKS.

#### PENNSYLVANIA IN SONG.

THE SNOW SHOE TRAIL AND OTHER POEMS. By Isaac Rusling Pennypacker, with an Introduction by Charles Leonard Moore. Philadelphia, Christopher Sower Co., 1913. Pages 172.

PENNSYLVANIA—THE KEYSTONE—A SHORT HISTORY. By Samuel Whitaker Pennypacker, Governor 1903–1907. Philadelphia, Christopher Sower Co., 1914. Pages 316. (Chapter on Pennsylvania in Poetry.)

The Pennypacker family has done some service to the State. This has been freely given with pen and plow, with sword and scythe, in the realms of law and literature, science and sociology. None of it was rendered in a better cause nor more needed than in emphasizing Pennsylvania's true place in song and story. Ex-Governor Pennypacker and his scarcely less distinguished brother have worked for many years most effectively along these lines.

Some years ago a person named Stevenson printed what he called an anthology, entitled "Poems of American History." Like many other historical and literary provincialists he did not know there was a Pennsylvania which held the cradle of Freedom, and it long years ago was the capital of the country, to which Cæsar Rodney made a ride more fateful than Paul Revere's; where the British soldiery gambolled and danced while Washington nourished the dying Revolution to new life on the blood-tracked hills of Valley Forge; through which broad commonwealth civilization and settlement treked to the great South and the greater West; on the soil of which sovereign State contending forces of opposing sides in the war for the Union staked and settled the issues of a century's conflict, there determined for ages to come.

This anthologist did not know that Pastorius, forerunner of the forceful German element in American citizenship, wrote "De Mundi Vanitate" for the world; that Hopkinson's "Battle of the Keys" exposed Sir William Howe to a battery of derision almost as fatal as the iron guns of war; that Peter Muhlenberg's dramatic exchange of the pastor's gown for the field marshal's sword; the breaking of the transcontinental highway across the Alleghenies; the impetuous dash of Sheridan's black charger down the Valley of Virginia had been portrayed in verse by Read whose "Drifting" gave new lure to the Bay of Naples; that Bayard Taylor's "Song

of the Camp" foreshadowed the English-Scotch-Irish unity of to-day for British honor; that George Parson Lathrop's lyric of "Keenan's Charge" told the story of a Pennsylvania hero-soldier's death; that Will H. Thompson's "High Tide at Gettysburg," the matchless lyric of the war, was inspired by a Pennsylvania historical event; that the tragic story of Wyoming had tuned the harp of Campbell, touched Bryon's strings and inspired Halleck; that the American Episcopate had wakened Wordsworth's lofty strain to fit tribute to a Pennsylvania bishop; that Tom Moore gathered fresh and fadeless laurels on the banks of the Schuylkill, and some of Poe's best work had earliest recognition and patronage in Philadelphia; that Longfellow immortalized the nuns of Bethlehem and the oaks of Radnor; that one of Whittier's noblest offerings was to "The Pennsylvania Pilgrim"; that Bayard Taylor scattered flowers of poesy over the blood-stained field of Brandywine; that Boker, of Pennsylvania, wrote and read the memorable Phi Beta Kappa poem for Harvard '95; that "Hans Breitmann" was suggested by a Pennsylvania cavalry regiment; that some of Lloyd Mifflin's noblest sonnets had been inspired by Pennsylvania's historic streams, the Susquehanna, Swatara, Conowingo and Octoraro; that the Rev. Dr. Muhlenberg's immortal hymn, "I Would Not Live Alway," was suggested by a personal experience at Lancaster, Pa.; and that Harbaugh's Pennsylvania German hymns, lyrics and ballads are the tenderest and most touching poetic expressions of a great people, moving historically across the American continent from the fat fields of Lancaster county to the prairie lands of Iowa and the broad ranches of Nebraska.

As Stevenson had evidently not heard and would not learn of them, Mr. Isaac R. Pennypacker first reminded him of his sins of omission in a contribution to "The Dial." He has now furnished additional weight to his side of the one-sided contention, by giving to the press and public a contribution of his own which distinguishes himself and the Commonwealth of his forebears.

Mr. Pennypacker does not claim that his Pegasus, like Bayard Taylor's Bedouin barb, is a "stallion shod with fire"; nor will his fondest admirer deny that his muse sometimes lights and sometimes limps; but he has "brought sheaves with him" from a rich and ripened harvest. None who was familiar with his "Gettysburg," and his timely "Life of Meade," fit appreciation of that great Pennsylvania soldier, could doubt the inspiring effect upon him of deeds done and places made historic in our State. The merit of his fugitive pieces had been recognized by even New England critics and anthologists; and of the numerous odes and lyrics suggested by Gettysburg, none had received more encomium than Mr. Pennypacker's, which Stedman, dean of American letters, pronounced a "free hand epic."



The striking feature of this volume is the poetic pilgrimage entitled "Bridle Paths," through which runs a cavalcade of modern horseback travellers, moving southwestward in the shade of the mountains that background the border land struggles of the late Civil War. Like the Canterbury Pilgrims they stable their horses one night at a "drovers' inn" and then seek a "club house, small and quaint." Suggested by wayside experiences, the historian tells the story of "Young Pearson's ride across the Western plains." The Preacher reads his lyric of "The Jersey Blues"; the Doctor then takes up "the thread of talk" and furnishes "a good motto for the partly dead." The grizzled Sage, the robust Youth, each in turn, sings his song and tells his story, of which none is better than "The Dutch on the Delaware," unless it be the rhymed story of the "Pennsylvania Germans." To those whose race and faith make this facet of the jewelled story attractive, none has better portrayed the influence and the historic importance of this strain in our composite American citizenship:

Moulder and master of Europe's fate,  
 Maker of nations where the hearth  
 Rests the chief corner of the State,  
 Home-lover, bearing round the earth.

Live hearth-brands to a land remote—  
 The Teuton with his axe and spade  
 The Pennsylvania forests smote,  
 Their wilderness a garden made.

As well he smote at once for all,  
 At the new serfdom, and his plea  
 Above the din of slavery's fall  
 Rings our first paeon for liberty.

And while he tended vines and hives,  
 And started fairest vales to bloom,  
 He cherished the old martyrs' lives,  
 And set the press beside the loom.

If elsewhere man were prey to man,  
 And life a war by cunning won,  
 Here was wrought out the nobler plan,  
 By Christ upon the Mount begun.

These took no oaths, nor drew the sword,  
 But lived in common brotherhood—  
 The rich and poor; the debtor's word  
 In lieu of bond and usury stood.

Doors were not barred, nor windows locked,  
The pulpit was not filled for hire,  
Nor were the Sabbath teachings mocked  
By walks through moral fen and mire.

Cease, cease, insistent Saxon tongues,  
Lest in the chants by angels said  
These, these, who silent climbed the rungs  
Of sacrifice be heralded.

By fifteen decades act and deed  
Preceded Tolstoi's word; across  
Twelve hundred years we find the seed  
In march of Goth and Italy's loss.

All Holland was; all England is;  
Rome might be now, but that is vain;  
We know the Teutons marched, and this—  
That Rome has never risen again.

For it is not the hour or place,  
Or country, clime, or circumstance;  
It is the man, it is the race,  
That makes the way for man's advance.

Nor is the strain less poetic, and yet historically accurate, when the Preacher tells of the non-militant sects, of whom weaponless legions poured over the borders of Lancaster county—whither the stream had flowed from Germantown—into the valleys of the Alleghenies, the coves of the Blue Ridge, to the Far West and the great valleys of Virginia:

Then spoke the Preacher saying: "Blessed are  
The Peacemaker, those Dunker brethren, who  
Were first to lift war's devastating car,  
Which the rough Sheridan up the valley drew,  
Fighting the women with the Indian's torch,  
Starting a wave of flame, wide as the vale,  
Which children, standing on the vine-clad porch,  
Or mothers gripping close the pasture rail,  
In helpless terror saw sweep nearer night  
By night, lick up the stores of corn and wheat  
And leave a hundred miles of valley white  
With pallid faces bowed or trembling feet.  
There were no tools with which old men could till  
The stricken land. There were no seeds to sow  
Upon the flame-swept fields; no cows to fill  
The dairy night and morn; no stock to throw



The furrow, and no help at hand to aid  
Those who so long had fed the host which fought  
Their fight. Somehow the women lived. They made  
Over their rags, and with the bush-thorn caught  
The jagged rent. There, life stood still. The sun  
Came up and brought no hope. His noon came on  
Above a silent world. His course was run  
Month after month, and all he looked upon  
Remained a waste. Then came the happy fall  
When Northern Dunkers, bearing seeds, returned—  
A thousand measures for each mile of all  
The hundred miles of barns by Sheridan burned,  
Gifts given in the careful German way,  
Not with improvidence, but by overseers  
Allotted in just portions. On that day,  
For those plain fairy princes grateful tears  
Welled forth from hearts long used to bitterness.  
The land was plowed; the seed was sown; the grain  
Was reaped and threshed and sown again. Its dress  
Of green the fertile grass-land wore again  
The wheels of life went round once more. Now ground  
The mills again the wheaten flour and there  
Was bread for all. The wornout soldier found  
In cobwebbed attic tattered school-books rare.  
The school bell rang more startling sound than roar  
Of soldiers' musketry. The children played  
Old, unfamiliar games. The cross-road store  
Was swept, and on its garnished shelves were laid,  
For wondering eyes to see, the simple stuffs,  
In which lithe forms were swiftly rearrayed  
As sunset faded from the western bluffs.  
For love discrowned by war and long afraid  
Had now resumed his rule. The middle-aged  
Were grandsires made almost before they knew.  
The past was softened and its hate assuaged  
And one again the warring sections drew.  
Thus reaped the Dunkers, and will reap above,  
But they were men of peace.

“The Old Church at the Trappe” and some other of the shorter pieces in this volume are not published here for the first time; but they are very fitly collected into a volume which must take a cherished place among the not too frequent contributions to a distinct Pennsylvania literature.

W. U. HENSEL.

THE SUPREME REVELATION. A STUDY IN THE SYNOPTIC GOSPELS. By William C. Schaeffer, Ph.D., D.D., Professor of New Testament Science in the Theological Seminary of the Reformed Church at Lancaster, Pa. Publication and Sunday School Board of the Reformed Church. Pp. 316. Price \$1.50 net.

This volume constitutes the Swander Lectures for 1913, having been designated as such by the faculty of the Theological Seminary. It contains the substance of a course of lectures delivered for several years to the junior class in the Seminary as a part of the regular course of instruction, and, it goes without saying that the publication is interesting and important. In the first place it affords an opportunity to members of the Reformed Church to learn what is taught in the branch or department of theological science which is placed in the hands of Dr. Schaeffer in our school of the prophets, and it must be a matter of congratulation to all that the work is done so ably and so thoroughly. But the book possesses also a much higher importance in that it is a real contribution to the best theological thought of the day. It is scholarly, but not revolutionary; it shows thorough familiarity with the subject without blinking the difficulties, and, at the same time, it leads to sane and sober conclusions on the issues involved. It is of value, therefore, not only to the student of theology from the technical or professional point of view, but also to the bible reader in general and to all who care for the development of religious truth.

The theme of the author is that we have the supreme or highest revelation of God to man in the person of our Lord Jesus Christ, His life, his works, his teachings, accordingly, are of supreme importance, and they necessarily occupy the first place in Christian theology from the founding of the church down to the present time. Who and what was the man whom we call Jesus Christ? and what was the nature and purport of the work which he undertook in the world? These questions force themselves upon the minds of men in every age; but especially do they come home to the christian consciousness in the intellectual ferment and turmoil of the present day, and, if Christianity is to be a vital factor in the life of the age, they must receive an answer commensurate with and satisfactory to the scientific and philosophic thought of the modern mind.

There are two reasons why a study of the synoptic gospels is especially important at this time: the one theoretical, the other practical. First of all many theologians think they have discovered not only a difference but even an antagonism between the Christ of the synoptic gospels and the representation of him as given by St. Paul and the author of the fourth gospel. Modern Christianity, according to these writers, is based on the latter and not on the former, and the nature and character of it came from Paul rather than from Jesus. Again, the development of our modern, so-called Christian civilization presents so many features in the lives



of Christians and organized churches, the division of men and women into ranks and classes, socially and industrially, which are at variance, with no common bond between them, great riches and abject poverty, religion in the church on Sunday, and grasping selfishness during the week, lavish gifts and little charity, that men question whether this can be the spirit and life brought into the world by the lowly Nazarene, the Great Teacher. It becomes necessary, therefore to go back to the foundations, and to meet the challenge which is thus raised so that faith may have its proper justification.

The author, accordingly, turns to the synoptic gospels, manifestly the oldest narratives of the life of our Lord, and looks for an answer to the questions which have been raised. There is first a discussion of the sources and a comparative study of the material which enters into the three synoptic gospels. The oldest and the foundation narrative is that of St. Mark, and his material is freely used by Matthew and Luke. But the latter two also have a great deal of material not found in Mark, particularly the teaching and discourses of our Lord. These are supposed to have been contained in another original source now lost, the so-called "Q" document. The writers also had personal contact with eye-witness of the events which they narrate, so that each of them has some original material, at the same time that he writes from an angle and for a purpose of his own, or, as we are accustomed to say, there is a "personal equation" to be taken into consideration in each case. The result of our author's inquiry is that in the unique personality of him whom we call Jesus Christ we have the supreme revelation of God, and that in his life, his works, his teachings, his presence in the church, we have what Eucken calls the "at-one-ment of God and man," and the realization of the Kingdom of God among men.

As preliminary to a discussion of the nature of this Kingdom we have first Jesus' Conception of God, and then his Estimate of Man. God is the all-father; His love extends even towards the sinner. On the other hand, if we say that God is the father of all, are we justified in saying that all men are sons of God? That depends upon what we mean by sonship. Men are by endowment and destination sons of God—that is sons of God in possibility; but there is an ethical sonship which is not natural but acquired. Our Lord says of the Jews: "Ye are of your father, the devil." Now while man is not utterly depraved, he is evil and lost; and he becomes a child of God by salvation in Jesus Christ so that his sonship is ethically realized. For this purpose God is revealed in Christ that his kingdom may be established. The way is open, then, for a study of the Kingdom, of its Founder (giving us the Christology of the synoptic gospels), the Establishment or Founding of the Kingdom, its Citizens, its Life, its Development, and its Consummation.



The topics here mentioned are taken up in logical order in successive chapters with the result that the intelligent reader finds a most helpful and illuminating treatment of the questions involved in the synoptic problem. The book may without reserve be recommended to theologians, ministers, intelligent laymen, and Sunday School teachers as affording more real help towards a proper understanding of the gospel than could be obtained by the use of even the best of our ordinary commentaries.

JOHN S. STAHR.

SOCIAL HEREDITY AND SOCIAL EVOLUTION. THE OTHER SIDE OF EUGENICS. By Herbert William Conn, Professor of Biology in Wesleyan University. The Abingdon Press, Methodist Book Concern, 150 Fifth Ave., New York. Pp. vi + 348. Price \$1.50 net.

It is not easy to exaggerate the importance of a book like Professor Conn's *Social Heredity and Social Evolution* nor is it necessary to urge a careful reading of it upon those who are interested in the subject of which it treats. So much stress is laid in these days upon evolution from the physical point of view, that its social aspects are almost entirely overlooked; and the new science of Engenics, or what claims to be such a science, in the nature of the case, finds its field of operations largely in the domain of heredity transmitted in the body from parents to children. Our author's contention, however, is that while heredity of this kind is undoubtedly a factor in the evolution of man, its influence extends only to the making of the human animal, and that the development of man as a social being, the only aspect from which progress and civilization can be understood, is conditioned by forces and factors not physical in their nature nor capable of transfer physically from one individual to another. Professor Conn, a biologist by profession, has distinguished himself by his earlier works on some phases of evolution, and he comes to his present task well equipped for the work in hand. He writes clearly and forcibly and it is not likely that any one who takes this book in hand with a serious purpose will lay it aside without reading it through.

After discussing the resemblance and the difference between human evolution and animal-evolution, the author proceeds to show that the distinctively human attributes are social in their nature and that there is a social inheritance, as real and tangible as physical inheritance can possibly be. He accepts Weismann's theory of organic *heredity* through the continuous germinal substance or *germ plasm*, which, of course, involves the impossibility of transmitting in this way acquired characteristics. Only what is in the germ, or what is due to variation in the germ as such can be transmitted, although he grants that there may be congenital contagion as of venereal diseases, and the effects of poisons upon the germ, the syphilitic poison, alcohol, etc., which give rise to a weakened progeny. Here it seems to us, a third



factor ought to be included: pre-natal influences on the part of the mother upon the child, as illustrated in birth-marks or mother-marks, etc., as stoutly maintained by the older psychologists. But our author's contention is that our higher attributes are mostly of the nature of acquired characters, and these are transmitted by *social heredity* as over against *organic heredity*, and that therefore the future of the race does not seem quite so hopeless as the free mating of criminals of the Jukes type would indicate.

Following the line of social development as indicated there is a discussion of the origin of Language, the Evolution of Moral Codes, the Evolution of the Moral Sense, Social Evolution, Different Types of Organization, the Forces at Work, Egoism, Altruism, etc., leading to the conclusion that civilization is an artificial product, consisting of acquired characters, and that all these constitute a realm, call it spiritual environment or whatever you please, in which the forces of heredity are truly at work. But here they can be shaped by human effort and directed to the desired end by the normal processes of intellectual, moral and religious education.

We have found Professor Conn's book a fascinating study, and we believe it to have great and permanent value.

JOHN S. STAHR.

TRAINING THE GIRL. By William A. McKeever, Professor of Child Welfare in the University of Kansas. The Macmillan Company, New York. Pp. viii + 342. Price \$1.50 net.

This book may safely be recommended to all who have girls to educate, or are interested in the education of women. The author, it is easy to see, writes *con amore*, in sympathy with the growing generation of boys and girls, for he is the author of a similar book on "Training the Boy." The work before us is divided into four parts: 1. Industrial Training. 2. Social Training. 3. Vocational Training. 4. Service Training.

Professor McKeever starts out with the proposition that every woman ought to be brought up in touch and in sympathy with the household economy. Whether a girl's future life will be spent in affluence or under the hard conditions which poverty or moderate means impose, ordinary work and industry constitutes "the foundation stone for every great life, including a life of well-poised womanhood." And those who live on different planes of the social scale, ought to know and understand each other. From this point of view he follows the training of the girl in the home, in the kindergarten, in the school, the high school, and the college, giving wholesome suggestions and directions along the whole line. Going hand in hand, however, with school training, there must be social training, learning to play, how to enjoy company, how to dress, how to behave, etc. When the author comes to vocational training, he lays special stress on Home Making, and for this all girls ought to be properly prepared. Then comes an enumeration



of different lines of work for women, for which special courses of instruction may be necessary. He finds the climax of a girl's development under the fourth head: Service Training. Here he finds the real meaning of life, the source of the highest happiness for self and for others. Here the religious training lies at the foundation, and there must enter into the life good will, good sense and a spirit of genuine social service, leading to the attainment of "peace and poise," the conditions of true happiness.

JOHN S. STAHR.

A SYSTEM OF PSYCHOLOGY. By Knight Dunlap, Associate Professor of Psychology in the Johns Hopkins University. Charles Scribner's Sons. Pp. xvi + 368.

Dunlap's *System of Psychology* has merits of its own as a textbook which give it an important place among the many elementary books which have recently made their appearance. The author attempts to put in the compass of a comparatively small volume the essential facts and principles of the science in a form adapted to class-room use. His desire to compress has led him to omit the description of the nervous system altogether, taking for granted that the student will get such knowledge as he needs from other sources. In other cases the brief statements are, perhaps, not sufficiently explicit or clear for the student who takes up the study for the first time. The development of Sensation, we think, is notably good, although it is somewhat surprising that under vision the author adheres to the Young-Helmholtz three-color theory with rather brief and inadequate reference to the Hering and the Kries-Franklin theories.

Passing on to the higher functions there is a good discussion of the Relational Elements, and a very good statement of the principles of Association. Perception is fully discussed, the development of the concept is to some extent given incidentally; the affective content or feeling receives fair treatment. There is nothing specially new in the treatment of Action and Will, although the order and manner of presentation possess original features. The discussion of the Self or Empirical Ego, of different degrees of consciousness, of the Sub-conscious, and of the Ego as necessary to the full explanation of experience, in each case, possesses valuable features, and these topics, in our judgment, make the book highly suggestive and valuable.

JOHN S. STAHR.

THE LIFE OF THE REVEREND BENJAMIN BAUSMAN, D.D., LL.D. By Henry Haverstick Ranck, Pastor of St. Andrew's Reformed Church, Reading, Pa. The Publication and Sunday School Board of the Reformed Church in the United States. 1912. Pp. 439.

Comparatively few deceased ministers of the Reformed Church in the United States have been honored with an elaborate bio-



graphy. The *Lives of the Fathers* were written in a series of volumes by Drs. Harbaugh and Heisler, but only one of them, Michael Schlatter, was given the space of a whole volume. Among the leaders of the Reformed Church in the nineteenth century lives of Harbaugh, Nevin, and Schaff have been written and published in book form, though a number of their associates and successors deserved similar recognition. These facts help us to appreciate all the more the rare distinction of the splendid literary monument which has been erected by one of his own kith and kin in the *Life of the Reverend Benjamin Bausman*. The position of prominence held by him as a minister in the Reformed Church, a citizen of Pennsylvania, and a resident of the city of Reading made him worthy of this honor. Its neglect would have been almost as keenly felt as its bestowal is highly appreciated.

After reading the book the reader will conclude with me that the author has accomplished his purpose. He says in the Preface that wherever possible he endeavored to have Dr. Bausman's own words express what was to be said. Quotations are taken, not from his widely-read books, but from his less easily accessible diaries, letters, addresses, and articles, literally hundreds of which were collected, carefully read, and extracts made by the author, so as to throw light on every stage of his subject's career. The casual reader, fascinated by the story as it unfolds from page to page, may be inclined to forget the painstaking care and the indefatigable industry which have been given in the course of three years to the preparation of this work. The author may well find reward for his toil in the assurance that he rendered, not only honor to whom it is due and acquitted himself as a workman that needeth not be ashamed, but has gathered a fund of material which will be of great value both for inspiration to noble living and for an accurate presentation of the history of the Reformed Church in the nineteenth century. The external form of the volume—the binding, paper, printing, portraits, and plates—is worthy of the contents and a credit to the publishers.

The secret of Dr. Bausman's strength may be traced to various sources, but not the least among them was his ancestry and his early training. His father came to America from the lower Palatinate, Germany, at a comparatively late date, 1802; while his father's brother, Andreas Bausman, had come to this country many years before, November 10, 1764. The settlement of the Bausman family in Lancaster County, Penna., their industry and thrift, their patriotism and their piety, their loyalty to the Reformed Church and their fidelity to the simple teachings of Jesus Christ, their unpretentious but dignified family life, the Christian nurture of the boys and girls in the Bausman home, their punctual attendance to the religious customs and usages of the Church of their fathers, the unusual religious experience of young Benjamin



—all these are graphically set forth and direct our attention to the source of the sterling virtues of the patriarchal pastor of St. Paul's Reformed Church of Reading, Penna.

Dr. Bausman excelled as preacher and pastor. He was both prophet and priest before his God and among his people. He permitted no other form of church work to lure him from these functions of his office. Yet his sound judgment, his moderation in controversy, his breadth of vision, his sympathy for all classes and conditions of men, his fine dignity tempered by Christian humility, his literary art and his scholarly acumen, enabled him to serve his Church in diverse ways.

From youth to age he was possessed with the *Wanderlust* of his German forebears. He travelled extensively in Europe and the Orient at a time when it was considered no small undertaking for an American to study in a German university, and to retrace the steps of patriarchs and prophets, of the Christ and the apostles, in Egypt, Arabia, and Palestine. The gleanings of his travels he presented in lectures before large audiences. To his friend Dr. Rust he wrote: "Am still holding my lectures. Last time the vestibule and aisles and pulpit were full, even the sofa on the pulpit, and several hundred went away who could not get in." The material of these lectures was put into permanent literary form in his *Sinai and Zion*, "a fine neat, large volume of 543 pages." The account of his experiences as a wanderer abroad, his reflections on men and affairs, his correspondence with friends at home are recorded in chapter five. A second visit to Europe almost twenty years after, and his tour to California in 1886, are described in the twelfth chapter.

In his early ministry Dr. Bausman cultivated the art of writing as well as of preaching. The products of his pen are found in the periodicals of the Church as well as in his books. Perhaps no minister of his generation could more effectually interest the people, young and old, English and German, by his articles in the Church papers than Dr. Bausman. From 1859–1866 he was editor of the *Messenger*. The modesty and courage with which he assumed this task, the difficulties and discouragements which confronted him, the high ideals and practical purpose which inspired him, are delightfully set forth by appropriate extracts from letters, diaries, and articles in chapter seven. As editor of the *Guardian*, 1867–1881, he became the successor of Dr. Harbaugh, his bosom friend, and maintained that periodical on the high plane of excellence on which the first editor conducted it. In his "Parting Greeting," December, 1881, he wrote: "Through all these years the *Guardian* gave me much pleasure. I wove into its texture my heart's warmest sympathies, my mind's purest thoughts, and often in writing for it, have I felt the touches of the warm throbbings and fresh glow of the young, in whose be-



half I labored. I love the young now no less than I did fifteen years ago. I am as much in sympathy with them now as then." For its fine literary style, its appeal to the youth of the Church, and to the family circle generally, the Guardian ranked second to none among similar periodicals in America.

Perhaps the most unique and characteristic of his beneficent undertakings was his founding, editing, and publishing of *Der Reformirte Hausfreund*, a paper designed to reach the Germans in eastern Pennsylvania. It was wholly a labor of love on the part of the editor and revealed his deep interest in his own people and his untiring efforts to develop the membership of the Reformed Church. The fourteenth chapter, recounting the origin, progress, and end of the *Hausfreund*, is by no means the least interesting and illuminating in the book.

In the course of his long ministry there was hardly a board of the Church of which Dr. Bausman was not a member. He served on the Board of Visitors of the Theological Seminary, the Board of Trustees of Franklin and Marshall College, the Board of Trustees of the Synod, the Board of Trustees of the Society for Relief of Ministers and their Widows, the Sunday School Board, the Board of Home Missions, and the Board of Foreign Missions. But on no board did he serve with so much devotion to the cause as the Board of Managers of the Bethany Orphans' Home. Next to St. Paul's in Reading, Bethany was his life work, the object of his daily toil, constant prayer, and liberal gifts. His services in behalf of the orphans are known to the whole Church, and ministers and laymen will read with undivided attention the fifteenth chapter, showing the close relation between Bethany and Dr. Bausman.

Time permits us only to mention the chapters discussing his attitude in theology and in the controversies through which the Church passed during his ministry, his characteristics as a man, a preacher, and a pastor, and the closing years of his life. One lays down the book, after having read it through, feeling that he has followed the unfolding of a truly great and noble life—considering greatness and nobility in the light of the Christian standard. He was, indeed, a man of God, who strove to realize the ideals of the gospel in his personal life and in the social order of which he was so influential a part. Men and women who read this book will catch a glimpse of the power of Christ in men to inspire high ideals, patient endeavor, indefatigable industry, rational living, self-sacrificing service and eternal life. The author deserves the gratitude of the Church for his contribution to her literature, and the Church will always point with just pride to her distinguished son whose life is told on the pages of this volume.

GEO. W. RICHARDS.

# THE REFORMED CHURCH REVIEW

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## I.

### JOHN HUSS AND THE REFORMED CHURCH.

JAMES I. GOOD.

Five hundred years ago (July 6, 1415) John Huss was burned at the stake at Constance, Germany. Has that any special meaning to our Reformed Church?

Of course, as Huss was martyred a century before our Church was born, he had no direct contact with our Church. And yet he had, through his followers the Hussites. That their relation to us was especially intimate is shown by the following fact: On August 26, 1618, there was elected as King of Bohemia, Elector Frederick V. of the Palatinate, the grandson of Elector Frederick III. of the Palatinate, who caused our Heidelberg Catechism to be written. So our prince became ruler of Bohemia. But, alas, it was not for long. For only one brief year, he was their "Winter King." And on November 8, 1620, he and his army were utterly defeated by Ferdinand, the Catholic emperor of Germany, at the battle of White Mountain, a few miles west of Prague. In that awful defeat, not merely did Bohemian Protestantism go down to destruction, but also our fair land of the Palatinate in western Germany went down with her. So then the Hussites and our Ger-



man Reformed Church were compassed in the same destruction—they were brothers in the same suffering. For Frederick was not merely put off the throne of Bohemia, but also deposed from the Palatinate. And as in Bohemia so in the Palatinate, Protestantism was forbidden. For thirty years both they and we suffered as the Catholic powers ravaged our lands. Then, at the end of the Thirty Years War, relief came to our fathers as the Palatinate regained its rights. And so that Church was preserved to later found our Church in America. But for it, we would have been blotted out as was the Hussite Church.

Because of this historical coincidence, there ought to be a very tender tie between our Church and the followers of John Huss. We should therefore be greatly interested in Huss who gave them their beginning and has in all the years been their inspiration. And we should therefore join in the observance of the five hundredth anniversary of Huss's death, that, as it gave the Hussites such great inspiration, it may also give us an inspiration and benediction.

There are especially four links between the Hussites and our Reformed Church that make this Huss anniversary significant to us.

The first was forged at the reformation. In the reformation the followers of Huss came at first into contact with the Lutherans who were geographically nearer to Bohemia. But by 1540 they came into contact with the Reformed and the Reformed with them. Church discipline especially was the link that drew them together. The Hussites separated more and more from the Lutherans because of their laxity of discipline, both in their churches and universities, and so they came nearer the Reformed because they emphasized discipline. Bucer, when he heard of the Hussites, wrote to them, inquiring about their Church discipline. And when he had received a copy of it, he could not restrain his tears. He went to the other Strassburg reformers who were sitting near and said, "This is a more heavenly Church government than earthly." And when one of the Bohemian brethren who had come to Strassburg apologized

for the lack of scholarship in his address, Bucer replied that "the Christian must not look on the elegance of the words but on the piety," and he added, "It is God's work, that these uneducated people have been so exalted a Church." The reformers of Strassburg, including Calvin, then sent back to Bohemia commendatory letters except on their celibacy. Later John A'Lasco, the founder of the Reformed Church of Poland, sent their confession to the reformers of Switzerland. These at first criticized it somewhat on the sacraments, for the Bohemians had, in 1535, revised their confession so as to make it more agreeable to the Lutherans with whom they were then in contact. It was these Lutheranizing expressions in it that did not quite suit the Swiss. But after explanations of it were made by the Hussites, it was evident that they agreed most with Calvin's doctrine of the Lord's Supper and so Calvin was satisfied at last.

It was however especially through our Reformed Church at Heidelberg that the Bohemians became intimate with the Reformed Church of Germany. This was due to two facts—Dr. Crato, of Crafftheim, who, although a Protestant, was the court physician of three of the emperors of Germany, and therefore had great influence at court, had saved them from persecution by the emperor. He was the man who had educated Ursinus, one of the authors of the Heidelberg Catechism.<sup>1</sup> So he was the link between them and Ursinus at Heidelberg. The other fact was that Hubert Languet, a university friend of Ursinus, advised them to send their young men who wanted an education to Heidelberg University, and in 1575 they first began coming there. After that, all their young men who went abroad for their education went to Reformed universities. And when they went back to Bohemia, their commanding influence virtually made the Bohemians Reformed in spirit. There was no union as yet with the Reformed, it is true; for the Bohemians were not permitted by the Austrian government to unite with any foreign Church. Indeed, they had been perse-

<sup>1</sup> See my work "The Heidelberg Catechism in its Newest Light."



cuted for being merely in correspondence with foreign Reformed churches. But we see that their relation to us became as close as it possibly could under the circumstances.

The second link between the Bohemians and us was the one we have already mentioned. Our prince of the Palatinate became their king in 1619. When he was elected the hope was expressed that by it the Reformed of Germany and the Hussite Church might be brought together. A number of their Bohemian cities and congregations became Reformed, especially those that were democratic. But the defeat at White Mountain and the awful destruction that came on Bohemia later led to other links that made them Reformed. So we pass to the third link between the Hussites and our German Reformed Church, and that was that of the Hussites who fled to Germany, most of whom became members of the Reformed Church. The awful persecutions that followed the battle of White Mountain caused thousands of the followers of Huss to flee to other lands. Many of them went to Poland, so that there were soon, it is said, sixty congregations there. The Hussites in Poland merged with the Reformed in 1628, says Rev. Dr. Herman Dalton, the historian of the Reformed Church of Poland and Russia. When Poland was divided, the district in which these Hussite churches were located fell to Prussia. And there is now a Reformed synod in eastern Germany, the synod of Posen, which is composed of the descendants of these Hussites. There are also in Silesia some Reformed congregations founded by the Hussites. In Berlin there is a Reformed congregation, the Bethlehem congregation, composed of descendants of the Hussites who named that church after Huss's chapel at Prague. Perhaps most interesting of all, in order to show how thoroughly these followers of Huss became part of our Reformed Church, we may refer to Rev. D. E. Jablonski, of Berlin. He was of Hussite parentage, the grandson of Comenius, the great educator of Europe in the seventeenth century. Jablonski was the court-preacher or head of the Reformed Church of Prussia, and at the same time and for many years the senior or head of the Hussite Church. He

it was who ordained Zinzendorf as head of the "Renewed Hussites," as the Moravians are called. We thus see that an important constituency of our Reformed Church of Germany came out of these Hussites.

The fourth and last link between the followers of Huss and our Church is the present "Reformed Church of Bohemia and Moravia," numbering about 120,000. This church, like ourselves, adheres to the Heidelberg Catechism. What a story is theirs, and how it ought to appeal to us, as we remember how nearly our Church came to being destroyed with theirs in the Thirty Years War (1618-48). Our Church at that time suffered with them, but after thirty years gained relief and was reëstablished. But their Church got no relief for 160 years, until, in 1781, Emperor Joseph of Austria issued the Edict of Toleration. The Bohemian church had been dead for six generations and was supposed to have passed out of existence. But lo, what a resurrection! It is one of the miracles of church history. Where there were no Protestants before, lo, 90,000 came out and avowed themselves Protestants! How was it that without churches or sacraments or ministers they had preserved their faith for a century and a half. We remember many years ago being shown by our sainted brother, Elder Rudolph Kelker, then treasurer of our Foreign Mission Board, a baked Bible. The story connected with it was, that it had belonged to a Bohemian family during their persecutions. And when the Catholic soldiers or Jesuits came around, the family would hide it in dough which they would place in the oven. It came out with the loaf, baked—but preserved. The present superintendent of the Bohemian Reformed Church, Rev. Mr. Dusek, told us that the reason why the followers of Huss so highly honored their Bibles was because, as they had no pastors or churches, all they had was their Bibles. And therefore they cherished them all the more. These Bibles were secreted in hollow logs or under stones or in caves, etc., so as not to be discovered. And often their hiding place was only known to the father of the family who, just before dying, would disclose it to his son.



When this Bohemian Church was again resurrected in 1781 they were not allowed to become Hussites. The Austrian government ordered them to become either Lutheran or Reformed, as they were the only two Protestant Churches recognized there by law. It would have been easier for them to have become Lutherans, as it was easier to get Lutheran pastors. But they did not like the high churchism of the Lutheran ministers, who came among them with their robes, altars and crucifixes. Therefore, most of them became Reformed—three-fourths it is said—which would mean about 65,000.

But how were they to get Reformed ministers? Here comes in one of the most interesting tales in their history. The nearest Reformed Church was in Hungary, and to it they appealed. In September, 1782, their letters were read at a large meeting in the University of Saros Patak, Hungary, and finally four of the young Hungarian theological students declared their willingness to do. They were ordained by the Reformed Church of Hungary as "Apostles to Bohemia." But their difficulties were very great. One of them was the language. The Hungarian and Bohemian languages are quite different, as different as French and German. So these young ministers, who then spoke only Hungarian, had at first to prepare their sermon in Hungarian, then translate it into Latin, and then, by the aid of a Latin-Bohemian dictionary, translate it into Bohemian. But even then their pronunciation was at first very imperfect. We fear that many of our modern sermons today would go to pieces under such a process. But they persevered and by and by became eloquent in Bohemian.

And their congregations, how did they receive these first imperfect attempts to preach? Let any of our Reformed congregations who are hypercritical sit up and listen to the story. They did not criticize the mistakes of the preacher as do our congregations now. No, they were too hungry for the gospel, after a famine of 160 years, to do that. It is said that when they heard the first sermon in their own tongue, even at the beginning when the text was read, a great agitation went over

the congregation. And many of them, especially those who had suffered persecutions, wept; but they were not tears of sorrow, but of joy at hearing the gospel of their fathers in their own tongue. Think of the self-denial of those young Hungarians as they went to found the Reformed Church of Bohemia. No wonder their descendants, who are today in the ministry as Szalatnay, Nagy and Molnar, are looked up to with special honor as "Sons of Aaron." Thus these Hussites in Bohemia became Reformed and are today devotedly attached to the Heidelberg Catechism.

We thus see how closely the followers of Huss were originally connected with the Reformed Church, until finally the most of them went into the Reformed Church. The little colony who became what we call Moravians numbered only 300 when they first left Moravia; but those who went to Poland, whose descendants became Reformed, numbered many thousands. And when we add to them the Reformed Church of Bohemia and Moravia, we see that by far the greater part of the original Hussites are today in the Reformed Church.

For these reasons, we of the Reformed Church ought to observe this anniversary of the martyrdom of Huss and be interested in his present followers in Bohemia. We can therefore count Huss as a pre-reformer of our Church, paving the way for Zwingli, Calvin and Ursinus. For had not Huss and the Hussite movement shown the easiness with which a nation like Bohemia could break away from Rome and get along without a pope, it would have been harder for the reformers of the sixteenth century to have gained the victory.

Four celebrations of Huss have been planned for this year.<sup>2</sup> The first is a great national celebration by the Bohemians as a nation. Huss has ever been the national idol of Bohemia, for he was their leader when they first came to national consciousness. Though the Romish Church has for centuries tried to undermine his influence among the Bohemians, Huss is still their great national hero. And though most of the Bohemians

<sup>2</sup> The European war may prevent some of them.



are Catholics, yet they admire and love Huss from a political point of view. Therefore, the Bohemian nation proposes to place a great statue of Huss in the Central Square of Prague, strange to say just on the spot where the Protestant nobles of Bohemia were beheaded in 1621 for their faith.

The second celebration is to be by the Freethinkers of the world. But Huss was not a freethinker. He was too devoted to his Bible for that.

The third is, strange to say, by the Romish Church. It is hard to see what she has to celebrate, unless it be her perfidy in breaking Huss's safe-conduct at Constance and putting to death one of the purest and most devoted of her sons. Doubtless, the great influence of Huss among the people compels them to have some sort of celebration.

The fourth will be by the Reformed Church of Bohemia and Moravia. And shall we who are of the same faith and order not join with them in this observance? If Catholics and even infidels intend to observe it, are we going to be worse than they? Certainly we will show our sympathy for that suffering but noble Church by joining with them in it as our last General Synod has ordered. It is therefore hoped that each pastor will in his congregation or charge, on a date as near to next July 6 as is most convenient, preach a sermon and hold a Huss service. This is to be done for the education of his people, but also for the inspiration they will get from the story of Huss and his followers. And if the interest of the congregation is sufficiently great he will take an offering to aid that struggling sister church of ours in Bohemia. For though that Church is now over a century old, yet it does not yet have its own theological seminary. It is the only national Church of Europe that does not have its own school of the prophets. It is proposed, therefore, to erect in Prague a Huss House as a memorial to Huss. This is to contain a theological seminary and also to be a center for the Church in its work and especially in its work among the students of the University of Prague. The Congregationalists of our country, though not allied to the Bohemian



Church in faith or government as we are, is putting \$6,000 to \$8,000 into their mission in Bohemia every year. Can we, who are so much nearer than they, afford to do less for a church that loves our Heidelberg Catechism. Any money that is raised can be sent to the chairman or members of the committee of our General Synod, Rev. Drs. Good, Richards, and John Gekeler, who will be glad to forward it.

We ought therefore to observe this anniversary, not merely for the sake of the Hussites, who have been so closely related to our Church, but also for the inspiration that comes from their founder John Huss. A life like that of Huss, completed and crowned by so brave a martyrdom, will be a great inspiration to ministers and congregations alike. It will tone us up in this luxurious age to greater self-sacrifice and nobler Christian living. It is true, Huss had his faults—who has not. Thus he held to transubstantiation; unless the charge of his enemies that he held to the doctrine of remanence (that is, that the bread and wine remain bread and wine and are not all changed into the body and blood of Christ) contain an element of truth in it. But we can overlook his faults; for above all his faults rise his greater virtues. It was for his essential Protestantism that he gave his life.

We might suggest in closing a few of the lessons that might be dwelt upon at this anniversary.

1. Huss stands out as the Champion of the Supremacy of the Word of God. Like Wyckliffe, whose follower he was, the Bible was his great guide and theme. It was for Bible-reading and Bible-preaching that he became a martyr.

2. He stands out as the great Apostle of Congregational Singing. The Romish Church had robbed the congregations of this privilege and caused all the singing to be done by the priests. Huss restored singing to the congregation and made the Hussites great hymn-singers; so mighty, that by the singing of their national religious hymn, they repeatedly put great armies of their enemies to flight. We have congregational singing in our churches today because Huss started it and Luther and Calvin followed him.



3. Huss stands out as the great Slav Reformer, the only prominent reformer among the Slav races. The gospel of Huss is the one that especially appeals to the races allied to the Bohemians, like the Poles, Slavs, Ruthenians, Lithuanians, Russians, etc., who are just opening up to our pure gospel of Protestantism.

4. Huss stands out as the great Champion of Religious Liberty—so does in fact every martyr for that matter. But Huss was one of the first of them for Protestantism. He demanded the right to believe according to his own conscience. And they burned him for it. Would we in America be enjoying our cherished religious liberty if Huss had not blazed the way so long ago?

5. Huss stands out as a Christian so entirely devoted to his faith that he was ready to die for it. What a lesson this to our Church and how great the appeal we can make from it to our members to be true to their Reformed faith and churches.

6. Huss stands out lastly as the man who was willing to die for his conscience. We have not thus far referred to the reasons for his martyrdom, as they are well known, but we will close with one that is apt to be overlooked. Huss died so as to keep his conscience pure. Would that our people today were as anxious to keep their consciences pure and undefiled. He would probably not have been put to death, if he had been willing to falsely grant that he held to the errors the Catholics charged against him. He declared to the emperor "I can not offend God by saying I held to heresies I never held." He would rather die than violate his conscience. He held it was better to burn than hold to truths his soul abhorred, such as that he was the fourth person of the trinity. He could not do it, he did not do it, and so they burned him. But you can't burn out a conscience like that any more than you can annihilate a soul. You can martyr it as Huss was martyred, but Huss still lives on the earth; for his principles have become immortal here.

Listen to the story of his death. "God is my witness," he said, "that I have never taught or preached those things which

have falsely been ascribed to me, and the chief aim of my preaching, writing and acts has been that I might save men from sin. And today I am willing and glad to die for the truth which I have taught, written and preached." They put on his head a paper crown a yard long with three demons painted on it clawing his soul with their nails. And Huss said, "The crown that my Redeemer wore was heavier and more painful than this." The priests said, "We commit your soul to the devil." "And I," said Huss, with clasped hands and upturned eyes, "commit my soul to the most gracious Lord Jesus." And thus he closed his life, fulfilling his own motto given in one of his letters two years before. "It is better to die well than live badly."

When we think of all this, is it not worth while observing this saint's martyrdom? O that we had men and women of such consciences today!

They climbed the steep ascent of heaven  
Through peril, toil and pain.  
O God, to us may grace be given  
To follow in their train.

PHILADELPHIA, PA.



## II.

### A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF ANCIENT AND MEDIAEVAL MISSIONS.

*(Concluded.)*

LEONARD L. LEH.

When Paul began his missionary work, his usual method was to open his propaganda by preaching in the Jewish synagogues. In this way a good many of the Gentile seekers who attended these services were won. This method, however, could not long be continued, for the original distrust of the Jews for the new soon grew into active opposition. Even in Paul's time, practically all connection of Gentile Christianity with Judaism had perforce ceased. At Ephesus, as we are told in "the Acts," he preached for some time in the lecture hall of Tyrannus. At Athens, the city of learning, he followed the example of the philosophers and rhetoricians, and spoke to men in the streets and in a public assembly. It was very easy to get an audience in the time of the Empire; everywhere the people were eager to hear discourses about life, religion, and philosophy. We may therefore suppose that in the first years of Christianity, before active pagan opposition had begun, the usual method of the missionaries, just as in the case of Paul, was to address such audiences in all kinds of assemblies. Christian travelers, not bent particularly on a missionary errand, also lent their aid in the work by talking about the "Good News" they had discovered to all such as they came into conversation with. After the churches had sprung up, the preaching was largely confined to the churches themselves, but the unconverted were attracted to these meetings for the very same reason that they had previously attended the more public gatherings. They were

eager for truth, and here it seemed possible to find it. Besides the method of preaching there were other, more individualistic, ways of teaching people the new faith. Mature Christians, with their balanced life, their stately bearing, and their stores of wisdom, were looked upon, by many a pagan youth, in the same light as the philosophers who flourished at the time, and thus frequently were applied to for advice. It was in this way that the great Justin, after having studied several philosophies in vain, was won over. The deacons of the Church, whose business it was to look after the poor, also made good use of the opportunities their work presented to tell people of the blessedness of Christianity. Perhaps the most powerful and effective method of diffusion was that which took place in an altogether private and unofficial way. "One person told another where he had found peace and comfort—one laborer to another, one slave to a fellow-slave. What was heard was interchanged, as was also what was received in writing, a Gospel, it may be, or an apostolical Epistle." It is but natural to expect that these methods of spread brought into the folds of the Church a preponderance of the lower elements of society. This fact was a favorite point for the critics of Christianity to use against it. Celsus makes use of it in his satirical discussion of the "ecclesia of worms." "The Christians," he says, "tell us, 'Let no cultured person draw near, none wise, none sensible; for all that kind of thing we count evil; but if any man is ignorant, if he is wanting in sense and culture, if any is a fool, let him come boldly.' Such people they spontaneously avow to be worthy of their God; and, so doing, they show that it is only the simpletons, the ignoble, the senseless, slaves and womenfolk and children, whom they wish to persuade, or can persuade." The very fact, however, that Celsus was writing a lengthy and detailed refutation of Christianity, couched in all the subtleties of the diffusive rhetoric of the time, shows that it was not only the uncultured classes that were influenced by the religion, but betrays rather a fear that even the best of the Empire were at the point of being won over. During the persecutions the open



propaganda of Christianity ceased. Even the church gatherings had to be secret. Yet the work went on—greater crowds than ever came in. The persecutions did all the advertising that was necessary, while private contact with the members completed the work. We may well describe the mission method of early Christianity in the terms of a parable which Jesus himself used—that of the leaven. Jesus transmitted of his life, his personality, his new outlook upon life, to his disciples, and they to disciples of theirs, and so on, until the whole Empire was leavened.

The quality of culture in the persons addressed by early Christianity is shown by the manner in which the message was apprehended and the thoroughness with which it was applied. Wherever the new religion was adopted it was because men had become convinced of its inner truth. This convincing was accomplished in many different ways, but, whatever the manifestation or the occasion that brought it about, the result was always the same—the converts were convinced that here they had found the essence of life. In some the end was reached as the direct result of a long philosophical quest, as in the cases of Clement of Rome, Justin Martyr, Clement of Alexandria, and Tertullian. More frequently, however, we may suppose, the occasion was rather a vision of the Christian life, of the tranquility and morality of the Church, the steadfastness of the martyrs, or similar objective manifestations. As a rule the conversion was the result of a long process. Men pondered what they had seen and heard, and finally, when the evidence had accumulated so as to be overwhelming, they also became Christians. There was a good deal of hesitancy on the part of most of the pagans before they allowed themselves to be persuaded. As Uhlhorn says, "Everything about (the new religion) was too strange to the heathen, too repugnant to the views with which they had been familiar from childhood, for them to be able to understand it." But this hesitancy made them all the better Christians when once they overcame it. The converts had a definite consciousness

of the change they had undergone. They felt that their life had been transformed down to its very foundations. They were now members of a new community which existed apart from the heathen world although it was still in its midst. The early Christians were very insistent upon this separateness of life. Theirs was a new course entirely from that of the heathen around them, and they felt that many things were forbidden to them which were matters of every-day custom to those about them. At the same time they realized the more strongly the new bond which bound them together as Christians. Thus were the converts to the new faith converts indeed, new in ideas, new in customs, and new in life. The extent of this transformation is seen in the indirect effect it had upon the still pagan world. An active element within a community, even though it is in the minority, helps greatly in the formation of the *Zeitgeist* of the period. Thus the Christian spirit had grown so strong in the Empire toward the end of the second century, that even the pagan world began to be possessed with Christian ideas of benevolence and charity, of purity in morals, and other characteristic Christian marks. Evidences of this new mood are seen in the facts that the lot of the miserable was greatly ameliorated, and that many institutions of benevolence were set upon their feet. The leaven was so strong that its influence touched even its avowed opponents.

As we have seen, the early Christian missions found their first fruit largely among the lower classes. Because of the new hope it instilled into the hearts of the despairing, and the new life and riches it brought to those most in need, the new religion would naturally make its first appeal to the down-trodden and oppressed. Besides, the lower classes are always the more easy to win over to a new movement, as they are more unstable than the ones holding position and privilege. But Christianity would not be confined to the lower circles—its appeal, then as now, was universal. Soon it had spread to the literary circles, and its tenets were widely proclaimed in



philosophical terms and in rhetorical dress. As early as 150, Justin Martyr wrote his splendid apology, addressed to the Roman Emperor. Even before that time, there had crept into the Church various Gnostic heresies, which, in themselves, were proof that the religion had a strong hold upon the philosophic. It is sometimes objected that there is a remarkable silence in regard to the new religion on the part of the pagan writers of the period. This fact, however, is not conclusive proof that it was unknown to them. Marcus Aurelius barely mentioned them in his *Meditations*, and yet he knew them well enough to fear that they threatened the old regime, and to institute an active persecution. May it not have been that the silence was studied? There are many indications that the accessions to Christianity from the better ranks were numerous. The presence of men of liberal education, such as Clement, Justin, etc., has already been spoken of. In periods of peace magnificent church buildings appeared in the cities. The contributions to charity were constant and generous from the time of Paul on. In the catacombs of the period we find costly crypts and tombs, which the Christians had made there. Clement of Alexandria, in his *Pædagogus*, inveighs against the vices of an opulent and luxurious community. These facts go to show that the Christians were not by any means all poor. In fact, they indicate a general prosperity, and even occasional wealth. A contemporary account of the martyrdom in Vienne and Lyons (177) seems to show that the martyrs were generally of the middle or better classes. Among those mentioned by name are several Roman citizens, heads of households, and a well-known physician. An edict of Valerian, dating from about the middle of the third century, gives evidence to the same effect: it provided that "bishops, presbyters, and deacons be immediately put to death; that senators and men of rank and knights be first of all deprived of their rank and property, and then, their means being taken away, if they still continue to be Christians, be also punished with death; that those in Cæsar's household who have for-

merly made profession of Christianity, or now profess it, be treated as Cæsar's property, and, being put in chains, be distributed among the Imperial estates." Paul already spoke of "those of Cæsar's household." Domitian, whose reign falls within the first century, felt constrained, even at that early period, to put to death Flavius Clemens, the consul, and to banish Domitilla, his own niece, for "atheism" and "going astray after the customs of the Jews," as Dio Cassius puts it. Toward the close of the second century there began to be a widespread dread, on the part of those who had the Empire at heart, at the increasing number and power of the Christians. This it was that called forth the book of Celsus. This also it was that made every capable emperor, from Marcus Aurelius to Diocletian, a stern persecutor of the faithful. This is another index of the extent to which the leaven of the Kingdom had worked. Tertullian may have exaggerated, yet he could not have written the following without some basis of truth: "Men cry out that the State is besieged; the Christians are in the fields, in the forts, in the islands; they mourn, as for a loss, that every sex, age, condition, and even rank, is going over to this sect. . . . The temple revenues are every day falling off; how few now throw in a contribution." When Constantine adopted Christianity as the state religion about 325, the conversion of the Empire was still far from complete; yet so strongly had it intrenched itself that the last obsequies of paganism as an institution were not far distant. When the Emperor Julian made it his life-work to restore the old faith, it did not take many years for him to discover that he was the champion of a lost cause. The knowledge of his inclinations filled his court with professors of paganism, but he could well see that enthusiasm was lacking. When he came to Antioch on his way to the East, he went with great pomp to celebrate the festival of Apollo at the Temple of Daphne, of former fame; but, to his great chagrin, when he arrived there he found no one but a single old priest, who was sacrificing a goose at his own expense. The days of paganism



were over. If the words that tradition attributes to Julian as he received his death-blow in battle were not spoken by him, they nevertheless express the unalterable truth that the situation represented: "Galilean, thou hast conquered!"

The missionaries of the Middle Ages were from the monasteries. The average layman was too busy with his own affairs to concern himself about bringing the Gospel to those who did not know it. If he did make it a matter of concern for himself, usually the only method he could think of, or that was adapted to his impetuous nature, as in the case of Charlemagne and the stubborn Saxons, was to convert them by a generous application of the sword. So the work of Christianizing the Teuton nations fell to the monks. The monks were men who made being a Christian their sole business. People had not learned then yet that the best way to be a Christian is to stay right in the midst of the world and its work, and then apply the principles of Christ there. They thought that to save his soul properly, a man must separate himself entirely from secular life and its temptations, and give himself up altogether to devotional and ascetic exercises. The monasteries were regarded, we might say, as spiritual gymnasia. Now many of the monks, having carried their previous worldliness inside the holy walls, forgot what they came for, and abandoned themselves to idleness and self-indulgence. Others kept their mission in mind, and subjected themselves to a very strenuous discipline, but they forgot the world and the Master's command to love. We are glad to say, however, that true Christianity, with its spirit of self-forgetting service, was not entirely shut out from the monasteries. There was a third group, and indeed they were fairly numerous, who were ever ready for any good work that might be given them to do. These soldiers of Christ were as steadfast and dauntless and devoted to their banner as ever were soldiers who marched under an earthly flag. Had it not been for these men, it is to be doubted whether there should ever have been any mission work in the Middle Ages. As it was, the great bishops



of the Church, who were anxious that the pagans should be brought into their fold, found ready tools for the work.

In the period that we are discussing, the missionary monks came from two sources. One series came from the Benedictine monasteries of Italy and adjacent lands, and were sent, for the most part, by the Roman bishop. The others came from the monasteries of the Irish Church, which at this time was entirely independent from Rome, having been cut off by the Anglo-Saxon invasion and maintained a separate existence up to this time. In both series do we find men of a high type, hard-working, self-sacrificing, and ready for almost any hardships if there was prospect that their task could be accomplished. There was a great difference, however, in the supporting power back of them. The monks of the Roman Church felt themselves the authorized representatives of a great, catholic ecclesiastical system, which had grown to be a power, even in the external or political sense, greater than any other in all western Europe. The Keltic missionaries came from a church that knew no higher organization than the individual monastery, and were impelled to the work, not by the order of some superior, but rather by their own vision of the need of Christ's cause. Naturally, this difference manifested itself in a difference in spirit of the men of the two forces. The purest type of Christianity was to be found among the Kelts. They had least in the way of worldly motives to confuse them. As for the Roman missionaries, giving them all due credit for their perseverance and uncomplaining self-sacrifice, we must admit that they displayed considerable haughtiness of spirit and impatience at opposition. One incident is enough to bring out this point. The Venerable Bede relates how Augustine, after he had come to Britain, appointed a synod where he might meet the bishops and learned men of the Keltic Church in order to discuss with them the question of church union. The Keltic representatives went to an old man, widely known for his piety and wisdom, asking his advice. The following is a quotation from



Bede: "He answered, 'If he [Augustine] is a man of God, follow him.' 'How shall we know that?' said they. He replied, 'Our Lord saith, Take my yoke upon you, and learn of me, for I am meek and lowly of heart; if, therefore, Augustine is meek and lowly of heart, it is to be believed that he has taken upon him the yoke of Christ, and offers the same to you to take upon you. But, if he is stern and haughty, it appears that he is not of God, nor are we to regard his words.' They insisted again, 'And how shall we discern even this?' 'Do you contrive,' said the anchorite, 'that he may first arrive with his company at the place where the synod is to be held; and if at your approach he shall rise up to you, hear him submissively, being assured that he is the servant of Christ; but if he shall despise you, and not rise up to you, whereas you are more in number, let him also be despised by you.'" Accordingly, when they came to the synod, they found Augustine sitting proudly in his chair of state, ready to dictate to them the changes they were to make in their customs in order that they might enter the universal church and join him in preaching "the word of God to the English nation." The Kelts were angered at this summary treatment, and answered that "they would do none of those things, not receive him as their archbishop; for they alleged among themselves, that 'if he would not rise now up to us, how much more will he condemn us, as of no worth, if we shall begin to be under his subjection?'" As the result of their fine Christian spirit, we find the most illustrious names of this missionary period among the Kelts. Their beautiful life-histories were dear to the devout hearts of later times, as the luxurious growth of legendary story that sprang up about them proves. But the missions of the Keltic Church were neither of wide nor of lasting success. They were not adapted to the times. Wherever a Kelt brought about a lasting conversion of a Teutonic people, or wherever a Keltic mission in Teutonic territory became permanent, it was through connexion with the Roman ecclesiastical organization. The Roman missionaries, on the other hand,

were successful from the beginning. Indeed, theirs was no smooth road either, and they often had to wait a long time; but, in the end, they always won. The times were with Rome.

It will be in order at this time to mention some of the leading missionaries of our period. At the beginning of the sixth century we meet with the first, and perhaps most illustrious, of this line of great men. This was Columba, an Irish prince, who left his native land to establish the monastery of Iona on the coast of Scotland (563). This was regarded as a step toward the conversion of the Picts, which was accomplished later by Columba and his followers. The founding of Iona was, however, of far greater importance for the future history of Europe than this, its original purpose, implied. Iona became a great missionary institute, whence came many workers of subsequent fame, not only for Pictish fields, but also for the lands of the Angles and the Saxons, and even for the continental Teutons. A second Keltic missionary of outstanding importance was Columbanus, who worked among the pagans in the region of Switzerland about 600. He remained true to the Keltic traditions, and came into several conflicts with the Roman Church. Augustine, the pioneer who brought Roman Christianity into Anglo-Saxon Britain, landed in Kent in 597, bearing the commission of the Great Gregory. He became the first Archbishop of Canterbury. Paulinus, another Roman missionary, accomplished the conversion of the Northumbrian king Edwin in 627. He was the founder of the episcopal see of York. Aidan and Cuthbert were two successful Keltic laborers in Northumbria. Mellitus, one of the assistants whom Pope Gregory had sent to Augustine, going under the shadow of the Kentish king Aethelbert's authority, planted a rather short-lived mission in London. To the Northumbrian Cedd belongs the credit of the final conversion of Essex. Birinus, a continental missionary (d. 650), was responsible for the winning of the West Saxons. A brother of the afore-mentioned Cedd, Ceadda or St. Chad, as he came to be known, a man of singularly beautiful Christian character,



did a valuable intensive missionary work while Bishop of Mercia. Wilfrid of York, for some time bishop of that see, later was a pioneer worker among the South Saxons and among the Frieslanders of the Continent. Other noted apostles to Friesland were Eligius and Willibrord. The former was a man of noble rank, a favorite of the Frankish court, and of wide fame as a goldsmith, which was then one of the few honorable crafts in that country. Willibrord was a Northumbrian, of the school of Wilfrid. Besides these names, there are two others, whose work, though it falls beyond our time limit, nevertheless is but a continuation of the labors of those already mentioned. The first of these is Winfrid, better known as Boniface, who brought about the conversion of a large part of Germany in the eighth century; the other is Ansgar, the apostle to Norway and Sweden, who labored in the ninth century. All these men were great and beautiful characters, and Europe owes much to them. They were the apostles to Teutonic Europe, and deserve a place beside the Twelve who went out in the first century to win a heathen world for Christ.

A previous paragraph has tried to tell about the missionary motives of the ancient workers: now we shall consider those of the apostles of the Middle Ages. Missionary work is never prevailingly selfish, but always largely a labor of love. It is, as far as can be, the opposite of the inglorious way of traders, whose habit is to exploit a new country for the benefit of their own pocket-books. Yet, we must say that the missionary motives of the mediaeval period were not quite as pure and Christlike as those that fired the disciples of the first century. It cannot be denied that, in addition to whatever humanitarian ideas possessed the minds of the popes, they also had a vision of the political importance they would gain if they could bring over the barbarian conquerors of Europe into their fold. The bishops of Rome in those days were men of large vision, and they realized that their see was in the ascendancy, with untold promise before it, should they play their cards well. This

hope of widening the influence and authority of their Church could not help but affect also the missionaries who went out directly at the wish of the popes. They went out with a feeling their fight was to be one for their Church as well as for Christ. Perhaps it was often the consciousness that they were the pioneer representatives of a mighty institution behind them that gave to these missionaries the strength and endurance that they displayed. This can also, to some extent, be said of the missionaries that came from the Keltic Church. It was not so much the organization there, yet the spirit of the body of Christians whom they left at home must often have urged them on when their own wearied spirits would have rebelled. Another motive which gave rise to missionary work was the fact that it provided a way for meritorious living. All monasticism was the result of the efforts of individuals to gain merit in the sight of God. Here was a new way to serve the Master, one that provided abundance of privation and hardship, that enabled them to spend all their thoughts upon things divine, and that, at the same time, demanded the humility and love that the Master was so insistent in demanding. Consequently there was an eagerness among the monks to enter the mission field. Then the spirit of some monasteries was missionary in its nature. In some, as in the case of Iona, it became the tradition of the institution. We may trace this spirit to the founders of the particular institutions, or to some great members who had once lived there, who had individually heard the call springing out of their own piety and zeal. Here again we may say that idea begets idea, and life begets life: the influence of great missionary-minded men made other missionaries, and they others, and so on. Besides these influences there was also another, a very natural one. To a Christian, who conceives himself in possession of the one true, universal religion, it comes as a sort of a shock to learn that there are still people living outside of its grace and ignorantly following gods who are mere figments of the imagination, or at least beings incapable of working them any



good. This natural altruism has always been one of the main sources of the support given to missions by a well-established home church. In spite of all the fine, self-sacrificing work done by the mediæval missionaries, however, there was an air of artificiality about it that we cannot help but notice constantly and distinctly. There was not the old spontaneity about it which, by the very abundance of the life within, compelled men to go out in order to bring this life also to others. The missionary spirit here was as a carefully nurtured plant, grown in the artificial atmosphere and environment of the monasteries, where virtues alien to man's nature and to the clear sunlight of the open fields were being forced upon flesh and blood that rebelled. So even about the missions there is something strained and unreal. But the monasteries afforded the best that there was to be had: the rest was barbarism.

In Bede's *History* we read how Augustine and his followers, having landed at the Isle of Thanet, "sending to Ethelbert, signified that they had come from Rome, and brought a joyful message, which most undoubtedly assured to all that took advantage of it everlasting joys in heaven, and a kingdom that would never end, with the living and true God." This, in essence, was the message of the major portion of the mediæval missions. We may say that the fundamental message always brought, at least by the Roman missionaries, to the pagans, consisted of two parts. The first was that the Christian God was the only true God, and the Catholic Christian Church the only true church; and that all their own gods were false and their religious practices abomination. The second was that the Christian religion offered eternal salvation to all who were received into the Church. Besides these basic ideas, there were others which entered into the message. One was the politic one which assured success to the king who took up the Christian cause. This was used frequently. Here is an extract from a letter of Pope Gregory to Ethelbert: "Almighty God advances all good men to the government of nations, that He may by their means bestow the gifts of his mercy on those



over whom they are placed. This we know to have been done in the English nation, over whom your glory was therefore placed, that by means of the goods which were granted to you, heavenly benefits might also be conferred on the nation which is subject to you. Therefore, my illustrious son, do you carefully preserve the grace which you have received from the Divine goodness, and hasten to promote the Christian faith, . . . for He also will render the fame of your honor more glorious to posterity, whose honor you seek and maintain among the nations.” Another element of the missionary message was the doctrine that the Christian sacraments were the sole means of grace. This idea, if dwelled on consistently for a long time, would be almost certain to make an impression upon the superstitious barbarians. In addition to these doctrines, the missionaries of course preached about some of the Christian virtues and truths, such as purity, humility, forbearance, forgiveness, etc. Many of these were distasteful to the average war- and sport-loving Teuton, yet the fact that the missionaries themselves offered constant living examples of them made its impression on some. There were some of the Christian traits and demands, however, which were sympathetic to Germanic character. To quote from Richard: “The idea of the infinite must have appealed to their mystical inclinations; their sense of personal worth must have been satisfied to learn that the Lord of the Universe took an interest in each individual. Christ and Christian saints, furthermore, permitted much more intimately personal relationship than the indefinite nature divinities of the German’s imperfectly developed paganism.” Wherever the missionaries went, they established monasteries, which became self-supporting centers of culture in their respective communities. These monasteries became the schools of the surrounding barbarians. Here they were taught the value of books and learning, the arts of building and agriculture, the art of healing, various trades, and many another of the processes that make for comfort and pleasure in life. Thus we may say that not the least



message the missionaries brought to the barbarian peoples was the message of civilization, illustrated in a practical manner. All through the mediæval mission work we notice a certain dictating attitude, an uncompromising "I am right, and you are wrong" spirit, which is practically absent in the ancient period. There was no respect for the inherited ideas of the pagans themselves. This, however, may have been for the best, as the men to be convinced had not yet reached the stage where the reason was a ruling influence in their lives. Moreover, the barbarians knew where these men who spoke with so much authority had come from; they knew about the great civilization of the south, which these men represented, and they had much respect for that civilization.

The influences which preceded the missionaries to a new country, creating a favorable disposition toward Christianity, were, perhaps, of greater importance than that of the missionaries themselves. If the Christian monks had come out of the unknown, and entirely unheralded, it is to be doubted whether they could have made any impression whatsoever. The barbarians were not eager for a new religious message. The first and greatest of these extra-missionary influences, as we have said at several places before, was the knowledge of great Rome itself. In his book *The Holy Roman Empire*, James Bryce tells how, although the western Empire had fallen, and its provinces were now in the hands of Teutonic barbarians, nevertheless these same barbarians could not forget its old splendor, and how, even in their minds, the idea never entered that this Empire was dead. It was only "weakened, delegated, suspended"; with many of the nations it was a cherished hope some day to restore it to its full magnificence, with themselves at the head. Moreover, the barbarians had always associated the Empire with Christianity. The two belonged together in their minds. The fact that other barbarian kings were taking up Christianity was a strong influence among those who were still pagan. These felt that the way to political power lay only in this direction, and they did



not care to be left behind in the race. Oftentimes there was a direct influence exercised over a nation by its overlord, who had become Christian. For example, the way was opened for Mellitus to establish his London mission because Ethelbert of Kent happened to be overlord of the East Saxons and their king Saebert. It was a comparative easy matter for Mellitus to win over Saebert; he found it more difficult to gain the king's sons or his thegns. The politics of the smaller kingdoms were in constant turmoil, and many were the lords and princes who had to spend part of their lives in exile. Often this exile meant presence at a Christian court. Oswald of Northumbria actually spent his youth in the monastery of Iona. No wonder he was zealous for Christianity when he had become king! Sigbert of East Anglia had been converted while an exile on the Continent. Then there were many political matrimonial alliances whose influence went in the same direction. Clovis, the first great Frankish prince, was converted to Christianity about 500. He had previously married the Burgundian princess Clotilda, who was an orthodox Christian. Before Augustine came to Kent, Ethelbert had married a Christian Frankish princess, whom he had allowed a bishop and a chapel in order to worship according to her faith. Edwin of Northumbria, who was afterwards persuaded by Paulinus, had married the Christian princess Aethelburh, a kinswoman of Aethelbert. When Peada, the son of Penda, the great pagan king of Mercia, applied to Oswiu, of Northumbria, for the hand of the latter's daughter, he was refused on account of his faith. So he offered to become a Christian, and was baptized and married in the same year.

It is interesting to note that, while ancient missions began with the people and worked up to the Emperor, mediæval missions began with the kings, and after these had been won, worked with the people. Stubbs, in *How Europe was Won for Christianity*, states that "so long as Eadwine remained unconverted, the preaching of Paulinus would have little effect upon this pagan folk (Deira)." The same was true in almost all other



barbarian countries: the king was the key to the situation. Naturally, therefore, the missionaries began with the kings. The mission methods of the Middle Ages may be called ecclesiastical and monastic, as over against the personal and persuasive methods of the ancient propaganda. By the former, we mean that the pagans were made to feel the presence and power of the Church as an institution from the beginning. By the second, we are trying to designate the intensive methods to be described later on. Wherever they could accomplish it, the missionaries arranged so as to make their advent as impressive as possible. When Augustine was to meet Aethelbert, the king arranged that the meeting be held in the open air, fearing that the newcomers might be skilled in the magic arts. "But," says Bede, "they came furnished with Divine, not with magic virtue, bearing a silver cross for their banner, and the image of our Lord and Saviour painted on a board; and singing the litany, they offered up their prayers to the Lord for the eternal salvation both of themselves and of those to whom they were come." The missionaries were not slow at exacting promises if they found themselves in a position where this was possible. Bede relates how Paulinus found the then-exiled Edwin brooding over his misfortunes in the dead watches of the night, and brought him the promises of new hope. Said he, "But if one came to thee with the assurance of thy safety and a promise of thy return to thy father's kingdom and thine, what wouldst thou do for such a one?" "My gratitude should match his kindness," was the response. "And if he who promised these things should tell thee of a better way than any thy ancestors or kinsfolk ever heard of, wouldst thou follow his teachings?" "In very truth I would," the exiled prince replied. Paulinus, who was then an entire stranger to Edwin, raised his right hand and, placing it impressively upon Edwin's brow, he said, "When this sign shall be given thee, remember our discourse and delay not to fulfil thy promise." There came a time when the sign was given, and the noble Edwin could not refuse. The aid of the strong arm of military force was not despised. When



the young Amandus, later missionary to Friesland, returned from Rome to labor for the conversion of the pagan tribes on the Schelde, he met with little success. So he besought Dagobert, king of the Austrasians, to force upon these tribes the Christian faith. Naturally, the result of this move was not very desirable. The work of Willibrord in Friesland was made possible largely through the influence of Pepin, the father of Charles Martel, since that prince compelled the Frisians to receive the missionary peacefully and listen to his words. The popes were in the habit of sending personal letters and sometimes even presents to the kings whom their missionaries were trying to convert. Considering how the pope, as the head of the great Christian Church in the West, and the only visible head the Empire had at the time, was regarded by most western peoples, we may imagine what effect these things had upon the vanity of the obscure barbarian kings. Appeal to a man's vanity, or please him with presents, and access to him is made very much easier. The missionaries themselves employed presents as a means to their end. For instance, when, after a period of absence, Ansgar returned to his Swedish mission, he found that paganism had been revived with new vigor there, and that he was liable to be driven out again any moment. So he invited King Olaf to a grand dinner, and presented him with rich gifts, finally requesting him that he afford protection to him and his work. The protection was granted. In order to gain their ends, the missionaries worked much on the credulity of the people with whom they dealt. Says Richard, "Priests and bishops gained and held their influence over the people probably not so much as the representatives of a higher civilization or a more spiritual religion, but as the wielders of magical power." The story of Boniface and the Hessians is a case in point. The following narrative is from Sheldon: "Finding that it was difficult to win the people of that region from their idolatrous veneration of an enormous oak tree which was esteemed sacred to Thor, Boniface decided to lay the axe to the tree. The awe-struck heathen stood around, expecting that their deity would



take vengeance upon the authors of the sacrilege. They only saw the tree come crushing down, and riven into four pieces. Of these Boniface constructed an oratorium and dedicated it in honor of St. Peter. Impressed by such a palpable indication of the impotence of their gods, many of the heathen turned to the Christian faith."

Of course, such methods as this had very little Christianity in them. Yet we must not forget that the missions of the Middle Ages also had a sound Christian element in them. Otherwise the work could not have lasted. Questionable methods were used for the most part only in order to gain an entrance into the fields. The missionaries, after all, were fine personalities, and their time was spent, by far the bigger portion of it, in painstaking and self-sacrificing personal work. They were constantly preaching to all classes, and they got many of them to think. The story of St. Chad, the bishop of Mercia, is a beautiful one, and the influence he exerted over the lives of the people can be imagined. A noble, holy figure he made, yet he was not content to sit in his episcopal chair, but spent much of his time making long journeys on foot, preaching the gospel "in towns, the open country, cottages, villages, and castles," winning the devotion of all classes of people. We might find many whose lives were a round of service like that. But the missionaries were not content with preaching. They helped their people in all ways they could. When Wilfrid came to the South Saxons a second time, he found them suffering from a famine. So he taught them to weave together their small eel-nets and to venture out with these into the rivers and bays where a plentiful supply of food was to be found. The newly established monasteries, too, were ever ready to help in time of need. The greatest missionary work of the monasteries, however,—and this is where what we called the monastic method of missions comes in—was to train young men of the neighborhood in a Christian education, thus preparing them for work among their own people. This may be called the origin of the educational policy in missions, so generally adopted in

the foreign work of today. It was the men thus prepared who made the conversion of the Teuton tribes a permanent achievement.

The mediæval missionaries often had to work a long time without any visible results at all. That was because the time was not favorable, and no good opportunity had offered itself. Once they could get external circumstances in their favor, the converts were gained quickly and in great numbers. Augustine was not in Kent a long time before he had established a good-sized church there. So at many places. When the Frankish Clovis was baptized in 496, 3,000 Franks went to the font with him. In our period, there frequently was manifested a similar devotion to the king or chief. And how about the kings? They likewise were, in many cases, impelled by state reasons. What Richard says of Clovis was true of many others: "The king found it to his advantage to be baptized, not only because he had vowed to become converted in case the Lord gave him the victory over the Alemans, but for important reasons of state." Ethelbert of Kent felt that by his conversion he could come into closer alliance with the continent. At the time of the struggle between the Mercian Penda and the Christian alliance under the Northumbrian kings, Christianity was made a principal issue of the conflict, and this must have influenced many. It is significant that the king of the West Saxons, the people who were to become the future overlords of Britain, was converted about this time. Similarly, the Norwegian prince Harald was converted to Christianity while living in the hope that the Franks would aid him in recovering his kingdom. The political nature of these conversions is shown by the ease with which they would relapse into paganism if circumstances happened to alter. After the death of Ethelbert, there was such a return even in Kent itself. For a time, as we have seen, Essex was entirely lost to the Christians, Melitus having to flee for his life. Sometimes the hold depended altogether on the presence of the missionary. Wilfrid spent a fairly successful winter in Friesland, but, being compelled to



continue his journey in the spring, "the immediate results of his labors were soon swallowed up in the surrounding paganism." Those countries whose isolation or spirit of independence put them out of reach of the Roman influence were all but impervious to Christianity. It was this cause that made the struggle to gain Friesland so long and hard. To quote from Stubbs: "From their first appearance in history their record is one of struggle against mightier powers to retain ancestral independence. It is not surprising, therefore, to find them for many years resisting all efforts of the missionaries sent among them to win them to the Christian faith, and clinging tenaciously to the worship of gods in whose name their ancient heroes had fought and conquered. A new religion and new customs threatened the very foundations of the old free life, and priests and leaders and people set themselves like flint against the introduction of the Christian Church." They were not politically ambitious, like so many others of the Teutons of the period, and therefore had no use for Christianity. They were finally compelled to submit under the pressure of the strong hand of the Frank. Denmark was another such country. The great Willibrord, who had been successful in Friesland, where he had had the protection of the Franks, penetrated into this field, but he found it unpromising, and could make no other gain than the opportunity to educate some youths whom he purchased from slavery. Even at the late period in which Ansgar worked, the impression he could make in Norway in the course of a long period of work there was practically nothing. Thus we see that the remarkable success that greeted the missionaries of the Middle Ages was due, for the most part, to the political situation.

The depth of religious insight that all the copious preaching of the missionaries produced in the barbarian converts is gauged by a few incidents. When Edwin was considering whether he should turn over to the new faith, he called a council in order to determine how his people would look at the change. In this council one of the elders, who seemed to voice the sentiments



of those gathered, said: "The present life of man, O king, seems to me, in comparison of that time which is unknown to us, like to the swift flight of a sparrow through the room wherein you sit at supper in winter, with your commanders and ministers, and a good fire in the midst, whilst the storms of rain and snow prevail abroad; the sparrow, I say, flying in at one door, and immediately out at another, whilst he is within, is safe from the wintry storm; but after a short space of fair weather, he immediately vanishes from your sight, into the dark winter from which he had emerged. So this life of man appears for a short space, but of what went before, or what is to follow, we are utterly ignorant. If, therefore, this new doctrine contains something more certain, it seems justly to deserve to be followed." At the Synod of Whitby, which was called in order to settle the differences between the Keltic and the Roman representatives, long arguments had been made and strong claims presented by either party, when the bishop Theodore finally, in a fit of impatience, replied to his opponent that the Roman claim was upheld by Peter himself, who was entrusted with the keys of heaven. The presiding officer, Oswy, the influential king of Northumbria at the time, raised his head in new interest at this remark. "If that is the case," he said, "why need we argue any further? I, for my part, would not be willing to do anything that might bring displeasure to the one who holds the keys to our future abode of happiness." With this remark, the question was settled. Again, we read the following in Bede: "In the third year of the reign of Alfrid, Caedwalla, king of the West Saxons, having most honorably governed his nation two years, quitted his crown for the sake of our Lord and his everlasting kingdom, and went to Rome, being desirous to obtain the peculiar honor of being baptized in the church of the blessed apostles, for he had learned that in baptism alone, the entrance into heaven is opened to mankind." How childish these conceptions when compared with the depth of understanding and the profound change of life that Christianity effected among the converts of the first century!



The result of mediæval missions is already foreshadowed in the policy that was adopted in the work. Not that the result could have been any different, for we have already seen, in our survey of the field, that the people could not have received Christianity in the purity of its essence. But to consider the policy: a characteristic pointer is found in one of Gregory's letters to the English Mission under Augustine. "I have," he says, "upon mature deliberation upon the affair of the English, determined that the temples of the idols in that nation ought not to be destroyed; but let the idols that are in them be destroyed; let holy water be made and sprinkled in the said temples, let altars be erected, and relics placed. For if those temples are well-built, it is requisite that they be converted from the worship of devils to the service of the true God; that the nation, seeing that their temples are not destroyed, may remove error from their hearts, and knowing and adoring the true God, may the more familiarly resort to the places to which they have been accustomed. And because they have been used to slaughter many oxen in the sacrifices to devils, some solemnity must be exchanged for them on this account, as that on the day of the dedication, or the nativities of the holy martyrs, whose relics are there deposited, they may build themselves huts of the boughs of trees, about those churches which have been turned to that use from temples, and celebrate the solemnity with religious feasting, and no more offer beasts to the Devil, but kill cattle to the praise of God in their eating, and return thanks to the Giver of all things for their sustenance; to the end that, whilst some gratifications are outwardly permitted them, they may the more easily consent to the inward consolations of the grace of God." Compare this to the uncompromising hostility that the ancient Christians maintained toward all customs and implications that put them in danger of coming under the power again of the old dæmons. But the Teuton converts never knew that freedom from the dæmons was a thing to be desired. Chambers, in his *Mediæval Stage*, devotes a great deal of space to show how little the adoption of Christianity affected the real



customs and beliefs of the people, how usually the change was not much more than a change of name. Thus there are a great many folk-customs and folk-beliefs at this day which have their origin in pre-Christian times. Richard gives his testimony to the same effect: "Slowly, under the influence of German priests, the Christian saints took the places of the heathen gods. The sign of the cross, baptism, and other Christian rites were readily accepted as so many new spells." Christianity did not transform the superstition of the Teutonic barbarians into an intelligent, ethical religion, but only transferred that superstition to other forms, and even not that entirely, for there have continued to exist strong undercurrents of magic and witch-craft among those people down to this very day. But, if such was the effect upon the mass of the converts, Christianity nevertheless brought with it the hope of a new era, for it was the carrier of an old culture which could not fail but work in the minds and characters of the new peoples, as time went on, and, moreover, it brought with it schools in which were to be nurtured the world's future leaders. Altogether, the conversion of Teutonic Europe to Christianity was a step in advance, but it was so by virtue of its final results and not by its immediate effect.

We have seen how the ancient field comprised a large and peaceful Empire, which was the scene of a decadent culture. We have seen how men had grown world-weary, and were searching vainly in all directions to find salvation, or at least something that would give life a new zest. We have considered the mediæval field, how it was constituted of a multitude of barbarian peoples, just waking up to the external possibilities of life, and still full of original vigor and naturalness. Then we took up the Christianity of the first and second centuries, and found it a strong, vital force of the spirit, still close to the personality of its founder, and dependent for its propagation upon nothing but its own inner power. Mediæval Christianity, we found, was a well-established institution, in which organization, doctrine, and ritual had become the chief interests, but



which recommended itself to the new nations because of its immense prestige. After these preliminary investigations, we proceeded to a study of the missions themselves. The ancient missionaries we found men of various origin, with no official ordination nor a central authority sending them into the field, but urged forth by the zeal of the inner life within them to effect a similar life in others. The message of these missionaries was of singular simplicity and yet of such profound completeness that it was equal to satisfy every demand the intelligence or the conscience could make upon it. The method by which this message was proclaimed was through persuading the individual reason and through personal contact, with the influence that such contact implied. The missionary work, however, was not all done by the missionaries, but was greatly aided by many influences, chief among which was the example of the newly formed Church itself. The message was apprehended thoroughly, bringing about a complete change in the lives of those who accepted it, which converts at first came largely from the lower and middle classes, but which later came also from the highest classes, until finally the Emperor himself was reached. Taking up mediæval missions in their turn, we found that the missionaries came almost exclusively from the monasteries, and that many of them were sent out directly by the powerful church organization. We have seen that the message they presented was very superficial, and that, in itself, it did not make a very strong appeal to the persons to whom it was addressed, but that the success of the missionaries was due largely to the prominence their Church had gained in the political affairs of Europe. The method of work employed by the missionaries may be styled the ecclesiastical, which made men feel the power of the Church, and monastical, which planted monasteries in the midst of barbarian communities, to teach them civilization, but especially to train some of their own young men for later church work in those fields. The approach was usually made through the king of a country, whom the people then could easily be induced to follow, and this approach was accomplished usually by

making him appreciate the political advantages that would ensue upon his conversion. The spiritual apprehension was but meager, but, we may believe, as great as the convert's cultural advancement allowed. The immediate result of the mission was to leave the new nations in much the same superstition they had been in before, though with a change in form. The more remote result was to open the way for the new nations to develop into civilization, and to plant the seeds for even a higher advancement than had been reached in the best ancient period.

Which then were the better: the missions of the ancient age, or those of the mediæval age? Ancient missions would have been impossible in the Middle Ages; mediæval missions would have been foolish and equally unsuccessful in ancient times. In both we find elements that are of use in our foreign mission work of today; in both, also, there are elements which we could not use. So our conclusion is this: both ancient and mediæval missions were good, because each one was best adapted to its own work.

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### III.

## EUGENICS.

CHARLES P. STAHR.

The science of eugenics has a direct bearing and influence upon our social life; the better its principles are understood by those interested in social uplift, the more reasonable will the application of those principles to social problems be, and if the hopes and dreams of the eugenist are ever realized, no one can estimate the economic value of this eugenic movement.

The object of this paper is "to enlighten, not to frighten," using the words so often displayed in the campaign for improved infant hygiene; and if, in this paper as in these campaigns, the illustrations used are at times, to say the least, unpleasant, we hope that the truth of the statement "that sometimes it is necessary to frighten in order to enlighten" will be a sufficient defense and apology for the writer.

We wish it understood at the outset that we do not pose as an authority on eugenics. We wish to give you the results of our reading and study, and in so doing it is our aim, as far as possible, to remain neutral. The argument of the eugenist will be presented, his aim, his object, and the need for the application of the principles of eugenics to our social life; and at the same time, the writer will endeavor to present what, to his mind, are the strongest reasons for the doubt existing in the minds of many authorities today, concerning the practicability of the teachings, or the wisdom of the attempt to apply to our modern life the conclusions of this new science.

The literature of eugenics is large. Our popular magazines are full of articles, for and against the subject, the scope and depth of which will suit every taste, ranging from "Mr. Dooley on Eugenics" in a late number of *Hearst's Magazine*,

to articles which tax the understanding of the scientist and biologist. We are not ready to agree with Dr. James H. Walsh, when, in a recent lecture, he characterized eugenics as a "fad," and asserted that "the doctrine of heredity is a silly superstition." At the same time the most rabid eugenicist is ready to admit that the science of eugenics is yet in its infancy, and has progressed very little beyond the stage of investigation. Let us therefore investigate with a fair mind.

The word "eugenics" is derived from two Greek words, and literally means "*well-born*." Eugenics has been defined as "the science of being well-born," or in the words of Sir Francis Galton, commonly accepted as the founder of this new science, "Eugenics is the study of the agencies under social control, that may improve or impair the racial qualities of future generations, either physically or mentally," or "the science which deals with all influences that improve the inborn qualities of a race." The word "*inborn*" in the latter definition is the thorn in the flesh of those opposed to the principles and methods of the eugenicist, for surely no one could find fault with the *study* of all agencies concerned, nor dispute the value of such a study, nor deny the possibility of some rational, practical application of some, at least, of the results of that study to our modern social life.

Mr. Charles Benedict Davenport defines eugenics as the "science of the improvement of the human race by better breeding." He says "the eugenical standpoint is that of the agriculturist, who, while recognizing the value of culture, believes that permanent advance is to be made only by securing the best blood." "Man is an organism,—an animal,—and the laws of improvement of corn and of race horses hold true for him also." Just here Mr. Davenport has exposed himself to bitter attack, but of this, later on.

We have called eugenics a new science. In reality, it is an old one. The idea of definitely undertaking the improvement of the innate characteristics of the human race has been expressed repeatedly through centuries, seriously, hopefully, but



perhaps not until now scientifically. As Prof. Wm. E. Kellcott, of Goucher College, says, "we can trace the idea, perhaps better the hope, of eugenics back to Plato." Plato in his "Republic," pointed out that the quality of a herd or flock could be maintained only by breeding from the best, and by the destruction of the weaklings. He drew attention to the necessity in the state for a functionary corresponding to the shepherd to weed out the undesirables, and to prevent them from multiplying their kind. Plato also stated clearly the essential idea of the inheritance of individual qualities, and the danger to the state of a large and increasing body of degenerates and defectives.

The present eugenic movement may be said to date from 1865, when Sir Francis Galton showed that mental qualities are inherited just as are physical qualities, and pointed out that this opened a way to an improvement of the race in all respects.

He published in 1869 his "Hereditary Genius," presenting in this work facts in support of the above claim. In 1883, he published his "Inquiries into the Human Faculty," and the word "eugenics" was then coined. These publications, however, failed to arouse any general interest in the subjects presented.

In 1901, in his Huxley lecture of that year, he returned to his theme, and in a more direct and elaborate way. His lecture was upon "The Possible Improvement of the Human Breed under the Existing Conditions of Law and Sentiment." This time Galton received a real hearing. He proceeded to show that we have a sufficient biological knowledge of man to furnish a working basis. He showed that we possess a knowledge of man's variability and heredity, that some men are worth more than others in a community, and that individual traits are also family possessions, and followed this up with definite suggestions as to possible means of the "augmentation of favored stock."

In 1904 and 1905, Galton delivered addresses before the



Sociological Society of London. His first address was upon "Eugenics, its Definition, Scope and Aims." This was a statement of the elementary principles of the subject, a sort of eugenic creed. A few of Galton's enthusiastic supporters brought forth on the spur of the moment, wonderful visionary schemes for eugenic progress, which all died a natural death, and much of the adverse criticism of Galton went wide of the mark. But Galton did start the scientists and biologists to thinking, and in the years that have passed, an immense amount of knowledge has been gained, and excellent workers have been recruited. A periodical, *The Eugenics Review*, has been established and appears regularly. A Eugenics Education Society has been founded to popularize and disseminate information.

While England remains the seat of the greatest activity and interest in the eugenic movement, much is being done now in our own country. In America, the subject is largely under the auspices of the American Breeders Association, through its efficient Committee on Eugenics, with which a large number of biological and medical workers are coöperating. A Eugenics Record Office has been established at Cold Spring Harbor, which is busily engaged in gathering data from all over our country, eugenic ideals are being given practical expression, and the science is rapidly gaining headway.

A few words concerning the work and the aim of this Eugenics Record Office. This office wishes to get in touch with all those interested in the eugenics movement. Every person who is willing to do so is invited to record his heritage, and place the record on file at the Record Office. All you need to do is to drop a card to the Eugenics Record Office, Cold Spring Harbor, New York, and the blank schedule will be gladly furnished. Of course, these records are held as confidential, and are to be used only for scientific purposes. A mass of really valuable information can be secured in this way; surely no harm is done, and the inheritances of many traits can be traced in this way, and scientific investigation be stimulated.



The office asks especially for pedigrees in which one or more of the following traits appear, short stature, tallness, corpulency, special talents in music, art, literature, mechanics, invention, mathematics, and certain diseases, rheumatism, eye defects, peculiarities of hair, skin, etc., cancer, hemophilia (bleeders), deformities, such as hare lip, cleft palate, and so on through a long list. They do not appeal primarily to physicians for the information, but "to the thousands of intelligent Americans, who love the truth, and want to see its interests advanced," quoting from "*Heredity and its Relation to Eugenics*," by Davenport. Statistics gathered in some such way are of value as we hope to show later on in this paper.

The blanks furnished by the Record Office, if properly filled out, furnish a complete family history, space being given to the father of the family, mother of the family, father's father and mother, mother's father and mother, with space for the children of the family. Information is asked, concerning birthplace, residence, occupations at various ages, lesser diseases to which there was special liability, in youth and in middle age, grave illnesses in youth and middle age, operations undergone, and if dead, cause of death and age at death. Then a statistical table to be filled out for the various individuals before mentioned, consisting in part of height, weight, color of hair, of eyes, general mental ability, special ability, as for instance, in music, art, literature, mechanics, etc., and then bodily defects, and defects in the special senses. Enough we grant you to weary the average individual before the blank is half completed and much, to our mind, of no practical value.

Now, what is this all about? What does the eugenist hope to accomplish, and is there any need for his effort? The latter part of this question is easily answered. No social order is so perfect that it cannot afford carefully to consider plans for its improvement, but we postpone the consideration of this part of the general subject of eugenics until later. We cannot better state the aim of the eugenist than by quoting again from Mr. Davenport. He says "The general program of the eu-

genist is clear. It is to improve the race by inducing young people to make a more reasonable selection of marriage mates, to fall in love *intelligently*," which, to quote the thought at least, if not the words of Mr. Dooley, is *some job*. It also includes the control by the state of the propagation of the mentally incompetent, wherein, to our mind, the eugenist strikes solid rock, and meets with universal accord.

Inseparably connected with the science of eugenics is heredity; one of the prime objects of this science being the study of the laws of inheritance of human traits, and as these laws are ascertained, to make them known, and it is the dream of the eugenist that when such laws are clearly formulated, many unfit matings will be avoided, and other matings that might have been shunned through ignorance, may be happily contracted.

No presentation of the subject of eugenics would be complete without some consideration of the general subject of heredity. The writer realizes the difficulty which confronts him in his attempt to consider this portion of his subject. He will endeavor to be clear, direct and brief, avoiding as far as possible, technical and scientific terms.

Before we go into the subject of heredity in detail, let us consider what Mr. Herbert E. Walter in his most interesting book on "Genetics," an introduction to the study of "Heredity," calls "the triangle of life." He forms a triangle with the base line representing *heritage*, one side he calls *environment*, the other, *training*. In the center within a circle, he has the words, "what we," and an arrow pointing toward the base or heritage, ending at the word, *are*, another toward environment, ending in *have*, and another toward training, ending in *do*. In other words, heritage represents what we are, environment, what we have, and training, what we do, with our heritage and environment.

Certainly, these three, heritage, environment and training, are factors determining the characteristics of any individual. No one factor can be omitted, but the eugenist places the em-



phasis upon heritage. This is to him, the factor of greatest importance. Is he right or is he wrong? To our mind, he is partly right and partly wrong. Heritage or blood expresses the inborn equipment of the individual. It is what he is actually given before birth. "It is his nature," quoting from Mr. Walter. It is what determines whether he shall be a beast or a man. But does it, to the extent the eugenist would have us believe, determine *what sort* of a man he is going to be?

Now, what is heredity? In the words of Professor Castle, in his "Heredity in Relation to Evolution and Animal Breeding," "it is organic resemblance based on descent." It is commonly said a son is like his father, because he is a "chip off the old block." As Mr. Walter says, it would be nearer the truth to say that the son is like his father, because "they are both chips from the same block."

The *Century Dictionary* defines heredity as "the influence of parents upon offspring, the transmission of qualities or characteristics, mental or physical from parents to offspring." Another definition is "by heredity is meant the tendency manifested by an organism to develop in the likeness of its progenitor."

Our knowledge of heredity and the laws governing it has increased wonderfully. The nineteenth century has been called "Darwin's Century." From the *Origin of Species*, in this, the twentieth century, biologists are turning to the origin of the individual and the study of heredity. Our knowledge even today, however, is very incomplete, and the study of this subject is yet in its infancy. It must be remembered at the outset that facts so far discovered have been the result of work done on plants and the lower animals. The eugenist claims that as man is an animal, the laws of heredity as found to apply to animals must apply to him also. This is true up to a certain point, but only up to a certain point, as we hope to make clear in due time.

A great deal of the inspiration for the work done in the study of heredity came from the work of an Austrian monk,

Mendel, who was born in 1822, and published an account of his experiments in 1865, but it was not until nineteen years after his death, until the year 1900, that biologists came to appreciate what he had done. The term, Mendelism, is applied to the results of his experiments, which are today the foundation of the knowledge of the physiological process of heredity, which now is rapidly being extended by biologists in various directions. We will speak again of his work and of Mendel's Law.

To make the way clear, let us consider briefly a few fundamental facts in the reproduction of any organism, plant or animal, that you may better understand the physiological process concerned in heredity.

We now know that all living organisms, plant or animal, no matter how complex, can be resolved into minute, microscopic units, which are called *cells*. This is the cell theory, advanced by Schleiden and Schwann, and now universally accepted. These cells, whether plant or animal, present the same general characteristics. They consist of a mass of living matter, called protoplasm, surrounded by a cell wall, and containing, usually centrally placed, a portion of specialized protoplasm, to which the term nucleus is applied, which is in turn surrounded by a nuclear membrane.

The nucleus is the vital part of the cell; upon it, the life of the cell depends, and all the changes which the cell undergoes, begin in the nucleus. The nucleus consists of more than one kind of substance; two at least are recognized, which are named from their reaction to staining agents, as chromatin (colored material) and achromatin (non-colored material). In certain phases of cell life, the chromatin masses together and forms within the nucleus definite structures termed chromosomes. These chromosomes appear constant in number in all the various cells that make up an individual of any one species. The growth and development of an organism depends upon the growth, development and reproduction or cell division of the cells in the tissue of that organism.



It is generally acknowledged that the chromosomes, the structures formed in the nucleus already described, play an important part in the hereditary process, so that it is interesting to note the part played by these same structures in the sexual process almost universal among animals and plants.

The mechanism by means of which two cells unite to make one in sexual reproduction, fertilization, as it is called, is essentially the same in plants and in animals. Here we have to deal with two kinds of germ cells, the male and the female, the egg or ovum and the spermatozoon, which take part in producing a new organism. These two germ cells, although different in structure, are essentially cells, and have in their nucleus the number of chromosomes characteristic for the species of organism under examination. With the union of the male and female cell, we would expect to have in the resulting cell twice the number of chromosomes. This is not the case, however, because these cells before becoming ripe for the process of fertilization undergo a process called maturation, in which half the number of chromosomes is thrown off by the nucleus, and extruded from the cell. Therefore, after union, we have again the original number, half supplied by the male, and half by the female element.

The mature germ cell, male or female, ready for fertilization with half its number of chromosomes is termed a gamete (marrying cell), while the fertilized cell, formed by the union of the two gametes, is termed a zygote (yoked cell), and contains the characteristic number of chromosomes.

By a process of repeated division, the zygote becomes a plant or an animal, whose cells apparently retain this double structure throughout. Certain cells of such a zygote become germ cells, and are set apart in certain tissues of the organism for the formation of gametes, undergoing as has been indicated, the reduction in the process of maturation. Let us here note that in this process of reduction, the chromosomes extruded from the cell may be those of paternal or maternal source, or a portion of both, a point to be remembered in the study of the

physiological method of heredity, offering some explanation of the observed inheritance of characters.

It is not within the scope of this paper to discuss at length different theories of heredity. We have indicated briefly the chromosome theory. Whether correct or not, we have in the union of the two gametes what Walter calls the "hereditary bridge." He says: "Whatever may ultimately prove to be determiners of the hereditary characters which appear in successive generations, it is obvious that in any event, such determiners must be located in the zygote, that is, the fertilized egg. This single cell is the actual bridge of continuity between any parental and filial generation." Moreover it is the *only* bridge.

The entire factor of heritage, therefore, is found in the two germ cells, derived from the respective parents, and as has been pointed out, in all probability in the nuclei and in the chromosomes of the nuclei. To the eugenicist, therefore, a careful survey, a safeguarding of this hereditary bridge is of first importance, upon this depends the effectiveness of his campaign.

The application of the laws of heredity, that have been recognized as such, from studies in breeding plants and animals, to man, is at once a most difficult matter, difficult because our knowledge of these laws is so limited, and because the tracing of the hereditary transmission of traits, physical or mental, through generations of individuals, is a task that requires care, and the utmost caution in drawing conclusions. Herein lies one field of usefulness for the mass of data, which the Eugenics Record Office, already described, is striving to collect. The more accurate these data, and the wider their scope, the more valuable will be the conclusion drawn from their study.

We have spoken of Mendel, and his work in this field of investigation. Mendel chose the common pea as his subject for experiment. He studied the mode of inheritance of a single pair of characters at a time. On crossing a tall and a dwarf pea, he found that the hybrids, or first generation, were all



tall. Accordingly, he termed the tall character *dominant*, and the dwarf character *recessive*. On allowing these hybrids to fertilize themselves in the ordinary way, he obtained a further generation which on the average was composed of three tall to one dwarf. Subsequent experiment showed that the dwarfs always bred true, as did one out of every three tall; the two remaining tall behaved as the original hybrids in giving three tall to one dwarf. Experiments were made with several other pairs of characters, and the same mode of inheritance was shown to hold good throughout. Tallness and dwarfness here can properly be termed *unit characters*.

Mendel's law of dominance and Mendel's ratio have been observed by investigators, as holding true for the inheritance of many traits in generations of human beings. The essential part of Mendel's discoveries, it must be remembered, is that any gamete or germ cell ready for fertilization, can carry but one of a pair of unit characters, and must be pure for that character. This unit character is transmitted to the gamete by the zygote as it is set aside in the tissues of the organism.

Now let us consider two other terms, used in the study of heredity, variation and mutation. According to the *Century Dictionary*, variation is "the act, process or result of deviation from a given type of form of structure in a plastic vegetable or animal organization, by means of natural selection, or the sum of the phenomena resulting from the influence of conditions of environment, as opposed to those which would have been exhibited had the law of heredity alone been operative."

Some authors use the term variation, as implying a modification directly due to the physical conditions of life, and in this sense, variations are supposed not to be inherited. Were it not for the law of variation, the eugenicist's idea of life would be hopeless indeed. It is a common experience with breeders of plants and animals to meet with constant difficulties in getting organisms to breed true. It is just these variations constantly interfering with breeding true, that furnish the only foothold for improvement. If all organisms did breed strictly

true, one generation could not, using again the words of Walter, stand on the shoulders of the preceding generation, and there would be no evolutionary advance. The breeder seeks to hold fast to whatever he has found to be good, and at the same time, tries to find something better. When the similarities and dissimilarities between succeeding generations therefore are clear, then heredity can be explained. This entire subject of variation from type is bound up with any consideration of the fundamentals of heredity.

There are many different kinds of variations enumerated in works upon heredity; they may be morphological, physiological, or psychological. Somatic or body variations arise as modifications due to environmental factors, germinal variations arise without regard to environment; they are deep-seated, racial rather than individual. Most important in our present connection, variations may differ with respect to heritability, they may possess the power to reappear in subsequent generations, or they may lack that power. Darwin said half a century ago, "our ignorance of the laws of variation is profound." This is true today. Let it be sufficient for us to say that Weismann believes that the causes of variation, at least of heritable variations, are inborn, intrinsic in the germ plasm.

By a mutation is understood a new quality, that appears abruptly without transitions, and which breeds true from the very first. To the student of heredity, there are two distinctions of prime importance with respect to mutations. First, they usually appear full-fledged, without preparatory stages, and second, that they breed true from the first appearance. *Fluctuations*, on the contrary, ordinarily "revert" to the parental type in subsequent generations.

Mutations are of three kinds, progressive, regressive, and degressive; *progressive*, the *addition* of a new character, *regressive*, the *dropping* out of something, and *degressive*, meaning the *return* of a character, formerly present in the past history of the race. We may offer as examples of mutations



among animals, the Ancon breed of sheep, sheep with short, bent legs, the Merino sheep, and the hornless Hereford cattle.

Whatever the causes of mutations may be, since they occur regardless of environment, they are probably of a germinal nature. The bearing of this whole matter of mutations upon heredity lies in the fact that it is apparently mutations that make up heritable variations and not fluctuations. If this is true, these mutations furnish the essential material in the study of heredity.

This discussion of heredity may seem far afield from the subject of eugenics, but some knowledge of the laws of heredity is necessary for a thoughtful consideration of our subject. Eugenics' worst enemies are the misguided, enthusiastic, but uninformed few, who are exploiting it, at the expense of those sincere and honest investigators, who brought the science into being. It really seems that those who have the most to say about eugenics, are those whose knowledge of it is the most superficial.

On the scientific basis of heredity, let us now consider the question of the inheritance of what are spoken of as *unit characters* and *acquired* characters. Like any other organism, man is a bundle of characteristics, physical and psychical. In their fully developed state, some of the traits or characteristics of organisms are single, simple, fundamental characters, not analyzable into more elementary factors. These so-called unit characters are analogous to the chemical elements, which may be combined and recombined in different ways, but which always maintain their integrity as elements.

Each unit character in the adult is the result of a series of reactions between the environing conditions of development and a structural unit in the germ cell which is called the *determiner*, which in some way that is not yet understood, represents this adult trait. The presence or absence therefore of a determiner in the germ cell is the primary cause of the corresponding presence or absence of a certain characteristic in the adult organism. Where both germ cells carry the determiner



for any unit character, the organism resulting from the union of those cells will have a double stimulus to the development of the given unit character. The eugenicist then says the character is of duplex origin. Where on the other hand, one germ cell carries the determiner and the other lacks it, in the developing organism, the determiner is simplex and the resulting character is simplex in origin.

Just what may be regarded as human unit characters is a hard question to decide, and we will not attempt it. There are, however, many whose right to be called unit characters cannot be disputed, whose heredity has been traced and found to obey the general law of Mendel. Authorities are in accord, we think, in the belief that these unit characters are hereditary. Time will not permit us to go into detailed description of the heredity of many of these unit characters. Many of them are unimportant, even from a eugenical standpoint, except as corroborative evidence to prove the general proposition, such as eye color, hair form, hair or skin color, stature, total body weight, musical ability, ability in literary composition, mechanical skill, memory, temperament, etc. The inheritance of the above traits, or peculiarities, has been traced from the study of family records, and seems to obey some general law as follows. When both parents possess positive factors for any given trait, all of their children will exhibit the trait also; if both parents lack the factor, the offspring will lack the trait; when one parent possesses the factor, and the other lacks it, the children will vary much in respect to the trait in question.

When we come to consider general mental ability and its inheritance, we are confronted at once with the difficulty in recognizing a unit character. General mental ability, like stature and weight, undergoes a progressive development, so that in studying its heredity, we must compare it in adult persons, or else measure it by some such test as the Binet-Simon test. The eugenicist claims, however, that there are laws of inheritance of general mental ability that can be sharply expressed; they say that low mentality is due to the absence of



some factor, and if this factor that determines normal development is lacking in both parents, it will be lacking in all of their offspring. "Two mentally defective parents will produce only mentally defective offspring." This is a law of inheritance of mental ability, that has been demonstrated beyond a shadow of doubt by the work of Dr. H. H. Goddard, superintendent of the Training School for Defectives at Vineland, N. J.

Dr. Goddard says in a paper on "Infant Mortality, in Relation to the Hereditary Effects of Mental Deficiency": "We now know that a surprisingly large percentage of people are of such low mentality, that they are incapable of living what we term a normal life. Another fact that we have learned is that these people of low intelligence transmit that low intelligence to their children, and that, consequently, a large percentage of these children, if they live and grow up, will be mentally deficient, will always be a burden on society, and more or less a burden to themselves."

Dr. Goddard further says: "Certainly in the light of all that we are beginning to know of eugenics, we cannot tolerate for a moment the thought of thus consciously and definitely going against all that eugenics teaches us, and aiding and abetting the establishment among us of a race of defectives, degenerates and weaklings." Strong words, surely, but made strong, because the truth which they express has been driven home to Dr. Goddard by wide experience. No one can accuse this authority of not knowing the subject to which he is devoted, the problem of the mentally deficient child. We venture the opinion here that if the science of eugenics does nothing more, it will be of enormous economic value in this, perhaps the most important branch of its activity.

As Davenport says: "In view of the certainty that all of the children of two feeble minded parents will be defective, how great is the folly, yes, the crime, of letting two such persons marry." Epilepsy and certain forms of insanity have been studied in much the same way, and their inheritance has been

found to follow the same general laws as that of feeble-mindedness.

When we consider the subjects of narcotism and criminality in general, we can find a strong hereditary tendency toward alcohol, and a hereditary tendency to crime, in not a few families in our country. To the writer the question comes whether in these cases, it is after all the heritage that is at fault, and not a faulty environment. Alcohol has been termed a racial poison, and we can readily see that the germ cells of an individual could be lowered in vitality by that poison, with the other cells in the tissues of the organism. Admitting then this hereditary predisposition, the individual possessing it would naturally be especially susceptible to the influence of bad environment.

The medical profession has been the subject of much severe and, to the writer, unjust criticism for what has been termed its reluctance to accept the theory of the hereditary transmission of disease. We resent the words of one critic, who says: "Modern medicine is responsible for the loss of appreciation of the power of heredity. It has had the attention too exclusively focussed on germs and conditions of life." On the other hand, we do not agree with Dr. J. J. Walsh, already quoted, who in a recent lecture at the University of Pennsylvania, said: "Not until physicians learn that disease and habit cannot be inherited; that tuberculosis and drunkenness are the results of environment, *pre-disposition* and suggestion, and that both are curable, can there be progress in medical science."

In our opinion, Dr. Walsh owes an explanation of the word, "pre-disposition," which he uses in the quotation referred to. He would find it hard, we think, to explain the difference between pre-disposition as he uses it, and the hereditary pre-disposition which we have tried to explain.

The medical profession has never doubted the influence of heredity in the development of certain diseases. One of the first things the medical student is taught is the importance of securing a careful family history, preparatory to his study of



any case. But scientific investigation has taught the physicians that many diseases long looked upon as hereditary are not such.

We, as a profession, are ready to admit and appreciate the part that heredity plays in many nervous diseases, Friedrich's disease, or hereditary ataxia, for instance; in hemophilia, the sufferers of which disease are commonly called bleeders; in syphilis, in a form of chorea, called Huntington's chorea, the essential feature of which is its appearance in successive generations.

In this connection, attention may be called to one of the most remarkable illustrations of hereditary transmission recently reported at a meeting of the College of Physicians and Surgeons in Philadelphia. A case of aniridia, or absence of the iris of the eye, was reported, which had been transmitted for four generations in the same family, involving 117 persons. The case was reported by a Dr. Risley, who said that in his opinion, the case was one of the most important illustrations of the transmission of anatomical characteristics he had ever seen.

The mode of the hereditary transmission of disease we do not know. We do not believe that the exciting cause of an infectious disease can be transmitted by the germ cell to the developing organism. The manifestations of congenital syphilis or syphilis of the new-born, are different from the lesions found in the adult.

Alcohol has been called a racial poison; so is syphilis. Whatever the mode of transmission of this disease, its results are distressing enough, and the honest efforts of the eugenicist to check the ravages of this and other venereal diseases deserve the hearty support of all thoughtful people.

It is hardly within the scope of this paper to enter into a discussion of venereal diseases in general. With the exception of the one mentioned, they are not hereditary. They are, however, disgenic agencies of the greatest importance. They cannot be disregarded in a consideration of the subject of eugenics, because the broader the scope of eugenics, the more valuable will its application be to society in general.

One criticism we can offer to the work of the eugenicist is that perhaps too much stress has been put upon heredity to the neglect of other eugenic agencies, which to the writer, at least, appear even more important.

We have mentioned "hereditary pre-disposition." Tuberculosis or consumption was long regarded as a hereditary disease.

It is no longer believed to be such. No one will deny, however, the importance of this "hereditary pre-disposition" in the consideration of the cause of this "white plague." Children born with this hereditary weakening of the germ cells, born into a tubercular environment, are practically doomed to fall victims to tuberculosis.

Here certainly environment is of more importance than heritage, but the call to the eugenicist is just as strong in this field as elsewhere. His duty does not end when he does all in his power to prevent the marriage of persons in whom he may find this "hereditary tendency." Of far more practical value will his efforts be if they are directed toward correcting the defects and faults in the environment of children that may be born of this non-eugenical marriage.

In this connection, it might be of interest to note that work in line with this very suggestion is being done at many of our large stock farms. Cows, reacting to the tuberculin test, which formerly would have been destroyed, are kept for breeding purposes, isolated from the rest of the herd. The calves after birth are removed to a new environment, clean, airy stables, and although in certain instances, they are fed upon their mother's milk, sterilized by boiling, only a very small percentage of these calves ever react to tuberculosis, and grow up into perfectly healthy cattle, and a saving of considerable economic importance results from the application of this measure.

This system of breeding from tubercular cows was first applied by Dang of Denmark, and has been successfully tried at some of our own state experimental farms. Remember, please, that we are not advocating this method for general application to human beings, but surely the success of it in cattle offers us



some food for serious thought in our always present problem of lessening our high infant mortality.

We have spoken of the important part played by variation in heredity. The question now arises as to what kind of variations actually reappear in successive generations, and may, therefore, be considered hereditary. Can variations that are not inborn, but are acquired during the life time of any individual, be inherited? In other words, can acquired characters form a part of our inheritance? Can the experience of the parent, or can the environment of the parent, enter in any way into the heredity of the child? To make this possible, we can understand that changes wrought in the tissue of the organism will have to so act upon the germ cell that it in turn will give rise to tissues similarly modified in the next generation.

We must remember here that we are speaking strictly of biological inheritance, so that confusion may not arise in the views presented toward the close of this paper. The question "Can acquired characters be inherited?" is a most important one. It is most important to know whether one's own efforts can give one's children a better biological start in life.

Francis Galton was one of the first to express skepticism regarding what had been up to that time the generally accepted belief that the personal accumulations of a life time were heritable. August Weissman, for nearly fifty years a professor in the University of Freiburg in Baden, did more than any other to inspire thought and investigation upon this question. Weissman now has most of the authorities with him in the belief that acquired characters are not inherited. He claims that there is no known mechanism, whereby body characters may be transferred to the germ cells, that the evidence that such a transfer actually does occur is inconclusive and unsatisfactory, and lastly, that we have sufficient facts to account for heredity without the assumption of the inheritance of acquired characters.

Certainly from data furnished by experimental breeding in animals, the weight of probability is decidedly against the time

honored belief. We cannot go into a discussion of the question pro and con. Whether we believe that nurture as well as nature can be transmitted, the fact remains that between the two factors, there is no conflict. To our mind, it is not nature versus nurture, it is nature plus nurture. These two factors, hand in hand, work to form the individual. These make the man, and determine what kind of a man he is to be.

As has been hinted before, to our mind, the eugenist has perhaps laid too much emphasis upon nature, and has not paid enough attention to the influence of nurture. We do not mean to underestimate the importance of heritage. A faulty heritage, the inheritance of some physical or mental defect, will in the nature of the case do much to defeat all that we might hope from the influence of careful, tender, nurture, but we venture the assertion that in many, indeed, in most of the examples cited by the eugenist as typical of the influence of a bad heritage, we can trace side by side with this factor, the influence of lack of nurture, a bad environment.

The histories of two families are usually given by eugenists, as examples of good and bad inheritance. First, the Edwards family, drawn from Winship's account of the descendants of Jonathan Edwards. We quote as follows: "1,394 of his descendants were identified in 1900, of whom, 295 were college graduates; 13 presidents of our greatest colleges; 65 professors in colleges, besides many principals of other important educational institutions; 60 physicians, 100 and more clergymen, missionaries or theological professors; 75 were officers in the army and navy; 60 prominent authors and writers; 100 and more were lawyers, of whom one was our most eminent professor of law; 30 were judges, 80 held public office, of whom one was Vice-President of the United States; 3 were United States Senators; several were governors, members of Congress, framers of state constitutions, mayors of cities, and ministers to foreign courts; one was president of the Pacific Mail Steamship Company; 15 railroads, many banks, and other large industrial establishments have been indebted to their management. Almost



if not every department of social progress and of the public welfare has felt the impulse of this healthy and long-lived family. It is not known that any one of them was ever convicted of crime."

In contrast to such a family we have to offer the history of another well known family at the other pole of society. It is the history of the so-called "Jukes' Family of New York State," so carefully investigated by Dugdale.

This family is traced from the five daughters of a lazy and irresponsible fisherman born in 1720. In five generations, this family numbered about 1,200 persons, including nearly 200 who married into it. The histories of 540 of these are well known, and about 500 more are partly known. This family history was easier to follow than are some others, because there was very little marriage with the foreign born, a "distinctively American family." Of these 1,200 idle, ignorant, vicious, pauper, diseased, insane, feeble-minded and criminal specimens of humanity, about 300 died in infancy. Of the remaining 900, 310 were professional paupers in almshouses (at whose expense? we might ask), 440 were physically wrecked by disease, the result of their own wickedness; more than half of the women were prostitutes, 130 were convicted criminals; 60 were habitual thieves, 7 were murderers. Not one had even a common school education; only 20 learned a trade, and ten of these learned it in prison. It has been estimated that this family has cost the state over a million and a quarter dollars.

Mr. Kellicott says in his reference to this family: "What right had an intelligent and humane society to allow these poor unfortunates to be born into the kind of lives they had to lead, not by choice, but by the disadvantages of birth?"

Darwin wrote, long ago: "Except in the case of man himself, hardly any one is so ignorant as to allow his worst animals to breed."

The history of these two families presents a striking contrast. Here again the question naturally comes to our mind, how much is this contrast due to heredity, and how much to

environment, how much to nature, and how much to nurture? Consider, if you will, what would have become of an Edwards baby transferred soon after birth to the Jukes' environment, and what would have become of a Jukes' baby adopted by an Edwards' family in its early infancy. We will not attempt to answer this question for you; think, and answer it for yourselves.

We have been told that several members of the Jukes family did emigrate to the West, broke away from their evil environment, and became useful members of society. Unfortunately, we cannot offer you the proof of this statement, but we believe that it is correct and authentic.

Naturally the serious consideration of facts such as are contained in these family histories, leads us to ask, "What can we do about it?" Before we attempt to present the eugenicist's answer to that question, let us consider a little more in detail the need for eugenics, or, if you will allow the writer to use the words, a broad, liberal, eugenic movement.

We as Americans are all too prone to feel with a false sense of self-satisfaction, that all is well with us, that things are as good as they can be made, so why should we worry over what cannot be helped. However, when we look at our almshouses, our institutions for the insane and feeble-minded, our jails, houses of correction and penitentiaries, we are not quite sure whether the above mentioned feeling is at all justified.

We again quote from Mr. Davenport. He says: "It is a reproach to our intelligence that we as a people, proud in other respects of our control of nature, should have to support 80,000 prisoners and 100,000 paupers at a cost of over 100 million dollars per year. A new plague that rendered four per cent. of our population, chiefly at the most productive age, not merely incompetent but a burden costing the above sum yearly, would instantly attract universal attention. But we have become so used to crime, disease and degeneracy, that we take them as necessary evils. That they were so in the world's ignorance is granted; that they must remain so is denied." Whether or not



the hereditary endowment of the civilized races of man is undergoing a gradual process of deterioration is a problem of the greatest importance.

Mr. S. J. Holmes, in an article on "The Decadence of Human Heredity," in the *Atlantic Monthly* for September last, calls attention to many forces in human society, which make for degeneration, and he says that in clear recognition of them lies our safety.

Speaking of the deleterious influence of modern warfare, for instance, he says: "The men of manly vigor, brains and courage go to the front to die by thousands in the cause of national defense. The weak, the cowardly, the mercenary, the degenerate remain behind to multiply." He dwells upon the greatly reduced influence of natural selection that has been brought about by the advance of medicine and surgery, and the knowledge of how to check and control many epidemics that formerly wrought havoc with the human race. We no longer have the elimination of the weak through tribal strife. We no longer leave the weak and imperfect infants to perish, but do all in our power to rear them, and then unfortunately give them full liberty to perpetuate their defects.

We again quote: "With sixteen exceptions, there are no states in the Union which forbid the marriage of the feeble-minded. In only fifteen states is there any prohibition upon the marriage of the insane. Only in Indiana and Washington is there any restriction placed upon the marriage of confirmed criminals." Through ignorance, indifference, false ideas concerning "personal liberty," and the absorption of legislators in matters of more immediate, *in their opinion*, expediency, we are permitting the accumulation of a vicious and defective heredity which should not be tolerated.

We have tried to show that mental and moral defects are heritable, and we know beyond a shadow of doubt that while individuals with a record of intellectual achievement are multiplying with relative and increasing slowness, the physically and mentally unfit reproduce more rapidly now than ever before in the history of races.

The superintendent of the Ohio Institution for the Feeble-Minded wrote only a few years ago: "Unless preventive measures against the progressive increase of the defective classes are adopted, such a calamity as the gradual eclipse, slow decay and final disintegration of our present form of society and government is not only possible, but probable."

We could quote opinions along similar lines from numerous men who speak from experience and with authority, but we do not wish to stand accused of being an alarmist. We do feel, however, that enough facts have been produced to show that the *call* for the work and aim of the eugenist is positive and strong enough to command our attention, while we briefly consider what Ellicott terms "the *eugenic program*."

We might well divide the work which the eugenist hopes to accomplish into two chief classes, first, *educational*, and, secondly, *legislative* or *compulsory*. First the eugenic program calls for the spread of the facts, through all classes of society. The aim is to bring forcibly before the people the facts of human heredity, to teach people to understand the force of the eugenic idea of good breeding. The eugenist hopes by education to produce first of all a thoughtfulness in the community, regarding the racial responsibilities of marriage and reproduction.

By placing before the people clear and truthful ideas regarding fit and unfit matings, he hopes to secure the ultimate effect, and more effective and permanent results will follow this plan than are likely to come from any amount of hasty and premature legislation. Just what effect such a campaign of education will have upon Cupid we do not know. Neither do we know just how much attention two young people thoroughly in love will pay to each other's family history or how thorough will the search for bad heritable qualities be conducted by the two interested parties when Cupid stands guard.

A very good friend asked the writer a few days ago, whether he was going to kick Cupid out of the window, or down the stairs, apropos, I suppose, of a recent picture in *Life*. Indeed,



he is not, but neither is he going to try to discuss for you the seeming conflict between the eugenic idea and love. In an article called "Eugenics and Common Sense" by H. Fielding Hall in the *Atlantic* for September, 1914, Mr. Hall says, "You see the eugenist omits love, he knows nothing about it or the world." This statement is probably about as unjust as some of his other criticisms of the eugenic idea. Mr. S. J. Holmes, before quoted, in an article entitled "Some Misconceptions of Eugenics," in the February *Atlantic* in a rather strong argument answers Mr. Hall's paper above mentioned, and while he mentions the above quotation, unfortunately, for us, offers no explanation.

It is, however, in the second class of activity comprising the legislative or compulsory measures that we find the most practical expression of the eugenic program. Under this head we comprise all measures which have as their object the limiting of the multiplication of the undesirable, dependent or dangerous elements of society.

From what has been said it follows that laws preventing the marriage and reproduction of those mentally defective and physically unfit are not only justifiable, but wise and necessary. Most of the eugenic laws which have been enacted and are in force in different states at present are aimed to prevent the marriage of those suffering from venereal disease and those who are feeble-minded. Laws against the marriage of the feeble-minded are unscientific because they attempt no definition of the class, and indeed there is a great difficulty here in securing competent persons to sit in judgment upon the applicants.

Laws preventing the marriage of those suffering from venereal disease are probably wise and for the most part, just. They entail a physician's examination, which naturally would be objected to, is often carelessly done, not always a sure safeguard and often a considerable expense to the parties interested or to the state. We do not care to discuss this phase of the question at length. We do venture to say, however, that a certain discrimination should be left to the examiners, which is always hard to secure when we have hard and fast laws.



As has been said in speaking of tuberculosis, in certain cases marriage under regulation and supervision might be fairer than absolute refusal to grant a license to wed. The State Board of Health of Wisconsin in its annual report shows that since the eugenics law went into effect January 1, 1914, the number of marriages dropped 3,800. The state board also says that many persons went into other states to be married rather than submit to the medical examination.

It might be interesting to note here that the Supreme Court of Wisconsin on June 17, 1914, sustained the constitutionality of the eugenics law, enacted by the legislature of the state, reversing in its decree the decision of a lower tribunal, which had declared the law invalid on the grounds that the required blood test for males was discriminatory.

We might discuss the laws in force in other states, but they are of the same general type, requiring certain things from the applicants for a marriage license, and present the same general defects and limitations that we have attempted to indicate.

We must, however, have laws not only controlling the marriage of the feeble-minded, using the term as indicating a broad class, but preventing their reproduction. Laws with this object in view can take two forms, a law permitting the sterilization of the class by a surgical operation, or laws requiring the segregation and proper isolation of the class according to sex.

The first form has not met with favor up to the present time. It has been applied chiefly to certain classes of the criminal and insane. The states of Indiana and Connecticut and Oregon, to our knowledge, have such laws in force at present.

The second form of law is a most commendable one. It entails a careful observation and study of the feeble-minded from childhood up. Our compulsory education laws bring every child to official notice, or can be made to do so. The child thus brought to notice should be examined as to his mental development. If he is normal, he will go on to the regular school, if merely backward, to a special school for backward children; if an idiot, an imbecile, his condition should be so recorded; if a



border line case, he must be watched, if he develops evidence of mental deficiency, that fact must be recorded. At the proper time, the parents must be informed of the state's willingness to take care of the child in a colony or suitable institution; if they are unwilling and not capable of seeing that he does not become a parent, the state must take him by force. Such a policy will cost money, but this will be compensated for by the reduction in the population of prisons, almshouses, asylums, etc.

This is the plan advocated by Dr. H. H. Goddard, who says: "We must detect all the mental defectives in childhood, keep a record of them and colonize them either at once, or upon the first intimation that their parents are not taking care of them, and that they are becoming nuisances. Because of the enormous hereditary factor in all of this problem, we must see to it that none of these people shall become parents. We may reasonably hope that such a policy carefully followed will in a generation or two largely reduce our feeble-minded population, and thereby our problems of pauperism, prostitution, disease, drunkenness and crime." A practical example of the effectiveness of some such idea of segregation is found in the work done with the cretins, who formerly abounded in Aosta in northern Italy. They were segregated in 1890, and by 1910 only a single cretin of sixty years and three demi-cretins remained in the community.

We have spoken of other eugenic agencies, which we feel should form part of a true eugenic program. To our mind, any factor which in any way can modify or improve the environment, the nurture of a child is a factor to be regarded as a eugenic factor. No less a eugenicist than Luther Burbank says in a little book, entitled, *The Training of the Human Plant*, published in 1912: "All animal life is sensitive to environment, but of all living things, the child is the most sensitive. Surroundings act upon it as the outside world acts upon the plate of the camera. Every possible influence will leave its impress upon the child, and the traits which it inherited will be overcome to a certain extent, in many cases being more apparent



than heredity." He says again: "There is not a single desirable attribute which, lacking in a plant, may not be bred into it. Pick out any trait you want in your child, granted that he is a normal child, by surrounding him and giving him all that is implied in healthful environmental influences, and by doing all in love, you can thus cultivate in the child and fix there for all its life these traits."

He then presents a strong argument for the cultivation of abnormal children, transforming them into normal ones, and predicts great results for the good of the race from this practice. Is not this a hopeful view? Does it not open up a field of endeavor different, broader, and with a greater promise of successful results than any usually advanced for eugenics.

Measures for improvement of the environment, the early training, the physical and mental well-being of the child, are surely within the reach of all agencies, which have as their object social uplift. Under this head would come clubs for the training of "little mothers," our public schools as social centers, housing reforms, better child labor laws, and last but by no means least, societies to teach and to put into practice proper care of the prospective mother, whose surroundings are unfavorable. Our point is that these factors, not perhaps generally regarded as eugenic, as such, in the broad sense of the word, and a proper regard for them will in some degree at least overcome the defects of bad heritage.

And now what can be said against eugenics, against its teachings, its aims and the results when those aims are realized? We must remember at the outset that eugenics is admitted, by its strongest advocates, to be, at the present time in the state of investigation. No harm can possibly come from a most careful study of the laws of heredity of human characteristics. The applications of the results of such study to the mating of human individuals will be, if ever realized, a slow process. We dare not jump to conclusions. For the present, we are in accord with all honest efforts to prevent the multiplication of the physically and mentally unfit. In the meantime, while we offer



the eugenists all possible help in their investigations of human heredity, we cannot but feel that they are losing sight of the importance of the other two sides of the triangle of life, environment, and training. To our mind, environment is equally essential with heredity. We dare not consider and strive to improve the one at the expense of the other.

Breed a horse with all the speed you can secure in the pedigree of its parents, and the colt will never bring credit to that pedigree without a careful training on the track. The setter dog with its innate, inherited sense of scent, will never be a pleasure and a pride to its owner, a fit companion for his favorite pastime, the hunt, without careful training and a development of those qualities which it has acquired by heredity, which make it a hunting dog. Mere heredity never made a race horse or a bird dog. And as the eugenist argues that the laws of breeding for plants and animals hold true for man also, so we say that the reverse is true, that in man as in animals, environment is after all an equal factor with heredity.

We have said that the laws of inheritance, of evolution, of improvement of plants and animals hold true and apply to man, only up to a certain point. What this point is we will now try to determine. Prof. Herbert William Conn, professor of biology in Wesleyan University, in a book, *Social Heredity and Social Evolution, the Other Side of Eugenics*, makes a distinction between man as an animal, and man as a social unit.

While the laws of heredity which we have attempted to explain may hold good for animal man as it does for plants and the lower animals, there is no doubt that man as a social unit has developed under a new set of forces which have had little or no influence in the development of the animal kingdom. To this new set of forces, Conn applies the name "social heredity" in distinction from organic heredity, which we have been discussing. By the term social heredity, he means the power of handing on to the offspring the various accumulated possessions of the parents. These may be material, purely mental, customs, habits or even the methods of thinking of the last generation.

The fundamental differences between man and animals appear to be two in number. First, man alone possesses the power of forming concepts and using words, and second, man alone possesses a moral sense or conscience. We must remember that all the characteristics of social man, language, writing and printing, moral sense, customs, knowledge and accumulations are distinctly acquired characters. Man is not born possessing these distinguishing characteristics, and, like other acquired characters, they do not seem to be transmitted to the offspring.

But, nevertheless as Mr. Conn says, it is perfectly evident that these characteristics which constitute civilization are handed on from generation to generation. There is never any failure for one generation to receive them from its parents, and then they are transmitted just as truly as eye color, skin color, etc. Hence, the author's distinction between organic heredity and social heredity, or a heredity totally different from that which students of heredity have been studying. This kind of heredity has nothing to do with the mixture of the germinal substance; it is capable of being modified by the action of individuals, and is not controlled by the ordinarily accepted laws of heredity, and for this reason, has not received much attention in studies of eugenics.

But if we recognize this factor of social heredity how much more hopeful does the situation become. The pessimism, the hopelessness which so often follow a consideration of eugenics disappear, and a new spirit of cheerful endeavor takes its place created by the thought that we can do something to better the heritage of the next generation, using the word heritage, in its new broader sense.

And this idea of social heredity gives a sound basis for what we have termed broader eugenic agencies. We may hope for an advance in the race through all factors that help to improve the conditions of life of the present generation. Even though acquired characters may not be inherited in the usual acceptance of the term, they surely have some influence upon life, and as



we find that these acquired characters comprise nearly all that is most valuable in human nature, we cannot deny the power that social heredity plays in determining human evolution and progress. The essential feature of this social heredity lies in the ability of the individual to learn from his surroundings, and to teach his offspring what he has learned, it being really a re-learning, or a reacquiring by the young of those things that the parent is able to teach.

You may question whether the principle we have just considered can properly be called heredity. Certainly, it must not be confused with organic heredity, and we have tried to make the distinction clear. We speak of the child inheriting property from his parents, which of course, comes under the head of social heredity, and not organic heredity; so just as surely does he inherit language, customs, habits and other characters from his parents, and after all, what the child becomes he really owes to social heredity, though what he is when born, he owes to organic heredity.

Social heredity is just as sure in its action as organic heredity, and in fact to our mind, there are fewer factors of uncertainty in it. A child born and reared under a certain environment is sure to develop under the influence of that environment.

What we have indicated before, we may repeat here, that while organic heredity gives us certain powers, this factor, which Conn has called social heredity, determines what we shall do with those powers. And even though an individual have an inheritance weak both mentally and morally, he may be molded into a fairly good member of society, if he is surrounded by proper environment; but if, on the other hand, he is reared in the wrong environment, tending to produce a wrong social inheritance, he will not be a desirable member of society, no matter how good his mental and moral inheritance may have been.

Now the success of a marriage from the standpoint of eugenics is measured by the number of disease-resistant offspring, capable of development into useful manhood that come from it.

Therefore, the family with the greatest eugenic influence is the family with the largest number of such children, and in the narrow eugenic sense, those unions not blessed with children must see their influence upon evolution grow less and less.

Contrast this with what Mr. Conn says: "Through social heredity, a single individual, though leaving no offspring, may turn the direction of evolution and have more influence upon mankind than another with numerous progeny. Hence, while emphasis should be placed upon reproductive efficiency, even greater emphasis needs to be placed upon making the individual's life count, since the influence of the individual upon evolution through his life may be far greater than his influence through his offspring."

We know full well the untold happiness that comes to the family with the advent of children. But, after all, there is more to marriage than the raising of children. Love, companionship, mutual helpfulness, all that go to make man and wife the best of chums and comrades, we surely hope that eugenics will never detract in any way from these, and we do feel with Mr. Conn, that even though such a union be not blessed with offspring, it is in its power to make its influence felt in the progress of the human race.

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## IV.

### THE GOSPEL AND THE HEATHEN DEAD.

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It is the purpose of this paper to show that evangelization must needs be co-extensive with the race and that the Gospel is preached to the dead as well as to the living.

The fall of Adam is plainly implied in the Bible account of his transgression and consequent expulsion from Paradise, whether the account itself is an allegory or a historical narrative. The sacred record shows, moreover, not only that the disobedience of Adam would prove fatal to himself (Gen. 2: 17) but also that "in Adam all die" (1 Cor. 15: 22). As the descendants of Adam (the race) are thus involved in the fall without exceptions, it seems reasonable to infer that the provision of the Gospel was made for them in common.

*The Offer of Deliverance is Due to all the Race.*—The proposition is based on *justice* which is the principle of rectitude and therefore the standard of morals universally. The affirmation of the proposition, that all men are entitled to the offer of deliverance, implies (1) that the race are not accountable for the fallen condition in which they find themselves at consciousness and (2) that the ultimate responsibility for the fallen condition of the race belongs to the Creator Himself.

1. As men are brought into existence in *race-reproduction* and are thus necessarily precluded from *self-determination* in their origin, it follows that they are *non-moral* beings at the inception of life. They are, in fact, mere physical entities with mental and spiritual potentialities and become moral agents only with the evolution of the consciousness. To hold them accountable for their natural depravity when they thus become members of the race, not by their own *volition*, but by race-

reproduction, would manifestly be unjust and could not possibly be sanctioned in the realm of morals. Enlightened moral sentiment is here in full accord with moral philosophy. Men deprecate the moral tragedy of original sin but they do not attribute personal guilt to innate depravity.

2. Adam was *created*, but the race are *generated*. The distinction is marked and its recognition is essential to moral truth in this discussion.

God created Adam in His own intellectual, moral and spiritual likeness, endowing him thus with the highest mental and moral qualities. He also made him fully responsible for his moral conduct by thoroughly instructing him and accentuating, with the menace of death, His prohibition of the misuse of his moral agency (Gen. 2: 17). It is therefore plain that Adam was accountable for his personal fall and that the judgment pronounced on him was just (3: 17-19).

As the race, however, come into existence in birth, it is plain that they "die" "in Adam" through *generative entail* and as natural generation is the divine order of race-reproduction, it follows that the responsibility for their enthralled condition belongs to God and that they are entitled to the offer of deliverance.<sup>1</sup>

While therefore the fallen condition of the race is the immediate result of the fall of Adam, the responsibility for their involvement in the fall reverts, in the last analysis, to the Creator Himself who equipped man with the genital organs and decreed that he should "Be fruitful, and multiply, and replenish the earth" (Gen. 1: 28).

*Deliverance for all the Race is Implied in Redemptive Revelation.*—The protevangel (Gen. 3: 15) was the divine pledge

<sup>1</sup> If deliverance is *due* to the race, how can "eternal life in Christ Jesus our Lord" be "the free gift of God" (Romans 6: 23)? "Eternal life" and deliverance are not equivalents, it is answered. Man "in Christ" is much more than restored to his original status. He is a "new creature" (2 Cor. 5: 17) and partakes of the "divine nature" (2 Peter 1: 4). The Gospel therefore not only vindicates the divine justice but it also mediates the divine grace.



for the *common* deliverance of the race, since the "seed" of the woman should *destroy* the serpent in whose fatal folds all generations would be encoiled automatically at birth. The establishment of the New Testament economy was in antitypal fulfillment of Old Testament typology and the sin-offering on the Day of Atonement (Lev. 16) was typical of the "Lamb of God which taketh away the sin of the world" (John 1: 29).

*Deliverance is Available to all the Race.*—Promise and prophecy are gloriously fulfilled in the Messianic advent and the Creator's responsibility for the fallen condition of the race is faithfully met in the mystery of the incarnation in which God and man are in essential union at the fountain of the race-life. The "seed" of the woman (Gen. 3: 15) proved to be the Son of God (Matt. 3: 17) as well as the Son of Man (John 3: 13). An analysis of His Person, moreover, discloses the immensely significant fact that, while He is a member of the race by birth (Matt. 1: 25), He is also the "last Adam" (1 Cor. 15: 45) by incarnation (John 1: 14). He therefore assumed not only individual human nature but also the human *order of life*. As He thus became the spiritual Progenitor of man, the race-life in His Person was cleansed at Calvary and the race who "die" in the loins of the first Adam are, through the "last Adam," "begotten of God" without taint of sin (1 John 3: 9).

The unity of the race was, however, broken at the death of Abel and the two divisions of the living and the dead are in different states of existence. Mutual relations are disrupted and they are debarred alike from intercourse and intercommunication. Redemptive revelation was, however, made to the *living* or for the living. Thus the divine assurance was given to Abraham that in him should "all the families of the *earth* be blessed" (Gen. 12: 3). The Prophet Daniel foretold, not only that the Messiah's kingdom should be indestructible but also that it should be *world-wide* (7: 14). The Apostolic Commission makes mandatory the evangelization of "all the nations" (Matt. 28: 19). Does it, however, follow

that the evangelization of the dead is not involved in redemptive revelation? No. The dead, like the living, are divided into natural humanity and spiritual humanity. Prior to the fulfillment of the protevangel at the Messianic advent, the teeming myriads of the race, except the slender line of revelation, died without covenant relationship. Nineteen centuries subsequently to the predeclaration of the Deliverer Himself that His apostles should be His "witnesses" "from Jerusalem . . . unto the uttermost parts of the earth" (Acts 1: 8), two-thirds of the billion and a half of the earth's population are dying without the offer of deliverance. The logic of the situation would of itself reduce to absurdity the proposition that the saving function of the Messiah is restricted to the living. But then God is perfect in His works and just in His dealings (Deut. 32: 4) and it is quite unthinkable that redemptive revelation could be inadequate to span the gulf of the fall and that therefore the great body of the race are debarred from the remedial provision of the Gospel. Besides, the assumption of inadequacy, in the premises, would clearly contravene the divine attributes of love (John 3: 16) and omnipotence (Gen. 17: 1). As, moreover, the state of death is, in fact, a condition of the fall itself (Rom. 5: 12), it follows that the dead are included in the promise of deliverance (the destruction of the serpent) and the assumption that death precludes the challenge of the Gospel would be absurd as well as illogical.

*Preliminary Evangelization by Christ Among the Dead.*— Fallen human nature in the Person of Christ made Him *mortal* and His advent was necessarily also to the dead. His descent "into the lower parts of the earth" (Ephes. 4: 9), like His appearance on the earth, was *Messianic*. The believing dead who, "having had witness borne to them through their faith, received not the promise" (Heb. 11: 39), without doubt recognized in Him the Messiah just as their living co-religionists had done. Did He also perform the function of preliminary evangelist among them as He had done among the living (Mark



1: 14, 15)? Yes. St. Peter, having prefaced that His vicarious suffering was for man's reconciliation to God and that He was "put to death in the flesh, but quickened in the spirit" (1 Peter 3: 18), made the following unqualified assertion: "In which (disembodied state) also he went and preached unto the spirits in prison" (V. 19). The Greek verb here translated *to preach* means, primarily, *to proclaim* as a herald and, although it is transitive, the subject of the proclamation is not here designated. The writer, farther on in his Epistle, however, left no room for conjecture as to the omitted or implied accusative by asserting definitely that the *Gospel* was preached "even to the dead" (4: 6). Nor did he leave it doubtful that the ministry of Christ among the dead was truly *evangelistic*. He assumed that the Gospel would be the universal standard of the judgment. "For unto this end was the Gospel preached even to the dead, that they might be judged according to men in the flesh," he reasoned. Thus the Gospel is preached to the living who accept its terms and are saved by its provision, or they reject the offer of deliverance and become accountable for their fallen condition. The Gospel thus becomes automatically the standard of the judgment for men. On the other hand, the great body of the race have had no opportunity, "in the flesh," to accept or reject the offer of salvation and manifestly could not "be judged according to men in the flesh" unless the Gospel were actually preached "even to the dead." To judge them by a standard of which they could have no knowledge and to whose requirements they had no opportunity to conform, could not possibly be sanctioned by the moral law. If, moreover, the Gospel provision were not made available to the dead, they could not be judged, at all, and the final destiny of the race would remain in perpetual suspense, since the general judgment would be impossible.

Does it appear, however, that the Gospel was preached to the dead that they might *accept its terms* as well as be judged by its standard? Yes, plainly as the writer's second reason

in point indicates: "but that they might live according to God in the spirit" (disembodied state). It is equally plain that the dead to whom the Gospel was preached were also "dead" "in Adam" and that they could not possibly "live unto God" without being "made alive" in Christ (1 Cor. 15: 22) by the grace of the Gospel.

*Evangelization by the Church Among the Dead.*—Christ at the beginning of His ministry, like John the Baptist (Matt. 3:2), announced that the kingdom of God was "at hand" (Mark 1: 15). On the eve of His ascension, moreover, He charged the apostles not to depart from Jerusalem but to "wait for the promise of the Father" (Baptism with the Holy Ghost), assuring them that they should be qualified for world-wide evangelization (Acts 1: 4–8). The anticipated event was the actual coming of the kingdom of heaven on the day of Pentecost, or, in other words, the establishment of the Christian Church as the divinely instituted agency for the world's evangelization and the medium of the administration, by the Holy Spirit, of the entire provision of the Gospel. That the Church was thus meant to be the administrative custodian of the Gospel is evinced by the language of its Founder at the consecration of His apostles to the mission of evangelism: "Jesus therefore said to them again, Peace be unto you: as the Father hath sent me, even so send I you. And when he had said this, he breathed on them, and said unto them, Receive ye the Holy Ghost. Whose soever sins ye forgive, they are forgiven unto them; whose soever sins ye retain, they are retained" (John 20: 21–23).

At this point the scope of revelation becomes material and the question arises, Did the Holy Spirit fall on the *dead* at Pentecost as well as on the living?

The deductions of logic, like the dictums of revelation, are authoritative in discussion and the logical answer to the question is in the affirmative. As faith survives the incident of death, the spiritual attitude of both the living and the dead believers was plainly *identical*. Faith, moreover, is not a



mental abstraction but a concrete spiritual factor. Its content is the revelation itself by which it is evoked. The objective revelation as thus appropriated by faith becomes not only the inspiration of the believer but also the vital principle of his spiritual being. Redemptive revelation, furthermore, was not only objective but it was also *personal*. Thus the "seed" of the woman, in the genealogical climax, was *Christ* and the "rock" which followed the Israelites in the wilderness, in its symbolism, also was Christ (1 Cor. 10: 4). It was thus Christ in *prospect* that was the content of Old Testament faith.

As thus the faith of the pre-Christian believers was vivified by the indwelling of the *ideal* Christ, it follows that the believers among the dead were in the attitude of *expectancy* at Pentecost as well as the believers among the living.

It would seem, moreover, that the faith of the dead in the Messianic advent was clearer and stronger than the faith of the living. Thus they were free from the material influences which diverted the faith of the living from the Messianic ideal of a spiritual ruler to that of a political King who should overthrow the Romans in Palastine and reestablish the Jewish commonwealth. Nor was Messianic faith among the dead dependent on the sacred writings for the authentication of its object. It was therefore not liable to be unsettled by their misinterpretation, mutilation or interpolation. Instead, the original bearers of Messianic revelation to the living (Adam, Abraham and the prophets) had always been at hand, after their own death, to attest, in person, the verity of the protevangel and the covenant and to reiterate the Messianic prophesies. Their mere presence among the dead was, in fact, the sufficient sanction of the Messianic promise to the believers whose faith in the Messianic advent therefore not only remained wholesome but also grew stronger.

It is reasonable, furthermore, to assume that the advent of Christ among the living was communicated to the dead prior to His appearance among them. Thus, for example, the aged

Simeon had brought them the tidings that the "Lord's Christ" was presented in the temple (Luke 2: 26). John the Baptist had more recently announced the appearance of One in Palestine upon whom, at His baptismal consecration, the Holy Spirit descended and whose sonship received vocal acknowledgment from heaven (Luke 3: 22). Whose works of mercy and might, moreover, proclaimed Him as "He that cometh" (Matt. 11: 13).

As, now, the faith of the dead in the Messianic promise was not only unperverted but also highly enlightened, it follows that, unlike the living, they promptly recognized the Messianic character of Christ at His descent to them. Did they also expect the coming of the Holy Spirit after He had risen from the dead? Yes. St. Peter's assertion that Christ preached to the contemporaries of Noah, is only an example from which to deduce His evangelistic mission to the dead in general. As, however, the advent of Christ was specifically to the *believers* (Jews) among the living and the purpose of His ministry the authentication of His Messiahship to their faith, He doubtless performed His Messianic function, "in the spirit" (disembodied state), also chiefly among the *believing*<sup>2</sup> dead. And it is reasonable to infer from Matt. 20: 19 and John 16: 7 that He also foretold to them His resurrection the third day and the subsequent gift of the Spirit.

As, now, the human condition of Pentecost was *faith*, not, however, in the *ideal* Christ of the Old Testament but in the *actual* Christ of the New Testament and as the Holy Spirit fell on the believers at Jerusalem whose faith in Him had been evoked by His presence and teaching,<sup>3</sup> the inference seems warranted that the believers in the realm of the dead, who, at His *personal challenge*, had accepted Him as the Messiah, likewise received the Pentecostal effusion.

Indeed the order of man's deliverance itself would make

<sup>2</sup> Christ's assurance that the penitent on an adjacent cross should be with Him in Paradise attests His communion with the righteous dead.

<sup>3</sup> The assumption is reasonable that Christ appeared to the believers among the dead after His resurrection as well as among the living.



illogical a negative answer to the question propounded. The protevangel was fulfilled practically, not at the birth of Christ, nor at His death or resurrection but at the pouring out of the Spirit. In fact, the emancipation of the Deliverer Himself from the thralldom of the serpent was consummated only at His resurrection from the dead and therefore subsequently to His ministry among the dead. And it was only in climactic sequence to His complete "glorification" in His ascension (John 7:39; 14:16) that He sent the Spirit as the administrative Agent in the kingdom of heaven (John 3:5; 16:7-14; Acts 13:2, 4) through whose regenerative function men are automatically freed from the serpent in their penitent submission to the Gospel-ordinance for the remission of sin (Acts 2:38; 22:16) and the new birth (John 3:5).

Such being the order of the promised deliverance, one of two things must be true. Either the Spirit fell also on those among the dead, at Pentecost, who had accepted Christ at His descent to them or they still remained under the Old Testament institutions. If the latter alternative were the true one, the New Covenant would have been established in *addition* to the Old Covenant instead of superceding it. It is plain, however, that such an anomaly in historical revelation was quite impossible. The Church has necessarily been identical with itself at every stage of revelation. As it is an organism (Col. 1:18), it could not possibly become Christian among the living and remain Jewish among the dead.

As then the Christian economy superceded the Jewish economy, at Pentecost, among the dead as well as among the living, the inference seems warranted that they, like the living, received "power" to become "witnesses" of Christ and that the evangelization of *all* the race was thus inaugurated. The belief is justified, moreover, that the progress of evangelization among the dead is many times greater than it is among the living, since the "world" and the "flesh" are eliminated at death.

Do the Scriptures, however, sanction the conclusion of logic

that the dead were the subjects of the antitypal revelation at Pentecost as well as the living? They seem to. Thus the writer of Hebrews, having eulogized the heroes of faith who died prior to the fulfillment of the Messianic promise (11: 4-38), asserts (vs. 39, 40) that "these all . . . received not the promise, God having provided some better thing concerning us, that apart from us they should not be made perfect." The "better thing" is the fulfillment of the Messianic promise and therefore implies the actual deliverance of the New Testament believers from the serpent. The "perfecting," however, is to be attained only at the resurrection from the dead (second advent). As, now, the Old Testament believers who "received not the promise" in their lifetime are to be "made perfect" with the New Testament believers ("us") at the resurrection, what will be their religious status in the meantime? If the content of their faith were only the *promise* of deliverance, it is quite plain that they would remain, for the numberless ages of the first advent of Christ, in the Old Testament attitude of *expectancy*. Such a situation is manifestly impossible. It is, however, in full accord with the Scriptures to conclude that their faith in the Messianic promise was transferred to the Messiah Himself at His appearance among them as the outcome of His suffering for sin in fulfillment of the prophecy of one of the most illustrious of their own number (Isa. 53: 5). It is furthermore in harmony with the Scriptures that their faith in the *dead* Christ, which was not saving faith<sup>4</sup> was transferred to the *risen* Christ at Pentecost in ful-

<sup>4</sup> Old Testament revelation was not soteriological but promissory. "For it is impossible that the blood of bulls and goats should take away sin" (Heb. 10: 4) is St. Paul's negative estimate of Old Testament atonement. The two goats of the sin-offering were but the symbolic prefiguration of the "Lamb of God which taketh away the sin of the world" (John 1: 29). The principal events of revelation exemplify the law of cause and effect and are not in irrelative succession but in necessary sequence. Thus, for example, atonement is causal for forgiveness. As therefore it is "the blood of Jesus" that "cleanseth us from all sin" (1 John 1: 7), it follows that the removal of sin could not have been contemplated in the Old Testament expiatory ceremonial. Indeed the



fillment of the Messianic promise ("better thing") also for them.

Furthermore, St. Paul, having declared the supreme exaltation of Christ from the synclinal of His humiliation (Phil. 2: 8, 9), affirmed the universality of His sovereign sway: "That in the name of Jesus every knee shall bow, of things in heaven and things on earth and things under the earth" (v. 10). As "things under the earth" are dead men, it follows that the realm of the dead is a *constituent* of the kingdom of heaven.

As, now, the subjects of a kingdom are also its *constituents*, it follows that the first citizens of the kingdom of heaven among men came into existence simultaneously with its establishment at Pentecost. As this kingdom is "not of this world" (John 18: 36), citizenship in it is, moreover, conditioned on a new birth: "Except a man be born anew, he can not see the Kingdom of God" (3: 3) and the Holy Spirit *alone* is functional for the new birth: "Except a man be born of water and the Spirit, he can not enter into the kingdom of God" (v. 5). If then the reign of Christ was inaugurated also over the realm of the dead at *Pentecost*, it follows beyond controversy that the believers among the dead were constituted citizens of His kingdom in the effusion of the Spirit as well as the believers among the living. It is also more reasonable that the Christian Church was established among the dead through the Pentecostal outpouring than automatically through the subsequent death of Christians.

The Old Testament economy was the historical expression of the protevangel and the hostile activities of the Old Testament people were typical of New Testament evangelism. The "seed" of the serpent was the line of Cain in which the "natural man" (1 Cor. 2: 14) in his moral declension became akin to Satan (Ephes. 4; 17-19). The "seed" of the Hebrew verb, to make atonement (*kaphar*), does not mean to remove but to *cover*. It would, moreover, be the acme of absurdity to hold that the "seed" of the woman freed men from the serpent prior to His nativity, since, in the nature of the case, He could become functional for man's deliverance only at His assumption of man's nature.



woman was the line of Seth in which the moral sublimation of man eventuated in the human fatherhood of God. The promised deliverance was conditioned on the divinely inspired enmity between these two branches of the race and it was only after ages of battle that the mutual hostilities ultimated, on the one hand, in the crucifixion of Christ ("bruising" of His "heel") and, on the other, in the atonement for sin ("bruising" of the serpent's "head").

Is, however, the active agency of the people of God against the serpent under the protevangel paralleled under the Gospel? Yes, very plainly. Thus the office bearers in the kingdom of Christ are His agents: "As the Father hath sent me, even so send I you" (John 20: 21). They are, moreover, world-traversing evangelists: "Go ye therefore and make disciples of all the nations" (Matt. 28: 19). Nor is neutrality in the war against Satan possible: "He that is not with me is against me" (12: 30). They are the citizen-soldiery (Christendom) of the kingdom of heaven who follow this militant King on war horses (Rev. 19: 14) to conquer the world (v. 15).

It is quite immaterial here whether all this relates solely to the living or not. St. Paul asserts that, "in the name of Jesus," those "under the earth" should bow the knee as well as those "on the earth." They are therefore actual citizens of His kingdom. As, moreover, citizenship is functional for the ends for which kingdoms exist, it follows that the *active agency* of their citizens is implied.

Does the kingdom of Christ, however, exist among the dead for their *evangelization*?<sup>5</sup> Yes, since the King Himself, prior to His investiture with the sovereignty, performed the function of preliminary evangelist among them.

Thus was the divine responsibility met in the inauguration of *race-extensive* evangelization and divine justice vindicated.

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<sup>5</sup> A second probation is not implied in the offer of the Gospel to the dead. Probation is conditioned on the moral nature which may become hardened beyond the possibility of repentance, even prior to death, by the persistent rejection of the gracious overture and evil excesses.



## V.

# THE REALIZATION OF THE SOCIAL IDEAL OF JESUS.

FREDERICK C. NAU.

No question challenges thought more persistently today than the social question. Men on all the planes of intelligence are thinking about it. There is unceasing agitation among all classes and ranks of men, which is caused by the constantly awakening social consciousness of our age. There is widespread social unrest. It is the chief characteristic of our time. There are many reasons for this, but all arise from one, the remarkable growth of democracy within the past century. The conviction has grown among the working classes and the poor, that the common people are not receiving their just portion of the world's wealth. The people have been lifted up to elevations, from which they have gotten glimpses into the life and conduct of the highborn and privileged of this earth, and the result has been that they have become disillusioned, and have lost all respect for such wealth and power as do not rest upon the eternal principles of righteousness. The sting of social contrasts is felt as never before. The spread of education, the invention of machinery, the gathering of the people into the cities, the discussion of social problems in organizations of working people, the founding of people's parties, the widespread circulation of the daily press and weekly and monthly magazines, the preaching of social principles from pulpit and soap boxes—all these things have aroused the people, and convinced multitudes that they are not receiving justice at the hands of the modern world. The inevitable result of this is popular discontent, often sullen and ominous, and very often loud and clamorous agitation. Some fear that

this unrest and clamor bode ill for the future. They tell us we are on the verge of an impending revolution which will violently shake the superstructure of society from its foundations. I have no fear of such a calamity. Society will not be reconstructed in that way—by a sudden, revolutionary uprising. We are always in the midst of revolutionary movements of some kind, political, economic, educational or religious. They indicate that the race is progressing, and moving on toward higher planes of life. Ideal conditions will not come in a day, by one great act of legislation or by one mighty upheaval. They will come gradually, “first the blade, then the ear, then the full corn in the ear.” Revolutions are the accompaniments of evolution, the eddies and cross-currents in the resistless stream of evolution. When growing social tendencies and developing social instincts meet with deeply established institutions and customs, there are bound to be clashes, big or little revolutions. Sometimes it will be a tremendous civil war or labor war, then it will be a tempest in a teapot, like the struggle of English policemen with militant suffragettes. But back of all and in all is the eternal principle of social evolution. History is the unfolding process of the life of men and nations. The life of society is an educational process. The divine education of man is going on without ceasing, and in this great educational process Jesus Christ is the chief factor. He is “the teacher sent of God.” His social ideals are leading the race as the star led the wise men of old. His social spirit has been working like leaven in the life of humanity.

#### I. WHAT ARE THE SOCIAL IDEALS OF JESUS?

They are the innate social instincts of man in full bloom. They are rooted in the ages before his incarnation. There never was a time when man did not experience sympathy and fellow-feeling for his neighbor. The mother and tribal instincts have always asserted themselves in the race of men. Henry Drummond said: “Life is not only a struggle for self-



existence, but also a struggle for others." The social ideals of Jesus are the perfect expression of the Hebrew social principle, that God made the world for the many and not for the few only. It is interesting to note the development of the social spirit of Israel as leading up to the social teachings of Jesus.

In ancient Israel the interest of man in his fellowman reached a higher stage of expression than in any other race. When Moses, under the inspiration of Jehovah, entreated Pharaoh "to let the people go," he gave expression not only to a racial predilection, but to a deep social passion. The Exodus was a proletarian uprising, an emancipation of industrial serfs, as well as a great religious movement. Among the Hebrews, religion and social and political affairs were inextricably interwoven.

In Leviticus, the year of Jubilee was ordained as a year for special religious celebrations. But during that year industrial "liberty was proclaimed throughout all the land, to all the inhabitants thereof." Men's relations to property were to be adjusted in the fiftieth year. The poor man who had failed economically, or who had been exploited by another and robbed of his land, was to have his property restored to himself again.

The Hebrew Theocracy was also a democracy. God was the supreme King. The people chose an earthly king and then accepted and obeyed him as God-appointed. The Jewish Kingdom of God was a social order far superior to that of Egypt, Assyria or Babylonia.

The Hebrew prophets were social as well as religious teachers. They were God-inspired men, political leaders, and social seers. They were the champions of the poor and the oppressed. They were dominated by lofty social ideals unknown outside of Israel. The visions of Isaiah, Jeremiah and Daniel of a future Messianic Kingdom are pictures of a renewed society. The castigations of the idle, profligate rich by Amos were prompted by a passionate love for the people.

The inspiring message of the Hebrew prophet certainly was that a mighty social leader would come and deliver Israel from political and social injustice.

Jesus was the flower of the Hebrew race. He gave perfect expression to the social consciousness of Israel. He was the new social man, and His was a new social Gospel. He was the universal man. Phillips Brooks, in a striking sermon, said: "Jesus was the incarnation of the eternal humanity." He came from the bosom of the Father.

Jesus used the old, time-honored expressions of lawgiver and prophet, but he amplified, deepened and perfected their meaning. He also proclaimed social truths that were entirely new.

His social Gospel is rooted in His doctrine of the "Kingdom of God." To Jesus this Kingdom meant far more than the reestablishment of the Jewish theocracy. He taught that it would not be established by external forces. "The Kingdom of God cometh not by outward observation." It is not to "be taken by violence." It would be a kingdom of humanity without a visible king, court, or legislature. It would be inward and spiritual in its nature. "Behold, the Kingdom of heaven is within you (or among you)." It would have a humble beginning everywhere, would grow and expand like a mustard seed among Jews and Gentiles alike, until it became a great tree overshadowing and blessing nations and institutions. It would work like leaven in all the kingdoms of the world. Jesus advanced upon the position of Hebrew prophets, in that he made the universality, in fact the whole truth of the Kingdom, rest upon the doctrine of the Fatherhood of God. The Fatherhood of God is the basal fact in the Kingdom of God. All social principles are involved in that great fact. If God is our Father, then we as members of the human race are his children, and thus constitute one great human family. If God is our Father, then the earth and the fulness thereof belong to Him and His family. His children are, therefore, to share His material possessions, as well as His spiritual love.



They are to be obedient to Him, and to render account to Him as sons do to their earthly fathers.

Out of this idea of Fatherhood grows quite naturally the doctrine of the brotherhood of man. Jesus here transcends the Hebrew social ideal by removing the barriers that the Jews imagined existed between them and other nations. He was no respecter of persons. All men, of whatsoever race or color, are to live together as brothers. The law of sympathy, consideration, coöperation, and of helpful love, is the Christian law of association.

But while exalting brotherhood, Jesus stood for the highest development of the individual. "Be ye perfect even as your Father in heaven is perfect." He insisted on the regeneration of the individual as the essential condition of membership in the Kingdom. The individual must always consider himself a part of the entire brotherhood, and as such should be the highest type of brother, because of his relations and influence. The success of the brotherhood will depend upon the life of the individual member. "Ye are the light of the world." "What can a man give in exchange for his life."

He taught many other principles for the regulation of men's relations with one another. He set forth the secrets of true success and greatness in the Kingdom. "He that loseth his life for my sake shall find." "He that would be great among you, let him be the servant of all." "By love serve one another." The gospels reverse the commonly accepted standards of the Roman civilization of that time, when they make the law of service and sacrifice the secret of success and greatness. They esteem the power of material possessions lightly, and exalt moral and spiritual values. "The life consisteth of more than the abundance of things which a man possesseth." "Blessed are the poor in spirit for theirs is the Kingdom of God." "Blessed are the meek for they shall inherit the earth." "Blessed are they that hunger and thirst after righteousness, for they shall be filled." Jesus warns against the dangers of riches. They may interfere with the growth of character, and may keep the individual out of the Kingdom.

I have briefly stated the fundamental ideas of Jesus for the uplift, regulation and progress of human society. Jesus outlined no social program, he effected no organization, but he lived the perfect social life, and in parable, epigram and simple discourse, he revealed the eternal principles for the perfection of society.

His principles were vigorously preached by his followers. They were reinforced by their preaching of the death and resurrection of the Son of God. How were they received by Jew and Roman? The common people heard them gladly, but the rich, the officeholder, the ruling classes opposed them. The social ideals of the Nazarene sought to enter the various spheres of Roman society. They succeeded partly, but generally they were resented as unwarranted encroachments upon vested rights. They precipitated a conflict.

## II. THE CONFLICT BETWEEN THE SOCIAL IDEALS OF JESUS AND INDIVIDUALISM.

Extreme individualism was characteristic of the civilization of the Roman Empire. It was its primal essence. It manifested itself chiefly in the form of imperialism in the state and in the Roman industrial life. The conflict was between two different conceptions of life, the Christian and the Roman. The one held that the world was created for the benefit of all men, while the other was that the world is for the benefit of the few. It might be said that the history of Europe and America, during the past 1900 years, has been the history of the struggle for supremacy, between these two conceptions of life and society. It has been and is still the conflict between democracy and individualism in their various forms.

Bloody persecutions were carried on to stamp out the new Christian sect and their unwelcome doctrines. The authorities of the empire violently opposed the new religion for three centuries, but it seemed to gain prestige and followers, the more it was resisted. In the fourth century Christianity was recognized as the dominant religion. The temples of the



Roman gods were deserted, many of these were converted into Christian churches, and Rome had become, at least, nominally Christian. In the seventh century the empire was overthrown by Goth and Vandal. The Church was not destroyed by the warring hordes from the north. It survived the fall of Rome. But it had already, to a great extent, lost sight of the simple spiritual and social teachings of the Master. It had adopted the forms of the Roman imperial government, and many forms of Rome's pagan religion, and it now reared its head proudly above the ruins of the state as an imperial, ecclesiastical institution. It was a doubtful victory for Christianity. The seat of spiritual authority had been transferred from the soul of man to the papal hierarchy. The simple Gospel of Jesus had become hedged in and overlaid by the dogmas of the metaphysician. Jesus himself, the spiritual and social deliverer, had become the metaphysical Christ, the mysterious divine-human being, to be worshipped only as the second person of the Trinity. I am not questioning the truth of the dogmas about Christ, but I am convinced that the Christian Church suffered irreparable loss, when the emphasis was shifted from the simple teachings and the divine life of Jesus, to the dogmas and syllogisms produced by ecclesiastical councils. The Christian religion conquered Romanism in the state, only to be absorbed by Romanism in the Church. The age of imperialistic Christianity was the age of despotism and darkness in Church and state. But emancipation had to come. The world calls the emancipator Demos; the church calls Him Christos.

Emancipation came in the sixteenth century, next to the nineteenth the most progressive and significant century of the Christian era. The Reformation was a signal victory for the Gospel of Jesus and the common people. It was a tremendous blow that Luther and Zwingli, on the continent, struck at hierarchical Christianity. It liberated the mind of the believer, unfettered his soul, removed insurmountable ecclesiastical barriers, and gave him free access to God. By giving

to the world an open Bible, the right of private judgment, and the free evangelical congregation, the Reformation set in motion remarkable socializing forces.

Puritanism in England became the foe of imperialism. It fought valiantly against tyrant in church and state. It gave vigorous expression to the social ideals of Hebrew prophet and Christian teacher. Of course, there was much of the old spirit of the Roman dictator in Cromwell, but when the Cavaliers of Charles I. were defeated by the Ironsides of Cromwell, it was a distinct victory for the rights of man. Puritanism with its Calvinistic doctrinal basis did wield arbitrary power, but it was moral power; it did inspire fear in men, but it was the fear of God. No Puritan feared king or priest; like his great reformer, John Knox, he never feared the face of man. The Puritan movement in England, Scotland and America has been one of the mightiest of movements in history against extreme individualism in church and state, and a constant guardian of that true liberty which is based upon respect for the law of God. With all its inflexible doctrines, and "blue laws," Puritanism has cleared a wide path for the onward march of the social ideals of Christianity.

In France the Hebrew and Christian conceptions of society met in conflict with absolutism. Back of that holocaust of 1789, the French Revolution, was the cry of an oppressed and outraged people for bread and justice. Voltaire, the cynic, who taught the people to hate popes and kings, and Rousseau, the sentimentalist, who taught man respect for every other man, high or low, sowed the seed of the revolution. But they, the heirs of Luther and Calvin, were both irreligious men. The French Revolution was both inspired and led by unchristian men. If Mirabeau and Robespierre had been men of faith and prayer like Cromwell, the fruits of this bloody political and social upheaval would have become an incalculable blessing to France and the whole modern world. But, although Christ was eclipsed by the goddess of reason in the revolution, it did mean a triumph of the Christian ideal of the



rights of man over the rights of Bourbon kings. It was a blessing in disguise, a case of God making the wrath of man to serve Him.

All of these political and religious revolutions are unmistakable evidences of the ceaseless working of the social leaven of Christianity in the bosom of the centuries.

In the realms of science and philosophy, too, weapons were forged for the battle against extreme individualism. These have always been effective socializing factors in the race.

The Renaissance brought classic literature out of almost forgotten graves, and emancipated the minds of scholastic students who had become mere servitors of papal authority. The invention of the printing press disseminated old and new knowledge among the masses. The new astronomy, which supplanted the geocentric with the helio-centric theory of the universe, gave to scholars and laymen a new world-view. When men began to see that the universe was boundless, that there is an infinity of space, then they began to question the infallible authority of those who had fixed systems of truth for them, for time and eternity, on the basis of a theory of the world, that science had now disproved.

The new philosophy, which gave to men the theory of the relativity of all knowledge, helped to undermine the imperial authority of the pope in the realm of truth. Science and philosophy, consciously or unconsciously, vindicate the prophecy of Jesus: "Ye shall know the truth and the truth shall make you free." They are both most potent forces for the establishment of Christian truth, and effective socializing forces as well. One of the Christian's most humiliating reflections must always be, that the Church in the past too often battled against the progress of science.

In the economic and industrial world the struggle between the Carpenter of Nazareth and employers of labor has been no less marked than in other spheres. Individualism has always asserted itself in industry, from the days of the taskmasters in Egypt to our time. The new social order of Christianity first

met in conflict with the patrician and slave-holder of the Roman world. The vast majority of the Roman people were slaves. Many rich Romans, after joining the new Christian Church, liberated slaves, whilst others treated them with more consideration than before. Slavery, the ownership and management of human beings as chattels, can never long endure under a religion that insists upon the truths that personality is divine, and that all men are brethren. Back of every movement in history for the abolition of slavery, whether of man or woman, has been the unfailing social dynamic of the Christian religion.

In the industrial realm Christianity has fought its battles with Feudalism also, and gained many victories. The great land system of Europe in the Middle Ages and later, was called Feudalism. The democratic ideals of Jesus could not easily express themselves under this iron-bound system. The few who had inherited or conquered land, were the land owners. The many who lived on the lands and did the work, were the tenants. They were the subjects of the feudal lord, to whom they owed unquestioned allegiance. In times of peace they were pledged to him as laborers, in times of war they were sworn to fight his battles. The right of private property was denied the many. The lords owned the vast estates. Above them stood the king, who was the final owner of all, by divine right. Such a system is the very opposite of Christianity; and yet many feudal lords were devoted churchmen. The laws governing property rights in England today are still largely feudalistic heirlooms of the Middle Ages. In Mexico the system of peonage which is a kind of feudalism—perhaps worse, is now happily passing from the modern world, thanks to the fighters for social justice in Mexico, and the pressure of Christian diplomacy from without.

The economic system that superseded feudalism we call capitalism. It is about one hundred and twenty-five years old, dating from the time of the French Revolution. Capitalism means the private ownership and control of property, the private investment of moneys for commercial enterprises; in a



word, the right of any man or woman to secure, own and manage some of the natural resources of the world, or the elements of artificial wealth. The breaking up of feudalism and the advent of capitalism was a great gain for society. It tended to make the individual member of society a free and active force in the development of the earth's natural resources and in the building up of the material structure of modern civilization. The rise of capitalism was marked by the invention of machinery, the introduction of manufacturing, the development of commerce. Whatever may be the wrongs that capitalism has inflicted on the community, it has certainly been a great boon to the common people. Its first great blessing was the decentralization of wealth. The wealth of the world is no longer represented in unimproved lands; it is represented in mines, factories, ships, railroads, cultivated farms, etc. Wealth certainly has never before been so widely distributed as today under the commercial and competitive system. Commercialism compels the man of wealth so to use his wealth that the world shares it whether it will or not. The era of private capital has been the most progressive in history. During this era the common man has had a chance to strive and to attain. The masses have never numbered as many investors and depositors in savings banks as in our time. Under capitalism the greatest commercial, educational and religious institutions have been built up and have flourished.

But we are not blind to the evils and dangers of our present industrial system. We are told that we have achieved in our country political and religious freedom, but not industrial freedom. They tell us that real social freedom is in the iron grip of capitalism, and thus powerless to be born.

The social ideals of Jesus are indeed in fierce conflict with present capitalism; not because the system is wrong in principle, but because it is dominated by forces alien to the spirit of democracy and the welfare of the masses of the people.

Our modern industrial life is, no doubt, dominated by selfishness, and especially the selfishness of the strong and successful.

There are elements of feudalism still lingering in our commercial system. It is with imperialism in industry, feudalism in business, with Romanism in the whole economic sphere, that the social conscience of our age is at war. One of the menacing tendencies of capitalism since our Civil War, has been the centralization of wealth. In its youth capitalism meant decentralization, the distribution of wealth; but within the last half century, men have learned how to use money in many new and questionable ways for their own enrichment. They have learned how to exploit the wage-earner so as to use his wealth-producing power for the accumulation of vast millions. They have learned how to speculate in stocks and securities, and make a million in a day. The speculator gambles with our daily bread, our clothing and our shelter. He corners the market, throttles the law of supply and demand, and fixes prices of commodities from the standpoint of desired dividends. The trust and corporation are the gigantic results of this education in the use and abuse, the management and manipulation, of capital. While feudalism had its monopolistic landlord, capitalism has produced the trust-magnate, the railroad-magnate, the oil-king, the coal-baron, the insatiable plutocrat. And the amazing thing is that many a big capitalist, and many who belong to his political party, will fondly nurse the belief that society is dependent upon his management of the country's wealth, and that laboring men ought to be devoutly thankful that capitalists are furnishing employment for them. They deny to labor a voice in the matter of employment; they deny to labor the right to organize for the security of good wages; they refuse labor the right to work, if profits are not as great as they expected. The capitalistic system is indeed a profit system: Its motive is the securing of profits. Its dynamic is self-interest. For material profits men will lie and steal, will crush the life out of undeveloped children, will drive weaker men to the wall, and will barter away the riches of the inner life. Keir Hardie says: "The workman under capitalism is a serf. He has no right to employment, no one is under obliga-



tion to find him work, nor is he free to work for himself, since he has neither the use of land nor the command of the necessary capital." Morris Hilquit, America's ablest socialist writer, says: "Capitalism fails conspicuously in the equilibration of demand and supply. Under it, the production and distribution of wealth is planless and anarchical." Alfred Russel Wallace, in his last book, calls the "present system under which England is living, the worst in the world's history." These statements are extravagant, but there is much truth in them. Surely, it is difficult for the social ideals of Jesus to be realized under a system, characterized by self-seeking and the worship of mammon. The private material profit is too great and the social and spiritual gain too small, for the present system to be in harmony with the social conscience of the age.

What is the remedy? What is the solution of the problem? What will aid the Christian conception of life, the Christian ideals of society, rooted away back in Judaism and moving steadily down the path of the ages to this 20th century, what will aid this civilization to completely triumph over the imperialistic conception of life and society, rooted away back in the Romanism of the Cæsars?

There is no definite, cut and dried solution of the social problem. Its solution is wrapped up in the evolution of the race, in the Providence of God. But there are forces at work and movements on foot today, that are the fruits and victories of the social conflicts of the past, and promising and powerful aids to the realization of the highest social ideals of the race in the future.

I refer to the various

### III. MODERN SOCIAL MOVEMENTS.

Let me call attention to a few of these. They are all, either directly or indirectly, furthering the cause of social Christianity. I can dwell on them only with brevity.

The social sciences taught in college and university are sowing the seeds of social reconstruction. Our young men and

women in their academic courses are studying sociology and are learning to think of man and all life from the viewpoint of society. Nearly every commencement sermon or address bids the graduate go out and enter the service of humanity. Modern education is a powerful factor in the development of the social consciousness.

"Modern socialism" is bitterly attacking the system under which we live, and is challenging and disturbing thought in our time. It compels us, by its audacious claims, to listen to it.

Utopian socialism has failed. The communism in Jerusalem, the schemes of Fourier and Owen, the communistic settlements in Ohio and Indiana, have all failed for the same reason, namely, the lack of incentive to action and achievement for the strong, ambitious individuals of the community.

Scientific socialism has succeeded the dreams of Utopian socialism. Karl Marx is its founder. It is claimed that he considered all Utopian schemes futile, and through his monumental work, *Das Kapital*, made socialism scientific, proletarian, militant and international. His theories are at the heart of every socialistic program of today. The names of Engels, Bebel, Jaures, Hilquit, Debs, Berger, are familiar to all who have given any thought to Marxian socialism.

The object of this type of socialism is the abolition of the capitalistic system. To accomplish this, the workers of the world are called upon to unite. The earth belongs to the people; therefore its products should be equitably distributed among them. The capitalist is a robber, because he holds and controls what, by right, belongs to the people. All private capital is robbery. So these socialists vehemently argue. Let us examine their claims.

The economics of socialism are based on two theories. The first is called the "economic interpretation of history." In Germany it is known as the "materialistic conception of history." All history is the record of the struggle of individuals and classes for material things, for food, clothing, shelter, for riches and conquests. This is a half-truth. It does not take



into account the marvelous influence of science and art, invention and discovery, philosophy and religion, and all the transforming moral and spiritual ideals of men, in the making of history. The true interpretation of history must always be in the light of Jesus' prayer: "Thy Kingdom come."

The other fundamental economic theory of socialism is its theory of wealth and "surplus value."

"Wealth," say Marx and Spargo, "is the product of the application of labor to natural resources." All wealth is produced by labor. Therefore, it belongs to labor. Whatever the capitalist takes, after labor is paid its wages, is surplus value. All profits, interest, rents, are the unearned increment in industry and should be abolished. This theory of wealth is fantastic. It is unprovable, because in a complex society like ours it is absolutely impossible to determine how many forces enter into the creation of wealth. No man can be given the exact equivalent of what he produces, because the quantity and quality of his production can never be even approximately known. Socialism forgets nature's law that unequal brain and brawn, unequal energy and skill, cannot long receive an equal reward.

The ethics of socialism are the nature ethics of Rousseau, and of modern writers like Ibsen, Shaw, H. G. Wells, and the Swedish critic Brandes. The latter, on his recent tour of America, said: "The United States has far too few divorces. It is still influenced by old woman doctrines of morality." Marriage is a social compact, to be dissolved whenever it pleases the parties to so agree. The children are not seriously considered by them. Let the socialist state care for them. This theory would undermine the family, which is the unit of society. It is not wrong to steal, nor to refuse to pay rents, if you are poor or out of employment, because the capitalist is a robber, and has no natural right to the money you take, or the rent you refuse to pay. Moral laws are not static, not forever fixed. They must change as humanity advances and its life develops. With Nietzsche the educated socialist believes that the ancient moral code was framed by the masters for the government of slaves, by

the strong for the management of the weak members of society. The ethics of socialism are not the social ethics of Jesus; but in one thing socialism leads in expressing the social ideals of Jesus, and that is, in combating war and furthering peace among nations.

The religion of socialism is the religion of humanity. It knows no personal God. Marx was educated under the influence of Hegel and Feuerbach. He believed in the Hegelian doctrine "that the absolute comes to consciousness only in humanity," and God, or the absolute, was to Marx only the projection of his own ideal into the objective world. His intelligent followers are all, more or less, atheistic and materialistic in their thinking. Socialism claims Jesus as its own. In that magnificent "Labor Lyceum" in the heart of Brussels, there is a large painting of Jesus in one of the halls. The guide will tell you that Jesus was a great labor leader, died a martyr to the cause of the laboring classes, and that he was persecuted and killed by the capitalistic class. Socialism claims Jesus as one of its founders, but it does not accept the religion of Jesus. It does not pray and commune with God as Jesus did. It hasn't his conception of God nor his conception of sin and salvation. Sin, vice, crime and human misery are all due chiefly to bad environment, says socialism; change the environment, and you change the man. Jesus taught that the heart of man is sinful and that all the evils of life issue from it: thus, change the heart and you change the man. The prodigal son went wrong in spite of a fine home. He found salvation only after he experienced a change of heart, repented of his filial dereliction, and returned to his father.

The religion of socialism, the ethics and economics of socialism, its philosophy of life and history, all have some good in them, but the half-truths and fallacies of the scheme are so palpable that the race will never accept it as the final solution of the great social problem.

It is negative in its thought and tendencies, and no negative movement can ever triumph. It seeks the destruction of the



present order of society; it arrays class against class; it is more denunciatory than didactic, more belligerent than peace-making; it is intolerant and iconoclastic, and thus must eventually fail as a remedy for the ills of humanity. But it is rendering a service to society that must not be overlooked. It is awakening the people out of their orthodox stupor, by calling attention to gross injustices, by frightening capitalistic imperialists, and by driving thoughtful men to think more seriously about social problems. And this is needful service, for, as Professor Rauschenbusch remarks, "too many people take every existing system for granted, just as they do their stomachs." Like a scourge of God it has driven many to social repentance, but it cannot give social salvation. It cannot long hold the stronger elements of society, because of its extreme and shallow philosophy of life. It is essentially materialistic, and it moves on the surface of things. It fails to satisfy the deeper life of man. Professor Eucken says, "Modern socialistic movements, beneficial as they may be, are in the nature of the case, superficial, for they do not touch the reality of the spiritual life."

The unanswerable argument against socialism is the old, trite argument, which like Banquo's ghost will not down, namely, that it fails to provide for the true freedom and conservation of individuality. For his proper development man must have great freedom of action in the material world. His ambition to excel in the race of life, his innate sense of ownership, his bee-instinct for accumulation, must not be destroyed lest he be deprived of powers essential to his manhood. New incentives must be given man to find the great central reservoir of the Spiritual Life, but the old, legitimate incentives to action and achievement in the material world must not be taken away from him. Socialism unconsciously is opening ways for the progress of Christianity, but it has not the key to the solution of all of life's problems, as it claims. It lacks the one thing needful—the power and secret of leading men into the depths and riches of the spiritual life.

What will become of socialism? It will be gradually sup-

planted by more positive social movements. Its new and true principles will be appropriated by these. It will eventually be absorbed in larger movements.

Such larger movements are very much in evidence in our time. In Europe they are the Liberals and Social-Democrats, in America they are called the Progressives. They are active in the political world, but they are social at heart. In England they are seeking the emancipation of the people from landlordism, in Germany from imperialism in state and industry, and in America from the feudalism still ruling in the capitalistic system. These parties are all one in motive. They demand the greater rule of the people. They aim to elevate man above the dollar, to bring capital into the service of humanity. They hold, with Socialists, that the industries should be conducted for the benefit of the people and not for profits and dividends. In industry they stand for profit-sharing and coöperation. They want industrial democracy, in which labor shall have its just share of the wealth produced, and a voice in the management of the industry.

This is broader and saner than socialism. It is in line with historical development. It is a corrective of state socialism, and a reasonable promise of a fair and more equitable distribution of wealth. The most notable demonstration of the possibilities of industrial democracy is the profit-sharing plan of Henry Ford, now working satisfactorily and beautifully in Detroit, Mich. The proof of the desire of the people for "progressivism" in the political sphere, is found in the recent successes of the Liberals in England and the Progressives in the United States. When nine millions of American voters cast their votes for politico-social platforms, as was the case in our last presidential election, when the Progressive, Wilson, received six millions, and the Progressive, Roosevelt, three millions of votes, there remain few doubts that the social conscience of the people has been aroused, and that men are eager to follow high political and social ideals. These movements appeal to the thoughtful masses far more powerfully than socialism does,



because they are progressive without being destructive. They stand for the socialization of government and industry, but also for the conservation of the individual. They maintain a reasonable balance between socialism and individualism.

But the greatest movement that is making for the realization of the social ideals of Jesus is the Christian Church, and especially the modern movement in the Church. I have no time to dwell on modern theology in this paper; I only wish to say that the modern conception and interpretation of the Christian religion are more social than the old. Their starting-point is the Fatherhood of God, and out of this truth issue all the social principles for the social redemption of the race. The Church is the largest movement of all for humanity's social salvation. She will eventually absorb all lesser movements and lead the race to its predestined goal. The Church has no program to offer, and no political party to endorse in these modern times. It is her mission to preach, teach, inspire and lead. It is her duty, in the spirit of Christ, to give to the world the social Gospel, with its fundamental doctrines of the Kingdom, which are the universal Fatherhood of God and the universal brotherhood of man, with all the principles that are involved in these fundamentals. She must set her face against extreme individualism, in whatsoever forms it may assert itself. Her voice must ever be heard against Imperialism and Romanism in state, church, and industry. To be true to her exalted Head, she must advocate the principles of Christian democracy, and herself be a democracy. The Church must preach brotherhood and be a brotherhood in word and conduct. She must awaken the social consciousness of men; must convince rich and poor, capitalist and laborer alike, that man has a social origin, and that he can realize and find himself only insofar as he knows himself to be in social relations. Sin must be set forth as a social act, the cause of social disorder and ruin, for no man can sin only against himself, since no man liveth unto himself. Social and corporate iniquities will be fearlessly denounced by the true minister of the Gospel.



The Church of today should demand the socialization of wealth, the Christianization of capitalism, and the social regeneration of all members of society. She should seek the abolition of poverty among all the deserving; the employment of wealth in the service of mankind; the just distribution of all the products of industry among employers and employees; and the fraternal coöperation of capital and labor. She should teach the principle that work is a social function. Plowing and reaping, digging and building, buying and selling, investing and managing, teaching and preaching—every type of labor should be considered a social function; and all the philanthropic and missionary work of the Church should be looked upon as social service. Church work and daily toil should both be called Christian work: both kinds of work are sacred, and both are types of social service. Education, science and art should be made the servants of the people. It is encouraging to see how education and science are being popularized in our time. Some may think that art will disappear from our church worship when the Church gives up her allegiance to imperialism in theology and polity. The beautiful forms of worship in the Church are not the product or possession of ecclesiasticism. They are matters of art and art will abide. The noblest art may be employed, and should be, to adorn the worship of the common people. I protest against the idea that a church for laboring people must be plain and barnlike. Rich and poor alike should worship together “in the beauty of holiness.” So it is the mission of the Church to let the social spirit be manifest in her doctrine, her work and her worship.

But the supreme business of the Church is to hold aloft the doctrine of the spiritual life. The social and spiritual are indeed intimately interrelated. But in practice, we are all dualists, and do think and act as though the social and spiritual were separate entities. Jesus did and so must we. The minister should place first things first; the spiritual precedes and underlies the social. The Church must spiritualize the social motive and passion of men. This is so necessary in our time,



when so many who come under the influence of social teachings, drift away from their church. Men must be inspired to call upon the name of the Lord. They must be taught that the power they need most of all is spiritual power, and that it comes from above and not from abroad or below. They must be taught that the regeneration of man is necessary in order to the regeneration of society. They must tarry in Jerusalem, until they be endued with power from on high. Through prayer, preaching and the sacraments, the Church must keep her people in vital touch with God. She must teach them the privilege and secret of communion with the Father.

The great message of the modern Church should not be anything less than "Christ and him crucified." This will mean the bringing of men—sinful men—into unity with God and harmony with one another. It will be the preaching of the atonement, a social truth. "I, if I be lifted up, will draw all men unto me." Dr. John H. Jowett, in a striking sermon, says: "The irresistible magnet that will draw all men to one spiritual center is the uplifted Christ. His drawing power is the energy of sacrificial love. The cross stands in the center of the great circle of humanity. It is the center of brotherhood. From the wide-sweeping circumference, countless radii pass to the center. These radii are the paths that the feet of all men should tread, and a true church will direct their feet into these paths that lead to the uplifted Christ. And what will be the result? As men move down the radii and approach the crucified Lord, they will approach one another." The nearer they come to the center, the nearer will they come to one another; the closer they get to their one common Lord, the more will they realize that they belong to one common brotherhood, for they will be conquered by His divine love, and will believe Him when he says: "One is your Master, even Christ, and all ye are brethren."

When will the full realization of the social ideals of Jesus take place? No man can fix the time. The goal is set—it is the goal of history. The Church should always lift up her

eyes and look into the future, for her redemption draweth nigh. Hebrew and Christian civilization will some day triumph over the Roman. The Christian democracy will be established in all the earth. When will the Kingdom be here? When will that new heaven and earth appear wherein dwelleth righteousness? This is the Father's secret. "It is not for you to know the times or the seasons which the Father hath put in His own power." "But ye shall receive power after that the Holy Ghost is come upon you, and ye shall be witnesses unto me unto the uttermost parts of the earth."

The Church should always be busy in the present, doing the duty of the hour, and confidently, hopefully, and prayerfully assuring men that the time is coming when "the kingdoms of this earth shall become the Kingdoms of our Lord and His Christ."

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READING, PA.



## VI.

### NOTICES OF NEW BOOKS.

OUR HOME MISSION WORK. An Outline Study of the Home Mission Work of the Reformed Church in the United States. By Charles E. Schaeffer, D.D., General Secretary of the Board of Home Missions. Publication and Sunday School Board of the Reformed Church in the United States, Fifteenth and Race Streets, Philadelphia, Pa. Cloth. Pp. 263.

The efficiency movement has captivated the leaders of the churches of America. They are studying ways and devising means to make their work more efficient. This is especially true of the vast missionary enterprise of the Christian Church. In the early ages, missions were largely an individual passion for souls. And the missionary was a chivalrous knight of the cross who went forth, without purse or scrip, as a lamb among wolves, to gain converts to his faith. These heroic servants of the Church achieved magnificent results, but today their efforts would be dubbed knight-errancy. They would fail, as all haphazard methods do whether in religion or in business.

To succeed in its great missionary task, the modern Church needs no less passion for souls than its medieval forerunner, but, in addition, it needs an effective organization and efficient methods to apply and adjust its spiritual force to the vast field, at home and abroad. And these, in turn, require thoroughgoing study and reliable information. No Peter the Hermit can lead our modern missionary crusade to success. Instead of arousing the transient emotions of vast multitudes with fiery eloquence, we organize Mission Study Classes, where facts make their sober appeal to the mind and conscience of earnest students, and where solid information is made the basis of permanent inspiration. And thus we are in a fair way of engendering in our young people a missionary zeal that will have light as well as warmth, an intelligent consecration to the spread of God's kingdom on earth.

The book under review is intended primarily for Mission Study purposes in the Reformed Church. The author's aim was to furnish a manual of instruction, and he has succeeded admirably. But he has done more than produce a repository of facts and figures. They are merely the skeleton of his book which he has clothed with a living garment of deep spiritual insight into the larger meaning of Home Missions. One should begin the study of the volume with a perusal of its last chapter, entitled "The Larger Meaning of Home Missions." It strikes a note that was never heard in the past, and is still intoned too rarely. But it is the real keynote of the vast enterprise of Home Missions in America.



And then, with one's vision enlarged and ennobled, one may proceed to study the work of Home Missions in the Reformed Church, from the founding of the first congregation in the early decades of the eighteenth century to the present time. That work, in all its various phases, is presented topically in seven chapters. They are packed with accurate information, garnered from many sources. The human forces and the material resources that went into the making of our Home Missions are marshalled vividly; the genesis, growth, and present status of each phase of the many-sided work are set forth clearly; our territory is carefully analyzed, and the needs and claims of city and country are presented.

Dr. Schaeffer's book is a valuable addition to our denominational literature. It possesses an inspirational quality that is rare in books of this sort. It is well written and carefully indexed. It will become an indispensable aid in furthering the cause of Home Missions within the Reformed Church.

THEO. F. HERMAN.

**SOCIAL CHRISTIANITY IN THE ORIENT: THE STORY OF A MAN, A MISSION AND A MOVEMENT.** By Rev. John E. Clough, D.D. New York, The Macmillan Company. Price \$1.50 net.

This is the story of the life and work of John E. Clough, D.D., a Baptist-Missionary to the Telugus in Southern India. It is in the form of an autobiography, though written by his wife, Emma Rauschenbush Clough, Ph.D., his companion and helper in all his trials and triumphs.

Dr. Clough has been called the Apostle to the Telugus; and his achievements justify the title. Before his appointment the Baptist Board of Foreign Missions had, on three separate occasions, considered the advisability of closing the mission. Under his leadership, however, it attained unprecedented success. At the end of five years the mission had fifteen hundred members, and many adherents; and when what he calls the time of ingathering came, converts came by the hundred and by the thousand, seeking baptism.

The book gives a first-hand picture of life in India. It contains an answer to many questions, which are asked with reference to the contact between Christianity and the Oriental religions. It gives an account of the social revolution which the Christian religion introduced among the low caste people with whom Dr. Clough labored; and it furnishes an excellent illustration of how the gospel of Jesus transforms, not simply the individual, but the entire community. The book is the record of a singularly devoted and successful missionary life, and is a worthy addition to the growing missionary literature of our day.

WILLIAM C. SCHAEFFER.



THEY WHO QUESTION. New York, The Macmillan Company. Price \$1.35 net.

"Here is a stirring novel the theme of which, like that of Winston Churchill's *The Inside of the Cup*, turns upon pressing questions of everyday religion." It is thus that the publishers speak of this volume; and the claim is justified by the contents. An absorbing love idyl runs through the entire story; yet the whole story turns round questions of absorbing religious interest. In this respect it is like Winston Churchill's *The Inside of the Cup*; and yet it differs from that in two important particulars. In that the religious questions are largely dogmatic; in this they are almost exclusively practical. In that the difficulty in the way of faith is found in the imperfections, the insincerity, and the shortcomings of professed Christians; in this it is found in God's providential dealings with men. As in the book of Job, the all-absorbing topic is the problem of "unmerited suffering." From the first chapter to the last, the story voices the age-long cry, "How can a just God allow it?"

The several characters of the story are all made to pass before us in such a way that each is seen with his own peculiar cup of woe. The heroine of the story, Lady Enid Curney, is a singularly pure, chaste, and religious character; yet her life is full of sickness and sorrow. Her first-born child, even from the day of its birth, suffers constant and excruciating pain, so that her faith, originally so pure and childlike, finally suffers eclipse.

The author's solution of the dark problem is not given until at the end. He turns it over and over again in the experiences of his several characters, until the reader wonders whether he has a solution to offer. When at last it is given, it is put into the form of a beautiful sermon by the aged Dean of Melincourt, the central thought of which is that all "unmerited suffering," like that of Jesus, is vicarious; and that all who endure such suffering are in a profound sense sin-bearers, for the salvation of their fellows. Among other things the Dean is made to say: "There is a vast brotherhood in the world whom we need, or who need us. There was One we know whose deep affections for his fellow men saved them, and as he has saved so we too must save them. There are still sin-bearers in the world. We know that this is so in our daily lives; and that every true servant of God is, in some sort, a sin-bearer. We look on ourselves as isolated beings, but that is not God's way of looking at us, and before we can understand this, we must cultivate the universal element in our nature. The true self is universal not individualistic. . . . Most of us think that we bear a sufficiently heavy burden when we accept the punishment of our sins; but that does not appear to be God's plan for us. No one who has ever set out to fight for God's cause but has been wounded in the fray, and why should it



be otherwise? No one has ever tried to be ordinarily unselfish but he or she has not had to bear the sins of the selfish."

The volume is anonymous. The only hint of its authorship is contained in the following statement of the publishers. It is "undoubtedly the work of a well-known writer, who prefers, for reasons of his own, to remain anonymous." Whether he be well-known or not, he has given us a clean, absorbingly interesting book, which any one may read with pleasure and profit.

WILLIAM C. SCHAEFFER.

THE STORY OF PHÆDRUS: HOW WE GOT THE GREATEST BOOK IN THE WORLD. By Newell Dwight Hillis. New York, The Macmillan Company. Price \$1.25 net.

"A little of fiction, a little of history, and a little of legend have entered into the composition of this tale of early Christian days." So, in part, runs the legend on the first page of the wrapper in which this book is sent forth. It would perhaps be more nearly correct to say very much of fiction, and very little of history have entered into the composition of this tale. One's judgment of the book will hence differ according as he approaches it from the standpoint of romance or of history.

As a fictitious tale, the book is both interesting and fascinating. The author is a literary artist. The story is well told. The slave boy, Phædrus, is made to pass before us in a number of vivid scenes, which are painted in a wealth of beautiful imagery. The book is concerned with one of the most fascinating of themes, in which every Bible student is and should be interested. Who does not want to know how we got the New Testament, the greatest book in the world? Round this theme Dr. Hillis has woven a most fascinating story; and considered simply as a story, the book is no doubt a success,

It is when one turns to the other side that he feels disappointed. There is much less of history than one would expect from the sub-title; and what of history there is is unfortunately not reliable. If the author had been as diligent and careful in laying his historic foundation as he was in painting his picture and in embellishing his tale, the student, who has some knowledge of how the New Testament was formed, would find more satisfaction in reading his book. On page 308, in one of the historical notes at the end of the book, in which he is certainly not consciously romancing, he says that Codex A goes back to 320 A.D.! On page xviii of the preface, he says: "One thing is certain,—recent discoveries in the East prove that Mark, Luke, and Matthew used a common source for many of their pages"; and then he goes on to assert that this common source is "Q." The fact is that discoveries in the East had nothing at all to do with convincing scholars that there are common sources back of our Synoptic Gospels;



and there are, at least, some New Testament Scholars, who doubt whether Mark knew anything at all about the "Q" source. One can hardly avoid the conclusion that, if the author had leaned less heavily on his imagination and depended more upon a careful study of the facts, he would have written a different book. However interesting the book may be as fiction, it gives neither a correct nor an adequate conception of how we got the greatest book in the world.

WILLIAM C. SCHAEFFER.

VITAL ELEMENTS OF PREACHING. By Arthur S. Hoyt, Professor of Homiletics and Sociology in Auburn Theological Seminary. Published by the Macmillan Company, New York, 1914. Pp. 326. Price \$1.50 net.

This is a refreshing book, although it guides one along a familiar and hardbeaten highway. The librarian may have some difficulty in classifying it, as it may be placed with equal right in either of the departments of homiletics or pastoral theology. It deals mainly with preaching and the pastoral office. "The Called Man," "The Vision of Man," "The Human Touch," "A Man's Gospel," are specimens of the fifteen chapter headings, which indicate the author's scope and method of treatment. The value of the human and social quality in preaching is the dominant thought. This does not weaken, but rather enhances the divineness of the sacred office.

The previous works by the author on "The Work of Preaching," and "The Preacher," have not dulled his talent for his special line of work. This latest volume is fully justified both by the substance and style of its contents. While the several chapters are announced as lectures, there is no suggestion of the dry atmosphere of the conventional lecture-hall. And while quotations abound, aptly chosen from a wide range of homiletic literature, the book is entirely free from the mustiness of the library. From the brief preface on through the closing chapter, the thought-movement blends happily with the currents of human life. Consistently do the method and style of the author illustrate "The Vital Elements of Preaching."

Dr. Hoyt has given a new message on what one is more fully convinced, after reading the book, is the most needful, most helpful, and most rewarding work of every age. The book will prove to be a richly suggestive help, not only to students preparing for the Christian ministry, but no less to veterans in the service.

J. C. BOWMAN.

GOD'S PATHS TO PEACE. By Ernst Richard. New York-Cincinnati, The Abingdon Pres. Pp. 109. 75 cents net.

This booklet, as it is modestly styled by the author in his foreword, has far greater value than its brief page-limits would in-



dicade. To Mr. Richard belongs the distinction of being the founder of the New York Peace Society, president of the German-American Peace Society, lecturer on the history of German civilization in Columbia University. This statement is made simply for the purpose of information, and not with a view to begging for the booklet a favorable reception. Were the author unknown the book would still commend itself strictly on its merits. The title—*God's Paths to Peace*—at first thought would imply a religious appeal on the part of an idealistic dreamer in behalf of an organized peace movement, a trite preachment, made to glow afresh with fervent enthusiasm. Quite the contrary. There is no impassioned appeal to emotion; there is no play on religious feeling. The booklet is a study in the evolutionary processes making for world peace. God's paths are traced through the evolutionary process which make for peace through the various periods of history down to the present stage of "world-righteousness." From the frith, the Anglo-Saxon for "peace," of the family, to that of the clan, extending to greater social units, the small people or folk, to the large tribes, to the nation, and finally to the brotherhood of nations, the author traces the development of the peace-movement on to what he regards as the final stage of evolution, that of universal peace. Assuming that evolution is the law of human history as well as of nature, war may retard it for a time, but never can stop it. In a few brief chapters, covering less than one hundred pages, the author presents a compact mass of informing facts which carry with them the power of conviction, without any need of formal argument. He shows how all the forces of civilization have combined for the promotion of internationalism, the advancement of the mutual welfare of the nations. Science, art, commerce, labor, sports, education, and the mind itself, all have become more and more internationalized. And best of all, there is an international heart, and along with it there is gradually being developed an international conscience. Especially interesting are the facts which he cites with regard to the growth of world congresses, whose scope covers every field of human activity. Since the beginning of the present century there has been an annual average of one hundred meetings of world congresses. In these congresses the great achievements of mankind in all fields are made known, and plans for new progress proposed. Directly, or indirectly, the interests of universal peace are thereby conserved. It is reckoned that there are today no less than from six to seven hundred permanent international organizations. Equally interesting is the history of the evolution of international arbitration, showing its growing influence, not only in number but also in importance and beneficent results. One is surprised to learn of the large number of instances of settlement of international differences, preventing in not a few in-



stances resort to arms. Nor is there a single case on record when the losing nation did not submit to the arbitral decision, though the popular indignation could be placated only by great self-discipline. These various lines of enlarged human relations, tending to bring the nations more closely together, the author regards as the unfolding of natural laws. In them he sees the ways chosen by God to realize the prophecies of the Prince of Peace. So that the booklet, notwithstanding the emphasis placed on evolution, has religion in the background of all its thought, and carries with it the implication that the spirit of brotherhood, which is the spirit of Christianity, is the inspiration of all movements tending toward peace. The present terrible conflict of the nations does not prove the futility of the peace movement of the ages. It proves that the nations have not yet succeeded in freeing themselves entirely from the primitive instincts of violence and distrust, and that the weakness of the powers is to be found in the fact that the policy of governments still rests too largely on might instead of right. In spite of the present insane and inhuman conflict of nations, the eternal forces of human progress, irresistibly, though slowly, converge to the desired goal of Universal Peace. This is the logical and hopeful conclusion of the author's argument, based on the natural processes of evolution, which are "God's Paths to Peace."

J. C. BOWMAN.

RESTATEMENT AND REUNION, A Study in First Principles. By Burnett Hillman Streeter. Int. VII-XXII. St. Martin's St., London, Macmillan & Co., Ltd. Pp. 194. 2/6 net.

The author of this book, dean and lecturer in theology and classics of Queen's College, Oxford, has become widely known because of his prominent part in the production of "Foundations," of which he was editor and to which he was perhaps the ablest contributor. That work, the joint product of seven Oxford men, appeared a little more than two years ago, as "A Statement of Christian Belief in Terms of Modern Thought." It was at once accorded high rank as a contribution to liberal and constructive theology. The book now under review is in the same class with its notable predecessor. The author, in the opening statement of the Introduction, claims that "the book is not controversial but constructive." This claim is fully justified by the general contents of the book, but, unfortunately, in the Introduction the author betrays undue sensitiveness to the dissenting views expressed by the Bishop of Oxford in his pronouncement on "The Basis of Anglican Fellowship," and in his defense is led very close to, if not across, the controversial line. His protest against the Bishop's implication "that difficulties as to the Virgin Birth, the Physical Resurrection, and the Nature Miracles are



only felt acutely by those who base their criticism on a mistaken view of natural law, and on something less than a Christian belief in God," is of no interest to the general reader. Even the most liberally inclined are losing interest in the discussion of these disputed problems, while the "orthodox," as a result of the continued discussion, are likely to become more firmly entrenched by resistance than swayed away from their ancient moorings. And Christians generally, as they look at the dust which is stirred up by the conflict of theological opinion, ask, What boots it? Of what avail for spiritual enlightenment and comfort? The Introduction does not fairly introduce the contents of the book, but tends rather to detract from their high value. It is not in keeping with the uncontroversial, positive and constructive character of the book, and with the compliant and charitable spirit of the author.

Under the general title of Restatement and Reunion, the contents are included in four chapters: I. The Simplicity of Christianity; II. Authority, Reunion and Truth; III. What does the Church of England Stand For?; IV. The Conception of the One Church.

Briefly and very happily does the author define what he regards as the essential principles of Christianity, which may serve as a comprehensive basis for both a restatement of doctrine and a reunion of the various branches of the Church. In making his noble plea for the supremacy of the essential principles of the Christian religion, he does not exclude the valuable services rendered by theology, philosophy, and criticism. Rightly does he maintain that the center of gravity of Christianity does not lie in theology, and that entrance into the Kingdom of Heaven does not wait on the verdicts of philosophers, historians, and critics. In the emphasis which he places on the essentials of Christianity he points the better way, in which may be revealed unto babes things which have escaped, and are likely to escape, the wise and understanding. Love, which issues in a passion for service, will ever be the supreme test of a true and living faith. Prayer, meditation and work, are the ways whereby men are kept in communion with God and advance his Kingdom on earth.

The second chapter, on "Authority, Reunion and Truth," Shows the lack of authoritarian power on the part of the Church, because of her conflicting doctrine of beliefs and a consequent lack of efficiency for successful coöperative work. As the first and greatest need is truth, the question is discussed as to the source from which truth can best be obtained. The answer is, the christocentric principle, applied to the sphere of practical religion. The life of Christ on earth is the highest manifestation of the nature and life of God. Truth is actualized in life by fellowship with God in Christ. The knowledge of this truth



comes not through scientific research or philosophic analysis; it comes not as an achievement of the ratiocination of the thinker, but rather as "the expression of the spiritual experience of the mystic"; through an intuitive apprehension of fundamental principles, rather than by the acquisition of a knowledge of details obtained through what is known as the scientific method; by a mastery of eternal moral and religious values, rather than by a mastery of the knowledge of concrete facts. The author does not attempt to define positively the form of restatement and reinterpretation required by the changed conditions of thought and life. His plea is that the divided branches of the Church draw more closely together, first for coöperation in good works, and then for the discussion of belief. A discussion, accompanied by prayer and pursued in a spirit of charity and kindly concessions, with truth as the single aim, will prepare the way for a consensus of Christian belief, broad enough to serve as a basis for a federated union of the Churches, which would give an authority to faith which the Church in its divided state at present lacks and at the same time would conserve the power of the Church by avoiding the waste and misuse of spiritual energy through efforts to maintain and strengthen separate denominational interests.

In the chapter on, *What Does the Church of England Stand For?* the author seeks to show the characteristics which differentiate the Anglican Church from the Roman Catholic and the several great Protestant Communion. Her theology he traces to the Greek Fathers, in contrast with the Augustinian system. For a supreme authority, based on Orders, he makes no claim. He credits his Church with "comprehensiveness" as its distinctive mark, a spirit of sanity, balance and moderation, the love of truth. The ideal, as interpreted by the Church of England, is a synthesis of Hebraism and Hellenism. To other denominations he accords a large share of these same qualities, and acknowledges the great value of the principles for which they severally stand. His sweet reasonableness and broad charity qualify him to a high degree as a champion of the cause for which he pleads—that of closer union of all Christian bodies.

"The Conception of One Church" is discussed in the concluding chapter under three parts: (1) From Unity to Disruption; (2) The Preliminaries of Reunion; (3) The Problem of Intercommunion. In the first part the author gives a concise, scholarly survey of the history of Christianity in its struggle to give formal expression to the ideal unity of the Church, and at the same time shows how, on the part of the Church in all past ages, failure to realize that ideal conspicuously appears along the lines of doctrinal and governmental development. But notwithstanding the failures there has been both a negative and positive preparation in the history of Christianity, which warrants the hope that sooner



or later the prayer of Jesus for the oneness of his disciples will be fulfilled. The discussion of the Preliminaries of Reunion and the Problem of Intercommunion suggests valuable practical helps intended to strengthen the growing hope. The book merits high commendation for its clear and vigorous thought, while its value is enhanced by the spirit of piety, sincerity, and kindness which characterizes the author throughout his discussion.

J. C. BOWMAN.

**A MAN AND HIS MONEY.** By Harvey Reeves Calkins, stewardship secretary in the Methodist Episcopal Church. The Methodist Book Concern. Pp. 353. Price \$1.00 net.

This book is published under the auspices of the Commission on Finance of the Methodist Episcopal Church. It is a strong and clear statement of the principles and practices of Christian stewardship.

The origin and development of the general idea of ownership are discussed in the opening chapters of the book. The author claims that the conception of ownership and possession which has permeated the social order for centuries is pagan and not Christian. He traces the general idea of ownership through the history of the race and shows that in the Roman code the essence of ownership was the legal power to hinder others from using or enjoying one's possessions. He emphasizes the fact that the purpose of ownership with the pagan is to hinder and not to help.

Christianity repudiates this pagan doctrine and "recognizes possession, honorably acquired, as a token of confidence on the part of the Divine Owner." Christianity begins not with the Stoic Law of Nature as the fountain head of jurisprudence, but with the acknowledgment of God as Owner. Human stewardship is the necessary correlate of divine ownership. Even in the Old Testament, it was established for the first time in human history that men are to hold all their possessions, as a steward holds the possessions of his master, absolutely subject to the call of the Owner.

The author shows that there was a very distinct relation existing between Pentecost and Property. The early Church taught not a communism of possessions but stewardship. There was no compulsion, neither was there any general turning of possessions and goods into money, for the purpose of general distribution, but only "as every man had need."

The writer of this interesting and helpful book passes from the first to the eighteenth century and shows that the community of Herrnhut by adopting this Christian idea of stewardship and putting it to practical use gave an impetus to the missionary labors of the Moravian Church. He shows further that the principle of stewardship practiced by the early Methodist Church in America performed wonders for the Kingdom of God.



After tracing his subject historically the author skillfully differentiates the principle of stewardship from other principles and forms of economic organization. He shows very clearly wherein the principle he advocates differs from socialism.

His treatment of the subject of value is interesting. He lays down the proposition, economically sound enough, that the content of money is essentially spiritual, for value in its ultimate analysis is a spiritual force, making its final appeal to the whole man's sense of rightness or fitness, and money is the measure of value. The pursuit of money is and ought to be a spiritual calling. Money-making need not appeal to the sordid instinct of man; it may appeal to the finer elements of man's higher nature.

In the practical application of his principle the author develops these three ideas: (1) A recognized obligation of stewardship, without a program, is not intelligent. (2) A narrow, local or provincial program will frustrate its own purpose. (3) An intelligent program demands a fair understanding of the modern problems and opportunities of the Kingdom of God.

The book as a whole is a worthy presentation of a great theme. It will be helpful to ministers and laymen alike. The book is clear, thoughtful, sane and inspiring.

H. M. J. KLEIN.

OUR SPIRITUAL SKIES. By Charles Coke Woods. New York, Eaton and Mains. Cloth. Pp. 232. Price \$1.00 net.

The author of these meditations seeks to touch the deeper movements of life and experience in such a way as to show that their significance is spiritual. He contrasts the Christian view of life with the Agnostic's conception of the Universe, with the Fatalist's scheme of things and with the Materialist's explanation of facts. He illustrates his principle of the supremacy of the spiritual from the pages of Life, of Literature and of Scripture.

He shows light on the dark things of human experience by showing in a beautiful way how they may be called into the high and holy service of the soul. Not by philosophers and cults will shadows be overcome, but only by the life of Him who is the Master of the Shadows.

In drawing on the world of literature for the support of his faith in the truth of spiritual supremacy, the author has written several chapters on "The Soul as interpreted in Tennyson's *In Memoriam*," "Shakespeare and the Soul," "A Literary Study of the Soul as portrayed by Robert Browning." The writer of this book has a delicate and discriminating sense of the finer elements in English Literature. He shows too how these elements may prove to be of the greatest value as means of spiritual culture.

"The Skyward Look from Scripture" is the sub-title given to the third part of the volume before us. The author shows that



the spiritual conception of life as found in the Old and New Testament gives broad outlook and extensive horizon to life. At least twenty-five short chapters, full of suggestion, germinal thoughts, are devoted to the exposition of selected Scripture passages with a view to showing, as the writer puts it, "that the soul must have sky." The pages treating of the "Dreamers," "The Persistence of Personality," and "Points on Power," are among the best in the book.

The whole volume is an admirable handbook for the spiritual culture of layman and minister written by a man who knows life, literature and scripture, and who has the ability to make one see and feel that the Christian conception of life not only makes for things that are better but is able to meet the greatest occasions and strains of life with brave heart and confident hope.

H. M. J. KLEIN.

THE ASSURANCE OF IMMORTALITY By Harry Emerson Fosdick. New York, The Macmillan Co. Pp. 140. Price \$1.00

This book faces the problem of life after death from the standpoint of the twentieth century. It discusses the problem in the terms of the modern man. It faces the difficulties which modern thought and the modern attitudes toward life present in the consideration of the question. The author points out first the real importance of the problem, then he shows the inconclusive nature of the arguments commonly urged against a future life and finally he tries to present the positive reasons for a modern man's assurance that death does not end all.

His argument is based on the principle that the cosmic order is rational. He shows that the basic assumption of science that the universe is reasonable supplies a strong foundation for faith in immortality. Further he shows that the basic assumption of religion is that the universe is beneficent. If this be true then of necessity it argues the permanence of personality. A man can not reasonably believe in the goodness of God without believing in immortality. In addition to the fact that the universe is reasonable and beneficent and will certainly preserve its moral gains, we have the testimony of the spiritual seers. Jesus' teaching of immortality has the authoritative value of a verdict from a spiritual seer, but his life has a verifying value, exhibiting to us once for all the sort of character resultant from living as though immortality were true. The character of Jesus in which faith in God is the warp and certainty in life eternal is the woof, is the consummate verification of faith in immortality.

The book is well written, logical in thought, clear in style. It is bound to be helpful to any man who in an earnest and open minded manner seeks light on the great problem of life after death.

H. M. J. KLEIN.



THE SOVEREIGN PEOPLE. By Daniel Dorchester, Jr. Eaton and Mains, New York. Pp. 243. Price \$1.00 net.

This is a trenchant apology for the democracy that is and a noble prophecy of the democracy that is to be. The broad view of democracy is taken, that it is something more than a form of government. Social and religious no less than political, it is defined as "the organic manifestation of the people in their collective capacity, and thus invested with a sovereignty and character distinctly different from the individuals maintaining it." But in addition to these human elements there is a divine power and wisdom operative in the souls of the people, which "while immanent in humanity always transcends it and seeks to subordinate all political theories and parties, all selfish interests of corporations and individuals, to an ever-developing diviner social organism." It is this that gives to democracy its superior right to rule, for while the divine wisdom and power is to be found in any form of government it is present in all the people in greater degree than in any particular class. Hence the judgment of all the people is wiser than the judgment of any class. This conclusion the author finds amply confirmed by the history of democracy. In every great moral crisis, he maintains, when the issue between right and wrong has been clearly presented to the people their verdict has been in favor of the right.

The bearing of all this on the future is obvious. Social progress and well-being will depend upon the degree in which God's sovereignty is diffused through humanity, guiding and controlling the people and instilling in them new ideals; and only as the people become better fitted to obey this divine sovereignty, can their own sovereignty be established.

The book is a thoughtful and stimulating discussion of the social problem, and a real contribution to its literature. It clearly recognizes the importance of religion in social life and development, and postulates for the Church of the future a larger measure of responsibility for social conditions than it has yet dared to assume.

A. V. HIESTER.

SAFEGUARDS FOR CITY YOUTH AT WORK AND AT PLAY. By Louise de Koven Bowers. New York, The Macmillan Company. Pp. xiii + 241. Price \$1.50 net.

The book is the outgrowth of the author's activities and experiences as president of the Chicago Juvenile Protective Association. It clearly reflects the change of emphasis, in recent years, in the treatment of delinquent and abnormal children from punishment to prevention and from prevention to vital welfare. But this change was slow to register itself in legal forms. For it was not until 1899 that the first Juvenile Court Law in the



United States was passed by the Illinois legislature. That the act was altogether incomplete may be seen from the fact that while it provided for the organization of juvenile courts and a probation system to go with them it made no provision for the salaries of the probation officers. To prevent the utter failure of the law a Juvenile Court Committee was organized in Chicago, which for eight years provided the necessary salaries. To keep delinquent children out of the police stations the Committee also maintained a detention home, through which about 2,600 children passed each year. This naturally led the Committee to a study of the causes of juvenile abnormality, and to meet this broader task a Juvenile Protective Association was organized, the first of its kind in the United States. In its efforts to minimize the wretched conditions which demoralize children and breed criminals the association prosecuted various investigations, the results of which have been published from time to time in the hope of stimulating a greater civic concern for the morale of the next generation.

The book is an account of these investigations and the various attempts which have been made to meet the evils disclosed by them. While it deals with conditions in Chicago, its conclusions are applicable to every large city as well as to many smaller ones. The book is singularly free from the morbid and sentimental. It is not the work of a doctrinaire, but a thoroughly sane discussion of an acute urban problem. The preface is by Jane Addams, the well-known head of Hull House.

A. V. HIESTER.

THE JUVENILE COURT AND THE COMMUNITY. By Thomas D. Eliot. New York, The Macmillan Company. Pp. xiii + 222. Price \$1.25 net.

This is one of the American Social Progress Series edited by Prof. Samuel McCune Lindsay, of Columbia University. It is not so much a technical treatment of the Juvenile Court as a critical study of that institution in its relation to other social institutions. Not a little criticism has been leveled at the Juvenile Court, possibly because too much has been expected from it, as is usually the case with any social device that succeeds in enlisting public interest and favor. While the book is a criticism of the Juvenile Court it differs from most other criticisms. Other critics have usually contented themselves with attacking particular aspects of the work of the Juvenile Court, but the author contends that its failures have been owing, apart from purely personal considerations, not to accidental excrescences, but to inherent and fundamental defects. He admits that it has been for a time a splendid institution, but that it has now reached the point of diminishing returns in comparison with other agencies designed to deal with the problem of abnormal childhood; and that in the future it will justify its existence only by leading the



way to something better. As immediate substitutes he suggests the school and the Domestic Relations Court.

The Juvenile Court has hardly had enough of a trial, and in many instances hardly a fair trial, to warrant a final judgment. But the book is worth a careful perusal both by its proponents and its opponents.

A. V. HIESTER.

FATED OR FREE? By Preston William Slosson. Boston, Mass., Sherman, French & Co. 1914. Cloth. Pp. 89. Price 75 cents net.

The subtitle of this little book, "A Dialogue on Destiny," suggests its theme and method. It is a discussion in dialogue form of the age-old puzzle of the freedom of the will, using the word freedom in the sense of a partial, or at least potential indeterminism. The author has very cleverly named his dramatis personæ in such a way that their surnames indicate their respective philosophic attitudes, and their given names, contemporary or recent representatives of the opinions they defend. "Doctor Clifford Owen Denker" combats the notion of freedom by pronouncing it inconceivable; "Professor Huxley Kohlenstoff" appeals to the scientific assumptions of the universality of causation and the conservation of energy; "Professor Ward M. Manteller" relies upon the success of the statistical method in social science; "Dr. Edwards C. Gottlieb" bases his argument upon the sovereignty of God; and "Mr. Dewey Smith," the pragmatist, attempts to throw the whole case out of court, as without practical significance. Against these redoubtable foes "Mr. James B. Freeman" bravely defends the possibility, probability, and practical importance of a theory of limited indeterminism, summoning philosophers to awake to the possibility of illimitable progress in an indeterminate world.

The dialogue is well maintained, and the author has succeeded remarkably in weaving into the argument all, or nearly all, of the considerations which are relevant to the baffling problem of the will.

RAY H. DOTTERER.

THE PHILOSOPHY OF CHRIST'S TEMPTATION. By George Stephen Painter, Ph.D. Boston, Mass., Sherman, French & Co. 1914. Cloth. Pp. 333. Price \$1.50 net.

The particular incident in our Lord's life on earth which the author undertakes to interpret in these pages has long been perplexing students of the gospel narratives. In a recent volume of "Christian Meditations" Moule discusses at length "the large demands on faith which the account of the temptation makes." Dr. Painter recognizes the same fact, but approaches the study of it from an entirely different angle. The perplexity will never be



removed, he thinks, until in our study of the records we cease to regard them as merely objective and mechanical, rather than inner experiences which are to be accounted for on psychological principles. The interpretation of the "wilderness experience" has tended toward the mystical and supernatural, and thus toward the obscuring of what is thoroughly human and natural in the experience.

The recorded temptation is, in the author's opinion, a typical example of the problems involved in narratives based upon traditions. It presents a literary type, the recognition of whose nature is necessary to gain a valid conception of the meaning and value of the underlying historical facts. Dr. Painter's contentions are set forth in these chapters with a vigor and clearness, born of a deep conviction as to the soundness of his philosophic position, and whether one can or cannot accompany him to all his conclusions, his study of the temptation of Jesus, is suggestive and interesting throughout, and will amply reward readers for the time they may give to the careful reading of the volume.

A. S. WEBER.

THE PSYCHOLOGICAL ASPECTS OF CHRISTIAN EXPERIENCE. By Richard H. K. Gill, Ph.D. Boston, Mass., Sherman, French & Co. 1914. Cloth. Pp. 104. Price \$1.00 net.

The nine brief chapters comprised in this readable and informing book are full of truths needed by Christian workers. In succession they discuss mental and emotional aspects of religious experience, with a firmness and certainty of touch that can leave hardly anyone in doubt as to the flimsy and evanescent nature of the emotional as compared with the worthwhile and permanent character of rational experiences. This psychological inquiry justifies educational religion by showing that for the attainment of the deeper, the abiding, and the immeasurably more powerful interests of righteousness in life and character, the mind, the heart, and the will must be brought into a reasonable and intelligent harmony with God. This mental experience makes for a vital and permanent devotion to the Christian life, for the lengthening and strengthening of Christian experience, and for stopping the leakage of back-sliding which so often saddens the hearts of religious workers. The methods for Christian work and pulpit effort, suggested by the author, are well worthy of being given careful attention by preachers, Sunday School teachers and parents. In these days when a volatile emotionalism is once more threatening to engulf the saner and enduring educational practices of the Church, the corrective and steadying message of a book like this is as seasonable as it is important. It should be widely circulated and prayerfully studied.

A. S. WEBER.



THE CHRISTIAN LIFE IN THE MODERN WORLD. By Francis G. Peabody, D.D. New York, The Macmillan Company. 1914. Cloth. Pp. 227. Price \$1.25 net.

One who has read the *Harvard Review* from its initial number to the current issue has no hesitation to declare that the best and most rewarding of all the articles it has published, appeared in April, 1913, under the title *The Practicability of the Christian Life*. In a revised and slightly altered form, the article reappears in the present volume under the same title as the first chapter. The impressions as to its soundness and value, made when first read, are fully sustained and confirmed by one's second and more careful perusal of it. The force and lucidity of the argument, the beauty and charm of literary style, the keen and kindly criticisms, the competent learning and the catholicity of spirit, one is made conscious of in reading this first chapter, reappear on every page of those succeeding it, and combine to make the book from start to finish one of the richest and most enriching contributions to the literature of Christianity in its social aspects that in recent years has come under one's eye. In his earlier volumes on *Jesus Christ and the Social Question* (1901), and *Jesus Christ and the Christian Character* (1904), Professor Peabody rendered the cause of Christianity a service of unspeakable value. But one risks nothing in appraising the present as being of still greater worth. His presentations of the Christian life (1) in the modern family, (2) in modern business, (3) in the making of money, (4) in the uses of money, (5) in the modern state, and (6) in the Christian Church, are as heart-searching as they are life-inspiring, and, in both these offices, transcendently significant and reassuring. His contentions disclose a maturity and mellowness of character, a balance of judgment and conviction, at almost every point, that leave but little else to be desired. Everyone eager to know the best that is to be had on the pressing questions here so ably and effectively dealt with, will secure and study this book. The outcome of such study cannot fail to warm the heart with a new confidence in the power of the Gospel, and fire the mind with new energy in its proclamation as the hope of the world.

A. S. WEBER.

THE MAN OF NAZARETH. By Frederick Lincoln Anderson, D.D., Professor of New Testament Interpretation in Newton Theological Institution. New York, The Macmillan Company. 1914. Pp. x + 226. Price \$1.00 net.

In the foreword the author frankly describes his viewpoint and his method of study in the preparation of this book. He claims to belong "to no party," but to have attempted to investigate independently and fearlessly, and "to have drawn the picture



of Jesus, which the facts, as I see them, give me. My whole attitude has been historical rather than theological." In his investigation of the life of Jesus he "observes the rules of the critical game," using practically "only the first three gospels, and, even in them, clearly differentiating the sources." The results of his "fourteen years of research" are presented in popular form, so as to meet the requirements of "the ordinarily intelligent man." The pages are not burdened with elaborate critical arguments or with citations from scholarly authorities, which will commend the book, not only to the layman, but also to the preacher and teacher.

One naturally wonders what conclusion about the Man of Nazareth a scholar with such an avowal of freedom and independence, following the historical and critical method of research, will reach. He may be a radical of the extreme sort, or, perchance, a reactionary who finds the Chalcedonian definition of Jesus in the gospels of the New Testament. A statement on page 65 shows clearly that he is neither a radical nor a reactionary. The writer says: "When the clouds of dust raised by centuries of conflict and criticism finally lift, we should see that the naked fact is that *a new type of man, fresh, strong, and unique, appeared in our race in the first century.*" This is the one presupposition with which he begins his sketch of the history and significance of Jesus. Yet it is not to be taken as an a priori assumption of the author but as a conclusion of his unbiased investigation of the gospel records.

The presupposition, however, is well worth our consideration, both on account of what it affirms and what it ignores. It asserts in indubitable language the newness and the uniqueness of the type of Jesus' manhood. He was not an ordinary man; there never was one like him. There was something in him that was in no other man before or since. He is, therefore, the beginning of a new species of manhood. It ignores the dogmatic theory of two natures in Christ as the way of accounting for the mystery of his person and the power of his life and work. Of this theory of Jesus' person he says on page 42: "As a sincere attempt to explain the mystery of the personality of Jesus and guarantee his unique greatness and divinity, it is worthy of our respect, but we cannot help feeling that it is mechanical, unnatural, impossible, and without warrant either in Scripture or in experience. Our age demands a more vital theory, more in line with what we know of mental and moral growth, more congruous with the portrait of Jesus in the gospels." We have defined at some length the author's mode of procedure to show that one may adopt the critical method of studying the records of the New Testament and divest himself, so far as possible, of dogmatic prepossessions and popular preconceptions, without surrendering the elements in the person



of Jesus which are essential to his Saviorhood and his Lordship.

It is a mistake to presume, as some seem to do, that in accounting for the life of Jesus in an historical way, the mystery of his person is minimized or explained. His personality, with its latent potencies, is the supreme mystery of history. The historian may trace the gradual unfolding of his life from childhood to manhood and show the influence of heredity and environment on the manner of his life and the form of his message, but the secret of his personality is far beyond his reach. Why Jesus in boyhood and manhood had a unique consciousness of God—the sureness of God's existence, the nearness of his presence, the discernment of his goodness in sunshine and rain, in lily and sparrow, the joyous filial fellowship with him, the absence of a feeling of guilt separating him from God, the sense of responsibility to do his will—all this we may recognize as fact, but why he had it and how he got it is as insoluble a mystery in the twentieth century as it was in the third. In the words of the author, "Men have always asked and are still asking the secret of this personality. It will never be wholly revealed."

In the author's view the greatest historical question about Jesus is his relation to the Messianic ideals of his age. That Jesus thought himself to be the Messiah the author does not doubt; but he is equally certain that he gave the terms describing the popular Messianic hopes new content. He cites numerous passages from the gospels to show that Jesus had the conviction of being the Messiah, not only after baptism but even before baptism. He acknowledges, however, that in considering Jesus' thought of himself before baptism one is on more debatable ground. But Jesus came to the conclusion that he was the Messiah and adopted that title, because it was the only word in his world which was in any way adequate to express the character and purpose of his life. He was far more than Messiah, as that term was popularly understood. The title was not unexpectedly imposed upon him from without at his baptism. "His inner experience of communion with God, his sonship, was the source of his Messiahship. What he was was the root of what he became. He came to think that he was the Messiah, because he found that he had a Messiah's work to do, and that he had within himself the resources to do it." His Messianic work consisted in "sharing with men his joy, his freedom, his light, his energy; to give men his life—a life with God, a life of love and righteousness." We are, however, not to think of Jesus as reaching the conviction that he was the Messiah by a logical process; but rather that "the idea sprang up in him spontaneously and necessarily. He could call himself nothing else, and never thought of calling himself anything else."

After Jesus became certain of his Messiahship, in the sense defined above, he had to face the question, how to accomplish his



Messianic work? In the temptation the author finds the inner thought of Jesus on this subject. Here we see the things which he decided not to do and the things he determined to do. He refused to be the popular political warrior Messiah, conquering the kingdoms of the world, and resolved to effect his spiritual end by spiritual means. His mode of procedure was first to preach the spiritual kingdom and then at last to disclose himself as the spiritual king, "for he thinks the cause of the righteousness of the kingdom is after all summed up in him."

His conception of the nature of the kingdom was as distinctive and as much his own as his idea of the Messiah. As he found the Father sovereign in his own heart and life, he went forth to induce all men to accept this blessed sovereignty and to enjoy all the satisfactions and privileges of the Father's love. The Messianic reign resolves itself into the rule of holy love in the universe of matter and of mind. The kingdom is both a present possession and a future attainment. Thus all ceremonial and national conditions for sharing in the blessings of the kingdom were abolished, and the ethical conditions alone remained for all men in all ages.

The kingdom is more than an individual experience. "It involves new social relations and indeed a new and heavenly society on this earth, a society in which the will of God would be done as perfectly, unanimously, and joyously as in heaven itself." A new social order was a necessary consequence of Jesus' work.

In answer to the question whether Jesus accepted at least in part the apocalyptic and catastrophic idea of the Messiah and the kingdom, the author gives "a modified 'yes,' if we are to hold to our gospel data." Yet he denies that Jesus changed his fundamental spiritual attitude and conceptions when he adopted the apocalyptic form. "He took the apt apocalyptic form, familiar to all Jews, and through that taught them figuratively things which he could not have expounded literally and definitely." The author is fully conscious of the difficulties in explaining the apocalyptic elements in the teaching of Jesus, and, while his explanations may not be wholly convincing to readers of different points of view, his interpretation is well worth pondering and is commendable because of the frankness with which he faces the whole issue.

At some length we have described the salient conclusions of the author because we consider his book brief, simple, and popular as it is, to be one of the noteworthy contributions of an American scholar to the theological literature of the past year. It is positive and constructive, based upon a thorough knowledge of the results of New Testament criticism and a recognition of the difficulties in the way of an historical interpretation of Jesus and his work. In a most satisfactory way the author has avoided the



untenable views of the Christ of dogma, as well as the apocalyptic Messiah of many modern scholars. He finds the Christ to have been far more than the child of his age, yea superior to prophets and kings of all ages, and yet he fails to see in him all that philosophic theologians have speculated about him. The essence, however, of what men have attempted to formulate in christological statements and the abiding hope which is embodied in apocalyptic visions, are conserved in the spiritual character and the ethical ideals of Jesus and his kingdom. At the close of the last chapter the author says: "In our marvellous world-history, Jesus is the greatest marvel of all. No one can ever take his place. All future saviors will acknowledge his supremacy and finality. His energy seems exhaustless and indeed increasing. . . . This Jesus, so strangely and uniquely full of God, is Lord in a sphere beyond the reach of our highest thought. He therefore demands and deserves the wonder, reverence, love and supreme devotion of every human being."

GEO. W. RICHARDS.

THE OPEN DOOR. By Hugh Black. Fleming H. Revell Company. Pp. 224. Price \$1.00 net.

In the first paragraph the author defines the purpose of his book and states the reason for its title. Its purpose is "to suggest a certain attitude towards the world and life." The common figure of speech, "The Open Door," chosen for the title, indicates that general attitude. We are to face the future with the spirit of hope, and hope is based on the fact that ours is not a static, but an evolving, world. The Open Door is a symbol of life itself which unfolds continuously from the lower to the higher, out of the past into the present, and out of the present into the future. In the political, social, intellectual, and moral spheres everything is in process of becoming—doors are open and through them one may enter upon a larger and fuller life. The Open Door means progress, opportunity, inspiration, faith, courage, hope. "Complete democracy when it comes will still further open wide all the doors into the richest possibilities of human life."

The author discusses life from the viewpoint of an evolutionist and yet is a prophet of personal responsibility. He proclaims a causal, not a casual, universe, and yet he insists that man is not the victim of necessity, but the arbiter of his destiny. He demands obedience of law, and yet he preaches the necessity and the efficacy of divine grace. Idealist, as he is to the core, he is not a visionary, but recognizes the value and function of things material and temporal. While he is controlled by democratic ideals, he stands for culture and restraint as the criteria of the highest type of manhood and womanhood.

Those, who have read one or more of the many books which the



author has written, need not be told of the charm of his style. It is chaste, crisp, gripping, vigorous in thought, pulsating with emotion, and buoyant with a wholesome optimism. His paragraphs are adorned with epigrams, replete with illustrations, bristling with allusions to biblical and classical lore, and rich in incidents drawn from wide reading and a close observation of men and affairs.

The book contains nine chapters, each of which seems to have been a sermon, at least contains much sermonic material. The chapter headings are the following: The Open Door, The Laws of the Open Door, The Shut Door, The Doorways of Tradition, The Magic Door, The Lure of the Open Door, The Door of Opportunity, The Adventure of the Open Door, The Last Open Door.

GEO. W. RICHARDS.

A MAN'S REACH OR SOME CHARACTER IDEALS. By Charles Edward Locke. New York, Eaton & Mains. Pp. 278. Price \$1.00.

Each of the seventeen chapters in this volume seems to have been originally a sermon; if not, it may easily be turned into one. While the chapters have widely differing headings, there is a unity of thought running through all of them. The binding thread is the necessity of having and of realizing ideals. Only men of ideals have power and destiny. Every notable achievement has its source and motive in a dream, a vision, an aspiration. To use the author's words in the Foreword: "From the days when the Father of the Faithful went forth from Chaldea, 'not knowing whither he went,' down to the eloquent Roman orator who said, 'Ideals are overtures of immortality,' and on to Mazzini, who taught the young men of Italy 'to love and venerate ideals, because ideals are the word of God,' earnest men have been in pursuit of their fondest dreams. Such men have momentum and destination."

The table of contents contains a variety of subjects, each one arousing interest because it is directly related to life. Among others are the following: Ideals and What They Cost; Heroism in Everyday Life; The Cure of Doubt; What is Life; Reverence; Getting Along With Folks; Master, Say On.

The author writes in a popular style and, by reason of the form and substance of his discourse, appeals to the general reader. The minister will find suggestive and stimulating lines of thought; the youth will be stirred to high resolves and noble endeavor. The chapters are adorned with poetic quotations, and numerous illustrations from history, science, and daily life. A book of this type well deserves a place in the library of the home, the school, and the town.

GEO. W. RICHARDS.





# THE REFORMED CHURCH REVIEW

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## I.

### JESUS' MESSIANIC CONSCIOUSNESS.

ELMER L. COBLENTZ.

Did Jesus believe himself to be the Messiah? Was he the Jewish Messiah? What was his idea of Messiahship? This whole question is surrounded with great difficulties.

The first is that of entering the inner life of another, of discovering his estimation of himself and his sense of his relation to the current ideas of his day. To investigate the inner shrine of an ordinary person is difficult; of Jesus it is well nigh impossible.

The second difficulty is that we have to approach this question through past modes of thought. The gospels are Jewish Christian estimates and admirations of Jesus expressed in the current religious and political language and forms of thought of the first century, many of which have only very obscure meaning for us and can only be apprehended after the most thorough research. But the importance of this subject, the conviction that it lies back of and is a necessary condition to a valid understanding of the gospel of the kingdom and of Jesus himself makes the effort an inspiring venture.



## I. THE UNIVERSAL ELEMENT IN THE MESSIANIC IDEA.

The word Messiah being a Hebrew term, found in the literature of the Jewish people, leads some to suppose that the Messianic idea had its origin among the Hebrews and is limited to the Jewish and through it to the Christian religion. But the word Messiah expresses an idea far older and wider than the Hebrew people. It is as deep as human need and as wide as the human race.

The three characteristic forms of thought in which primitive man expresses his relation to the phenomena of life are: (1) A sense of fear before the powers that seem to threaten and destroy him; (2) a yearning for and a dependence upon some beneficent power to ward off these dangers and protect him from them; (3) his happiness when he is thus protected or escapes, and his perplexity and misery when not. These are parts of the native furniture of the human soul. It belongs to us as human beings. It exists long before temples, altars or Bibles. It builds temples, writes Bibles and formulates creeds.

The first of these, the sense of fear, is at first only perhaps a physical quaking before physical danger, but it develops into trembling of the soul before moral evil. It grows from danger of body to danger of soul and personifies the evils of nature into devils and a Satan.

The second expects unseen powers, gods and spirits to befriend the helpless. It develops into tribal deities, saviour heroes, Messiahs and Christ. It grows from physical relief to spiritual redemption.

The third is the consequence of release from fear. It expresses itself in belief in the golden age, in the kingdom of God, in Paradise and heaven. Sin and Satan are words to express ideas developed from man's fear of adverse powers. Redemption and Salvation are words to express ideas developed from his dependence upon a saviour hero, and heaven is a word to express ideas developed from his belief in the overthrow of all adversaries and his complete bliss thereby assured.

The early myths of all peoples manifest these fundamental beliefs. The roots of the Messianic hope therefore run back beyond the prophets, back beyond the Hebrew nation itself, down into the soil of popular imagination.

## II. THE VARIOUS JEWISH IDEAS.

When we leave the broad universal field and confine ourself to the Hebrew literature we find the Messianic idea has diversified meanings. It passes through various stages. Among the earliest prophets this idea is simply a return of a Davidic king, who will reunite Israel and bring the peace and prosperity that characterized David's reign. At times it seems almost a belief in the return of David himself. When, however, the great prophets sought to restate this old belief in the supremacy of Jehovah over their adversaries (for Jehovah was their saviour hero), this Messianic hope came to mean more and more a special king with special prerogatives. He was to be Jehovah's representative endowed with Jehovah's power and sense of justice; and Jehovah through him would set up the reign of Righteousness at Jerusalem, to which all nations would be compelled to come. When the people were forced into exile then their faith suffered a shock. They first thought Jehovah had failed, or had deserted them. Then they reinterpreted that event as Jehovah's punishment for their purification and his preparation of them for the great Day of Jehovah when he would subdue all enemies and restore Israel. But these prophesies never were fulfilled. Israel passed from national failure to national destruction. The more the Jewish people wallowed in miserableism the more fantastic became their belief in their future. The apocalyptic literature is the pictorial expression of forlorn hopes. When they could no longer expect a restoration through the normal political channels, then they fell to taking these great political hopes of the prophets and giving them all kinds of allegorical enigmatical unearthly meanings, and the Messianic idea passed from the first stages of a great and good successor of David



to a heavenly visitor endowed with magical powers, who would sweep in upon the earth from out the clouds with a shout of vengeance and by the might of sheer omnipotence scatter all their enemies and reinstate the Jews in Jerusalem in bliss and reveling in prosperity. Apocalypse is thus degenerated prophecy. When Jesus appeared, the nation with its traditional hope of Davidic splendor preached by its great teachers, now for centuries restated in the wildest and most unreal terms was eagerly expectant of such a fantastic Messiah. The common people, unsophisticated, had the simple longing for some readjustment which would bring them release from their utter subjection, politically and economically, which made life a torture. They had all kinds of crude notions about who, and what such a releasing hero, Messiah, should be. They even thought the rude-looking John the Baptist from the wilderness could be he. But however crude, a popular belief in a suddenly appearing national deliverer who would do marvelous things and bring them sweet release, prevailed among the populace. The learned men, the Scribes and Pharisees, had worked out a minute system of Messianic dogmatics, and theology purporting to tell just when the time would arrive and what sort of being the Messiah should be and what particular deeds he would perform.

Thus we see that the Messianic idea among the Hebrew people was not a fixed, definitely defined concept, but differed at different periods of their history and among different classes of the same period. It passed through and meant all shades of belief, from a temporal victorious king who should unite Israel and make it supreme, like David, to a supernatural, unearthly mysterious being manufactured by and colored with the wildest imaginations of the apocalyptic writers after the exile, all of which was arranged into an ecclesiastical system. These facts must be clearly recognized before any satisfactory consideration of Jesus' own Messianic consciousness can be approached.

Through all these apparent variations runs one unifying

idea. It is that of the kingdom. It is the kingdom, whether as at first purely political and national, or as afterwards more spiritual and exalted, and sometimes unearthly that is the occasion for and gives the form to the hero who is to establish it. The Messiah was expected to be instrumental in bringing the kingdom, but the desire of the kingdom actually generated the Messianic hero idea. We get to the Messianic idea through a study of the kingdom, rather than to the kingdom through a study of the Messiah. The idea of the kingdom of God was not originated by Jesus any more than the idea of the Messiah was. It too meant everything from national supremacy and personal ease to the reign of righteousness and justice. But it always and at all times involved and meant a change of fortune for the better for Israel. A kingdom message that did not promise this, and any one whatever else he did or did not do, that would not do this or attempt to do it would be utterly denied the Messianic title.

Just as among all primitive people, the nature of their particular hardships and dangers formed the occasion of their immediate wants and thus created and colored the form of the saviour hero who should protect and provide for them, so among the Hebrew people, the national and social stress formed the occasion for their particular kingdom wish, and through it the kind of a hero, who would surely bring this wish true. The Messiah personally was only an object of admiration ~~perhaps~~ and expectation because of the advantageous and happy results they desired and expected him to bring. Largely on the basis of what they felt to be the summum bonum—their chief good—was their Messianic idea erected. It reflected always their life attitude. Just as the doctrine of the fall has determined for centuries the ideas of theology about Jesus, and he is made to fit into a previous scheme rather than make the scheme fit him, so the previous idea of the kingdom determined the measure and kind of a Messiah.

Just as the grade of a man's intellectual and spiritual life, the attitude of his soul decides whether he wants to get some-



where or become something, whether he wants to enter pearly gates or have a pearly conscience, walk golden streets or have a golden soul, and through this indicates the kind of a Saviour he wants, so their idea of their supreme good, whether ease or righteousness or both, determined their concept of the Messiah. It was the various kingdom ideas that bred and reared and shaped the various Messianic concepts. It was Jesus' kingdom ideas that helped to shape his Messianic idea.

### III. JESUS' IDEA.

Every man, especially every man of sufficient ability to be a leader of men, is a product of two sets of forces. One is the original power and particular genius of his own nature, his own soul structure. The other set is the political, social atmosphere in which he lives, combined with the spiritual possessions of the nation or race to which he belongs. He is both an effect and a cause.

To think of Jesus as a sort of meteor dropped into the material world with no vital relation to it, living in sublime isolation with a series of mysterious ideas given him in a previous realm is to do violence to him and to his cause. On the other hand, to think that he of all men was the least original, that he was a mere product of outside forces; that by adding the column of things and ideas that surrounded him the result would be Jesus, is to do him and the whole nature of man an unpardonable violence. Jesus and all men are a fresh flame from the central fire. The world of things and thoughts may furnish the fuel, which will affect but can not create or ultimately determine the force and fury of that flame. Jesus' Messianic idea therefore is not purely an original product thrust upon the world, nor a mere repetition of his inheritance. It is a continuation of both. He got his Messianic idea, whether as at first as being some objective person other than himself, or as later as himself the Messiah, from his personal relation with the kingdom.

Jesus believed implicitly in the great national religious

hope—the coming of the kingdom. His first message was an almost exact repetition of John the Baptist—“The kingdom is at hand.” His gospel is the glad news of the kingdom. Notwithstanding many minor passages, we feel warranted in saying that Jesus looked upon the kingdom both as a future fact, and as a sudden rather than a gradual process. Had he abandoned the idea of futurity there would have been no basis for his preaching, for surely neither the present nor the past indicated the reign of righteousness. He had no desire to believe anything else. In this he was in harmony with the apocalyptic writers. He likewise felt that the advent of the future coming kingdom would be a sudden expression of God accompanied by marvelous demonstrations of divine power. It would be an immediate act of God bursting in upon the present world. John believed and preached this too. To John the advent would be largely destructive, but to Jesus constructive.

It is easy to read our own ideas back into any past period. It is easy to make Jesus preach the coming of the kingdom as a gradual moral transformation of society through all the ramified life interests. But who can think of the people of his day or the first century in the midst of the most desperate conditions giving any credence to a gospel of slow transformation. All of the apocalyptic sayings which are assigned to him, and those in the book of revelation, and the belief in the speedy return or second coming in Paul's writings, indicate their belief in a sudden future event. Because we find it necessary to have a different idea is not said that Jesus had our idea, and in order to get the support of his spirit for our age we are not compelled to deny that he preached in the apocalyptic categories of the kingdom and the Messiah of his age.

They conceived and expressed their assurance of God's presence and God's sovereignty in terms of apocalypse, we in terms of evolution. We may need a new apocalypse, for the past seems to prove its necessity. It is questionable indeed



if the Hebrew or early or even later Christianity could have achieved or kept alive its great spirit without the apocalyptic framework.

But though Jesus did have the idea of the kingdom as a future event suddenly appearing, he differed decidedly from the traditional in his interpretation of the kingdom due to his different concept of God. It was his God concept that affected his interpretation of the kingdom and therefore of the Messiah. If the expected kingdom was to be God's kingdom, then its nature depended upon the nature of God. It is precisely here that we find Jesus' originality and his point of departure. His gospel was not only the glad news of the kingdom, but the glad news of such a kingdom as his father God would establish.

A comparison of his teachings, his parables (*e. g.*, the one popularly called "The Prodigal Son," but which in reality is "The Parable of the Suffering Father") and his life with the conventional prescriptions of the priests of his day reveals not only a fundamental change but a grand elevation in the concept of God. His God would have a kingdom come and a Messiah to aid in it, but it would only be such a kingdom and such a Messiah as such a God would have.

While we are justified in saying that the source of Jesus' Messianic idea was his immediate experience of God, that immediate experience was not externally given but derived from his struggle for primary values of life. "What life teaches, God teaches," and it was his wholesome relation to the normal needs of men in their human affairs that both furnished and served to express his superior God consciousness, kingdom and Messianic ideas. As Höffding says, "A man draws his circle of ideas from his practical relations in the struggle for the primary values of life and his religious experiences find expression in these without the formation of entirely new ideas which would probably be an impossibility." His God was righteous, but the righteousness of such a God meant right human relations, and simple human affairs were sacred and

the holy concern of God. God was to him not a remote detached sovereign, but an interested brooding parent. His kingdom would be the sway of holiness in human relations, and not of sheer omnipotence in behalf of any race or people. His Messiah would be one that would be most useful in making all human relations wholesome and good, rather than one who would dazzle with supposed heavenly splendor and dominate in royal fashion. He would have to be such a Messiah because God was a God with just such a character and purpose.

Out of the plain honest grapple of his soul with the plain human facts of life, in a desperate struggle for the primary values his soul saw and embodied an ideal achieving spirit, saw and embodied God, which was the foundation not only of a new conception of the kingdom and of Messiah, but of a new kingdom and a new Messiah.

Here too is the basis of the almost constant controversies and misunderstandings between him and the Pharisees. Jesus was not the victim of wicked men, but of blind and bigoted minds. As he said, "They could not see." They had sought to do the law, rather than the human truth. Their God was a high priest interested in the temple and ritual requirements. His God was a father interested in his children, and their human needs. Differing thus fundamentally, we are not surprised at the frequent debates and conflicts, and their culmination in his death.

With such a God and such a kingdom as the Pharisees had in mind, they would naturally expect a Messiah, as a Davidic king or a spectacular personage doing marvelous things. With such a God, and such a kingdom as Jesus had in his mind and heart we would naturally expect such a Messiah as he was.

To them the kingdom would be chiefly national and political, with headquarters at Jerusalem, and the Messiah would be a national character and a nation subduer. To Jesus the kingdom would be more universal, largely ethical rather than political, and the Messiah would be a world redeemer and not a conqueror.



To them he must come panoplied with power and continually manifesting his supernaturalness in behalf of their release. To Jesus he should be like unto his brethren. He could grow weary and be surprised, anxious and exposed to the common lot of men. His idea was hence so different as to expose himself to their reproach. They thought it blasphemy for him to identify himself with this majestic figure. Of course they could not see in him their Messiah, for there was so little in him that in any way conformed either to their prophetic teaching or doctrinal speculations. Jesus was not the Jewish Messiah in the sense of fulfilling their Messianic scheme or schedule. They were right from their standpoint in refusing him. When we try to make Jesus an exact fulfilment of Old Testament prophecy or of Pharisaic dogmatics, we go into the face of facts. We try to assert what he actually was not, and what he never tried to be. The great trouble with the Jewish Messianic hope in the form which it assumed, is not that it is yet to be realized, but *can never be realized*. It is an impossible and preposterous expectation. *Their* Messiah will never come.

It is sometimes asked, why did Jesus dare to assume the Messianic title if he knew he could not meet the expectations that the name aroused? How could he expect them to believe in his Messiahship when it was so radically different?

He did not arrogate to himself the sacred title. Like every man in every age he had to use the categories of thought in use. We use the word government or Bible or God, even though we know by their use we have a different set of ideas from those who believe in a monarchy, a divine dictation or an avenger. Words, like men, have to be born again. Jesus made the word Messiah fit him rather than himself to fit it. He exploded and recreated the word. By doing God's will in the struggle for the primal values he was not, like the Pharisees, seeking to so punctiliously obey regulations as to induce God to reward their righteousness with the coming kingdom, but he was expressing already the kingdom morality. It was not an ethic to please God, but God's ethic. His habit was the

kingdom habit of action. It was not what must I do to be saved in the kingdom, but what will a kingdom man do. John the Baptist had revived a fading hope in the coming of the kingdom. Jesus accepted this hope, but he found he was not only a more hopeful herald, but a helper. The kingdom was not only immanent, ready to come in, but it was being expressed in anticipation by Jesus. Because he thus knew he was doing God's will, because he knew his morality was kingdom morality, he knew he was bringing the kingdom and was thus the Messiah. He fulfilled the title by filling it full of new meaning, and asserted his own right to act as judge upon what it should mean and in the kingdom he was bringing. He did not arrogate to himself a glorious title, but glorified with his own glory a word that expressed in spite of itself a truth too good to let perish.

We of this present age can learn here from Jesus in our modern struggle. Sometimes words and phrases in current use no longer express our religious convictions. Sometimes institutions seem to be hindrances rather than helps. What right have we to use these words or be related to these institutions? They, after all, express an abiding truth and can serve perhaps as the best medium for the new spirit we wish to infuse. Was Jesus' message in his day; can any message in any day be independent of the framework of that age? A man should not move out of the church because its doctrinal statements no longer express his convictions. The church may do with him what the Jews did to Jesus, but he has the privilege of giving old words a new meaning, and still retain those words that their spirit may still move among men. Religious phrases and institutions have a proneness to become detached from life and grow sterile. They must be redeemed and reunited vitally with life. This was part of Jesus' task, and it is ours.

However much the somewhat minute predictions of Jesus' death may reveal the viewpoint of writers after that event transpired, and however much he may have in his early life



expected a somewhat general and enthusiastic acceptance of his gospel and himself, it seems entirely evident that he soon saw that his people would not follow him, but he would arouse such opposition as would possibly lead to the worst. The cross not in clear outline but as a shadowy but awful possibility seemed to be always near him. He lived his life under it. Not long, if at all, did he expect his people to accept in any wholesale fashion his idea of the kingdom and himself as their Messiah. He was surprised when even a few seemed to catch the idea. He seemed to pity those who could not. He did not die of a heart broken by disappointment.

The Messiah of Jesus seemed such a dwarfed, puny, helpless thing in comparison with the majestic splendor of the traditional apocalyptic belief. His associates, his manner of living, made him almost ridiculous in the eyes of the authorities. They had no place for such facts in their idea. The only way it was at all tolerable even to the disciples was on the supposition that he was always on the verge of casting off this helplessness, this reserve, this weakness and at the next turn of the way would manifest marvelous power. They could not see anything Messianic! They could only hope he would be. But even if on one occasion one of them did seem to see a little clearer he soon spoiled the whole impression and showed how the old idea still clung by positively objecting to Jesus' statements about going to Jerusalem and meeting face to face the issue and its consequences. For a suffering Messiah they had absolutely no room. A dying Messiah was a ludicrous thought indicating a sort of insanity. It was a stumbling block to all the more thoughtful Jews, including Paul, to whom it was a terrible blasphemy, and his conversion was not so much ethico-religious as theological, from the doctrine of a non-suffering to a suffering Messiah. But in Jesus' idea it was the most natural element.

He started with a struggle for the primary values of life, against entrenched social and ecclesiastical tyranny. He felt the lot of common toil. He knew the power of monopoly in

the fish market. He once went with the family to the temple and saw his pet lamb killed as a sacrifice to God, and it made him feel the awful robbery of the poor and the travesty of such a belief that God wanted or delighted in such things. He got his gospel out of the heart of a great struggle. He praised the widow's mite, for he knew what that small coin meant in his own experience, and then he proceeded to demolish the whole system that exacted that coin in the name of God. Out of such experiences he would gather to himself the words of religion that would help him and his soul, and it was here that he must have clasped to his heart that beautiful and sublime passage in Isaiah in which in human terms and in a typically humanly good character, the expiatory value of the suffering of such a character, whether it be nation, remnant or individual, is expressed. He knew he had this character. He knew after awhile that he was expiating, removing sin by putting a new life in the wrongdoer through fellowship. He knew he was thus living God's life and the kingdom way, and therefore he was Messiah not in spite of but by very reason of his suffering. If to them suffering and Messiah were utterly incompatible terms, to Jesus they, out of actual experience, were utterly inseparable. Out of experience he knew the kingdom of good will comes only by good will suffering in behalf of ill will in seeking to make it good. He was not assured of his suffering through his Messiahship, but of his Messiahship through his suffering.

The death of Jesus, which to others meant the failure of a foolish movement and an unanswerable argument to all claims of Messiahship, was to him, though not always in clear terms, but in death-like grapple in the dark, the evidence of Messiahship. His death was certainly occasioned by his fundamental ideas and loyalty to them. But while he died heroically and will always be the hero's hero, yet he faced it with a sense that what he had been potentially, during life, by his death he would now become actually. His death would be his inauguration day when he would be actually what he had been ten-



tatively or potentially. It was not only the pathway of duty, but the pathway to power, and saviourhood.

As Jesus' kingdom idea was present in so far as it was evidenced by his deeds, and thus so near as to be already felt, yet was chiefly future, for he prayed "Thy Kingdom Come" not thy kingdom keep on coming, so his Messianic idea was a present reality only in so far as he was manifesting the kingdom kind of life and bringing the kingdom spirit in, but was chiefly a future fact yet to be gained.

Professor E. F. Scott in his book, "The Kingdom and the Messiah," says that Jesus believed his death would "(1) bring about the great transition, (2) break down the limitations about him, (3) mark the commencement of the final drama in which the Messiah will bear the central part. He believed his death was his baptism to the Messianic office, and a decisive episode in the Messianic period."

If this expresses Jesus' view of his death in this particular, it indicates that, notwithstanding his radical departure from his contemporaries, he still was much under the influence of the old apocalyptic notion. While his idea of the kingdom and the Messiah was different, yet its operation, though deferred till after his death, was to be somewhat after the old national type, for nowhere do we have any trace of how his investiture with complete Messianic powers was to take place or to be expressed other than in apocalyptic terms.

Just what Jesus' own idea at this point was there seems to be no way of accurately telling. It is doubtful if it was as distinctively apocalyptic as is often supposed.

However, his disciples and the first preachers were saturated with the old Jewish Messianic idea. They never got far away from it. Peter's preaching was not an exposition of the spirit of the sermon on the mount or of the good samaritan, but an effort to prove that Jesus was the Jewish Messiah. The writers of the New Testament quote passages from the Old Testament entirely out of their context and give them a meaning they were never intended to have in order to prove their

case (*e. g.*, I will call my son out of Egypt, was used as a prediction of Jesus' escape from Herod when in the Old Testament it meant no such prediction whatever). We may deplore and feel a stupendous loss in this departure from preaching Jesus' faith to faith in Jesus as Messiah, from spirit to apologetics, but it was done and perhaps was necessary. Just as it is difficult for us to see how Jesus could have looked upon his death other than as a miserable defeat except in the cosmic terms of the Messianic system, so it is difficult to see how the new movement could have survived or have been more than a local sect had it not been taken up in the categories of the old Messianism. This was not only the swaddling clothes, but the mighty body which stood before the Jew and went before Greece and Rome in supernal splendor.

The whole series of beliefs about the second coming of Jesus, with which St. Paul was saturated, is but a rebaptizing of the old Jewish Messianism with a Christian name. They drew the equation, which was not true except in the most modified form, that Jesus is the Jewish Messiah and at once fitted him into the elaborate system. As the doctrine of the Old Testament prophets of a mighty king establishing his kingdom at Jerusalem kept the flame of hope burning through the long nights of despair, though it was an illusion and never came true; so the newer form of the same doctrine, the second coming of Jesus kept the hearts of the first Christians brave in the midst of those desperate days, though it too was largely a brain fabric. Is our so-called undoubted Christian faith any nearer reality? Might not much of it be our doubtful Christian knowledge? How much of it is symbol and how much real? Has the spirit been lost or choked to death? But who would not rather meet God even in a dream than not to meet him at all.

The doctrine of Messianic hope, both in Jewish and Christian form, was not an unmixed good. Its false expectations made sceptics and produced the mistaken convictions that killed Jesus. The second coming doctrine created an end



ethics, a little communistic scheme that failed and furnished the occasion for hard-headed men like Ananias to lie. It has helped to keep religion an unearthly and other-worldly affair with blessings to be externally secured by miraculous and supernatural activities. It has supported ecclesiastical domination and religious isolation. It has obscured Jesus, and made one of the religious burdens of the ages to be the rescue of Christ from Christianity. Those marvelous pictures in the book of Revelation of a bloody arch power trampling over foes and reveling in carnage are a vivid restatement of Jewish Messianism, but a miserable misunderstanding of Jesus which has helped to color the Christian horizon blood red down the centuries. Did Jesus ever think of himself thus? He took the title Messiah not as a mere matter of accommodation, but from necessity, but he broke its traditional bounds and made the title fit him. His idea was primarily ethical rather than political, universal not exclusively national, redemptive not restorative, saving from wrong not protecting from foes, manifesting God in human service, not in lording it over them, bringing men to God not to Jerusalem.

That for which mankind longs, that which Israel tried to express even though in national and fantastic terms, that which we seek to express in our Christologies may not be true to the actual Christ, may indeed be untrue but as we know Jesus the Messiah was, though different, yet greater and grander than the Jewish Messiah, so we believe Jesus the Christ is greater and grander than any Christology yet written or conceived.

CARLISLE, PA.

## II.

### THE AIM OF THE SERMON.

ROBERT F. REED.

The sermon's place in the church service is secure and permanent. It would be just as easy to think of such a service with prayer left out as to think of it with no sermon. Of course prayer has a fixed place in the normal service in the sanctuary. But the sermon has come to be no less an essential element of worship in the Lord's house.

But then there are sermons and sermons. They are not all of equal value. Some are good. You feel it. You are certain that they have been a blessing and will continue to be of help to you in the days and weeks to come. They give tone and color to the whole of life. They contain spiritual pabulum. The worshipper comes away from the church where he heard them resolved to lead a different life. He recognizes a value in his fellowman such as before he failed to appreciate. He has a new vision. Literally, he sees matters in a new light. Life now, whatever may have been the case formerly, is really worth while. Both God and men have come closer to him. Of other sermons the most charitable thing to be thought or said is that they are of no real value. People leave church as they went. Not altogether, either. They are just a little dissatisfied with themselves for having spent an hour in a place where they got nothing in return, at least nothing from the sermon in the way of helpfulness.

A minister need not be in the work very long before he comes to know that his sermons are not alike in value. At one time he preaches well: a really helpful sermon. He somehow knows that his message means something to men. The truth he proclaims is vital. He is aware of the fact that it lays hold



of men's hearts and consciences. He feels certain that it does them good. Neither is he mistaken in his view of the matter. On another occasion, for no very clear reason, he preaches, just preaches. The message does not grip men. It seems to have no effect upon them. The sermon appears to be nothing more than so many words, perhaps never so well arranged. But from all appearances it accomplishes very little.

Why this difference? What makes the one sermon good and helpful and the other not? What element in the sermon differentiates one from another? And it matters little whether the two sermons come from two different ministers or whether they come from the same minister on two different occasions.

Certainly the difference is not a question of entertainment. The sermon is not supposed to be and need not be entertaining in the same manner in which, for example, a lecture or recital of some kind or a play, is entertaining. The church of Christ is not in competition with the nicklette. True, some people come to the house of God to be amused. They institute a comparison between the sermon they hear on Sunday and the humorous lecture they attend occasionally during the week. But such people err. Indeed they are not properly qualified to judge a sermon. And the fact that after a time they no longer come to church service is more of a reflection on their own spiritual life than on the ability or talent of the preacher who earnestly tries to discharge the duties that devolve upon him as the Lord's messenger.

Nor again is the difference due primarily to the fact that the one sermon is educational and the other not. The work of educating people belongs mainly to the various schools: week day schools of all descriptions and the Sunday school. True, the sermon usually has an educational factor in it. There is hardly a sermon preached that does not contain at least a little something pertaining to the life of the people of God, either of God in his relation to men, or of men in their relation to one another, that comes as helpful news to some people in the congregation. But granting this, it is nevertheless a fact that we

hear many a sermon that contains nothing in the way of information, nothing new, for us, and yet it proves very helpful. Therefore we conclude that the educational element in the sermon is not the one of first importance.

However let me not be misunderstood. While neither the element of entertainment nor that of education is of the very first significance in relation to the sermon it does not follow by any means that either of them ought to be wholly excluded. A sermon may in some ways be both entertaining and instructive. The worshipper may be very much interested in the sermon and may learn not a little from it. But he certainly does not come to church chiefly to be amused or instructed. He seeks something else. Why then does he come? What is that additional element that makes the sermon helpful?

Let us look at the genesis of the preaching function. What very likely was the end of the first sermon ever preached? What was the aim of the first preacher? What did he want to bring about? Was it not a change of heart or mind on the part of his hearer or hearers? No doubt he wanted men to feel that they no longer ought to do certain things; or perhaps that they ought immediately do certain other things. Furthermore he was very much concerned that men should be made to realize that they would be able, if only they were to make the attempt, to strike out along the path he then pointed out to them. He was anxious to have the people whom he addressed view life together with all its interests after the manner in which it becomes the privilege of the people of God to look upon these matters. His desire was to supply them with spiritual food; place it before them; tell them where to obtain it, or lead them to the place where they could find it for themselves. Whether it was Noah or not, the first preacher and every one since, true to his calling, was bent upon giving men the conviction that conduct unbecoming to them as men ought to be done away with, and on the other hand, that the affairs of life that always are to man's credit ought to be magnified by them. In other words, the preacher of all ages tries to



bring about a quickening effect upon the hearer. The sermon ought to be stimulating, edifying, inspirational. The end of the sermon, therefore, is neither entertainment, nor is it education, but it is edification.

To bring this about it is not enough that the sermon be preached. If there is any desire on the part of the preacher to produce results in relation to his hearers it is of course essential that he reach them. The gospel must be made to appeal to men and women. It must find them. It needs to be modern and adapted to all classes of people, young and old, cultured and not cultured. The sermon must have what Ian Maclaren terms the canon of humanity.

While the people that from time to time appear before the minister as he arises in the pulpit to proclaim the word of God represent all stages of religious growth, bear very many different attitudes to God and the eternal verities, some of them dwelling at home while others are sojourning in the far country and still others are loitering along the way at almost all points between the far country and the father's house, nevertheless, the sermon is intended, broadly speaking, for two classes of people. Every congregation is composed of either saints or sinners. As a rule of both, in various proportions. The men and women who listen to the sermon are, on the one hand, either penitent sinners, persevering Christians, coming saints; or, on the other hand, they are reckless transgressors, impenitent evil doers, proud sinners. The worshipper is either penitent or impenitent. At one time when at church he may be penitent, at another, not. No doubt in every assembled congregation, the saints are in the majority. For the impenitent sinner does not habitually seek the house of God. The atmosphere of the sanctuary is not to his liking. Of course, religion is of great value. Even men of the world recognize this fact. And, therefore, now and then, there are those who pretend to have it who yet are utter strangers to the genuine article. Hence not all who seem to worship are sincere, and their presence at the service in the temple does not

necessarily indicate that they really seek help from God. There are modern hypocrites. To be sure, we have this product, as so many others, in an up-to-date form. But no matter, after all, what is the proportion of sinners to saints, we may be certain that the two classes are represented in practically every congregation.

Since this is the case, it is self-evident that both classes are to be reached and helped by the sermon. Both of them need to be kept in mind by the minister in the preparation and the preaching of the sermon. Nevertheless, it is not necessary that every sermon should be directed to both sinner and saint. It may be expedient at times to have in mind the one class almost exclusively. For the sermon that is adapted to the sinner is not very likely to be of great help to the saint. Nor again is the sermon that is of help to the saint very often likely to be of equal help to the sinner. But, after all, it is very important for the conscientious servant of the Lord who would minister efficiently unto both classes to remember that neither the one nor the other may safely be overlooked, or neglected, for any long period of time.

The sinner ought to be told in one form or another that he need not remain a sinner; that he is capable of a life of a much higher order than that in which sin predominates; that there is forgiveness for him; that what he needs to do is to come to himself and make up his mind to return to his father's house, for there his sins will no longer be remembered against him; that God, his loving Father, is ready, and longs to share with him the blessings of the kingdom. This is what we designate as the positive side of the gospel for the sinner. This positive element was very marked in the case of our Saviour's work.

The negative side comes to view in the warning that needs to be sounded at least occasionally. If men refuse to repent in spite of all the gracious invitations that are extended unto them in the name of their Father, who is not willing that any should perish, but who desires all to come to a knowledge of salvation as it is in Jesus Christ, then there is nothing left



for the minister of the same God and Father to do but to tell them of the end of such a career: to remind them of the fact that it is dangerous to remain impenitent sinners. For God is not only a merciful God but He is also a just God. And He cannot, even He cannot, save men against their own wills. The father could not keep the son at home contrary to his will, nor get him to return until he came to himself and decided to come home. And, therefore, it certainly becomes the duty of the Lord's Messenger to sound a note of warning, so that men may not ignorantly waste their time upon the things that have as their issue death. Of course, it is well to remember that it may not be open wickedness so much as spiritual indifference that keeps men fettered to a life of sin. But even though it is nothing but indifference, after all, it is the business of the minister of the gospel to rouse men who have become careless: for there is danger that such indifference may become callous. And, if they fail to respond to the positive appeal of the gospel, then certainly he, too, like his Master, ought to remind them of the disastrous consequences of their choice.

On the other hand, the treatment the saint, the growing child of God, calls for is very different. He, too, still has very much to do with sin. That is, sin is still a very real factor of his life. But there is this difference. He is not in accord with the powers of sin. He is genuinely sorry that sin has such a hold on him. He recognizes it as an evil to be conquered. He seeks to overcome it more and more and looks for help that will enable him to be more than conqueror. In short, he looks upon himself as one who has as yet not attained the goal of his life, but also as one who is constantly striving to gain the mastery and feels that, little by little, if he perseveres, with the help of God he will ultimately succeed. What such a one needs is illumination and encouragement: the saint's assurance that heaven's approval rests upon him and his efforts. One who is thus minded ought to be sent away from the house of God with the conviction that, if he keeps on, by

the grace of God he cannot fail. In some way, he must be made to feel that while the forces that are arrayed against him are many and subtle, after all, the powers that are at his command are far superior to those opposed to him, and that, therefore, in the end, the victory will be his. And the sermon fails, so far as this class of people is concerned, if it does not provide help for them. It must present unto them a way of life better than that of faltering which opens unto all who are earnest and sincere seekers after God. It must send them forth with their hearts filled with a hope and courage that will issue in a more Christ-like life.

And I am confident that our sermons should have this note of helpfulness more frequently than any other. The people who, as a rule, come to the house of God are in earnest and sincerely try to live aright and, therefore, they are in need of spiritual enlightenment or encouragement, generally, of both, and it is the privilege of the minister of the word, in some way, to be of help to them in their effort to be and do better.

It goes without saying that the sermon should be so related to the people who hear it that it will not only touch, but move, as well, their hearts and consciences. It ought to apply to them: be of value to them in relation to their own peculiar needs. It must be practical, even concrete rather than abstract, modern, dealing with facts that grip the heart and mind. Yet it is not the aim of the sermon to point out every sin that is brought to the attention of the preacher. The minister of the word manifests decidedly poor taste, and gives evidence of no tact at all, if he makes a public example of some one among his hearers of whose sinful acts he happens to have knowledge, or, at least, supposed knowledge. The sermon ought not afford occasion to any one to detect a personal attack. It is true that the prophet of the Old Testament appeared before the King and said: "Thou art the man." But it is well to recall in this connection that the accusation was made not from the pulpit but at a private interview. And it may become the exceedingly unpleasant duty of the man of



God, in private, to admonish some one of his flock now and then. But, certainly, nothing will be gained by singling out any one in the congregation and going rough-shod over him: "giving it to him," as they say.

So far as the sinner, the indifferent, reckless child of God, is concerned the sermon ought to point out clearly the exceeding sinfulness of sin; leave no doubt in his mind of the fact that God is wronged by him; declare so unmistakably the dire consequences of sin as to convince even the most hardened among sinners that it is wholly unprofitable to dabble in sin. The sermon ought to do this so earnestly, with so much reason, so persuasively, that all impenitent sinners may at least know that it does not pay to sin, and if at all possible, that they may be made to feel very uncomfortable under the preaching as they come to make the application, as they must, to their own particular sin whatever it may be. It ought to result in the conviction that wrong is wrong at all times and everywhere. It must create a desire within men to fight sin as their worst enemy; beget in their hearts a genuine hatred for iniquity. And when this course is followed no needless offense is given in that no one is made a public example. Yet no matter what specific sin on the part of any one may need attention, whether open or secret, the cure for it is at hand, inasmuch as every one will feel as though the sermon was addressed to him, as in a very real sense, it also was. According to Jowett, "our messages must be related to life, to lives, and we must make everybody feels that our key fits the lock of his own private door."

And the same sermonic principle obtains in relation to those who are earnestly trying to do their part as God's people. It is not good taste, neither is it very helpful, to single out any one individual in the congregation, to direct one's remarks to any one person so bluntly, that the fact is observed by the congregation generally. Perhaps there may be one here or there in the congregation whom the minister desires very much to reach in a word of comfort, approval, or encouragement. Very

seldom do we as ministers address an assembly of men and women among whom, for example, there are not at least a few whose hearts long for comfort. We recall in this relation the declaration of Ian Maclaren, made toward the close of his life, that if he were to begin his ministry again, he would, among other things, preach a more comforting gospel. The preacher may know of some one here or there in the congregation who is putting up a brave fight in the battle against sin. The victory is as yet not his. The minister feels confident that he will win out in the end. He longs to help him in his conquest for the right. He ought to. He desires to speak a word of encouragement. He wants to give him his approval. He wants him to know that he has God's approval. But if he fails to exercise judgment, he will do more harm than good, and in his very effort to be of help to him he simply makes it still more difficult for him to carry off the victory.

Let the sermon present God, as revealed in the life and character of Jesus Christ, so lovingly, so sympathetically, and as One so deeply interested in his children at all times, and especially so, when in need of his help, that every one hearing the message of his servant will at once know God as bearing this helpful relation to him personally, and therefore, will leave the service, either penitent, or else comforted, encouraged or enlightened, as he may have need of the one or the other.

I do not want to be understood as claiming that the sermon ought to deal in generalities, even though they be glittering ones. Impersonal platitudes, dull commonplaces, wherever else they may be of value, do not enhance the utility of the practical sermon. Yet the sermon certainly ought to be built upon principles, personal principles resting upon and growing out of the life of Christ, our Saviour, in their relation to the facts of the lives of ordinary men, as they are, and more especially as they ought to be. The sermon that is really helpful must be prepared with a view of the needs of a definite congregation in mind, and, therefore, it cannot as a rule be preached to another people until it has at least to some extent been modified



and adapted to the peculiar needs of that other people. The sermon does not view life upon so broad a basis as to volatilize, or thin out its message into meaningless, wearisome generalizations. But it has in mind that portion of life represented in the congregation to whom it is addressed, and presents principles of conduct that may be put into practice by the people immediately concerned. "The sermon must be a proclamation of truth as vitally related to living men and women." A reference to the sermons of the great preachers of the world of all ages illustrates this fact. They fall back on deep, first principles. When we look at the gospel of our Lord, we see, as we naturally would anticipate, that his utterances, too, rest on the solid rock of life principles. "The Master's teaching is neither ancient nor modern, neither deductive nor inductive, neither Jewish nor Greek. It is universal, enduring, valid for all minds and for all times." Yet it is not impersonal. It has the personal touch. He even protested on one occasion when he was asked to go beyond the proclamation of broad, basic principles. A certain man, who could not agree with his brother as to his part of the family inheritance, came to Jesus and asked him to speak to his brother to the end that he divide the inheritance with him. But Jesus said unto him, "Man, who made me a judge or a divider among you?" and forthwith proceeded to give him a talk on the greed of covetousness. That is, the Saviour knew well enough that if he could get the man before him to see the sin of covetousness, so far as he was concerned, the matter of dividing the inheritance between him and his brother would be rightly attended to. It is not the business of the minister to tell his people in so many words how they are to adjust the affairs of their family life; nor how they are to regulate the doings of their social life; nor, again, how they are to conduct their business matters. Certainly it is his duty to hold out principles of action as exemplified more especially in the person of our Saviour in relation to all the avenues of life that they may be called upon to take; principles that they may make use of and that will be of help to them at



all times, whether at home, in society, or in the business world. It is his privilege to enlighten them to such an extent with the light of the gospel, present the eternal truths of the gospel of the Christ in their application to the children of God so clearly, that they must see their beauty and value as bearing upon their daily life in such a manner that they feel encouraged immediately to go forth and seek to put them into practice. It may become the duty of the members of a congregation as individuals, or united into a group of some kind, occasionally to array themselves against some definite form of evil at large in the community. The minister of God interested in the highest welfare of mankind may not have occasion to frown upon the present-day tendency toward what is known as social service. He may approve of it and even assist in launching the movement. But after all his primary duty is to preach the gospel as effectively as he knows how, and then let the truth of God work itself out in a practical way, first among his people, and afterwards, through them, in society, generally. After the sermon has done its part, the holy spirit with the aid of the quickened conscience may safely be relied upon to do the rest. Therefore, it does not necessarily follow that since the preacher does not mention by name this or that evil rampant in the community that he is indifferent in regard to a matter that others, who are in the fight against it, claim ought to have his attention. After he has made clear to his people the gospel of God in its vital relation to them, they must of their own accord go after this or that special form of wickedness. The sermon ought to help men know the right: be instrumental in creating a passion for righteousness. But, as a rule, the people must then be left to themselves so far as the specific application is concerned. The sermon is not the machinery that under the guiding hand of the skillful operator turns out the finished product, but it is rather the power that drives the machine, and others as well, and thus enables the mechanic to produce the article ready for the market.

It is the aim of the sermon to help in the making of men



and women after God's own eternal plan—men and women of Christian character who are resolved to do only what is becoming to the children of God—then let them use their own judgment as to whether it is to be this special work as over against that, or that as over against this. It is the aim of the sermon to help make Christians and then let those Christians decide for themselves whether they want to be Christians in this place or in that place, doing this or doing that. "Christianity is a spirit—it is a set of principles, and not a set of rules."

Let me illustrate my contention. Let us examine the principle I advocate in connection with the grace of giving. It is not so much the end of the sermon, bearing upon this feature of the Christian life, to get men to give of their means to any one object as it is to cultivate the spirit of Christian charity, and then let them select one or more causes from among the many that have a claim upon men. The apportionment has come to have a prominent place in our denominational life. Our work at home and abroad is largely dependent upon the unanimity with which our people enter upon our common task in this connection. We fully believe that the money applied to the apportionment on the part of our congregations is well spent: is employed to carry on God's work in behalf of his children. And it is well if we can get our people to see matters in such a light that they feel themselves under obligations to help raise the apportionment, if they are not able to count it a privilege to do so. As a denomination, we would have a foretaste of Paradise if the entire apportionment were to be paid. But, after all, the aim of the sermon touching upon this matter is much broader than simply to get people to help pay the apportionment. It is certainly to cultivate the grace of Christian liberality. If we can get our people to see their privileges in relation to the unsaved at home and abroad, then we can rest assured that the apportionment will come to be viewed as but a small part of their work along the line of giving. Certainly, after the sermon has been preached setting forth the beauty of sharing one's possessions with others, it may be essential for

a minister of the Reformed Church, with our system of benevolence, to direct his people's attention to the apportionment as a channel, and even an important one, along which they may exercise Christian liberality. But, after all, full grown men should be permitted to use their own enlightened judgment in the matter. I am quite certain that some members of the Reformed Church help pay the apportionment, not because the grace of charity has to that extent been developed in them, but largely because the subject has been presented to them in such a light by their pastor that they help in the work, and give what they give, as a favor to him. Something, to be sure, has been gained when such is the case, but, undoubtedly, men are agreed that the aim of the sermon relating to the specific matter of giving is not primarily to get the apportionment paid, but rather to cultivate the charitable spirit, which then when unfolded will result in the payment of much more than the apportionment—the minimum of our congregational effort in behalf of others.

The object of the sermon, then, as I see it, is to picture God in such a light to both sinner and saint, whether represented in the same person or in two different persons, that men cannot help but be glad to know that He is their heavenly father; God's love, so helpfully, that men's hearts will be won to him; his interest in men, so earnestly, that they must rejoice to know his will for them in order that they may do it; the value of Christ as a safe leader of men, so convincingly, that men will be glad to accept him as their Saviour and follow him as he bids them; the advantages of the kingdom, so clearly, that men will be made to see that they cannot afford to deprive themselves of them; the exalted position of the child of God in relation to his father as a member of the kingdom, so vividly, that no man can well refrain from coming and offering his heart, his life, himself unto God. It is the aim of the sermon to portray the relation that the child of the kingdom bears to his fellowmen in such a true and correct gospel color that men who hear the story simply cannot help but feel mean



so long as they stand related to men in any other light, and hence at least make an honest effort to love their fellowmen; paint the positive life of the Christian in such a strong light that men will not rest contented until they have made an attempt to get rid of all that mars the picture thus sketched; present the eternal principles of the Master, so persuasively, so consistently, that they justify themselves as the basis and standard of the only life worth while. It is the object of the sermon to help men see that appearances do not count very much in the kingdom of God, however much weight they may have at times with men of the world; to make men feel that wrong is wrong no matter by whom it is done, in the home or on the street, at play or at work; to get them to know beyond all doubt that right is right, at all times, under all circumstances, the world over.

The sermon serves its purpose well when the man back of it enters sympathetically into the real life of the members of his congregation; knows of their cares, needs, doubts, and sins; is not unmindful, on the one hand, of the poverty of their faith and love; nor, on the other, does he permit himself to forget the depth of their inmost longing for better things, even though this longing does not always come to a full, conscious expression on their part. Thus he lifts them upon the high plane of the gospel of their Saviour and brings them face to face with God as their never-failing Helper, and, in the end, is able to send them to their various stations in life with renewed hope and fresh courage. This is what he should do for his people. For there can be no question that the sermon is to put heart into men and women, in order that they may be able to cope with the affairs of their everyday life. Like the Master himself, the gospel sermon is come that men might have life, and that they might have it more abundantly.

The sermon is to be of help to men, indirectly: in finding their place in the world; in enabling them to learn what specific work they are to do. The sermon is to be of help to men, directly: in filling them with a strong determination to

take their place, whatever it may be, as God's children; in doing their appointed tasks in a manner becoming to them as members of God's kingdom. Largely, if not primarily, I should say, the sermon is to be quickening, inspirational.

FREEMANSBURG, PA.



### III.

## TRUTH.<sup>1</sup>

N. C. SCHAEFFER.

If an inhabitant of Mars could visit our planet and listen to the discussions on industrial education, he would be tempted to think that the grand aim and purpose of mundane education might be displayed by putting above the entrance to the school house, in letters of electric light, the word *Money*. We have schoolmen who hold the almighty dollar so close to their eyes that they see nothing else in God's universe. Branches of study like history they propose to exclude from the curriculum of the modern school because they do not see how such studies can help the boy to solve the problem of earning a livelihood. The great Teacher says that man shall not live by bread alone. Instead of placing the word money above the door of the school house I would substitute another word of five letters—*Truth*.

Truth is more than knowledge, although the latter is the more comprehensive term. Knowledge may abide in the mind as a mere matter of intellect and exert little or no influence upon life and conduct. Truth always goes deeper than the intellect. It touches the heart out of which are the issues of life. Hence the best teachers of every age and clime have regarded truth as the pearl of great price which should be sought and valued above everything else. Pythagoras cherished so high an estimate of truth that he said if the Deity should make himself visible to man, he would choose light for his body and truth for his soul. In the book of Proverbs we find this admonition: "Buy the truth and sell it not, yea wisdom, instruction, and understanding."

<sup>1</sup> A commencement address by Dr. N. C. Schaeffer, Superintendent of Public Instruction in Pennsylvania.

Since a proverb is the summing up of the wisdom of the many through the wit of one, it is always helpful to meditate upon the wealth of meaning hidden in proverbs. Does the author of proverbs mean to say that truth can be got in exchange for money? Does he mean to intimate that truth can be inherited as we inherit money? Without doubt the human race is the heir of all the ages in the possession of truth and in its application to the arts and industries. Moreover we often get the benefit of an expert's knowledge of truth by paying for his services. But the expert acquired his mastery of the truth only as the result of painstaking effort and study. And there is no other way by which truth can be acquired and mastered.

The Hebrew unit of value was the shekel. Like our dollar it stood for labor, exertion, effort of some kind by somebody. Money is the measure of the value of the effort which some one has put forth. Many things which are essential to our existence come to us as a free gift, *e. g.*, the light and heat of the sun, the showers of rain from the clouds, and the pure, fresh air that we breathe. Truth does not come to us in that way. A modern commentator interprets the proverb to mean three things:

1. The truth must be bought—it costs.
2. The truth is worth all it costs.
3. Although the truth is worth so much, it is sometimes sold.

Euclid, whose name is synonymous with geometry, was right when he told his royal pupil: "There is no royal road to geometry." Mathematical truth can be grasped and mastered in one way only—that is, by close and laborious thinking. It can never be acquired by memorizing, nor by coaching, nor by loafing. The acquisition and the mastery of all types of truth involve diligent search and investigation.

Did you ever think of the word laboratory as indicative of what is involved in the quest of truth, yea in all scientific research and investigation? Did you ever see in a doctor's



office the picture of Andreas Vesalius, standing beside a dissecting table. Could you help thinking of the persecutions, the exile, the patient labor in hidden and pestilential places which he had to undergo in his career as the founder of the science of anatomy? History is full of the tales of heroic effort and sacrifice which the quest of truth has cost the martyrs of science.

But the truth is worth all it costs. We sometimes say that a man running for office puts himself into the hands of his friends. If you have ever stretched yourself upon the surgeon's table, you have put yourself into the hands of your friends as no politician ever did.

And if after going down to the brink of the grave, the surgeon's knife has brought you back to health and strength, you have realized that the scientific truth discovered by Vesalius and others is worth all it cost. Scientific truth has revolutionized the arts, the industries, the warfare of modern times. Science is transforming the conduct of business, the processes of manufacture, the methods of mining, the activities of commerce, the practice of the professions, the education of children.

At this point we get a glimpse of the difference between the elementary school and the high school, between the high school and the university. In the elementary school we must generally be satisfied if the pupil learns the processes and grasps the *how* without mastering the *why*. In the high school he is expected to penetrate beneath the surface and to discern the relations which are scientific. What is science? Science is the knowledge of things in their causes and essential relations. The high school teacher must get the pupils to pass from cause to effect, from reason to consequence, from law to its application. The university professor must go still further. He must train the mind in the habits of thought which lie at the foundation of scientific research and discovery. It is the function of the university not merely to preserve and transmit truth, but to enlarge the boundaries of science, to promote the

quest of truth for its own sake and to apply it for the uplift of humanity.

But the strangest thing about the truth still remains to be emphasized. Although truth is worth so much, it is sometimes sold. Judas sold his Lord and Master for thirty pieces of silver. In modern times we often sell the truth for less than that. "Where is that ribbon we were selling at five cents a yard," asked the sales-lady of the floor-walker. "Over on the bargain counter, selling at six cents a yard," was the reply. In that department store they were selling the truth at a cent a yard. Sometimes the truth is sold for a vote, for a smile, for a mere monetary advantage. Here we should without doubt draw a distinction for the purpose of enlarging and clarifying our vision. Perhaps the distinction can best be made clear by a story which deeply impressed me in my boyhood. An elderly gentleman told me of two friends who had many things in common but on one point they could not agree. One of them was a great student of nature and nature's laws; but his soul never rose from nature up to nature's God. The other was likewise a great student of nature, but his chief delight was in the truth as it is in Jesus. One Christmas he received a present of a wonderful clock. He showed it to his friend who admired its mechanism, whereupon the Biblical student said: "I have not told you the most wonderful thing about that clock. It came into being by chance. It never had a maker." "You do not expect me to believe such nonsense," said the scientist. "And yet you expect me to believe that this Universe which is far more wonderful than a clock, never had a Maker or Creator," was the reply.

There are two great realms of truth—one the realm of truth as revealed in nature—the other the domain of truth as found in Revelation. A Latin proverb says that all truth is from God. Hence there can be no contradiction in the two types of truth, not in the essence, only in our comprehension of truth. Both types of truth may be sold by neglect. "What is truth,"



exclaimed Pontius Pilate and then turned away in despair without waiting for an answer. The human mind and the human heart often turn away from the source and fountain of truth by reason of pre-possessions and pre-conceived notions. Think of the vagaries of anti-vaccinationists and of the devotees of christian science. At the time of Harvey's death not twenty physicians had accepted his discovery of the circulation of the blood. At the time of Newton's death comparatively few scholars had accepted the theory of gravitation. How many still refuse to accept the truths of the higher criticism or the truths which Darwin brought to light by his patient investigations! However this is not our main trouble to-day. In this age we have almost become the dupes of credulity by reason of the wonderful things which science has achieved. The neglect of truth is not most flagrant in what is known as science but in the domain of ethics and politics. I said at the beginning that truth touches the heart out of which are the issues of life. When truth passes over into speech it becomes veracity or truthfulness. The worst insult you can offer to another, is to call him a member of the Ananias Club. The liar knowingly and willingly violates the virtue of veracity. When truth passes over into life, and conduct, it gives us true men and true women.

This brings us to the secret of success in teaching. Only he who lives the truth, can teach it with masterly effect. The transformation of knowledge into a harvest of new thought, sentiment and purpose becomes possible under the guidance of the teacher only when the truth has touched his heart, filled his soul and permeated his whole mind and life and conduct. The poet has well said:

Thou must thyself be true  
If thou the truth wouldst teach.  
Thy soul must o'erflow if thou  
Another's soul wouldst reach.  
It needs the heart's o'erflow

To give the lips full speech.  
Think truly and thy thought  
Shall the world's famine feed.  
Speak truly and every word  
Shall be a fruitful seed.  
Live truly and thy life  
Shall be a noble creed.

LANCASTER, PA.



## IV.

### THE NEWER ORTHODOXY.

PAUL B. RUPP.

In the preface to a small monograph<sup>1</sup> published a generation ago, we find this striking contrast: "By orthodoxy I would mean the continuous historical development of the doctrine of Jesus and his apostles; and the orthodox habit and temper of mind I would consider simply to be fidelity to the teachings of the Spirit of Truth throughout Christian history, as the things of Christ have been witnessed to the church in its great confessions, and as the words of the Lord are still opening their meanings under new providential lights, in the enlarging thought of the Christian world. Orthodoxism, on the other hand, is the dogmatic stagnation and ecclesiastical abuse of orthodoxy. Orthodoxism is an orthodoxy which has ceased to grow—a dried and brittle orthodoxy." Unfortunately this distinction has seldom been observed, and the two ideas have been used interchangeably. Orthodoxy is commonly regarded as harmony with the general teaching of the contemporary church, though it is a somewhat difficult matter for even the most orthodox churchmen to give an intelligent account of the precise teaching of the church. We are informed by the old school Romanist<sup>2</sup> that the dogmatic and ecclesiastical systems were originally given *in toto* by Christ to the apostles, and by them to their successors. Moreover, the substance of even the conciliar decrees was proclaimed by the Master. On the other hand we are greeted by the traditional Protestant conception that Christianity in its ideal form is to be found in the scriptures; that it was per-

<sup>1</sup> Smythe, "The Orthodox Theology of To-day," 1881, p. vii.

<sup>2</sup> Hastings, "Ency. of R. and E.," Vol. III, p. 586.

verted by the later Roman church, and that the Reformation was a return to the apostolic type of faith. But the former view, as we shall see, fastens upon Christian teaching a fixed content which psychologically it can not possess; while the latter would confer upon first century Christianity a permanent form which historical investigation will not be willing to grant.<sup>3</sup> Christianity, either as embodying static dogmatic concepts, or as bound unalterably to a primitive form, would be little better than a curious relic, worthy of a place in some museum of religious antiquities.

But Christian doctrine is neither so unchangeable nor so lifeless. There is resident in it an accommodating power which enables it to vindicate itself to the inquiring mind of every generation. We may, with Smythe, regard it as the result of "an historical development of the doctrine of Jesus and his apostles"; or we may, with many of the sects, consider it merely an excrescence upon the primitive apostolic faith; but in either case, its formulation has undergone a distinct course of development during the centuries, while Truth itself has remained the unchanging and underlying reality of all creedal statements.<sup>4</sup> It is only symbols and forms of thought which change, as the powers of the mind and the spiritual intuitions expand through successive generations. Thus one age sees rather clearly what a former merely glimpsed.

Just here we must remember in the first place, that truth is not identical with our statement of it. It was the neglect of this distinction which was responsible for the rise of that "dried and brittle orthodoxy" of which Smythe speaks. Our minds are unable to grasp truth in its absolute sense, for truth is infinite,—and we are not ready as yet to grant infinitude to humans. But therein lies the crux of the whole problem of orthodoxy. The derivation of the term is etymologically clear,—“thinking right” or “straight”—but its practical ap-

<sup>3</sup> Faunce, "The Educational Ideal of the Ministry," 1908, p. 55 ff.

<sup>4</sup> *The Outlook*, March 3, 1915, art. "In Lent."

Smith, "Social Idealism and the Changing Theology," 1913, p. 187.



plication is not so evident. We are all frank to admit that right thinking is fundamental in the Christian faith, but we are not all quite sure what *is* right thinking, nor even what is the Christian faith. For example, in his definition of Christianity<sup>5</sup> A. E. Garvie says it is a religion in which the relation of God and man is mediated by the person and work of Jesus. But by another<sup>6</sup> it is defined simply as "Christ, so far as he has yet become incarnate in humanity." By a third<sup>7</sup> the Christian principle is described as "the intuition of God as Father and of humanity as His children." The social reformer gives a social coloring to his definition, making it little more than a message of hope to the downtrodden and oppressed, and the knell of doom to a false capitalistic system. The philosophical idealist sees in Christianity the end of the process by which the Infinite reveals itself to the finite.<sup>8</sup> Here are five definitions of the same idea, and each has a large measure of truth in it; but not one adequately describes the whole truth which is tied up in the term Christianity. For truth is greater than any definition of it; we lose some of its substance when we attempt to compress it within the necessary limits of word-forms. Thus, "right-thinking," while it aims by a series of logical processes at a clear presentation of that which is obscure, or at co-ordinating various elements into a well-rounded system, is able to arrive at a conclusion which is only an approximation of the truth. This purely partial character of our conclusions, however, does not forbid the act of belief, when all possible evidence has been submitted in the course of the argument.<sup>9</sup> For an approximation is sufficiently near to the truth to convince all open-minded investigators that it is really worthy of acceptance. He who waits for the whole truth be-

<sup>5</sup> Hastings, "E. R. E.," p. 581.

<sup>6</sup> Brown, "Modern Theology and the Preaching of the Gospel," 1914, p. 40.

<sup>7</sup> McComb, "Christianity and the Modern Mind," 1910, p. 97, quoted from Harnack, "What is Christianity."

<sup>8</sup> McComb, *op. cit.*

<sup>9</sup> Moore, "The Rational Basis of Orthodoxy," 1901, Ch. 1.

fore he surrenders to faith will forever remain a skeptic of rather doubtful wisdom.

The second element, then, which is associated with the word orthodoxy is that truth which forms its subject matter is capable of only partial demonstration at any one particular point in time. This applies to each individual investigator. At no time can he assert without fear of contradiction that he has the whole truth of the matter. For he has only that fragment of it which can be seen from his own particular angle. There are other points of vantage from which a slightly different picture can be viewed, where other investigators begin their operations. Each glimpses something which is hidden from the other. In crossing the intervening ground between their viewpoints, the corresponding insight into the truth has changed just enough to be perceptibly variant. We may attribute this variable factor in all independent investigation to psychological difference innate in personality, or to the diverse impact which truth makes upon the mind, or to anything else we please. The fact remains that when each investigator employs all his rational powers in an attempt to penetrate to the very heart of the truth, he fails of just reaching its center, though he does arrive sufficiently near to be convinced of the real trustworthiness of his conclusion. That, however, is not quite so convincing to another. There is a shade of meaning in his interpretation which the other cannot quite balance up with his own. So that while each has investigated the same general proposition, and employed the same logical processes, and been equally honest in his motive, still their conclusions are not quite identical. And which one shall we say is orthodox? Or are they not both orthodox? Have they not both "thought straight?" And should not they both be willing to bridge the gap with clasped hands, and say, "I greet you, my brother?" Had Luther thus been able to reconcile his natural differences with Zwingli at Marburg, granting to the latter complementary intelligence and a commensurate grasp of the truth, the subsequent course of Protestantism would doubtless



not have been diverted into parallel channels. But it was his inability to appreciate the universal fact of psychological variation which permitted the German to brand the Swiss a heretic.

We may sum up the foregoing remarks in the apt statement of Van Dyke:<sup>10</sup> "There is one point in which all men resemble each other: it is that they are all different,"—and at once we see that we have been stating only a truism. Still we seem to lose all sight of its common but essential importance when we enter the theological sphere. Here one naturally desires to find unity and certainty, for one is dealing with truths which are vital to human welfare. One wants to know beyond the peradventure of a doubt that his creed is true. But the average man will consent only to his own interpretation of it, and is unwilling to admit that another may have an understanding of it equally logical and spiritual. He forgets that his understanding and statement are not identical with the truth itself, and that his interpretation is only one of several possible alternatives, each "orthodox" and in a measure correct. For one must remember, in the light of our foregoing remarks concerning variation, that orthodoxy can not be defined as a set form of truth, nor an elaborate and closed system of such forms, but an *attitude* of unswerving intellectual and emotional honesty in which one approaches the problem of truth. This conception of orthodoxy makes it possible for two people holding rather divergent views of the same truth to be active members of the same church. Each has his own conception of the Bible, for example, and neither view would exactly fit into the other. One holds with tenacity to the theory of verbal inspiration, and considers each book equally valuable for the development of moral character; the other holds that God's word is, indeed, to be found within the pages of Scripture, but only in a fallible form conditioned by the human agencies through whom He gave His message to the world. Each sees God back of the Bible, but each has his own conception of the manner in which

<sup>10</sup> "The Gospel for an Age of Doubt," 6th ed., p. 3.

the book was originally prepared and how it is to be used to-day. Yet the former view is not so divergent from the latter as it appears to be, for no one who holds it in theory maintains it absolutely in his practice. And were orthodoxy to consist in merely correct opinion *plus* general acceptance, it would be difficult to determine which believer is the more orthodox; for the former view is the one more generally accepted, while the latter is probably nearer the truth. Yet we call both men Christians, earnest, honest, and logical. It is their difference of viewpoint which accounts for their difference of conception: to the one, revelation is final and complete; to the other, it is progressive and changing. The common idea which renders their membership in the same church permissible is their belief in the reality of revelation.

This variation in personal creeds in the same religious organization is paralleled by a similar variation among the many organizations of the same general period. The "church militant" is one of the common terms of the day. We hear many flattering comments upon her splendid growth, her conquests of sin, and the sense of righteousness she is instilling in her contemporary world. But at the same time there is everywhere evident theological distinctions which somewhat reflect upon the stock phrase, "all *one* body we." Back of each denomination there is an inheritance of tradition, habits of thought, methods of work, and singular viewpoints which press its present beliefs into its own peculiar molds. For instance, consider the age-long problem of Divine Sovereignty *vs.* Human Freedom, and note the contrast in thought between two great branches of the Protestant church,—Methodism and Presbyterianism. Back of the latter there is an hereditary legalism which had its rise among the Latins. Augustine, though himself a Numidian, who came under the influence of the lawyer-bishop Ambrose of Milan, and John Calvin, the two foremost exponents of Divine Sovereignty, were both held under the spell of Latin imperialism in which the will of the emperor was the sovereign law. By mere theological trans-



literation God becomes the sovereign Lord of the universe, and in His hands alone rests the eternal destiny of His subjects. In the fulness of time, through the agency of John Knox in Scotland, Presbyterianism is born into the world with its full predestinarian emphasis in the Westminster Confession.

On the other hand the opposite view, Freedom of the Will, is most strenuously stressed by modern Methodism. During the eighteenth century in England morality was of the easy-going variety, but in no country of the Old World was there such a measure of liberty. There were a few choice spirits who remained true to the highest ethical standards, and who felt that the time was ripe for a thoroughgoing reformation of the neo-paganism which was fast sapping the vitality of the age. Whitefield and Wesley *et al.* initiated a movement which was religio-social in character, making its appeal to that "bit of Godlikeness," innate in the human soul, which is free to expand under the influence of God's grace to an almost infinite degree.<sup>11</sup> Their emphasis was placed upon free will,—an emphasis which was in strict accord with the democratic ideal of the period. As a result, the message of modern Methodism turns upon the point of man's voluntary reconciliation to God. "Come to Jesus" is one of its stock invitations. But man must be *free* before he *can* come.

Now neither has quite ignored the theological position of the other, for the hymnology of Methodism,—and it is the hymnology of a church which expresses the theology of the common man—has a goodly portion of songs which glorify God as *King*; while modern Presbyterianism is not altogether averse to revivalism, which has its root in free will,—is in fact becoming increasingly attached to that form of religious work. While each church is indeed partly overlapping that arc of truth which is determined by the viewpoint of the other, still each is emphasizing mainly that portion which has come to it in the ordinary course of its traditional inheritance.

Here, therefore, are two branches of the Christian church

<sup>11</sup> Davenport, "Primitive Traits in Religious Revivals," 1910, p. 137.

holding two rather divergent views which in the past could not by any possibility be harmonized. Which church is the more "orthodox?" Or dare we say that both are orthodox? If we limit the idea of orthodoxy to that religious conception which has weathered the storms and stress of time, then we must perforce grant orthodoxy to Presbyterianism, for Divine Sovereignty held sway for centuries prior to the rise of Methodism. But if we regard orthodoxy, not as a static theological system, but as an intellectual and emotional method of approach to the problem of truth, and at the same time remember that our viewpoint is always determined largely by both training and tradition, then we may properly assert that both churches are orthodox; for Divine Sovereignty and Human Freedom are simply two different aspects of the same problem: the relation of the divine to the human personality. But each view must supplement the other before we shall be nearer the whole truth. And the problem of human life, the solution of which induced theologians to find in Calvinism or Arminianism the common denominator, can actually be resolved only as one makes the grand circuit of viewpoints and considers truth from all possible angles. Even then there will be a residuum which just escapes the definitive power of the theologian. We should be very chary, therefore, of imputing orthodoxy to any particular one of the numerous branches of the Christian church to the neglect of the others. For it is very probable that the sum total of all their denominational tenets falls a trifle short of the truth itself. And the realization of this fact enables us, in this day of scientific insight, to greet one another as "brother."

During the "World's Fair" of 1893 there was convened in Chicago the World Parliament of Religions,—by some considered a treacherous compromise of Christianity with paganism, and a veritable breach of trust by the American church. By others it was regarded as a wholesome sign that Christendom is returning to the Pauline conception, which is at the same time thoroughly scientific, of the essential oneness of the



race;<sup>12</sup> that truth is not the monopoly of one people alone, but that each has a sight of it, however faint and glimmering,<sup>13</sup> which under Christian influences will brighten and deepen until it fairly approximates that of the ripest Christian experience. The Parliament of Religions was a tribute to the universality of spiritual insight, which reaches its highest development in Christianity.

This was nicely illustrated in the course of lectures which Charles Cuthbert Hall<sup>14</sup> delivered in the far East in 1906-07. In these lectures he states that it is the mission of Pantheism to testify to the being of God, a truth which not all churchmen will be willing to concede. But Hall is quick to declare, also, that this idea must be further supplemented and extended by another which the Christian religion alone is able to offer,—the moral character of God. While Pantheism testifies to the presence of God in the soul, in a more or less abstract way, Christianity clearly does so by the sure presence of the still small Voice, the positive message of Prophecy, and the Incarnation. In these lectures which did much to break down the barriers of prejudice among the upper classes of the Orient, we have an incisive presentation of the fact that the whole truth has not been intrusted to one individual alone, or group of individuals, or even to one faith, but that it is perceived here and there in more or less clear outline by those who approach it with open minds and earnest hearts; and that it is most clearly perceived by those who come into the closest fellowship with Jesus Christ and experience his saving grace.<sup>15</sup>

Again, we witness this variable insight into truth in the general stream of history. Here the real nature of orthodoxy becomes more readily apparent. In the light of the past centuries it can no longer be considered a unified system of permanently established beliefs. The history of the church is replete with the rise and *fall* of verbal formulations of truth.

<sup>12</sup> Acts 17: 26.

<sup>13</sup> Acts 10: 14; Rom. 1: 14.

<sup>14</sup> "Christ and the Eastern Soul."

<sup>15</sup> Cf. also Alexander, "Christianity and Ethics," 1914, pp. 33, 34.

Here, again, we must remember that the overturn of the official statement has not involved the loss of the truth itself; it simply declares that the church of a later age was not satisfied with the precise form in which truth was presented by a former generation. Thus the Atonement, long a central element in Christian theology, has been variously interpreted since the days the fact it symbolizes came to pass. During the first ten centuries the idea of the Atonement revolved solely around the *death* of Jesus which was construed as a ransom paid to the devil, into whose hands man had fallen through Adam's sin. But Anselm, an orthodox theologian of the eleventh century, who would have been a heretic in the sixth, revolted from the crassness of the notion, and proceeded to work out a new theory which we call the Substitutionary: Christ becomes man's substitute. By his perfect obedience, he satisfies God's justice and cancels man's infinite debt of sin. Thus he made it possible for divine love to become operative in the pardon of sinners.<sup>16</sup> This theory was an improvement upon the older in that it avoided the idea of a deception played upon the devil, and made the Atonement depend upon the idea of justice. It became, in the main, the accepted theory of the church. But it is not quite so satisfactory to the church of to-day. We are now passing through one of the world's great transition periods in which perception is enlarging, experience broadening, thought-forms changing, and all theories in a state of flux. Our theological beliefs are being tinctured by the concurrent conceptions of the day. We are no longer content to think of God merely as a moral governor, bent only on having His justice fully satisfied; we want democratically to think of Him also as Father, whose moral character prompts Him to come into the closest relationship with His children so that He may save them from their sins; we have ethicised our idea of punishment so that it is losing rapidly its former vindictive character and is becoming reformatory in its purpose; and the idea of substitution which was entirely justified by the

<sup>16</sup> Anselm, "Cur Deus Homo," Deane's ed., 1903. Welch, "Anselm," 1901.



juridical conceptions of the eleventh century, has become altogether obsolete. We now think that Jesus' chief function was to "show us the Father" and His love, so that we might hate sin and be reconciled to His love. And we are broadening the scope of the Atonement, so that Jesus' whole life will be included in any theory which we shall hereafter construct.<sup>17</sup> In our re-working of the theory we are not surrendering the fact; we are simply demanding a more ethical interpretation of the fact.

The history of the doctrine of Total Depravity bears the same witness to our developing insight and our ethical demands. There are many passages in Scripture which seem to lend credence to the belief in man's utter degradation,<sup>18</sup> but it was not until the days of Augustine that the idea was put into doctrinal form. Under the influence of Calvin the Protestant church retained this doctrine which the Roman church had always insisted upon, in theory, if not so explicitly in practice. Human nature was presented in its most hopeless aspects, and the position of the church virtually robbed it of all ethical implications. But in recent years, under the influence of anthropological research and Biblical criticism, we have discovered the one-sidedness of the doctrine, and are now peering around the edge toward the other. We have found that the Bible contains many other passages which hint at the real moral worth of man.<sup>19</sup> And we have found that even in the most primitive races there is "a dim consciousness of some higher power and a latent capacity for good."<sup>20</sup> We now believe that there has always been existent in man, long before the dawn of written history, a moral potency which needs only

<sup>17</sup> "The Minister and the New Theology," REF. CH. REV., 1912, p. 395 ff.

<sup>18</sup> Ps. 51; Rom. 7; 1 Cor. 15, *et al.*

<sup>19</sup> Ps. 8; Luke 15; Acts 17: 27 ff.; Matt. 10: 30, 31, etc. But we must not make the mistake, which is fatal to any scientific interpretation of Scripture, of merely weighing one passage against another. We should attempt to glean *the general tenor of a book*, or of the teaching of Jesus which is the norm for all the rest of the Bible.

<sup>20</sup> Alexander, *op. cit.*, p. 58.

the opportunity for its evolution; that human nature is neither utterly corrupt,—else the gospel appeal would be useless,—nor perfect, else the same appeal would be pointless. The heart of man rather gives evidence of two tendencies, towards evil and towards good, and it is the fundamental purpose of religion to repress the former and develop the latter.

We have not yet gained, it is true, a full insight into human personality. There is the whole realm of the subconscious which still awaits our scrutiny, and which will doubtless throw interesting sidelights upon the subject of the religious and moral instinct. But this fact alone should warn us against presuming to pass final judgment upon all questions relating to the nature and ultimate destiny of the soul. We have not yet reached that point where we can impute infallibility to human judgment, though we are probably progressing in its general direction.<sup>21</sup> But we shall travel a long road until the goal is reached. Therefore, it ill becomes any man or group of men to attempt to stifle one's moral convictions in the quest of truth, or to suppress that quest itself, under pretense that we already have "the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth." Such a dictatorial course breeds prejudice, fanaticism, and skepticism,<sup>22</sup> while it shows itself blind to the clear facts of history. Galileo's world continued to revolve in spite of the pope's edict. And the late pope's encyclical against modernism, while it may have intimidated the more timid among the Roman clergy, has not by any means crushed the movement itself. People are doing to-day just what they have always done,—using their divinely appointed powers of rational thought. They are not content, and never have been, with the concepts, intellectual, moral, spiritual, of a prior age, but are creating their own; and it should be the province of the church to afford this prevalent spirit of inquiry an environment which will be favorable to the formation of judgments which will be both logical and ethical. This century

<sup>21</sup> Matthews, "The Gospel and the Modern Man," 1912, pp. 51-54.

<sup>22</sup> Robertson, Sermon on "Skepticism of Pilate."



regards the cemetery as the only place where investigation has ceased and where theories are fixed.

We presume that it is very clear, by this time, without the need of further argument, that the theological statements of the church to-day are not those of the church of the tenth or sixteenth century. The church, however, still believes in her orthodoxy; she is still trying to "think straight" upon the eternal facts of her gospel. But she is casting aside, rather slowly it is true, the "orthodoxism" of ecclesiastics and councils, and is now more open to the great problems of the day and the scientific method of their solution.<sup>23</sup> She is gradually losing her former interest in the Index and "heresy hunt," and is more freely permitting her followers to enter the inner shrine of truth by whatever path affords the clearest prospect. She is changing in both her spirit and methods. She is beginning to realize that she has outgrown the naïve notions of her youth, and is coming into possession of the maturer powers and higher vantage-ground of riper experience. It is very natural, therefore, that her understanding of truth should be, and is, more rational, though none the less spiritual, than it was in the day of Anselm or Luther. She is adopting the inductive method of religious inquiry, and is leaving room in her conclusions for those modifications which further research and experience will necessitate. She is beginning to admit that all has not yet been said upon the great themes she preaches, and that it is still possible for the Holy Spirit to lead her into the further reaches of truth. But the most promising factor in her gradual transformation is her growing realization that she cannot pack a universe of truth into a narrow formula, nor take her position on any hill with the positive assurance of seeing the whole world. All our views are but partial, all our formulas shallow: truth is more comprehensive and deeper than either. The church is beginning, therefore, to reopen the questions she long considered closed, and to await with expectant air the message which further revelation will

<sup>23</sup> Eucken, "Can We Still Be Christians?" Gibson's tr., 1914, p. 201 ff.



declare.<sup>24</sup> And therein is the omen of her new and better day.

But just here someone may object that if truth cannot be stated with any assurance of finality, if our knowledge is so very imperfect, can we be sure of anything; and what becomes of the authoritative tone in which the church has hitherto preached, and that feeling of confidence with which one has always believed? Will not our temple of revealed truth topple over into ruins, and will not the sense of uncertainty, which is thereby engendered, in time be converted into open skepticism?<sup>25</sup> There is some warrant for the objection, one must admit; for shallow minds which are content with nothing short of *ex cathedra* dictation, will be deprived of their moorings, and may be inclined to drift upon the current of an only too prevalent unbelief or indifference. But there are certain facts concerning whose reality there can be no doubt, which are woven into the very warp and woof of not merely our beliefs but of our experience as well, and which lend a steadying influence to our religious inquiries: (1) the being of God, demonstrated, indeed, not by any measure of scientific data, but by the venture of faith; (2) the moral order, which ever erects a high standard for human aspiration; (3) man, imperfect, ever struggling to attain the moral goal, but never reaching it; (4) sin, that all-pervasive and discordant something which eternally checkmates the best efforts of the race for perfection; (5) the need of a redemptive power; (6) the presence of that power in Christ Jesus. These facts furnish us a sufficient background for all our religious inquiry and are able to direct the general trend. With these we may proceed to erect a theological system which will be both ethical and intelligible,—and less than that it dare not be. For in theological construction the primary aim must be the presentation of formulas which will be consistent with the logic of life. None other will satisfy. With these basic elements of our

<sup>24</sup> Peake, "Christianity: Its Nature and Truth," for general treatment.

<sup>25</sup> Eucken, *op. cit.*, for a crisp and positive answer.



faith and this aim of our study always before us, we need not be fearful of straying either towards "dogmatic stagnation," or towards that extreme liberalism which has lost its sense of balance. Nor need we feel that the church will lose her authoritative tone and the believer his confidence. For confidence and authority are secured, not by external imposition, but by that internal witness to the truth which is its own best evidence of genuineness.

As we progress in our theological construction we must always keep two facts in mind, if we wish to be essentially "orthodox": (1) the fashion of thinking and mode of expression of our age; (2) the inadequacy of any system to express the whole truth, and therefore the strict necessity for its perpetual revision.

1. Doubtless no one will insist that we think in precisely the same manner as did our forebears of the first century. While our mental processes may be substantially the same, still the content of our reflection is always slowly changing. Our scientific inductive method is furnishing us with new generalizations. Our very thought-forms are evolving with the culture and tendencies of the time, and our theological concepts must naturally accommodate themselves to the changing order if they shall obtain the attentive ear of the masses.<sup>26</sup> The rapid rise of the democratic idea during the past century will overthrow many a thought-form which has become very dear to us,—as it, in union with the modern conception of personality, undermined the old theory of predestination. We have long spoken of the "kingdom of God," a thought-form of the first century; but to-day we are thinking and speaking of the "democracy of man." Mulford showed himself sensitive to the change when he labelled his dogmatic with one of democracy's word-forms.<sup>27</sup> This change alone will compel us to inject the idea of loving service into our concept of our relation to God and man; while "brotherhood," one of the catch

<sup>26</sup> Smith, "Social Idealism," Ch. on "Ethical Transformation."

<sup>27</sup> "The Republic of God," 1886.

words of this day, is rapidly opening our eyes to the social aspects of the gospel. But be that as it may, the modern mode of thought is bound to react upon our theological system, causing it to revise its terminology and, to a degree, its content. We cannot be satisfied with the mere preachment of implicit obedience to the great King, when the very atmosphere of the age is surcharged with the current of sonship and brotherhood.

2. With our present view of the world as a changing order we must recognize the need of a growing theology, which Forsythe<sup>28</sup> terms an "alert" theology. Contrary to the dictum of the Preacher that "there is nothing new under the sun,"<sup>29</sup> our knowledge is periodically receiving new accretions, while our shifting viewpoints are broadening our insight and transforming our notions. Truth which has long been "crushed to earth" by the sheer weight of tradition is being elevated to its rightful place; while we are constantly adding to the pages of revelation "as the words of the Lord are still opening their meaning, under new providential lights, in the enlarging thought of the Christian world." As long as theology remains a true science it will never become static. The deadest church in Christendom is the *Orthodox* Greek Catholic, which regards revelation as completed, and Christianity as absolute conformity to an archaic expression of faith. That "the world do move" theologically is imperceptible to the primate of "the Golden Horn."

Thus we are beginning to perceive that the modern mind is entering into its Protestant inheritance which guarantees freedom of thought and untrammelled critical investigation. Symbols which expressed truth satisfactorily to a former period of the church are now found to be inadequate for their present task. "Orthodoxy" itself is no longer certain of the permanent form of its content, but is slowly realizing that a

<sup>28</sup> "Positive Preaching and the Modern Mind," H. & S. Lib. ed., p. 203 ff.

<sup>29</sup> Eccle. 1: 9.



changing order needs a changing formula. In fact it is looking into the mirror of the modern thought-world, and is beholding itself transformed: its very essence is no longer "settled thought" but "right thinking,"—that is, along the lines of common experience and well established principles. And the twentieth century is more firmly convinced than any other that "we know (only) *in part* and we prophesy in part";<sup>30</sup> and that we shall know fully only when we have reached that final stage in our spiritual growth where we shall see things as they are. Until that time comes, however, we must be content with proving all things and holding fast to those which temporarily satisfy us, ever looking to the future to reveal whatever is now obscure, and ever faithful to the Spirit of Truth as it enables us to "draw from our treasure things new and old."<sup>31</sup>

McKEESPORT, PA.

<sup>30</sup> 1 Cor. 13: 9.

<sup>31</sup> Matt. 13: 52.

## V.

### THE LOGOS DOCTRINE.

WILLIAM C. SCHAEFFER.

One of the peculiarities of the Fourth Gospel is its peculiar use of the word λόγος. There is nothing like it in the New Testament. Even the expression, "the Word of life," in 1 Jn. 1:1, is not quite like it. And one of the singular things about the use of the word is the fact that the author makes no apology for it, and gives no explanation of the peculiar sense in which he uses it. Evidently the term must have been familiar to his readers, so that there was no need for such an explanation. And all this we can readily understand, if we recall that there was a Logos doctrine current in the East, and found among practically all peoples who had given serious thought to things divine,—Greek, Persian, Egyptian and Hebrew. A Logos doctrine had been developing among the Greeks for well nigh six hundred years, before our Gospel was written; and it had reached its fullest development in Egypt and Asia Minor during the first century of our era. It was as common in philosophical systems of that day as the doctrine of evolution is in ours; so that the author of the Gospel could count on being understood by his readers, however difficult we moderns may find it.

There is, however, one broad difference between the use of the word in the Gospel and in Greek philosophy. In Greek philosophy generally, and especially in the Stoic and the Alexandrian, Logos meant both reason and revelation; in the Gospel it means the latter only. There is no evidence, either in the Prologue or in the rest of the Gospel, that the author used the word in any other sense than that of revelation or utterance. We shall have to recur to this distinction again;



we mention it here because of its bearing on the entire discussion.

### 1. ELEMENTS OF THE JOHANNINE DOCTRINE.

Given the conception of God as spirit, invisible, unknowable and unapproachable, except as he reveals himself, which is characteristic of this Gospel, and something like a Logos doctrine is inevitable. It is, in fact, a necessary corollary to the doctrine of God; and we find it in fact in all parts of the New Testament, as well as in all ancient philosophy, though the term may not be used.

It will be best for us to try to gather up the elements of the Johannine conception, before we attempt to study the relation of the doctrine to the rest of the Gospel or to the systems of thought which were prevalent in that day.

John speaks of the Logos in two great relations: in relation inward and upward toward God; and in relation outward and downward toward the creation and man.

1. In relation to God four things are affirmed; and three of these are found in the very first sentence.

(a) "In the beginning was the Word." There was no time when there was no such self-utterance of the divine Being. Though John conceives of God as spirit, who can be known only through some form of self-expression, he does not think of him as a solitary monad, wrapped up in eternal self-contemplation, and only coming forth in the form of a self-revelation, when he became weary of that supreme and awful solitude; he conceives of him as always coming forth in such self-revelation. Hence he says, "In the beginning," beyond which our human thought can not soar, "was the Word," implying the thought that the Logos is as eternal as God.

It is worthy of notice that the verb used is  $\eta\nu$ , which both by its tense and its original significance suggests the idea of eternity. Westcott says, "The verb *was* does not express a complete past, but rather a continuous state. The imperfect tense of the original suggests in this relation, so far as human

language can do so, the notion of absolute supra-temporal existence."

(b) "And the Word was with God." Our English preposition "with" expresses the significance of the original very imperfectly. The Greek preposition is *πρός*, not *μετά*, nor *παρά*, nor *σύν*. *Πρός* denotes motion towards, and suggests the idea of personal intercourse. Westcott has this suggestive comment: "The idea is not simply that of coexistence, as of two persons contemplated separately in company (*εἶναι μετά* 3:26), or united under a common conception (*εἶναι σύν* Lk. 22:56) or (so to speak) in local relation (*εἶναι παρά*, 17, 5) but of being (in some sense) directed towards and regulated by that with which the relation is fixed (v. 19)." It suggests the idea of face to face, as if God and the Word had existed thus face to face from everlasting. If it does not express personal relation, in the same sense in which we speak of two persons as standing face to face in social intercourse, it implies a distinction in the divine Being, to which our notion of personality furnishes the nearest human analogon.

(c) "And the Word was God." Here *θεός*, though occupying the first place in the clause, is undoubtedly the predicate, as brought out in our versions. It is without the article. *Ὁ θεός* is used of God in the absolute sense, the Father. The simple *θεός* here, without the article, denotes rather that the Word is thought of as divine in essence, without affirming identity with the Father. And yet the word is not *θεῖος*, in which case we should have to translate, "The Word was divine," which would evidently fall short of the author's intention. What he wishes to affirm is that the Word, who thus was from the beginning, and who was in such face to face relation to God, is none other than God. As he is God in the infinite deeps of his being, so is he God in this outgoing, in this self-revelation of his being; so that what we come to know in this self-revelation is not something different from God in his inner being, but God as he is in himself.

(d) To this Word, now, the author of the Gospel ascribes



the properties or attributes of God. "In him was life, and the life was the light of men." But life and light are attributes of the Father. Thus God is the "living Father" (6:57), the One who alone has "life in himself" (5:26). So the Epistle says, "God is light, and in him is no darkness at all" (I. 1:15). But of the Son the Gospel affirms that the Father has given to him to have life in himself (5:26); so that he quickeneth whom he will (5:21), and even raiseth the dead (5:25; 6:44). As he is the effulgence of the Father's glory, so he could say of himself, "I am the light of the world" (8:12). These affirmations that the Word is life and that he is light are simply particulars under the general affirmation that "the Word was God." The Word has the properties and attributes of God.

2. With reference to the relation of the Word to the creation and man, John likewise affirms four things.

(a) The Word is represented as the Mediator between God and the creation. As the self-revelation of God, the form in which he comes forth out of the infinite deeps of his being in self-utterance, the Word becomes the form in which the divine intelligence, the divine energy and the divine love go forth in creation and redemption.

(b) The Word is hence the Agent through whom the universe was called into being. "All things were made through him, and without him was not anything made that was made." This does not mean that the Word is the Creator. Though John does not stop to affirm creation directly of the Father, his whole argument implies it. The Father, the One for whom the title *ὁ θεός* is uniformly reserved, is the "Almighty, Maker of heaven and earth." But the Gospel just as clearly implies that it is not the Father in direct, unmediated activity, but the Father *through* the Word. The Word, as God in his outgoing energy and love, is the active Agent in the creation, the One through whom the energy, forever resident in the Father, goes forth into activity. Hence the emphatic statement, "And without him was not anything made." He is

behind the entire universe, as the active, efficient cause, through which it has come into being.

(c) In entire accord with this conception is the other that the Word is the One through whom all things are upheld, and through whom all intelligences are illumined. "He was in the world," and in it as the same efficient Agent as in the beginning. The Epistle to the Hebrews, whose conception is so similar to that of the Fourth Gospel, has the classic statement on this point. "Who being the effulgence of his glory, and the very image of his substance, and *upholding all things* by the word of his power" (Heb. 1:3). The Gospel carries out the idea especially with reference to the animate creation. "In him was life, and the life was the light of men." All that lives has derived its life from him. He is the One through whom the life of God, who alone is the fount of life, is mediated to the world. It is so with reference to our natural life; and so also with reference to our regenerate life. And as he is the effulgence of the Father's glory, so is he the One through whom the light of him in whom is no darkness at all, shines upon all who can see and know. Even while the world was in a state of alienation from God, his light was shining in the darkness (1:5). And wherever men have responded to his grace, he has become the light of all their seeing.

(d) And this Word now, of whom all this is true, "became flesh." That is really the culmination of the entire creative process. Wherever in the creation we find the expression of thought and reason (and we find it everywhere), we see it ultimately as the embodiment of his truth and light. Through all the ascending series of creation, the divine reason comes to ever clearer and clearer expression; and thus every form of life becomes in ever greater measure, an effulgence of the divine glory. We find a form of the self-utterance of God, the highest form of which is found in the Word made flesh, in every form of life; but that self-utterance was, not in articulate speech which addressed itself to the ear, but in acts and deeds which addressed themselves to the eye. So when we



come to his last, his final Word, we find it, not in the form of articulate speech, but in a life, the life which was full of grace and truth. And so the author of the Gospel comes finally to identify the Word with the historic person of Jesus.

Such in brief is the Johannine doctrine of the Logos. Its central thought is the self-utterance of God, who is otherwise unknowable and unapproachable. On the one side the doctrine assumes the eternity, the personality and the divinity of the Word; and on the other, it affirms that he is the Agent through whom the entire universe was called into being, that he now upholds and illumines all creatures, that he became man, and that he has dwelt among us, full of truth and grace.

## 2. WHENCE DERIVED.

Whence the author of the Fourth Gospel derived his Logos doctrine has long been a question in controversy. There are those who think that the main influence was Greek philosophy. Others think that we must look mainly to Hebrew sources. I shall quote three of our more recent authorities to illustrate this difference of opinion.

Profesor E. F. Scott may be taken as a fair example of those who find the chief source of the Johannine Logos doctrine in Greek philosophy, and especially in Philo. He says, "The idea of a Logos, an immanent Divine reason in the world, is one that meets us under various modifications in many ancient systems of thought, Indian, Egyptian, Persian. In view of the religious syncretism which prevailed in the first and second centuries, it is barely possible that these extraneous theologies may have indirectly influenced our Evangelist; but there can be no doubt in regard to the main source from which his Logos doctrine was derived. It had come to him through Philo after its final elaboration in Greek Philosophy."<sup>1</sup>

Professor B. W. Bacon occupies a position almost directly opposite. He says: "The roots of the Johannine Logos doc-

<sup>1</sup> "Dict. of Christ and the Gospels," pp. 49, 50.

trine are only to a slight and subordinate degree in Philo. They run back by way of Hebrews and more especially by way of the great Pauline epistles of the second period, Colossians and Ephesians, through purely Christian soil to the common ancestor, the Wisdom of Solomon. We have said, 'All of the Logos doctrine but the name is already present in the Pauline epistles.' We might say with almost equal truth. 'The whole Christology of John—a vastly greater matter than the merely cosmological concept of the Logos—is a straightforward development of the incarnation doctrine of Paul.'"<sup>2</sup>

Professor William Sanday occupies a somewhat intermediate position. He says: "The preponderance of opinion at the present time doubtless leans to the view that there is some connection between the Logos of Philo and the doctrine of the Logos in the Fourth Gospel. But the question is as to the nature and closeness of that connection. On this many shades of opinion are possible."

"It is a distinct question in what form we are to conceive of Philo's teaching as coming before him (*i. e.*, the Evangelist). The author of the Fourth Gospel was a thinker, but not a professed philosopher. So far as we can judge from the writings of his which have come down to us, we should not be inclined to credit him with much philosophical erudition. The idea that we form to ourselves of the Evangelist is not that of a great reader always poring over books. I find it hard to think of him as sitting down to a deliberate study of the Jewish scholar's voluminous treatises. The mental habits of the two men are too different. The Evangelist has a shorter and more direct way of getting at the truth. He was more like the old Ionian philosophers, who looked up into the sky and out upon the earth, and set down the thoughts that rose in them in short loosely connected aphorisms. The author of the Fourth Gospel did not look so much without as within: he sank into his own consciousness, and at last brought out to light what he found there. He dwelt upon the past until it became luminous to him; and then he took up his pen."

<sup>2</sup> "The Fourth Gospel in Research and Debate," p. 7.



"I believe that there is a connection between Greek, or Hellenistic, speculation and the Fourth Gospel. But I can conceive of this best through the medium of personal intercourse and controversy."<sup>3</sup>

It is a grave question as to whether Professor Scott has succeeded in making out his case. That there is some connection between the doctrine of Philo and that of the Fourth Gospel may, indeed, be admitted; but that is a very different matter from asserting that the author of the Gospel derived his doctrine directly from Philo. The connection may be no closer than is found in the fact that both stood in the same general world of thought, and that in that world of thought this same Logos doctrine met them each in his own environment and in his own way. Even Professor Scott is compelled to grant that the Evangelist has profoundly modified the doctrine of Philo. He says, "Thus in accepting the Philonic idea, St. John does not commit himself to the precise interpretation that Philo placed on it; on the contrary, whether consciously or not, he departs from the characteristic lines of Philo's thinking." And he falls far short in his attempted proof that the Evangelist was a student of Philo's books, or that he was even acquainted with them.

What shall we say of Professor Bacon's theory that the Johannine Logos doctrine rests immediately on Paul? Of course, the term Logos does not occur in Paul. That is conceded from the beginning. But are not all the elements of the doctrine found in Hebrews and in Paul? And is not the central element found in the teaching of Jesus? We believe that both questions may be answered in the affirmative.

We take up first the connection of the central element in the doctrine with the teaching of Jesus. That central element of the doctrine is found in the fact that Jesus is the final and perfect revelation of the Father. As we have already pointed out there is one fundamental difference between the Johannine doctrine of the Logos and that found either in Philo or in the

<sup>3</sup> "The Criticism of the Fourth Gospel," pp. 183, 188, 189, 198.

Stoic philosophy; and that difference is found in the fact that, while both Philo and the Stoics think of the Logos as both immanent reason and uttered thought, the author of the Fourth Gospel uses the term only in the latter sense. Now, this conception of a revelation of an otherwise invisible and unknowable God is found in the whole New Testament, and grounds itself on the teaching of Jesus; and with it is to be associated the claim which Jesus made for himself that he, and he alone, is the perfect revelation of the Father. "All things have been delivered unto me of my Father: and no one knoweth the Son, save the Father; neither doth any know the Father save the Son, and he to whomsoever he willeth to reveal him" (Mt. 11:27; Lk. 10:22). This conception passed into the universal teaching of the early church, as may be seen by comparing Heb. 1:3; Col. 1:15 and Jn. 1:18. And in the discussions of the Johannine Logos doctrine sufficient recognition of the fact, that its central and fundamental element is thus anticipated in the teaching of Jesus and of the entire New Testament, has probably never been given.

Can we accept Professor Bacon's view that the whole Christology of the Fourth Gospel, including the Logos doctrine, can be traced back through purely Christian soil to a common Jewish ancestor? The first half of his proposition, I believe, may be safely accepted. All the elements of the Johannine Logos doctrine, without the name, can I think be found in Hebrews, Colossians and Ephesians; and in accepting these as part of his common Christian heritage, the author of the Fourth Gospel was not under the necessity of making any such profound modifications as Professor Scott tells us he had to make in accepting the doctrine of Philo.

As the point is of great significance in the discussion of the question in hand, it may not be out of place to enter into a somewhat closer examination of the similarity between the Johannine doctrine and the earlier New Testament writings. We take up the points in the order given above.

The first point has reference to the preexistence of the per-



son whom John identifies with the Logos. This is none other than the historic Jesus. "In the beginning was the Word." That the author of the Gospel claims preexistence for Jesus Christ is well known.<sup>4</sup> But the same conception is found in Paul, especially in Phil. 2:6; Col. 1:15-17. These passages imply the preexistence of the Son just as clearly as Jn. 1:1 implies the preexistence of the Logos.

The second point relates to the independent personal existence of this preexistent Logos. We have seen how the idea is implied in the second clause of the first sentence of the Gospel. But does not Paul imply it just as clearly, when he says, "Who being in the form of God, counted not the being on an equality with God a thing to be grasped?" And does not the whole description in Col. 1:15-17 imply it?

John applies the term *θεός*, as a predicate, to the Logos. If the punctuation of Rom. 9:5, which is found in all our versions, be accepted, we have an exact parallel; even if we accept the punctuation which is suggested in the margin, we have evidence that Paul held as high a view of the divinity of our Lord as the author of the Fourth Gospel. Philippians 2:5-11 may be confidently appealed to as furnishing a parallel to the thought, if not to the exact words.

As to the point that Jesus Christ stands as the only Mediator between God and man, to communicate eternal life and to illumine our darkened understandings, the conception is fundamental to the whole Pauline system. It is sufficient to refer to Rom. 5:10; Eph. 2:1-6; 1 Thes. 4:13-17.

The cosmological conceptions of the Logos found in Philo and in the Greek philosophies are reduced to the minimum in the Fourth Gospel. All that is left of them is found in the third verse of the first chapter. "All things were made through him; and without him was not anything made that was made." A more emphatic statement is found in Col. 1:16, 17. "For in him were all things created, in the heavens and upon the earth, things visible and things invisible, whether

<sup>4</sup> See Jn. 3:13; 6:62; 8:58.

thrones or dominions or principalities or powers; all things have been created through him and unto him." Even the epistle to the Hebrews has as much on this point as the Fourth Gospel, where it makes the statement concerning the Son that through him also God "made the worlds," and that he "upholds all things by the word of his power" (1:2, 3).

Of the doctrine of incarnation there can be no uncertainty. Philo knows nothing about it at all; and the author of the Fourth Gospel can not have derived it from him. But Paul is full of it. According to Philippians 2:5-11, the one who existed in the form of God, took upon him the form of a servant, and was made in the likeness of men. According to Colossians 2:9, "all the fulness of the Godhead dwelt" in the historic Jesus "bodily."

Personally I feel convinced, therefore, that Professor Bacon is far more nearly correct in his view as to the immediate background of the Johannine Logos doctrine than Professor Scott. The relation between the epistles of Paul and the epistle to the Hebrews on the one side and the Fourth Gospel on the other is so close, that I can have very little doubt that the fourth Evangelist has derived his doctrine directly from them and not from Philo or the Greek philosophy. There is a purely Christian soil out of which his whole conception has legitimately grown.

This, of course, still leaves the other question as to the source from which the doctrine in Paul and in the epistle to the Hebrews is derived; and that is a far more difficult problem. For the history of Christian doctrine, it is also the more important question; but for our present purpose, we need not enter upon its discussion. It is a question by itself, far larger and far more difficult than the Johannine problem; and it leaves room for the question suggested by Professor Sanday as to the possibility of some other connection between the Johannine Logos doctrine and that of Philo.



### 3. HOW JOHN CAME TO USE THE TERM LOGOS.

If, however, the roots of the Johannine Logos doctrine are thus found in a purely Christian soil, if all the elements of the doctrine without the name are already found in the Christology of Paul and of the Epistle to the Hebrews, how did the author of the Fourth Gospel come to use the term? My judgment is that the answer to the question must be found along the line of a suggestion by Professor Sanday, above quoted. He says, "I believe that there is a connection between Greek, or Hellenistic, speculation and the Fourth Gospel. But I conceive of this best through the medium of personal intercourse and controversy."

Let us recall for a moment the purpose and aim of the Gospel. It was not primarily biographical or historical or philosophical, but evangelistic. The author tells us what he had in mind in writing. "But these things are written, that ye may believe that Jesus is the Christ, the Son of God; and that believing ye may have life in his name" (Jn. 20:31). The author of the Gospel, whoever he may have been, lived in a new age, and he was surrounded by a new culture. He tried so to present the gospel of the kingdom that the men of that new age and of that new culture might be able to understand and believe. His entire Gospel is an interpretation of Jesus to that new age and to that new culture. His theme is Jesus Christ, the Son of God. That Jesus is the Christ, the Son of God, is the premise from which he starts, and the conclusion towards which his whole argument moves. He had back of him the whole heritage of the Christian message and of Christian doctrine; and at the very heart of that message was the great declaration from the lips of Jesus himself, "No one knoweth the Son, save the Father; neither doth any know the Father, save the Son, and he to whomsoever he willeth to reveal him" (Mt. 11:27). And in Asia Minor he now lived among a keen-witted, philosophical people, who had long speculated as to what the inner mind of God is and how it is revealed. He found there the results of all this long line of speculation from

Heraclitus on down to the Stoics and Philo; and in presenting his message he now in effect says, What you have long since been searching after, this I preach to you. You have been speculating about the Logos, in whom you shall find the revelation of the inner mind of God. This inner mind and character of God has been manifested in One who has tabernacled among us, who has manifested the glory, glory as from the only begotten from the Father, full of grace and truth. Jesus Christ, the Son of God, is this Logos, about which you have been speculating. In him you will find revealed all that God is, all that is in his mind, all his gracious purpose in our creation and redemption.

We may thus admit that there is some connection between Greek speculation, yea, the philosophy of Philo and the Fourth Gospel; but the connection is not found in this that the author of the Gospel had made either Greek speculation or the philosophy of Philo his starting point, but in this rather that he has used them as the form or vehicle for expressing the ideas which he had derived from an altogether different source. Though the Logos doctrine is found in the Prologue, the Logos idea is not his starting point. That must be sought rather in the passage at the close of the Gospel, in which he tells us of his purpose and aim. He begins with the idea of Jesus as the Christ, the Son of God; and because he has found in him the perfect revelation of God, he calls him the Logos.

It is true, the contrary position has been taken. Professor Scott says, "Jesus was the revelation of God because the Logos, the divine principle of Philonic speculation, became incarnate in him."<sup>5</sup> This is a reversal of the true order of thought, as this is presented in the Gospel. The way in which the Evangelist gets at his concept that Jesus is the Logos is just the opposite. Through a great religious experience, he had become convinced that in Jesus he had found the revelation of God; this experience had its basis first of all in the direct declaration of Jesus himself; and from that declaration and that ex-

<sup>5</sup> "The Fourth Gospel," p. 162.



perience he then passed on to the conclusion that Jesus was none other than the being of whom the philosophers had vainly speculated, the Logos of God.

It is important to recognize that there is such a profound religious experience lying at the basis of what has been called the speculation of the Fourth Gospel. Sometimes it is charged that the author started from a metaphysical conception, and that consequently his entire presentation has been more or less vitiated. It is, I am persuaded, more nearly correct to say that he started from a deep and rich religious experience, and that the metaphysical dress was put on to recommend his message to a speculative people. To this experience the author himself points in 1:14: "And the Word became flesh, and dwelt among us (and we beheld his glory, glory as of the only begotten from the Father) full of grace and truth."

#### 4. RELATION TO THE REST OF THE GOSPEL.

What is the relation of the Prologue, with its Logos doctrine, to the rest of the Gospel? In a famous article, published in 1892, Professor Harnack took the position that the Prologue is a mere preface, written to conciliate the interest of a philosophical public. The following quotation states his view: "The Prologue brings in conceptions which were familiar to the Greeks, and enters into these more deeply than is justified by the presentation which follows; for the notion of the incarnate Logos is by no means the dominant one in the Gospel. Though faint echoes of this idea may possibly be met with here and there in the Gospel—I confess I do not notice them,—the predominating thought is essentially that of Christ as the Son of God, who obediently executes what the Father has shown and appointed him."<sup>6</sup>

Now, while it is true that critics generally have dissented from Harnack's view; it is admitted that his essay has served to show that the purpose of the Gospel is not that of a philosophical treatise, and that its main concern is not with the

<sup>6</sup> Quoted in "Dict. of Christ and the Gospels," Vol. I, p. 889.

Logos as a philosophical conception, but with the Logos incarnate, or with the historic person, in whom the Logos has become incarnate. My own conviction is that he is right on two main points of his contention: first, in the statement that the predominating thought of the Gospel is that of Christ as the Son of God; secondly, in the view that the Prologue is a true preface to the Gospel, and that it subserves the purpose of a preface in commending the Gospel to the author's Greek readers.

It is doubtless true, as Harnack's critics have maintained, that the main ideas of the Prologue recur again and again throughout the Gospel; but that is due to the fact that those very ideas were already a part of the author's Christology, not because he found them in the Greek speculations concerning the Logos. As I tried to show above, all the leading elements of the Johannine Logos doctrine had already found their way into the Christology of the epistles of Paul and of the epistle to the Hebrews. This Christology the author of the Fourth Gospel received as a part of the common Christian heritage. It was part of the message which he undertook to proclaim and interpret to the Greeks of Asia Minor; and it was because of this fact that we find them both in the Prologue and in the rest of the Gospel.

I hence do not deny the organic connection between the Prologue and the rest of the Gospel. What I am contending for is that the essential elements of the Prologue were part of the Christology of the times, and that Harnack is correct, when he says, that the Prologue was written as a preface to commend the message which the author was about to deliver to his Greek readers.

Professor William Sanday has admirably expressed the view, which I have been trying to advance, in the following paragraph: "The fact that St. Paul and the epistle to the Hebrews had substantially arrived at a Logos doctrine before any extant writing has mentioned the name, seems to throw light on the order of thought by which the Fourth Evangelist himself



arrived at his doctrine of the Logos. It is the coping-stone of the whole edifice, not the foundation-stone. It is a comprehensive synthesis which unites under one head a number of scattered ideas. From this point of view it would be more probable that the Prologue to the Fourth Gospel was a true Preface, written after the rest of the work to sum up and bind together in one mighty paragraph the ideas that are really leading ideas, though scattered up and down the Gospel. Whether it was actually written last does not matter. What I mean is that the philosophic synthesis of the events recorded in the Gospel came to the Evangelist last in the order of his thought; the order was; history first and then philosophical synthesis of the history. No doubt the synthesis was really complete before the Apostle began to write his Gospel; the writing of the Prologue may or may not have followed the order of his thought. It may have been as Harnack thinks, a sort of commendatory letter sent out with the Gospel; or it may be that the Gospel was written as one piece upon a plan present from the first to the writer's mind. The order of genesis and the order of production do not always coincide; and it is really a very secondary consideration whether in any particular instance they did or not."<sup>7</sup>

<sup>7</sup> "The Criticism of the Fourth Gospel," pp. 211, 212.

## VI.

### THE PHILOSOPHY OF EVIL.

PAUL J. DUNDORE.

#### I. A STUDY OF THE NATURE OF REALITY AS BEARING ON THE PHILOSOPHY OF EVIL.

The construction of a philosophical doctrine on this problem of evil calls, at the very outstart, for a clear and definite conception of the nature of reality. The writer contemplates to develop his doctrine along the views of Idealism, but feels that a brief statement of other views and their fallacies will bring the Idealistic Philosophy bearing on the subject in clearer view.

(a) Deism conceives God as creator of the world much after the fashion of a man building a ship. As the ship is separate from its builder or designer so God is distinct from nature and man which he has created. The Deist ascribes existence of things to an omnipotent and all-wise Being who has formed it externally as an architect fashions a house. The world, including man, resolves itself into a mere mechanism. This conception of the world bears on the subject of good and evil for it would make man a mere machine and it would be difficult to see how evil could arise and how responsibility could be placed. But experience teaches us that man is a being that realizes ends and also consciously aims at them. If we say that these ends which man pursues are dictated for him mechanically by God, it is evident that we can no longer view man as a self-determining being. But good and evil imply a moral agent that possesses self determination. Instead of God being external to the world and as a moral Governor of the world imposing laws upon man, we must view God as immanent and as related to man, not in a sense that



God determines man's actions for him but rather that man is capable by his own will to choose objects in harmony with the nature of God and willing what is in consonance with the divine will. The problem of evil demands man to be a self-determined being.

Deism, claiming that the world is created by a good, wise, beneficent God, a perfect Creator and Governor, can not explain the problem of evil. How can the imperfect world be the product of a perfect Being? The manifestation of a perfect God in an imperfect world would involve a contradiction and the Deist's conception of the world contradicts its conception of God.

(b) Phenomenalism states that our knowledge has only to do with appearances and not with reality. Democritus viewed knowledge as attained by sense perception as knowledge of appearance and knowledge attained by reason as knowledge of reality. He was a partial phenomenalist. Plato views sense perception as giving us an opinion of objects which objects are only copies of reality. Sophists conceived sense perception to be but momentary appearances of things, not the things in themselves. Phenomenalism is of necessity sceptical for it denies knowledge of reality. In consequence evil becomes unreal and as the phenomenal implies the real or noumenal, the doctrine leads to Agnosticism and leaves the problem of evil unsolved. Spencer says, "What is known is not real and what is real cannot be known." Thus the limitations of knowledge would forestall the solution of the problem of evil.

(c) Absolutism as bearing on Pantheism and Mysticism. Pantheism and Mysticism would deny nature and man any separate reality. Here nature and man are thought of either as modes of God, or illusions that eventually disappear when man attains his highest point of view, and God, the Absolute reality, is all that is left.

When the idea of the Absolute is maintained, the Absolute which gathers up into itself and transmutes individuals in some way that we cannot comprehend, we virtually abolish all

individuality and self-determination on the part of the several beings. By positing this abstract Absolute, nothing is left but a blank undefinable reality and all differences vanish. We must not permit the finite to be swallowed up in the Infinite for this will rob the finite of reality. The philosophy of Spinoza and Hegel manifests this tendency. But this is Pantheism. Absolutism maintains "that in the Absolute evil and pain disappear, being absorbed in a higher unity." In the Absolute, the good and the evil are transmuted and glorified. Thus the explanation of the universe according to the theory of Absolutism does not explain the moral distinction of good and evil, but rather explains it away.

The theory of Absolutism, which makes facts mere phenomena, which phenomena are indefinable and not within the grasp of intelligence, resolves the Absolute to a pure or abstract being. This logically leads to Mysticism where virtually all relations, even that of subject and object, are abolished. To the Mystic the whole sphere of scientific knowledge is viewed as occupied with what is merely illusion. The Mystic conceives Man's true life as consisting in religion and in this life he shares the Apprehension of God and comes into a direct contact and communion with God. This lifts them above all finitude, change or division which is foreign to the Absolute. Mysticism errs in maintaining that man completely transcends his individuality and is merged in God. It abolishes the distinction of man from God. Separation of man from God would make room for a division and man would have no consciousness of himself but it surely does not follow that in his consciousness of God he loses consciousness of himself. According to the Mystic the world and man, as divorced from God, are necessarily illusive and in consequence evil resolves itself into an illusion. Evil ceases to have any reality. Evil to the Mystic, if anything, is the insatiable desire of true and absolute being which attaches to everything finite. There are desires in the body which keep him from being absorbed in the Infinite. The morality of the Mystic consists in the struggle of



separating the soul from the body. Morality, however, is viewed as a fruitless effort in converting the finite into the infinite and in consequence morality is without meaning to the Mystic. The Mystic in his contemplation of the eternal has nothing in common with every day life but seeks to be lifted beyond the moral and become absorbed in the Infinite.

(*d*) Naturalism, which holds that the doctrine of the conservation of energy is the fundamental law of all existence, and embraces not only physical and chemical, but also organic and conscious processes, has no satisfactory solution for evil. In Naturalism all things are interpreted in purely mechanical terms. Naturalism claims that there is "not an atom either in the nervous system, or in the whole universe, whose position is not determined by the sum of the mechanical actions, which the other atoms exert upon it. And the mathematician who knew the position of the molecules or atoms of a human organism at a given moment, as well as the position and motion of all atoms in the universe capable of influencing it, could calculate with unfailing certainty the past, present and future actions of the person to whom this organism belongs just as one predicts an astronomical phenomenon."<sup>1</sup>

Here law is inviolable. The world is subject to this rigid and inviolable law and moral acts of man are not accounted for inasmuch as only a self-determining subject lifted out of this mechanism, is capable to act. In consequence, good and evil have no meaning when we view all occurrences in accordance with the unchangeable constitution of the world and all laws by which its processes are determined as inviolable.

(*e*) Idealism. As we have seen Naturalism threatened the extinction of the religious consciousness and Mysticism threatened the extinction of the human consciousness. Subjective idealism, which borders on Solipsism, claims that the subject merely perceives the idea of the object, not the object itself. Here the essence of anything consists in its being perceived,

<sup>1</sup> Quoted by J. Watson, "The Interpretation of Religious Experience," p. 150, Vol. 2.

“Esse est percipi.” It reduces reality to the experience of the individual subject.

The Philosophy of Idealism aims to establish a unity between subject, object and God. It posits the subject at the outstart and views the universe as being intelligible. The universe is not alien to our rationality for if such were the case it would be a suicide to our rationality. The subject and object are interdependent according to the system of Idealism. Neo-Realism errs in making subject and object independent of one another. Idealism believes in a relation between subject and object which relation is manifest in our conscious experience. The subject is the self that experiences and the object is that towards which the subject directs itself in its experience. That is subjective which is in experience and that is objective which is for experience. We cannot know reality outside of experience and experience is the consciousness regarded as common to all subjects through their being related to objects. Idealistic Philosophy, therefore, deals with experience forthcoming from the relation of subject and object.

The object has both active being and meaning. An object has active being which gives expression to reality. But mere existence or being is not sufficient. This would end in nothing. Idealists regard reality as being with meaning. The object has meaning for the subject. The violin, in relation to the master musician who plays it, conveys its meaning to the subject and its content becomes an element in the subject's reality. Thus through experience we organize the appropriate meaning of things into our own reality. The Idealist views object as incomplete without the subject. Realism claims the object is what it is apart of the subject. But the object must be brought into experience which is due to the relation of subject and object. In experience we find reality and what does not agree with the whole of experience must be rejected as false. Reality implies the knower and the thing known. The subject can not think, feel and will without the object. We are not subjects without objects. In order to



know the self we must distinguish it from not-self. Thus reality is only conceived in its subject-object relation and nothing can be known to us that falls beyond our conscious experience.

But in our treatise we are not concerned merely about the subject and object relation but both subject and object are related to the all-comprehensive unity of God. God must be the inner principle of both the physical and conscious world. The conscious subject recognizes that the world is no arbitrary creation of his own mind and thus the subject rises to the consciousness of the Creative Mind which is immanent in the world. This mind is immanent both in nature and in the self-conscious life of man. This mind immanent in nature gives it its meaning and it is only as our mind enters into communion with the Divine Mind that we comprehend the object and its meaning. "As truly as it is part of our nature to look outwards and fill our life with objective interests, as truly as it is the part of our nature to look inwards—to return upon ourselves and to become conscious of an inner life of our own in which we are separated from all others—so it is part of our nature, as immanent necessity of our rational being, to look upwards, and to regard our whole life, inner and outer, as based upon and circumscribed by a Power, in whom we and all things live and move and have our being. Hence the consciousness of God is as near to us, as necessary to us, as the consciousness of the world or of the self; nay, in a sense, it has a higher necessity than either, and we are nearer to God than ourselves; for the consciousness of self rests upon the idea of God, as at once its first presupposition and its last end and goal. All our life is a progress through the world and through ourselves to the God from whom we come, in whom we are, to whom we tend."<sup>2</sup>

We find that God is manifest in the world or else it would be unintelligible. God also communicates Himself to man and realizes Himself in the spiritual nature and history of

<sup>2</sup> E. Caird, "The Evolution of Religion," Vol. 2, p. 2.

man. We come to a knowledge of the world as a system because it is the embodiment of Mind and our life is the fullest expression of the Mind of God.

Man has a correspondence with God which amounts to identity. There is in man a spark of the Infinite and man is able to transcend the limits of his finite existence or he would never become conscious of his finitude. There is a unity of nature, self, and God. "The conflict with evil is the struggle towards that unity with oneself which is inseparable from unity with God. Were it not that man's self-consciousness involves the presence in Him of this ideal of perfection, he would be satisfied like other beings, with the gratification of his immediate desires and inclinations; but, because nothing short of absolute perfection of nature can give him permanent satisfaction, his spiritual life is necessarily a struggle towards an ideal, which he can only realize in the sense that it is the principle of his undying efforts."<sup>3</sup>

But this unity of man and God raises the question, how can God be immanent in man, while man preserves his individuality? Man is a rational being and therefore self-conscious. This is implied in his struggle after the divine ideal. Again, the action of mind upon mind does not destroy freedom and individuality but rather implies the presence of freedom and individuality with the one who is influenced. The immanent Spirit of God in the human mind receives response from a similar spirit and the influence of the indwelling Spirit is in essence identical with the influence of one human mind upon another.

Rudolph Eucken in his book, "Christianity and the New Idealism" speaks of the immanence of God in these words: "Whence the red of the rose? From the sun you say. True, but the sun did not reach out its red hand and paint the red of the rose from without. The red of the rose comes from the rose's own heart, but it does not come from its own heart with-

<sup>3</sup> J. Watson, "The Interpretation of Religious Experience," Vol. 2, p. 245.



out the influence of the sun. And it does not come from the sun without the activity of the rose. Somehow the activity of the sun and the self-activity of the rose come to be one and the same thing. There would be a contradiction were God a stranger and external to our being, were His will imposed upon us from without like a law differing from that of our own true nature. There is the inner presence of God in man, and its mysterious and ceaseless working within all the manifestations of man's personal life. God lives in us. We live in God. Our freedom is His authority. His authority is our freedom. His spirit makes us what we are. His voice is the voice of our conscience. To obey the will of God is to obey our own law. To obey our own law is to obey the will of God." The Divine immanence of God in man does not destroy man's conscious self-activity.

Confusion may also arise as to the immanence of God in the world. We believe in His immanence and His transcendence. God and the world are not two separate realities. The rather do we think of the world of nature and the world of spirit as two books written by the same hand, the one throwing light upon the interpretation of the other. But how is God in the world? Pantheism teaches that God is in the world as an unconscious intelligence, unpurposeful, wholly absorbed in the universe He has created. Instead of granting Him self-directing power they view God as a slave to the world He has created. Divine immanence means that God is in the world and at the same time fully conscious, purposeful and controlling. God is in the universe like the spirit of a man is in his body, which spirit is not limited by its body but is capable of activities that far transcend the physical realm. God is present in the world but also surpasses it. He is superior to it as a thinker is superior to his thoughts. But the thinker does not live apart from his thoughts but in them. So God is greater than His creation but does not separate himself wholly from it.

God is both immanent and transcendent. By immanence

is meant that He is everywhere and always present in the universe, not absent from it nor separate from its life. By His transcendence we mean, not that He is outside of this world and views it from beyond or above but rather that while God is in the universe, He is not shut up in it or limited by it. God, therefore, is a free spirit, inhabiting the universe but surpassing it,—immanent as always in the universe and transcendent,—as not subject to limitations. Each conception is in need of the other. Transcendence without immanence would give us cold Deism; immanence without transcendence would give us fatalistic Pantheism.

Hilderbert's hymn gives us a correct view of God's immanence and transcendence.

“Above all things, below all things;  
Around all things, within all things;  
Within all, but not shut in;  
Around all but not shut out;  
Above all, as the Ruler;  
Below all, as the Sustainer;  
Around all, as the embracing Protection;  
Within all, as the fullness of life.”

What I have sketched rather briefly indicates the trend of philosophical Idealism. It lays a foundation for the interpretation of evil in the world. Idealism not only has to face the problem of evil but philosophical Idealism as it seems to the mind of the writer is the only philosophy that is in a position to give a rational solution to the problem.

The world is intelligible and rational. There is no dualism where two powers contend with one another with equal power. It is a universe in the true sense of the term in which all finite things seek to embody the will of the Infinite Self. The ego has not to do with what is mere phenomena but with reality that reaches its completeness in experience. All is united in the Self towards “which all creation moveth.” The individuality of man is not absorbed in the Infinite but free-will has a genuine existence in this world and moral choice is present with man who is a free moral agent. This moral



freedom does not belong to the temporal order of the world in so far as it is merely temporal, but to a higher order of which we are apart and not unconsciously so. The God of the Idealist is no passive spectator to the sorrow, evil and misery in the world but is "with all as the fullness of life" both purposive and controlling. These thoughts we must bear in mind as we seek to interpret the problem of evil.

## II. DISTINCTION BETWEEN MORAL AND PHYSICAL EVIL.

Evil may be classed as two species, physical and moral. The term physical evil represents the evil that may be suffered and the term moral evil, the evil that may be done. In the physical realm philosophy must emphasize the principle of evil rather than its manifestations. Of the two kinds moral evil is the more positive whilst physical evil may be incidental, occasional and more of a negative character.

Both moral and physical evil are interwoven and at times it is difficult to establish a fixed boundary line and assign one, to one side and the other, to the other side. Physical suffering is frequently the result of moral evil. The distinction between the two may seem vague but nevertheless we are obliged to make the division. Moral evil falls under the categories of choice and action, physical evil under those of result and consequences. As stated physical evil is the evil men suffer, moral evil is the evil men do. Physical evil is conditioned by an established order or by the operation of fixed laws whilst moral evil has to do with a moral agent who has a will to choose and in consequence follows as an act of the personal will. In our further treatment of evil we shall treat both separately although to some extent the solution of the existence of the one is a solution for the existence of the other.

## III. MORAL EVIL.

### 1. *Origin of Moral Evil.*

(a) *Psychological Genesis of Evil.*—This leads us to attribute the cause of evil not to a thought beyond, but to a de-

velopment, in which the finite will strives to free itself from its natural impulse and enter into the realm of freedom. The child in the beginning is prompted to act by a natural impulse which is altogether natural and unaccompanied by any moral judgment for the child has as yet not entered into the state of the moral. These natural impulses cannot be classed as evil for in the first stage a child is not truly in a position to pass moral judgment and hence no evil that implies guilt.

But the child ere long finds its self-will to run counter the will of another, a will foreign to that of the child. This other will from without prohibits the expressions of the natural impulses and desires of the self-will and heretofore unrestricted desires are checked by the opposing will as it seeks to enforce its prohibitions. The bringing of the self-will into subordination to the prohibiting will is gradual and only results after a number of experiences. But by these experiences the self-will subordinates itself to the prohibiting will and also gives way to feelings of sympathy and regard to this higher will. This in time leads to fear in disregarding the command of the foreign will and a seeking after the reasonableness and rightness of this higher will with its prohibitions and commands. In realizing the rightness of the command "Thou shalt not" law and its feeling of obligation to meet it, dawns upon the child and the child through these complex experiences assumes the responsibility of a free moral agent. In this gradual development of self-will and its subordination to the higher will the placing of the first sin is impossible. Self-will, which seems the first apparent evil in the life of the child, must be overcome and subordinated to the higher will. Self-will, however, is first and has a tendency to continue its opposition to the law and in consequence there is a continual struggle between the "would" and the "should." The constructing process of the moral consciousness is a development, a development resulting from many experiences and it is true that in this development the possibility of moral evil is universal although the actuality of evil need not be universal.



No moral evil is conceivable, therefore, until a certain stage of development in the moral consciousness and the idea of Original Sin as implying guilt has no place in a treatise on the origin of sin. Moral evil only results from a conscious self-determination against the moral law. This gives us an idea of evil which seems rational and causes us to view man as developing not as fully developed. Moral evil develops in man much like the knowledge of his own consciousness. He looks outward, inward, and upward. "Every step in the development of conscience, every widening of the moral view, every increase in the refinement of judgment or in instinctive feeling of right and wrong, augments the possibility of reaction against abnormal impulses, of overcoming the bad motives by good ones, and thus increases with man's moral freedom his responsibility also for what he does and leaves undone."<sup>4</sup>

(b) *Moral Evil in the Light of Biological Principles.*—In the study of biology, the science which studies the life and structure of living organisms, including man, there have been for some years past, two contending theories advanced by two schools of the biologists. The one theory known as pre-formationism holds that the whole history of one's life is contained in a germ present at the earliest stages of one's life and all that one is ever likely to become is potentially present in that germ. All that is needed is merely to unfold oneself as years glide along and the duty of man is to unpack the treasures he already possesses in the embryonic form. The other theory known as epi-genesis reduces the germ factor and pre-existing conditions to a minimum and recognizes environment, one's surroundings as the main forces that determine the destiny and character of the human life. A number of scholars are prone to ascribe the development of morality and evil wholly to social influences brought to rest upon the child. Dr. Tennant, in his excellent book, "The Origin of Sin" speaks of morality "as a social creation and not as a ready-made endowment of the individual." This is true but we dare not overlook the

<sup>4</sup> Pfleiderer, "The Philosophy of Religion," Vol. 4, p. 38.

individual who as an individual has the endowment of capacity and who is endowed with the capability of becoming a moral creature. Morality as pointed out in the psychological genesis of moral evil develops by the self-will being antagonized by a higher will but individuality is present in the self-will. Self becomes conscious of self through other selves and so morality develops through a social process but this social process is not all that contributes to moral choice which makes evil possible. The theory of Epi-genesis is untenable.

The theory of Pre-formationism also errs in placing all of what a child is to be potentially in a germ which gradually unfolds itself throughout life. This theory might fall in with the Augustinian view of pre-destination or election. It would harmonize with the Leibnitzian Monadology. But to us it puts too much on the beginning of things and robs man of his initiative. The theory known as Epi-genesis savors too much after Pelagianism, holding that the actuality of sin is derived solely from the individual will as influenced by social environment. The theory of Pre-formationism savors too much after Augustinian pre-destination.

Rather let us think of the child starting out with a certain individuality which is grounded in God. The individuality gives the child power to choose and create his own destiny. The child with such individuality is not the creature of his environments nor is the child a passive spectator watching the unfolding process of what was potent in the germ but the child creates his own environment and determines himself the form of what comes out of the germ in its process of unfolding. Environment has its influence but by holding the individuality of child foremost we do not disconnect life from its evolutionary process but also give it a metaphysical ground. The child as a creature of God has power to act and is endowed with a freedom akin to that of God.

(c) *The Will and Moral Evil.*—The afore-mentioned statements leave the will of the individual free and unfettered and prepare us to say that evil has its origin in the creature and



not in God. The origin and essential quality of moral evil lies in its antagonism and revolt of the personal will against the sovereign will of God. "In its essence the act creative of moral evil is, to use a juridical phrase, 'a violation of law'; to speak with the stoics, it is a refusal to 'live according to nature'; to employ the language of Butler, it is the failure to recognize 'the authority of conscience'; or in that of Kant, it is to decline to obey 'the categorical imperative.' In these cases 'law,' 'nature,' 'conscience,' 'categorical imperative,' are but impersonal names for the ethical sovereignty of God; and the denial of this sovereignty means the alienation in will and character of man from his Maker. It is this denial and consequent alienation that creates and constitutes moral evil in its two ultimate forms, act and character, or choice and habit, or will and nature."<sup>5</sup>

Moral evil arises when man cuts himself off from the parental spring of rationality and spirituality and permits himself to be influenced by capricious impulse and lower animal propensity. The will, having revolted against reason and spirit, submits to lower passions and impulses and by choice permits these to predominate over the better self. It is a choosing of a supposed lower good for the ideal good. Evil arises in seeking for the satisfaction of our nature in particular, selfish ends instead of choosing to identify oneself with the good of the whole. Evil leads one to choose an end which is incompatible with the universal self. He strives to make his own separate good his end, not taking into consideration the injustice and wrong done to others and thereby loses the blessedness which ensues from an unselfish devotion to the common good which alone is in harmony with the divine will. "For whosoever would save his life shall lose it and whosoever shall lose his life for my sake shall find it." (Matthew 16: 25.) Again, moral evil can only arise in the will of an intelligent and personal agent. It is apparent that evil in order to become moral must be chosen and the choice made in the light

<sup>5</sup> A. Fairbairn, "The Philosophy of the Christian Religion," p. 150.

of a better knowledge. There must be an alternative or there can be no choice. "For apart from the law sin is dead." (Romans 7:8.) Moral evil involves intelligence of the higher good and choice must be ever the differentia of moral evil.

In consequence evil cannot be ascribed to the preponderance of the sensuous, but only to the will. What is commonly called a conflict between sense and reason is in truth a conflict between a lower and a higher mode of self-realization. "All that is of sense is not evil, and all evil is not of sense." Many vices do not spring from sense. This is true of such vices as avarice, ambition, hypocrisy and falsehood. These have nothing to do with sense. We cannot place moral evil in sense but in the spiritual direction of the will. Evil, in every aspect and phase, has its seat in the will and moral evil, including guilt and accountability, is only possible when the will is fully present and where the subject is a self-conscious, a self-determining ego.

Furthermore, no natural impulse or inherited tendency, is in itself sinful. A sensuous impulse or an inborn tendency to sin only can become sinful through our own volition. Moral evil can only arise when we deliberately refuse to reject the impulse. Thus no sin is possible prior to the emerging of the will. Prior to man becoming a self-determining being, intelligent and rational, moral evil in its actuality must be excluded. Moral Evil, then, from whatever angle we approach it, has its origin in the will. Kant said rightly, "Nothing in the world is good but a good will." We might add in the light of our consideration of the origin of moral evil the thought, "Nothing in the world is absolutely evil but an evil will."

But by making the will the seat of moral evil do we not explain away the immanence of God? We would answer, no. Man as a moral agent creates his own destiny. His will is for him to use as he chooses yet God is immanent. The immanence of God does not wipe away distinctions between God and man. God is immanent in nature yet distinct from it.



Even so with man. Both man and nature have no reality apart from God who is the Ground of both. We are apt to think of identity as sameness but true identity is unity in difference. So man and God are identical yet distinct. Man has his own individuality and the immanence of God does not absorb man's individuality. Man is not a passive medium for the display of divine power; if such were the case man would be a free agent no more than the stone which falls to the ground by the law of gravitation.

“Our wills are ours, we know not how;  
Our wills are ours, to make them thine.”

God has given man capacity whereby man may know God. Man is capable of so using his powers as to have his will blend more and more with the divine will. Man as a rational being bears these marks of identity and has capability of God-like development but in order to gain this higher self he has to exercise the will which is peculiarly his own. “For it is God who worketh in you both to will and to work, for his good pleasure.”<sup>6</sup> But we err in ascribing the whole work to God alone. God reveals the ideal, makes us conscious of it but the activity which responds and accepts and which wars against the flesh is ours. The higher self is not forced upon us but being the life which, when realized, is most true to ourselves, the finite will grasps it and with full freedom to reject it, takes it for its own.

Freedom and development are man's peculiar possessions. God the Creator and man the creature have this in common. As we conceive God as morally perfect we must conceive man as a moral creature. God's creatures, as moral beings, must make their own experience, develop their own characters, watch over their own conduct and in a sense create their own destiny. God would undo His own creation, annihilate or abolish his moral creatures, were He, at a critical moment, to interfere by direct action, with the choice of the human will.

Our doctrine of sin, therefore, leads to this view of finite

<sup>6</sup> Phil. 2: 13.

self. Man is a free, developing being. In the doctrine of divine immanence there is no abolishment of the finite self. God has made man as a rational being like unto himself and when man wills the opposite of what he knows as the good, he commits sin.

(d) *A Reconciliation of God's Omnipotence and Goodness to the Existence of Evil.*—In our treatment of the problem of evil thus far we have reached the conclusion that man is, in a sense, the author of moral evil but this does not answer, as a final solution. It is true that the responsibility of the actuality of moral evil lies with man but the responsibility for the possibility of moral evil lies with God. To say that man is the author of moral evil does not wholly exonerate God. It is very apparent that man could not have sinned unless he had been made capable of sinning. Why did God so make man that he was capable of sinning and if God is omnipotent why does he not so guide and direct the actions of man so that he will not do the evil?

This question becomes all the more vital when one considers the vast magnitude of moral evil. Moral evil in the individual is bad but moral evil is not confined to a mere individual. Moral evil is incorporated in families and is handed down from generation to generation in hereditary tendencies. It is rampant everywhere and possesses and dominates the collective race. Why did God permit such a fearful dilemma? Why did God permit moral evil or why did he make man capable of doing it? Our difficulty lies in our effort to reconcile the existence of evil with the thought that God is omnipotent and the world a manifestation of infinite goodness.

The difficulty at hand vanishes to some extent when we recall from our previous investigation that moral evil is not something that can be imposed upon an individual from without. Evil results in the individual failing to embrace the ideal in Society. Man, we said, is a developing creature, and evil is a lower stage of a higher good, though not good in the making.



Augustine throws a great responsibility upon God when he claims God to have created man morally pure and good and attributes sin, as to its origin, "to the transgression of the first man, who, as representative of the whole race, misused his freedom to will evil, and so introduced that bias to evil which has vitiated the whole human race." This places undue responsibility upon the first man and upon God. The truth is that the experience of Adam is the experience of every individual and the experience is of the same order. In a sense it may be said, man was not created good or evil because morality exists only as willed by a rational subject. No man can be either good or evil without self-determination and this thought lessens the responsibility of God in regard to moral evil. But the question as to why God permits moral evil or why he has made man capable of sinning remains unanswered. Why did not God prevent moral evil?

Much of the difficulty in the solution of this problem rests in our misuse of the word omnipotence. We cannot think of God as a pure abstract being. That would resolve Him to mere nothingness. God as the Creator manifests himself in the universe but such actions, within the finite, implies conditions. There are limitations for God as well as for man. Speaking morally, God is incapable of lying; intellectually, it is impossible for God to conceive the false as if they were the true; physically, it is impossible for God to make a square out of two straight lines. In other words, it is impossible for God to create man as an exact duplicate of Himself. There is but one God and to conceive of two infinities is absurd. God was, therefore, limited in creating His creatures and the creature could not be the exact duplicate of the creator. Surely, many things can be predicated of the creature which we can predicate of the Creator but the Creator always stands for more than the creature. God in His work of creation has His limitations and in creating man as a being of free choice He did all within His power. Even God Himself had the choice of good or evil. If we deny Him of that choice God would have known less than His creatures.

Again, we dare not emphasize the one attribute of Omnipotence at the expense of other attributes that bear a deeper meaning to us in our relation to God. Omnipotence is not the synonym of God and His perfection implies more than what one conceives under the mere category of an Almighty-Will.

Spinoza conceived God as a substance and in consequence was enabled to reduce His attributes to Extension and Thought, the one referring to His activity in Space and the other in Time. If we conceive of God as an unconscious will as did Schopenhauer then His activity in the universe will be minus the moral character and will be as irrational as that of matter, motion and force. To view Him as the purely Absolute, will make Him purely abstract which is a God without meaning.

Viewing God, however, as immanent, as a conscious center of our thought and volition we are led to interpret His attributes and actions under the categories of moral reason and ethical will. The most vital relations God bears to us are ethical and not physical. The physical attributes are largely determined by the ethical. God is conceived as divine not because He is Almighty but because He is the Supreme Good. Love is more divine than omnipotence. "Now we can only conceive an absolutely Perfect Being as one whose nature is harmonious in all its actions and its activities; for might without love were mere violence; presence without righteousness were only energy; omnipotence without wisdom were but intellectual perception,—the reflection of things in a mirror which had the quality of being conscious of the things it reflected. But if we so conceive the Divine Perfection, then all the physical attributes will be under the control of the ethical, and must be conceived as only means, while the others denote sovereign motives and ends. Power may forbear to do many things possible to it as power, because they would be alien to love; and the forbearance would not argue defective but effective will, not imperfect but perfect might, because



exercised in obedience to qualities and for higher than any which could belong to it simply as power.”<sup>7</sup>

The foregoing discussion on the relation of an omnipotent God to moral evil is convincing as far as it goes. God with all His omnipotence could not make man wholly like unto Himself and again the action of omnipotence itself is controlled by a higher motive of Love and Holiness. The question as to why God permits moral evil is not answered satisfactorily. From our consideration another question arises, why was the actualization of evil permitted by a God who was in essence a God of Love and who is perfectly Holy? We have reconciled evil with His omnipotence but we must also endeavor to reconcile the existence of moral evil with the Goodness and Love of God. But to ask why a Good Loving God permits evil is similar to the question “whether the Holiness and Love of a Self-revealing God are better manifested in an entirely non-moral world or in one in which good be possible though mixed with evil, and in which good may yet be the final goal of ill?”

Beyond a doubt this world is the best possible world for the development of character which is or ought to be the aim of all rational and moral finite beings. In it there is a range of contingency and existing conditions are well adapted to the development of free moral beings. A world without the possibility of evil would destroy the free self-determination of man, rob the world of conscious moral good and leave no room for a revelation of the Love and Holiness of God. Without the possibility of evil we would have no possibility of good, a world of mere things, of conscious automatons. But the cosmos is a moral order and affords an opportunity for the highest personal relations between finite persons and a personal God and in consequence this present world, with all its moral evil and misery, tends to a goal that is supremely good and in view of the good, moral evil is not incompatible with the love and goodness of a righteous God.

(e) *Moral Evil as a Possibility.*—From our study we reach

<sup>7</sup> A. M. Fairbairn, “The Philosophy of the Christian Religion,” p. 154.

the conclusion that moral evil is a possibility in a world of contingency. It is evident that God did not give His consent to the introduction of moral evil but views its presence as a foe to the moral order. Moral evil, therefore, is a contingent product of a moral world, without being willed by God as an end, nor wrought by Him as an act. It on the contrary contradicts the end willed by the holy will of God. Man being created with the freedom of self-determination was placed in a world where there was a possibility for evil and such a possibility for evil may be essential in order that many may attain unto the moral goal as a developing creature.

We would, then, disagree with Schopenhauer who views evil as a positive being and all good as negative. His irrational world, filled with chaos, blindness and mal-adaptation, leads to Pessimism. It identifies being and evil. If being and evil are one and positive and good and rationality are negative then the world is on a process of degeneration and not enough rationality is left to construct a theory.

Likewise the Leibnitzian theory which represents evil as becoming good, being good in the making, does not satisfy. If evil is merely a defect of good or good in the making, evil is in a sense good and Leibnitz loses the evil element altogether. Leibnitz does not seem to realize that evil is the opposite of good and that we must ever strive to suppress it. If so, evil is but mere appearance and has no reality. For if we, with Leibnitz make evil teleologically necessary to the best of possible worlds, we would transmute it into a relative good.

Again, we would part with the Hegelian School where the Absolute is viewed as altogether immanent, absorbing wholly the finite and in consequence all ethical relations between God and man are dissolved and evil ceases to be real. Hegelians would view evil as non-being, and strip it of all reality. But to view evil as unreal is to break with experience and experience to the Idealist is the ultimate basis of knowledge.

Moral evil as it exists in the world cannot be identified with being, non-being or as good in the making though it has its



roots in non-being. Evil is in this world merely as a possibility and the free self-determination of man implies the possibility of evil. The moral order was so constituted as to promote righteousness, obedience and happiness. It would be difficult to conceive obedience where disobedience is impossible or righteousness where wickedness is not a possibility. "The person that could not disobey would be quite incapable of obeying. If there was no power to do evil, there would be no ability to do good. Where the will has no alternatives, its choices can have neither merit nor demerit; where only one path lies before the traveller, error may be impossible, but so is discovery; where there is no vice to allure, there is no virtue to be won. The very notion of a moral nature under a moral law involves therefore, an order that can be broken." From the foregoing we see reason for the possibility of evil but let us bear in mind that evil only becomes evil by one's experience when he, of his own free will, chooses that which is evil. The mere possibility of the existence of evil does not say that a man must necessarily experience it as evil. God's will is that it should remain a mere possibility with us and not an actuality. The possibility of evil was present with us but its actuality should find no place in the contents of our will. We conclude this part of our study with the conviction that God is not the author of moral evil, but that it is a mere contingency in the moral order and that in a universe created where moral good shall be, the possibility of moral evil may exist.

#### IV. PHYSICAL EVIL.

##### 1. *Statement of the Problem.*

The natural and the moral world-order are arranged each with a view to the other, tend to the same goal but are not identical. The laws ruling in each are different and independent of one another. In nature the laws of cause and effect hold sway but this is not always the case in the realms of reason and affection. The belief in the uniformity of nature is ra-

tional but it does not mean that man, allied to some extent to nature in a physical sense, is subject to their natural uniformities. Man is allied to nature but by his reason and his free will he is over nature, is elevated above the plane on which these natural forces work, and the logic of causation can give no explanation of his conduct in those higher realms of thought and feeling. In consequence, natural, or physical evil deserves special study being its cause and sequence differs so materially from moral evil. The physical evils are of many and varied kinds. Here we have the evil arising from the destructive forces of Nature herself as storm, earthquake and volcanic eruption. Evils arise by nature failing to respond to the skill and work of man as famine. Evil is manifest in the disaster which Nature works on the things that man has invented as floods which break through the dykes, and tempests that lay waste the cities man has built. Evil is the result of man's neglect and ignorance of the law of Nature in the form of disease and pain. One could not satisfactorily classify the physical evils as they exist in their manifold forms. Many are the sufferings that Nature inflicts upon man. Yet it is noticeable that often Nature does not act alone and in most cases man, in the last analysis, is the responsible factor of evil and has to shoulder the blame for his suffering.

Beyond a doubt many of the physical evils, in the presence of which we stand horrified, are wrought by Nature and man in conjunction. Man often through ignorance of Nature's laws brings upon himself suffering. Man in conscious violation of Nature's laws brings untold sufferings to himself and the community. Floods, which caused the lives of hundreds of persons to be lost, were caused, in some instances, by the breaking of rotten fish dams kept in communities by groups of men for their sport. Many calamities can be explained from this viewpoint. Many evils considered as God sent are of man's own making. When men herd a million human beings in some narrow compact city, multiply its walls around the city, veil the light of the sun with smoke, poison the



air above and the ground beneath with foul secretions one need not wonder if fevers prevail. If the bubonic plague gets a foothold in the community and men do nothing to arrest its progress one need not wonder if entire families are visited by the hand of death. There is no doubt but what with our increase of knowledge we find more and more of our maladies and sufferings starting plainly from ill-dealing with ourselves. To a marked extent the bodily ills of humanity are wholly our own creation and within our own control. But this does not give us a satisfactory philosophical interpretation of the problem of evil. To satisfy our inquiring minds we must not deal with manifestations merely but with principles that give rise to these manifestations.

The solutions to this problem of physical evil are many. In this study of the subject the mention of some systems bearing on the causal relations of God and the universe will be justifiable inasmuch as a criticism of the same will help us construct a doctrine that is tenable.

## *2. Misconceptions of God in Relation to the World Bearing on Evil.*

(a) *Transeunt Causality.*—Exponents of transeunt causality view the operations of nature as a process of interaction among the things of nature. The world is filled with independent things. Causality is conceived as a passing from an antecedent to the consequent and the efficient cause is viewed as transeunt, moving on the plane of the phenomenal. Here the antecedent is thought to possess potency or whatever is required to produce the consequent. The antecedent comes into relation with the sequent and answers as a cause to the effect it produces. The antecedent is viewed as active and the sequent as passive.

This is the popular view of cause and effect, the view with which Science prosecutes its work. With such a view we could solve the problem of physical evil in short order. An earthquake is the effect of the formation of sulphurous gases which is the antecedent or cause of the earthquake. But this

does not explain. To treat cause and effect after such a fashion may satisfy Science but not Philosophy. Causality as temporal is nothing but mere appearance. We have to face reality and find causes in the World-ground or Internal ground.

An effect may spring out of an antecedent but an effect has a number of antecedents and one can not attribute a sequent to any single one. To say that  $x$  causes  $y$  leads us to find the cause of  $x$ . This would lead to an indefinite regression and by coming to the first cause we surrender the principle of transeunt causality. In consequence we are compelled to posit the causes in the metaphysical ground or God.

Again this theory of transeunt causality is pluralistic in spirit, positing a multitude of independent, reacting things. If they are independent it is difficult to see how they have a relation to one another, such as interaction implies. Newton's law, that all bodies attract all other bodies directly in proportion to the mass and inversely as the square of the distance may satisfy Science but Philosophy can not conceive an interaction between two mutually independent things.  $x$  cannot transfer its state or nature to  $y$  without becoming  $y$ . But by becoming  $y$ ,  $x$  loses its independence and ceases to be. Apparently between  $x$  and  $y$  there is a void which two independent things cannot pass over. Interaction can only be explained when we posit a Ground and Consequence and root the consequent in this Ground. We must substitute immanent causality for transeunt causality and there only can we find a cause for the sequent and this alone explains the causal relation between the antecedent and the sequent. The mere law of cause and effect on the temporal plane does not give us a metaphysical explanation of physical evil and therefore fails to satisfy.

(*b*) *Occasionalism*.—The system of Des Cartes left a dualism with which his followers were bound to struggle. Des Cartes' dualism consisted in the independence of mind and body. One could not influence the other. His successors Arnold Geulinx and Malebranche sought to overcome the difficulty by their doctrine of Occasionalism. They sought to bring the two together.



Des Cartes had presented God as the guarantee of truth as regards thought. This prepared the way to view God as intervening to guarantee truth of representation of object. Occasionalism was applied to action even more than to knowledge. Its exponents said on occasion of your willingness to move your arm the divine energy interposes and causes the arm to move. Here interaction of mind and matter was due to the intermediating agency of God. Volition here was the cause of God's intervention and the physical change was the effect. The doctrine was mechanical and limited the actions of God to the caprice of man.

Occasionalism in a modified form is the interpretation applied to much of the evil that is in the world to-day. Many accidents and calamities are ascribed to a direct intervention of Providence. The supernatural power from without is supposed to have interfered with the normal process of the world's or Nature's existence. This is a belief which reduces the cosmos to a medley of unrelated miracles. Rather let us not conceive God to work in this way. There is no interference or intervention from without but God is immanent, the internal Ground, the ever active agency, in which existence finds its complete reality.

(c) *Pre-established Harmony*.—This recalls the Leibnitzian doctrine of monads. He also battled with the question of interaction of real things or monads in the world. His monads are independent and self-sufficient. Each monad is windowless, a universe by itself, non-communicative. Yet they were supposed to interact but this interaction is impossible with self-sufficient monads but he claimed them to be pre-determined to a certain course of action. A monad is like a watch wound up which contains its history for the next twenty-four hours. So he conceived the monads wound up that they run together.

But his plurality of monads demanded an explanation. In consequence Leibnitz posits an infinite monad as the Ground of all monads. This infinite monad pre-establishes in each monad potentially what the course of each individual monad is

to be. But such pre-establishment, pre-destination and fore-ordination shuts out the immanence of God. It gives us an absentee God and tends towards fatalism. Physical evil as it exists to-day is often explained after this fashion. The world is viewed as running its course and calamities and fearful interruptions in the laws of nature are thought to be mere accidents over which an absentee God has no control. It is a common fault that results inevitably from a pluralistic conception of the world. Whatever position we take of evil we must conceive God as the immanental ground and only such a conception will make a satisfactory explanation possible.

### *3. God the Dynamic, Active Agent in the World.*

The philosophical problem of evil can only be approached in the measure we succeed in the adoption of an adequate ontology and doctrine of God. The criticism of the three theories mentioned above leads us to posit an Internal Ground which is the metaphysical cause of the varied manifestations in nature. This Internal Ground is active and energizing. The Ground which makes itself felt in every objective manifestation is dynamic, and its essence is reality itself.

By identifying the world-Ground as causality with activity we determine the world-Ground as an Agent who has the power to act. The finite is, therefore, his creation, and in its manifestation represents the purposive expression of will. The Agent is unitary in spirit and indivisible Agency implies selfhood. Instead of the world-Ground being a passive substance we conceive the world-Ground as an active Agent. The Infinite is not divisible. We must bear in mind that we have a universe and not a multiverse. The finite is not an emanation of the infinite. We have not to deal with a plurality of existences but with the one reality in which we live, move and have our being. The infinite is not the sum total of the aggregate parts. To divide the infinite into parts is to cancel it. Thus the finite is in unity with the infinite, being it is the creaton of the infinite.



We must be on our guard here or else we fall into pantheism. The creation of God, this is true of man, is capable of acting and of being acted upon. God creates creators. Man is endowed with personality and is able to think, feel and will. If we conceive God as creative then the created things shall also be creative—not in the same degree as Creator but to some degree. We may say that God is in all things but God is not all things. To say that God is all things would make our thoughts, feelings and blunders God's. His own freedom would be at stake and error and evil would be made divine. God has created a moral world-order, the workings of which we may not understand in its entirety. But the difficulties resulting from this conception are far less than the difficulties arising out of systems which view God as a substance and the finite as emanations and kindred systems which are pantheistic in spirit.

We, therefore, posit a basal being in action as the efficient cause of the finite, of all its laws, principles and realities. The finite is dependent on this efficient cause. The Active Agent or world-Ground is not wholly absorbed in this creation. He is not any less a person or Agent after creation than before. He has reserve power and is transcendent as well as immanent. God as the Active Agent is not all activity, exhausting Himself in the world.

The positing of God as the Internal Ground of the world gives us a rational interpretation of the world. It sets aside dualism, pantheism, materialism, agnosticism and other isms that confuse us in this study of the problem of evil. Instead of external relations of things we have an internal relation. We have relations not only between things themselves but the things bear a relation to intelligence itself. The world-Ground is above all things free and active intelligence. "If we seek a tenable theory of knowledge we find it only as we reach a basal intelligence. If we seek to find the many together in an all-embracing system, it is possible only in and through intelligence. If we seek for unity in being itself we find it only

in intelligence. If we seek for causality and identity in being we find them only in intelligence. If we would give any account of the intelligible order and purpose-like products of the world, again intelligence is the only key. If, finally, we ask for the formal conditions of reality we find them in intelligence. The attempt to define reality itself fails until intelligence is introduced as its constitutive condition. The mind can save its own categories from disappearing, can realize its own aims and tendencies, can truly comprehend or mean anything, only as it relates everything to free intelligence as the source and the administration of the system.”<sup>8</sup>

4. *Deductions from Doctrine of the Dynamic, Active Agency of God in the World.*

(a) *The World a Good, Rational System.*—The theory of ontology we have developed convinces us that the world is a system that is good and rational. God as the active Agent in the moral world-order is in complete control. Man is a creation of God and being akin to God, man becomes a creator himself. He is not a creator in an absolute sense but man is a creative agent and has the power of the initiative. Man misuses his free moral agency in the misadaptation of laws destined for good and pain is the natural sequence. That God’s law contains a possibility of violation is true beyond question. The term law implies that possibility. Man violates not only the moral law but the physical as well and in many instances the violation of the physical is the natural sequence of a violation of the moral law. God’s world is just and right but man has thrown himself out of harmony with God’s order, has abused God’s laws and thereby has brought much of the world’s evil and suffering upon himself by his own conscious acts. Much of the pain and sorrow and suffering in the world is due to man’s wrong use of right things. The mere fact that man has sexual and sensual passions in his physical constitution

<sup>8</sup> Borden Bowne, “*Metaphysics*,” p. 110.



which impel him to a sensuous and licentious living, does not permit us to extenuate the evil he may do. The rather should we say, he is obliged to obey the law which would turn Nature's way in his hands into an instrument of good; and if he disobeys Nature's laws he is charged with suffering, pain and affliction commensurate to the degree in which he has made Nature the partner and servant of his offence. We conceive Nature, then, as good in herself and evil only when she falls into evil hands and is made a minister to sin. Nature was designed for moral ends by being in the hands of moral beings. This moral order has been broken again and again by man's misadjustment to the moral world-order and in consequence much of the physical evil to-day is not due to the will of Providence as is often supposed, not due to the terrific forces of Nature herself but due to man.

(b) *Teleology and Evil*.—The conclusion we arrived at as the cause of much suffering in the world might lead to the thought that evil is retributive where the moral failure and outward misfortune evenly balance. This would not be the outcome of the argument because man is in social relations and sufferings often light on an individual who is not morally guilty. It is wrong to view every fortunate or unfortunate event as being by itself, apart from the natural causal connection of events, a special divine appointment. God manifests Himself in a regular and orderly way.

Due to our desire to honor the Providence of God and our misuse of sacred scripture we are apt to assign every calamity in nature to God's Providence. Beyond a doubt there is a sublime truth in the sayings, "that not a sparrow shall fall to the ground without the will of the Father. But the very hairs of your head are all numbered; That all things work together for good to them that love God." But we are not thereby justified to deduce from these words such thoughts for which the words give us no warrant, viz.: that every event of our life, the greatest blessing as well as the greatest calamity, comes from our Father's hand and is an expression of His holy will. We

are but fragments of an organic whole and cannot see the whole from a mere part. We cannot construct a theodicy in every minute detail because we cannot comprehend the whole from a knowledge of the part, the external goal from experience of the temporal order.

A pantheistic monism would strive to find a teleological end in every detail of the world's structure and history. Idealism tells us that whatever we experience is a fragment of the whole of reality and its end is seen only from a wider perspective than man possesses. Teleology is universal only from divine standpoint and man is not committed to it in the sense that he can trace a divine purpose to whatever evil befalls him.

(c) *The Omnipotence of God as Bearing on Physical Evil.*—The treatise given under the Reconciliation of Divine Omnipotence to moral evil will bear on this subject likewise for the most part. It may be wise, however, to emphasize a few additional points as we look into the relation of Divine Omnipotence to physical evil.

Omnipotence is but one attribute of God and not the most outstanding one in His relation to man or nature. In the moral realm we held the ethical relation He bears to man above the physical and in this instance we are forced to hold His intelligence of the moral order in its structure, history and destiny above mere physical force. There are many things God could do that would prevent many sufferings if He would deem it wise. He could cause many interruptions in the laws of the cosmos but by such interventions for different events we would have a medley of miracles instead of a moral world-order. By governing this universe with different laws for different events, human intelligence would be put to confusion. God as the reality of the whole sees the operation of this moral world-order in its entirety, has a vision of the end "to which all creation moves." As an intelligent active Agency He views the world as a unit instead of fragments. He deems it best for the whole in the end not to use His omnipotence in order to interrupt the uniform laws of nature.



We do not deny the omnipotence of God in the foregoing assertions. His immutability does not disprove His mobility. The mere fact that eclipses and storms and tides are determined by unchanging laws does not deny the omnipotence of God. Natural law is unchanging; yet not, theoretically, unchangeable. The laws of nature are not in themselves self-sufficient but are the free and self-determined will of God acting in relation to the creatures to whom He has delegated intelligence and moral life. God's cosmos is in the process of realizing His ends, in the process of its development as man is, and in this development physical evil is a possibility as well as moral evil, but these evils are only incidental in the moral world-order whose final end will be a triumph of the good.

(d) *The Divine Atonement as an Explanation of Suffering.*—In our study we found God to be the intelligent, active agent of this moral world-order. This basal truth causes us to think of God as being in absolute oneness with the world and its ills as suffered by finite beings. To remove Him from the world as an external ruler and creator would lead us to think of Him as cruel and helpless in regard to our finite ills. In identifying God with the world as we did we also identify Him with the sufferings His finite beings experience. Evil with its sufferings is opposed to the will or reasonable purpose of God and does not meet with His approval, yet it is apparent that it must fall within the sphere of that organic interaction in which the whole life of God unfolds itself, because otherwise there would be no possibility of its being overcome by the reaction of the divine organism of the world-order. Often it is asserted that the fact evil militates against the doctrine of monotheism but idealistic philosophy confirms that doctrine in its treatment of evil. Indeed, "the evil of the world could not be a moment which is destined to be removed and triumphed over in the harmony of the whole were not all the individual powers embraced by the unity of the whole life of God as subordinate moments of it, supported by His omnipotence, arranged by His perfect wisdom in an organic and purposeful system."

But to say that evil falls within the life of God as a moment of it we conclude that it must be felt by God and that He must suffer on account of the evil as it exists in the world. Our sufferings are not alien to the life of God. We exist as partial functions in the unity of the absolute and conscious process of the world. Our existence and our individuality are in an organic unity with the whole life of the Absolute Being. Consequently what we experience God experiences. What we suffer God suffers. Our concern of overcoming grief is His concern. His heart pulsates with ours. There was a time when God was not supposed to suffer. Suffering was thought to mar the perfection of God. But if we should read out of the life of God all passion, emotion and suffering we could not understand such words as, "For God so loved the world, that He gave His only begotten son, that whosoever believeth on Him, should not perish but have eternal life." (St. John 3:16.)

Our sufferings are God's sufferings and physical suffering is not sent as an external work, a penalty for sin nor is it due to His neglect as the intelligent active agency in the world. Grief, sorrow, pain are not means to an external end but they are a part of the divine life itself. The Cross was a struggle. Jesus was made perfect through suffering and suffering is a law that operates on finite beings as well as God. As stated, God created creators and analogically you may read back from creature to creator. As God is related to evil so are we as His creatures. Suffering is a law interwoven with life. The life most akin to God is not the life that has never experienced hardships and struggles that evil produces but rather the life that has experienced the triumph over evil. A woman on the lecture platform made the assertion that she had not suffered an ache or pain for ten years and through all that time had not a single thought of fear or worry. A stone in a building could offer a similar testimony but not God. There is a oneness existing between God and His creation.

Philosophical Idealism does not remove God from the world



but posits His immanence and as such He shares in our sorrows and triumphs in our victories. It is the right kind of a world for the development of His moral order in which man with repeated struggles reaches out to grasp the whole of life. Physical suffering with all its manifold possibilities is a law of life and God does not desire us to be overwhelmed by it. Such evils are more hardships than evils and are not incompatible with the perfection of the universe. As our struggles are God's so God's triumphs ought to be ours. If they are not the fault lies with us in our failure to live a life in harmony with His life. Evil exists only to be cast down, to be subordinated. The world viewed in its wholeness is an all-perfect ideal. We are finite, developing towards the attainment of the ideal. God is in the process and suffers in and with our ills with the assurance that evil will be subordinated. In this divine atonement we find our reasons that justify our physical ills and their accompanying sufferings.

In our study of this problem of evil we are not given to despair but are optimistic as to the final outcome in view of the fact that God as an ever active agency is working in the world. The Infinite expresses Himself in the finite and helps us and makes it possible for us to attain unto the ideal, unto the wholeness of life of which we are a part. Now we see only in part. "Beloved, now are we the children of God, and it is not yet made manifest what we shall be. We know that, if he shall be manifested, we shall be like him; for we shall see him even as he is."<sup>9</sup> If the novelist would reveal the secret of the story in the beginning of his work it would prove fatal to the interest of the book. The reader digs through its pages having faith that afterwards the plot will be revealed. As finite beings we start out without any definite knowledge of the beginning or the end. That knowledge belongs to the Infinite. But our study enkindles within us the most robust faith in Him whom we can well trust to the end, knowing the end to be a worthy culmination to the world process.

<sup>9</sup> 1 John 3: 2.

As to the entrenchment of both moral and physical evil in the world we find our answer in God's relation to His creation. If we cannot say that goodness is at the heart of the universe then we cannot say whether the world is good or evil. But we believe in the divine immanence of God and hence we need not be pessimistic as to the final outcome of things. God's wisdom and goodness are at the heart of things. Satan had his limitations in the temptations of Job and so evil, in its various phases, has its limitations to-day. There is no dualism where two parties of equal power contend with one another. Jehovah is upon the throne and holds the sceptre of power. With goodness at the heart of the universe and God immanent as well as transcendent we have ground for the most robust faith that goodness will prevail.

Though evil is round about us, we, with the right conception of evil and God's immanent relation to the world as its intelligent, active agent, will find true nourishment for our faith and shall say with Job, "Though He slay me yet will I trust in Him."

"I know not what the future hath,  
Of marvel or surprise;  
Assured alone in life and death  
His mercy underlies.

"I know not where His islands lift,  
There fronded palms in air;  
I only know I cannot drift,  
Beyond His love and care."



## VII.

### CONTEMPORARY SOCIOLOGY.

A. V. HIESTER.

Of all utopias, ancient, medieval and modern, the most serious, as well as the most scientific from the economist's point of view, is Hertzka's *Freiland: ein soziales Zukunftsbild*. Written two years after the appearance of *Looking Backward* it clearly reflects the influence of that romance; and its author has frequently been called the Austrian Bellamy. Dr. Theodor Hertzka, born in 1845, is a distinguished Austrian journalist and economist, the author of several notable works on economic subjects, a recognized authority on currency questions, who in his general economic views holds or has held to what is known on the Continent as the Manchester School in distinction from the Historical School of political economy.

*Freiland* is in part a reversion to the earlier types of utopias. Unlike such recent ones as *Looking Backward* and *News from Nowhere*, and unlike also the great body of modern socialists who believe that socialism, if it ever will be realized, must come through evolution and not through sporadic colonial experiments, *Freiland* does not in the first instance concern itself with the transformation of a long established social order. Nor does it, on the other hand, as is so commonly the case with the earlier utopias, content itself with the presentation of the finished picture of a magically established and accidentally discovered society of diminutive proportions in some remote corner of the world. What it does do is to exhibit a new society in the making, a social experiment projected on socialistic lines modified by individualistic principles, apart from the currents of civilized life, employing every device of modern science in the conduct of life and the production of

wealth, and rapidly developing from its small beginnings until it is satisfied with nothing less than the conversion of the world to its principles. In this world-conquering quality, and the thoroughgoing utilization of the achievements of modern science, and the consequent large scale on which everything is planned and done, combined with the principle of social experimentation and the making of a society *de novo*, *Freiland* holds a unique place among the world's utopias.

It may appear strange that an orthodox economist should be the author of a social romance. But too much stress must not be laid on the romantic quality of the work. The author had a two-fold purpose in this. "In the first place," he says, "I hoped by means of vivid and striking pictures to make the difficult questions which form the essential theme of the book acceptable to a wider circle of readers than I could have expected to reach by a dry systematic treatment. In the second place, I wished by means of the concrete form thus given to a part of my abstractions to refute by anticipation the criticism that these abstractions, though correct *in thesi*, were nevertheless inapplicable *in praxi*."

*Freiland* is not then an idle dream, but the serious effort of an orthodox economist, who confesses to a considerable change of heart, to solve the strange enigma that despite all the splendid advances in art and science in recent years there has been no sensible mitigation of human misery. That the ever increasing productivity of modern industry has proven, not a blessing, but a curse to humanity, is due, as the author maintains, to the fact that there exists no demand for the many good and useful things which are being produced. And the reason why there is no demand for these things is that the masses, however much they may need and desire them, are not in a position to command them, because they have no right to more of what they produce than is necessary for their bare subsistence. And the further reason why the masses are able to secure from their labor no more than a bare subsistence is that the entrepreneur, the landowner, and the capitalist, make



claim, and are able under existing legal and industrial conditions to enforce their claims, to a large part of the product. The consequence of it all is that the limited demand of the many poor, limited because they are so poor, and the still more limited demand of the few rich, limited because they are so few, fall far short of the productive possibilities of modern industry.

This then is the great question now confronting political economy. Why do we not become richer in proportion to our increasing capacity for producing wealth? The question is essentially modern. It could not have arisen in ancient or in medieval times for the simple reason that human labor was not then productive enough to do more than provide the means of production after satisfying the indispensable consumption demands of the masses and the possessors of property. After the author has answered the question propounded by himself, and after he has analyzed the evil of over-production and under-consumption and referred it to its proper causes, he proceeds to provide a remedy.

*Freiland*, or Freeland, the name of the new commonwealth, as well as the title of the romance which describes it, is located in the interior of equatorial Africa where alone is to be found that seclusion which is so essential to the existence of a peculiar commonwealth. And in order to afford still further assurance of the success of the enterprise the illiterate and the criminal have been rigidly excluded from the beginning, since both must of necessity be under constant authority and surveillance; and this is altogether inconsistent with the principle of the absolute self-control and independence of the individual on which Freeland is founded.

This principle of self-control is fundamental. Except in the beginning, when production had to be for obvious reasons the common undertaking of the entire community, there has been absolute freedom for every one, so far as his skill and ability permit, to apply himself to that branch of industry which yields the greatest profit. But in order to make this

liberty something more than a name two things are necessary. The first requisite is that every one must know where the largest profits are to be had. This information is provided by the commonwealth through prompt and comprehensive trade reports which give the prices of all commodities, and the amounts of each produced and consumed, during a given period. The other requisite is access to the necessary means of production. This is accomplished by vesting in the commonwealth the exclusive ownership of land and capital, both of which are placed at the disposal of individuals and associations without cost, the only condition being that the capital so loaned must be repaid out of the profits of the enterprise within a given period determined by the nature of the enterprise.

While land and capital are owned in common, houses and other forms of consumers' goods are private property, and can be disposed of as freely at death as in life. The right of bequest is subject to but a single limitation. Between husband and wife there is an absolute community of goods, and only the survivor can definitively dispose of the common property. Private property in houses is limited by the requirement that they must be used by their owners, for as soon as they are let for rent they cease to be consumers' goods and become capital.

With the free use of land and capital there is combined the no less fundamental principle of free association for purposes of production. The former has eliminated the landowner and capitalist from the field of industry; the latter seeks to dispense with the entrepreneur. To insure the success of the voluntary associations, which are organized by the workers to carry on production without the intervention of employer or master, it is only necessary that the members know what sort of persons to set at the head of the enterprise, that they give such persons sufficient authority to direct the enterprise, and that they reserve to themselves enough power to retain the ultimate control of the enterprise in their own hands. This



will assure the necessary managing ability, while the self-interest and absolute equality of the members will secure the necessary industry and fidelity.

Any citizen of Freeland may at any time enter or leave any association whether a member of any other or not. He may belong to any number of associations at the same time; and his share of the net profits of each is determined by the amount of work contributed by him, which is in turn measured by the number of hours he has worked. But this does not mean that all the members of a given association receive the same returns, even when they have put in the same amount of time. One reason for this is to be found in the universal practice of giving to the older members of an association a certain per cent., usually from one to three, for every year of seniority. Skilled labor is paid a similar premium while the labor contributions of superintendents and directors are reckoned as equal to a certain number of hours, more or less arbitrarily fixed, per day. These premiums and ratios are not uniform from one association to another, but are determined by each one for itself.

The highest governing authority in an association is the general meeting in which every member possesses an equal voice. A simple majority is sufficient to carry ordinary motions; for dissolution or liquidation, or for the altering of statutes, a three-fourths majority is necessary. The general management of the business of the association is vested in a directorate elected for a certain number of years by the general meeting, but subject to recall at any time by the same authority. The minor officials are appointed by the directors, but the fixing of their salaries is the function of the general meeting. In addition to the directorate there is a council of inspection, likewise elected by the general meeting, whose powers, largely advisory in character, include the inspection of the books and the furnishing of periodical reports.

The effect of free land and capital, and the principle of free association for purposes of production, by means of which the

workers have solved the problem of organizing and disciplining themselves without the intervention of the entrepreneur, is to leave to the worker the entire product undiminished by rent, interest or profits. This does not mean, however, that labor is the sole source of value. This error of the so-called classical economists, which has been very generally adopted by modern socialism, is not accepted in Freeland. It is true, the worker gets the whole of the product, not, however, because labor is the sole source of the value of what he produces, but for the simple reason that he is not required to surrender a part of the product to the entrepreneur, the capitalist and the landowner. Now to leave the entire product in the hands of the worker, however it may be explained, not only multiplies the consumption of the masses, and thus serves to correct the constant disproportion between consumption and production so characteristic of the exploitative system of industry, but it also eliminates the conflict of interest between producers which must inevitably arise as soon as consumption falls short of production. In such a conflict each producer, instead of turning out the largest and best product possible, seeks only to secure for himself the largest possible market; and the more he succeeds in selling the less his competitors are able to sell. Hence the interest of one producer is clearly opposed to that of the other.

It is altogether different in Freeland, where, owing to the fact that the total product belongs to the worker, consumption is the measure of production, the one increasing *pari passu* with the other. It is to the interest of every producer, therefore, that every other producer should produce as much as possible, since every increase in production will be followed by a corresponding increase in consumption. And the consequence is a solidarity of interest that is quite unknown wherever labor is subject to constant exploitation.

If it be objected that the practice of providing the producer with free capital out of the public taxes is unjust, since it burdens the many in the interest of a particular class, the



answer is that each one pays taxes in proportion to the work that he does. According to the same measure he also employs capital. But even if one does not employ capital himself, or does not employ it in the same proportion in which he pays taxes, he is still held to benefit from its use on the principle that every increase in production is equally distributed among all.

Another objection to the principle of free capital is that as long as capital is free to all there can be no guarantee that it will fall into the most capable hands, or be applied to those branches of industry that have most need of it. Here again the answer is ready at hand that owing to the mobility of labor, which is a corollary from the principle of free association, labor always seeks its best market by applying itself to those branches of industry which yield the largest profits. When the profits in a given industry happen to fall below the normal level that industry will fail to attract laborers, and even lose some of those which it has, until the lessened product raises the price, and with it the profits, to the required level. Hence the logical effect of the mobility of labor is to establish a uniform level of profits in all industries. But this is never completely realized for the reason that labor is not perfectly mobile even in Freeland; hence a certain amount of inequality is inevitable. In many instances, of course, existing inequalities cannot be immediately known or corrected. In other instances, difficult or dangerous kinds of labor must be rewarded with larger profits than the easier and more agreeable kinds in order to attract the requisite number of workers. Still another source of inequality is to be found in the premiums, which are paid to the older members of an association, and which have the effect of attaching the veteran laborer to his work, even after the general level of profits in that particular industry has been materially diminished. Similar to these wage premiums in their effect on profits are the salaries of directors and superintendents, which, more or less arbitrarily fixed, vary greatly from industry to industry and thus prevent the absolute equalization of profits.

The workers are appointed to the different grades and locations of land in precisely the same way in which they are apportioned, or apportion themselves, to the different industries. The better and more desirable lands by attracting more workers yield smaller and smaller profits, according to the law of diminishing returns, until they fall to the level of the profits obtained from the poorer grades of land.

Freeland is an industrial democracy, and the character of its government is very largely determined by its economic needs. The chief postulates of its political philosophy are the following: that every one has an equal and inalienable claim upon the land and other means of production accumulated by the community; that women, children, old men, and men incapable of work, have a right to a maintenance fairly proportionate to the level of the average wealth of the community; that no one can be hindered from the active exercise of his own free individual will so long as he does not infringe upon the rights of others.

The legislative and executive branches of the government—there is no judicial branch—are both divided into twelve departments corresponding to the main divisions of industry. Each of these departments has its legislative assembly and executive board. While every legislative assembly is elective the basis of election varies. Those which are concerned with the general interests of the community, such as education, art, science, sanitation and maintenance, are elected on the basis of residence. In other cases where particular interests are involved the electors vote according to calling. The numerical strength of these legislative assemblies varies from thirty to a hundred and twenty. Some sit continuously, while others meet merely for a few days once a year. Legislative service is paid for at the rate of eight labor hours for each day of actual service. When matters affecting several departments of industry are to be determined all the legislative bodies concerned sit together. One of the most important functions of



the legislative assemblies is the appointment of the highest executive officials who in turn appoint the inferior ones.

While every elector is free to enroll himself in any calling with which he prefers to vote, he is expected to confine his political activity to that branch of public affairs which he understands, or thinks he understands, best. To do otherwise would be to invite severe public condemnation. And in giving his vote in that branch of industry with which he has affiliated himself the elector is again expected to vote for the candidate who in his judgment is best qualified for the place. It follows, therefore, that every branch of the public administration is in the hands of experts. Women have the same right to vote as men, but with few exceptions they refrain from voting in those elections which concern only particular callings. In those elections, however, in which the voting is according to residence, they usually take an active interest; and not infrequently they sit in the legislative assemblies for education, art, science, sanitation and maintenance, although they take no part in the executive.

The maintenance of women, children, the aged, and the incapable, constitutes an important department of the government. Only in rare instances, that is, when exceptional gifts justify it, are women permitted to engage in any calling other than teaching and nursing. When they engage in any calling they are paid for their services the same as men. Single women who are neither teachers nor nurses receive thirty per cent. of the average income of the working part of the population. For married women the allowance is fifteen per cent., and for each of the first three children in a household it is five per cent. All men over sixty years of age, and all sick or incapable, receive forty per cent. All these allowances are not only high enough to command much more than the necessities of life, but they are constantly increasing because based on the average income of the working part of the population.

This system of maintenance is based on the general principle that the wealth of an individual is not the product of his

own capabilities but an heritage from previous generations, which belongs to the weak and incapable no less than to the strong and capable. And as to women, there is the additional principle that they are unfitted by nature to wage an active struggle for existence, and that their destiny is limited to the function of propagation and the beautifying and refining of life. The only reason why women are given smaller allowances than men is, not that their claims are regarded as less, but that their needs are less.

The average income upon which these allowances are based varies from year to year, but has steadily increased from the beginning owing to the extraordinary productivity of the soil and the unlimited use of machinery. The first year it was £160; at the end of the twenty-fifth year it had increased to £600. During the same period the average working day decreased from six hours to five. Because of the excessive heat in the middle of the day the hours of labor are from five to ten in the morning and from four to six in the afternoon. But no one is required to observe these hours. In those callings in which work cannot be intermitted the minimum number of laborers is secured during the hot hours of the day and at night by the payment of higher wages.

But money income by itself affords no index of economic well-being. Prices must likewise be taken into account. The first year a cwt. of flour cost 7s., a fat ox 12s., a complete suit of good woollen clothing 20s. to 30s. Lodgings for single persons cost no more at the most than £2 a year. In later years prices became higher, but the average money income, and with it all maintenance allowances, rose much more. But real incomes are even larger than they appear to be, from a comparison of money incomes and prices, because of the fact that many forms of service, which elsewhere must be paid out of private income, are in Freeland furnished gratuitously by the commonwealth. Thus traveling is absolutely free to all, whether by rail, or by water, or by electric conveyance. The same is true of electric lighting, the post, the telegraph and the telephone. Education, too, is free in all grades and departments.



The commonwealth does so much more for its citizens than is done by other nations that it requires extraordinary sources of income. But the national budget is a marvel of simplicity. To furnish the necessary capital for all forms of industry, to provide the large amounts required for education, to erect and maintain the necessary public buildings, to improve the means of communication and transportation, and to maintain the women and children and those incapacitated from work, the sole dependence of the commonwealth is a tax on income, which averages about thirty-five per cent. of the net income. No one regards this as a burdensome tax, since it is all expended for the common good and must necessarily return to the individual again in various forms of benefit. It is not to be regarded as a deduction from net income so much as an outlay deducted from the gross product with which to carry on the business.

That such a tax meets all the technical requirements of a good tax appears from the fact that there is no source of income except labor, that the income of everyone is exactly known, and that the tax is imposed at the source of the income. Hence there can be neither evasion nor discrimination, and the tax is, therefore, also a just one. The tax is apportioned by the central bank at which every individual and every association keeps an account. No money is used in domestic business transactions, all payments being made by check on this central bank which credits each one with his earnings and debits him with his expenditures. The loans of capital made to individuals and associations by the commonwealth likewise appear on the books of the bank. In this way the bank is informed of the minutest detail of every business transaction throughout the country, as well as every detail of domestic economy. No one can have any source of income unknown to it.

While certain forms of public expenditure are much higher in Freeland than elsewhere, there are others again, like those for justice and police protection, which, notwithstanding the

fact that they absorb fully ninety per cent. of the national income in other countries, cost nothing in Freeland. There are no courts of justice, since disputes between individuals and associations are settled by arbitration. There is almost no crime, and when it does occur it is not punished but protected. Crime is held to be impossible for men with a normal mental and moral character and living in a community in which all the just interests of every member are equally recognized. Hence casual criminals are regarded as mentally or morally diseased persons, who must be subjected to treatment as long as the public safety in the judgment of competent professional men may require it. These professional men are not magistrates but physicians specially chosen for this purpose. But appeals may be taken from their decisions to a mixed board of physicians and magistrates, who are required to hear the appeal in public.

Freeland is built on large lines in a way that is truly marvelous. In this it differs from all other utopias that aim to initiate the process of social reconstruction through colonial experiments. At the end of the first year it had a population of 95,000 souls, of whom 27,000 were men organized into 218 associations and engaged in 87 different kinds of work. Twenty-four years later the population had increased to 42,000,000—26,000,000 whites and 16,000,000 natives—occupying an area of 580,000 square miles. The total value of products was £7,000,000,000, one-fifth of which was exported to Europe and America. There were 380,000 miles of railroad, 30,000 miles of canals, 3,000 ocean freight steamers with a tonnage of 14,500,000 tons, and 17,800 lake and river steamers with a tonnage of 5,200,000,000 tons. The motive power for these railroads, canals and ships, and for all kinds of machinery, totaled 240,000,000 horse power, more than twice the mechanical power employed by the rest of the world, and averaging nine and a half horse power, or the equivalent of 120 laborers, for every inhabitant.

The story closes with a brief account of the extension of



the principles on which Freeland is founded over the civilized world. Its marvelous success had prompted numerous attempts at imitation, which were not infrequently accompanied by revolutionary uprisings, bloodshed and anarchy. With the purpose of reaching a common understanding, and making it possible to prosecute the task of social reconstruction with a minimum of disorder and violence, it was determined to invite all the nations of the earth to a conference. To this conference held in Freeland 68 nations sent 425 delegates.

The first edition of *Freiland* was quickly followed by three others in abridged form. In less than two years it had been translated into a number of languages, while more than a thousand local unions had been formed, chiefly in Germany and Austria, to provide the means of starting a colony. These local unions embraced all classes of people and were later united in an International Freeland Society. In March, 1891, it was announced from Vienna that a suitable tract of land could be had in British East Africa. In the end, however, insuperable difficulties developed and the project failed.

LANCASTER, PA.

## VIII.

### THE STARS NOT INHABITED.<sup>1</sup>

A. T. G. APPLE.

This is the title of one of the latest attempts to answer a query that has never ceased to trouble the minds of people ever since the dawn of astronomy. Professor Townsend puts no interrogation mark at the end of his title. It is rather the opposite: he is perfectly sure of his conclusions. The question is decisively negatived from every approach, but chiefly from the two points of view, that of natural science, and that of philosophy and theology. The first half of the book is occupied with a demolition of the arguments adduced from time to time by imaginative astronomers who let fancy run in various excursions through the universe in an attempt to picture what might be. This half is a rather interesting assemblage of quotations from various writers giving their standpoint, or fancy, on the question of the habitability of other worlds. As advocates of the theory mention is made of Dr. Chalmers, the Herschels, father and son, La Place, Prof. Mitchell, Sir Richard Owen, Isaac Taylor, Arago, Bruno, Nola, Kepler, Tycho, Fontenelle, while quotations are adduced from Newcomb, Flammarion, Brewster, Lodge, Brashear, Lardner, Elliott, Paliza, and Howe, and additional opinions respecting the possibilities of communications with inhabitants of Mars are quoted from Lowell, Pickering, W. H., and Todd. One could follow the argument with more assurance were it not for a certain carelessness of statement and misstatements frequently appearing.

<sup>1</sup> "The Stars Not Inhabited," Prof. L. T. Townsend, D.D., S.T.D., pp. 250. Eaton and Mains, New York.



It shows carelessness to confuse the two brothers Edward C. and William H. Pickering. It is not true that the projected 100-inch reflector is in use on Mt. Wilson; it is only lately it became possible to find a glass disc fit to make the mirror while its completion is still in the future. The assertion that the sun is "several million degrees hotter than the hottest of our atmospheres" is far and away beyond the highest estimate the most reckless has dared to attribute to that very uncertain quantity, the Sun's temperature. It is carelessness to state the diameter of Saturn as "seventy-three millions of miles" when it is only seventy thousand. In trying to prove that no planets revolving about the fixed stars could have inhabitants the author uses the star Capella as an example, and finds that, considering its intense heat, a planet would have to be so far away as to be in danger of entanglement with other systems. Putting his figures to the test we find that, granting Capella to be 128 times hotter than our sun, a planet might be placed in an orbit where it would receive no more heat than we do from our sun and yet be relatively no nearer to disturb us than an ant wandering twelve inches from its nest would threaten another ant thirty-three miles away, while the nearest star-nest would be still four or five miles away. The way in which Darwinism and Evolution are treated indiscriminately in the endeavor to prove that scientists generally are abandoning the doctrine of evolution shows that the philosophy of the book has been little more successful in escaping confusion than its mathematics.

Aside from these shortcomings, the main argument of the first section of the book we believe to be valid. The arguments for the habitability, first of Mars, are examined with the verdict, "not proven." The main reliance for the contention that there is rational life on Mars rests in the reputed existence of intricate series of fine straight lines radiating from numerous minute dots scattered over the surface of the planet. As figured by those who claim to see them they create the impression of a billiard ball enclosed in a fabric of

fine woven net work. The perfect straightness of these markings, and the claim that new ones are being continually formed constitute the principal basis on which is founded the whole claim that there are intelligent beings at the other end to engineer the forces that result in this appearance. And as it is further claimed that these fine lines appear and disappear coincidentally with the diminishing or the increase of extensive white patches covering the poles of Mars; and as the changes in these pole-caps coincide with the Martian seasons, ground is afforded for the theory that the fine lines are an extensive irrigation system by which water is brought from the melting polar snows, which stimulates vegetable growth for great distances on either side the main canal, and it is these strips of vegetation that give to us the impression of dark lining seen in some drawings of Mars. It is easy to see that the argument narrows itself down to this: straight markings cannot occur in nature, therefore the markings on Mars must be artificial, and therefore the crux of the whole matter is, first the reality of the markings, and then the validity of the primary contention. Certain it is that markings are seen on Mars. But they are so extremely faint as to be barely within the limits of visibility,—a region where vision is given to playing all manner of pranks upon the observer especially where it gets the suggestion of a wish or a preconceived idea. So to account for the appearances we have the theory of the “ray illusion” suggested by Prof. Douglass who formerly was an assistant at Flagstaff, according to which radiant lines are apt to appear diverging from a minute dot at the limit of vision. We do not think this will explain the appearances. The “canals” have something more to go on than mere illusion. However doubtful we may be as to their straightness or continuity, the fact remains, they are there. They have been photographed,—albeit very faintly,—and the principal ones always show up in the same place. At this point the Greenwich astronomers come in with a rather interesting experiment. A white disc upon which were scattered irregular specks and dots was placed at the one



end of a long room and a number of students at various distances were asked to sketch what they saw. The result was a number of drawings strikingly like those of the Martian canals, especially in the case of those draughtsmen not too near the object sketched. And so the theory at Greenwich and other European observatories is that Mars is covered with markings similar to those seen on the moon, and these owing to their distance, and also the disturbances always present in the atmosphere, the eye, and even the camera, sees as lines. In support of this contention comes M. Antoniadi, director of the Mars section of the British Astronomical Association, with the claim that with the superior power of the great refractor at Meudon in France, he could see these lines broken up into irregular markings. Director Campbell, of the Lick observatory, corroborates this testimony with the facetious remark that their telescope on Mt. Hamilton is "too strong to show the canals." The great difficulty in the controversy over the reality of the appearances lies in the different quality of the "seeing" in different parts of the world, whether the outlook is over a great city, or from the calm heights of a desert plateau. And here is exactly where Professor Lowell bases his challenge to the astronomical world to "come to Flagstaff and see for yourselves," though the force of the challenge may be somewhat blunted by the fact that his most determined opponents sit on Mt. Hamilton in the finest atmosphere in the world. Then a still greater difficulty is found in the varying degrees of talent for good drawing found in different observers, and the different "styles" in those of equal talent. One pictures what he sees in an artistic imaginative way, another puts down everything in a severe, mathematical, scientific manner. There are impressionists, and there are cubists, as well as realists among astronomers too. Prof. Wm. H. Pickering is just now engaged in a study which may result in clearing up many apparent contradictions. In addition to extensive studies of his own carried forward in the clear atmosphere of Jamaica, he is endeavoring to bring

together all available drawings made in different parts of the world by a great variety of observers. By comparing these, especially when they happen to be made at the same hour, some idea can be gained of the personal peculiarities of each astronomer, what might be called his "personal equation" can be made out, and the way cleared for getting at the objective basis of his particular drawing. In this way the work of each observatory can be appraised, and the truth arrived at by a study of resemblances instead of divergences.

The reality established of what is seen, the question is by no means settled. It remains to decide can Nature unaided by art produce straight lines on so vast a scale as appears on Mars. Here again astronomers are divided. Prof. Lowell and his adherents maintain that it is impossible. Straight lines may form naturally in crystalline forms, but when the scale of a planet is met it is different. On the other hand, Prof. W. H. Pickering from a study of volcanic forms in Hawaii, and from the white rays surrounding some lunar volcanoes, concludes that nature forces can under certain conditions produce results very strongly suggesting the "canals" of Mars. The mud cracks, cracks in asphalt, and "craze" in Japanese pottery which Prof. Townsend figures in the work under review, we do not think prove anything, as they are on such a totally different scale. For the same reason his analogies drawn from snow, frost, and other crystals are beside the point.

Let it be granted, however, that the canals are irrigating waterways, it remains to show how water can be conveyed across thousands of miles of desert in an atmosphere not more than one tenth the density of our own, and where the boiling point of that water must be reduced to  $84^{\circ}$  Fahrenheit and the rapidity of its evaporation immensely increased in consequence. While we do not consider this objection insuperable, there are a number of authorities cited by Professor Townsend who consider it fatal to the theory.

Again the stupendous engineering difficulties of constructing an irrigation system compared to which the Panama canal



itself is but the puddling of school children in the gutter of a summer shower, cause others to turn from the theory of artificial construction. The answer is ingenious. Since gravitation is so much less on Mars owing to its much smaller size, the man in the trenches there could lift a shovelful just three times as great as the terrestrial digger, and the work, whether done by pick and shovel or by machinery, would go forward just three times as fast as it would on the earth. One authority quoted attempts to reconstruct on a rational basis, the Martian physique. These people, owing to the extreme rarity of the atmosphere, must have an unusual extent of lung surface requiring enormously enlarged chest development, while with the extreme lightness of weight nature would practice her usual economy by setting them on legs the stoutness of a collie dog, a conjecture about as likely to be true as H. G. Wells's conception of a soft body of brain-like substance which through disuse has lost all bone and muscle tissue, and must enclose itself for protection in metal casings whence issue long electrically propelled cranes and levers by which the Martian walks about on stilts, catches its prey, and in the absence of a digestive apparatus nourishes its life by transfusion of the living blood of its victim.

And so after a weighing of arguments pro and con Professor Townsend comes to the conclusion that "such conceptions and statements [that Mars is inhabited by rational beings] from a scientific point of view, never have been less rational than at this very moment."

Mars disposed of, the remaining planets require less attention. Conditions are in the case of each planet so different from those obtaining on the earth that no one who has studied the physical aspects of the problem, for a moment thinks of attributing rational inhabitants to any other of our planets. The great and significant fact of uniformity revealed by the spectroscope convinces us now that the range of conditions under which life is possible on the earth must be substantially the same as on any other cosmic body. The hydrogen and

helium of a distant star behave in their reactions, physically and chemically, exactly as they do in the laboratory, and therefore we have no reason to assume (as an extreme case) fire-proof protoplasm existing in the sun or the stars and containing a form of life different from that with which we are acquainted.

The second part of our book concerns the philosophical and theological points of view. The ancient world believed in astrology, which is interpreted by our author as the result of a belief that the stars were inhabited, though if there was any idea of inhabitants in the ancient mind, ignorant as it was of the real size and distance of the stars, it must have been spiritistic in character and very different from the modern conception. The Biblical writers, in contrast with the heathen world, warned their disciples against astrology as savoring of witchcraft, and by their silence as to any other rational beings besides men and women, intended us to understand that the stars were not inhabited. The high estate which they attribute to man is interpreted absolutely by our author, and made to rule out any other orders of being in the universe, not only superiors but equals. The uniqueness of man, moreover, is proven by the whole doctrine of the Fall, Redemption, Vicarious Atonement, the Trinity and Christology, and these doctrines are therefore opposed to the belief in inhabitants on other worlds. The argument is far from convincing. All that is said would remain true whether or not rational beings existed in some favored planet revolving about some distant star. To the challenge "*cui bono*" in the face of the vast expanse of the cosmos the only answer is, "to incite man to wonder, study, and adore." It is a pretty conceit that pictures the stars as a "vast belfry of the sky trying to call the children of men away from their petty businesses and their useless and tiresome controversies to a religious service of prayer and praise in this vast temple not made with hands." The demand "*why this waste?*"—these millions on millions of suns and attendant planets—is met by the reminder that nature knows



no waste where she creates millions of seeds and eggs that never mature. At the same time, notwithstanding that in addition to this we see this apparent waste growing more and more prodigal as we descend the scale of being, yet to think of only one world inhabited in the universe and all the rest a deserted waste—well it rather offends our social instincts. The argument fails to convince.

The question is an indeterminate one,—not enough equations for the unknown quantities, and so will never cease to have its pull on the imagination rather than the reason. It is of but little practical moment. Its discussion serves only as a sort of exercise to test a writer's expertness in either physical social, or theological science. The inhabited planet is a sort of Utopia land to which new experiments can be removed now that the geography of our own planet has been practically worked out. There is, however, an interest in the various answers given the question, in that they are usually a reflection of the attitude of mind of the age in which they were made. So that we find the answer given by Christian Huyghens in the end of the seventeenth century very different from that made by E. Walter Maunder in the twentieth. At the time the former wrote astronomy was practically in its infancy: physics was only making a beginning with its vast fields unexplored; nothing was known of electricity and magnetism, the spectroscope was unknown, and the telescope even was a crude cumbersome affair. So the astronomer had free rein for the imagination in picturing conditions on the planets, sun, and stars. Wm. Herschel could describe the surface of the sun as conducive to intelligent life in such fulness that he would call it heaven, with no one able to say him nay. Huyghens in his little treatise in a bright chatty manner conducts the reader from planet, to sun, to star, finding inhabitants swarming everywhere, and he does not even slight the satellites, and the asteroids. Physical laws count for nothing, fancy and imagination everything; and yet our guide is the man who first attached a pendulum to a clock and gave the world its most rigorously exact measurement, time.

Quite differently is the subject handled by the twentieth century inquirer. Fancy must now walk circumspectly. The conditions under which life can exist are accurately known, the laws of physics are clearly searched out; it is found that the conditions that make life possible are by far more numerous and intricate than was once supposed. And each new necessary condition decreases manifold the chances of finding a place in the universe where the environment is possessed of all the qualities of a life-bearing one, and this notwithstanding the persistent tendency of life to establish itself wherever there is the very least possibility—in deserts dry or hot springs in the volcanic valley. So the answer of the second writer mentioned above, Professor Maunder, is quite different from the answer of the eighteenth century. The tendency of astronomers is now reversed and there is a strong disposition to answer the question of cosmic inhabitants in the negative. At the same time the conclusions of Professor Maunder are far from being as sweeping as those of Professor Townsend. Bound by no dogmatic presuppositions, he sees the possibility of frequent cases in planets attending solar stars on which rational beings might be expected. Though owing to the necessity of so large a number of favorable conditions coinciding, we must expect a much larger number of worlds that have either failed of inhabitants, because of the premature ripening of one condition or the tardy perfection of another; or we must expect a large number on the other hand that are not ready yet for habitation. And taking into account the comparatively short time of habitability as compared to the preparatory period, and the period of exhaustion, we must say that the number of habitable worlds in the solar system is confined to the earth alone, and among the stellar systems must be very much rarer than has been supposed by many writers.

LANCASTER, PA.



## IX.

### NOTICES OF NEW BOOKS.

JOHN HUSS: HIS LIFE, TEACHINGS, AND DEATH AFTER FIVE HUNDRED YEARS. By David S. Schaff, D.D., Professor of Church History in the Western Theological Seminary. New York, Charles Scribner's Sons. \$2.50 net.

This volume was doubtless prepared in view of the celebration of the five-hundredth anniversary of the martyrdom of John Huss. Few men in this country were better fitted to write it than Dr. Schaff. His reputation as a church historian was established when he published Volume V, in two parts, of Schaff's Church History. The extensive researches into the history of the middle ages required by this work prepared him for writing the monograph on John Huss. Evidences of his mastery of the later mediæval period are found on every page. The author, also, thoroughly familiarized himself with the doctrines of Huss by his translation into English of the Latin treatise on the Church. Besides he had access to the recently discovered and published work of Huss on the Sentences of Peter Lombard which has not been accessible to earlier biographers. He, also, made use of all the editions of the complete work of Huss as well as of Flajshans' recent edition of separate works. These sources and authorities are cited in the Preface. The book is both comprehensive and accurate in its details. It leaves little more to be desired. It is probably the latest and most scholarly treatise on the Bohemian Reformer in the English language.

In the first chapter the background of Huss's life is clearly sketched. He describes the ideals of the Church in which he grew up and by which he was condemned. The Papacy, the Church, and the Inquisition are mentioned as the great mediæval constructions. Against each of these institutions Huss entered protest. The author cites five distinct reformatory groups, each in its own way opposing the claims of papal absolutism. Huss belonged to one of these.

His training as a priest, his part in the University of Prague, his preaching in the Bethlehem Chapel, his debt to Wyclif, his national leadership, his revolt against the Archbishop and the Pope, are described in successive chapters. Chapters seven to eleven contain a vivid account of his withdrawal from Prague, his appearance before the Council of Constance, and his martyrdom at the stake. Of special merit is chapter eleven, defining Huss's place in history, his relation to his predecessors, his contemporaries, and the reformers of the sixteenth century.



The style is clear and easily holds the attention of the reader. While the book is scholarly, it is none the less popular, and should be commended not only to ministers but also to the intelligent laymen of the Church.

GEORGE W. RICHARDS.

CAPTAIN JOHN SMITH. By Rossiter Johnson. New York, The Macmillan Company. Pp. 190. Price 50 cents.

This biography is one of a series published by the Macmillan Company under the general title of True Stories of Great Americans. The books in the series which have already come from the press are Robert Fulton, Benjamin Franklin, Robert E. Lee and the volume before us on Captain John Smith. The writers of these volumes are emphasizing those events in the lives of great Americans which are calculated to appeal to the younger reader. The story of John Smith is attractively told by one who is not only accurate as an historian but who at the same time has an appreciation of what makes really good juvenile literature. If our boys and girls would read graphic, vivid, trustworthy biographies such as is this life of John Smith, instead of poring over the so-called imaginary tales of adventure or the cheap modern historical novels which are neither historical nor in any worthy sense of the word novels, they would get an insight into real adventure and real history that would serve to put a spur to their ambition. Sunday Schools and public school libraries would do well to procure the volumes of this series.

H. M. J. KLEIN.

GETTING A WRONG START. A Truthful Autobiography. Anonymous. New York, The Macmillan Company. Pp. 234. Price \$1.00.

We have in this volume the fascinating story of a man who spent the first forty-five years of his life in an attempt to find himself, and who after various failures eventually succeeded in filling a prominent place in literature and business. He writes this autobiography in the hope that it will be of use to some young man or older man who perhaps has lost heart in the long, hard struggle of getting on in the world. He writes for those who think they have failed. "For," says he, "truth is sometimes stranger than fiction. By no possibility could any man make more mistakes than I have made, make a worse start originally or make more bad starts later on in life. If success may begin after forty-five for one man, it may do so for others. It is that conviction alone which induces me to write."

The book is exceedingly readable. It tells of a young man of good parentage, and of splendid college training suddenly thrown out into the world without any definite plan, and simply floundering. He tries a dozen different things and fails in each. The



pages of the book are really a full and honest confession of a man who was a rolling stone for more than half a life time. It is an attempt to analyze the question why he did not succeed in his early efforts.

A touch of romance is given to his story as he confides to his readers the fact that when his prospects were poorest an heroic woman came into his life. Then came the long road that turned. When he ceased to be a rolling stone he gathered moss. With evident good humor he describes how the world which almost left him starve in the days of his hardest struggles beckoned him and discovered him and tried to honor him as soon as his books were listed among the best sellers. He describes too how he got a respectable footing in the business world as soon as royalties began to come in.

The writer's idea of success is by no means measured by financial standards. It is rather the finding of a place of real usefulness in the world adapted to one's capacities and inclinations. The book closes with some splendid advice to men who are halting or dismayed at what life is sending against them.

The style is simple, direct, straightforward. The interest is sustained throughout. The reader closes the book feeling that he has really been helped.

H. M. J. KLEIN.

**THE BIBLE AND LIFE.** By Edwin Holt Hughes, Bishop of the Methodist Episcopal Church. Published by the Methodist Book Concern, New York and Cincinnati. Price \$1.00 net.

This volume consists of a series of lectures delivered before the students of DePauw University. They are known as the Mendenhall Lectures; and are the first of a series to be delivered annually under the foundation endowed by the Rev. Marmaduke H. Mendenhall. The foundation consists of an endowment of ten thousand dollars "to found a permanent lectureship on the evidences of the Divine Origin of Christianity."

In the introduction the author says that he "does not claim to be a Biblical scholar in the technical sense. Nor did he deem that the primary need of the students whom he addressed would be met by a discussion of theories of inspiration or of dates and authorship. College students have a passion for reality, and the most convincing apologetic for them is the argument from actual living." This determined the nature and the scope of the discussion, which the author has undertaken in these lectures. We think he was wise in the selection of his method. The lectures throughout are based on the teachings of the Bible, and these are everywhere tested by the fruits which they have produced in the life of men and of nations. The scope of the lectures may be pretty fairly estimated from the topics discussed: The Bible and



Life; The Bible and Man; The Bible and Home; The Bible and Education; The Bible and Work; The Bible and Wealth; The Bible and Sorrow; The Bible and Practice.

The lectures throughout are wholesome; and De Pauw University is to be congratulated on the auspicious beginning of the new lectureship. The author's estimate of the Bible is sound, and the presentation of his subject such as must have given inspiration to the young people addressed. Here are a few sentences, which reveal in part the spirit which pervades the lectures. "The Bible was written by life, and the Bible was selected by life." "The Bible grew from life. The Bible was tested by life. The Bible climaxes in Life." "It would be too much to say that all revelation ceases with the closing of the canon. Lowell's claim that the Bible of the race is written slowly, that each race adds its texts of hope and despair, of joy and moan, and that the prophets still sit at the feet of God, cannot be denied." "The Bible is what it is, no matter what theory men may adopt as to its formation. It creates its own evidences. The argument for its inspiration is the life that it inspires." There is much more of the same kind, showing that the author is modern in his conception and alive to the deepest needs of the young men in our colleges.

The lectures seem to be printed just as they were delivered. The style is hence somewhat diffuse. While that was doubtless necessary in order to make the subject clear to young minds in the course of oral delivery, it somewhat detracts from the printed form in which the lectures are now presented. Yet even with this drawback, the book is to be commended. Many persons, who do not require scholarly and technical discussions, will find much in these lectures that is edifying and helpful.

WM. C. SCHAEFFER.

VARIETY IN THE PRAYER MEETING. By William T. Ward. The Methodist Book Concern, New York and Cincinnati. Pp. 192. Price 50 cents.

The author of this book was evidently constrained to write on the subject it proposes, because he shares with a multitude of ministers the conviction that the prayer meeting of this age of church activity is fast losing its accustomed place in the life and experience of believers. This doubtless accounts for the fact that he proposes in the contents of his book a great variety of methods and ingenious suggestions, for the leaders of prayer meetings, which if experimented with are likely to temporarily at least revive the interest, and increase attendance. For those who are puzzled, at every turn, to know what to do next, in order to arouse their people to a new interest in the prayer meeting, the book is most valuable.

The question which naturally arises, however, is whether the more or less artificial methods of attaining a certain measure of



visible success in this department of the Church are justifiable, and promising of worthy fruits, in view of the general apathy of church members toward the prayer meeting. It is coming to be acknowledged, apparently, that there is a great number of both ministers and laymen who do not see the need of this meeting in the church's life in the present age, for reasons that we cannot enter into here. Whether this be so or not, and especially while it is not universally acknowledged to be so, this book is welcome, for the help which it may render many hard working, sincere pastors who are battling with the prayer meeting service. The book contains a valuable bibliography in the appendix, which will help those who desire to study this subject more extensively.

W. STUART CRAMER.

A BOY'S RELIGION. By Edwin Holt Hughes. The Methodist Book Concern, New York and Cincinnati. Pp. 119. Price 50 cents.

This little book is written out of the experience and observation of its bishop-author. Its value is in the emphasis which it lays upon the home, teacher and pastor as determining agencies and influences in behalf of the religious temper and life of the boy. It is a very sane treatment of the boy problem, from the point of view of his early religious impressions and culture. It is practical rather than theoretical, taking the boy as he is, and suggesting the recognition of facts in his life which must be recognized and dealt with, by that method which is within the reach of parental and pastoral ability. The author does not encourage reliance upon miraculous spiritual powers for the boy's new birth, but advises the application of influences and discipline, which, when exercised with spiritual motives, will call forth the latent divine powers that are within him. The environment in which he will be most effectively helped is the Christian home, where God and His ideals of life, as revealed in Jesus Christ, are exemplified by God-fearing and respecting parents. The opportunity of the pastor and the church grows out of such a home, when parents are interested and active in the life of the church, and the pastor is a welcome visitor. This little book should be read by both parents and children.

W. STUART CRAMER.

JOHN HUS, THE MARTYR OF BOHEMIA, A STUDY OF THE DAWN OF PROTESTANTISM. By W. N. Schwarze, Ph.D., Professor of Church History in the Moravian College and Theological Seminary, Bethlehem, Pa. New York, Fleming H. Revell Company, 1915. Pp. 152. Price 75 cents.

This readable and authoritative short study of John Hus, The Martyr of Bohemia, comes from where one would naturally turn for it, the department of church history in the Theological Seminary of the Moravian Church, "The Renewed Church of the

Hussites." John Hus was burned at the stake (July 6, 1415) at Constance, Germany. He was the last of a group of men who have been styled the forerunners of the Reformation, and has frequently been referred to as "the morning star of the Reformation," for in his wake there followed the full daylight of the evangelical doctrine, which through the leadership of Zwingli, Luther, Calvin, and Knox, has encircled the whole world. In many respects he may be said to have begun the Reformation, and if circumstances had been more favorable he would undoubtedly have become the great leader of the opposition to Romanism.

The salient events in the life of the Bohemian reformer, especially his trial and death at Constance, are related in the stirring style and fashion of his fearless defiance of the Roman hierarchy; and his influence in the great revolt against papal authority in the fifteenth century is traced with a discerning eye. Well has this little book been styled "a study in the Dawn of Protestantism." Not only should this timely and popular study of Hus, prepared in commemoration of the five hundredth anniversary of his martyrdom, appeal to all Protestants and lovers of freedom of conscience and of government everywhere; but in a special sense to members of the Reformed Church, which was vitally related to the followers of Hus in the past and in whose folds most of his followers are found today.

JOHN BAER STOUT.





# THE REFORMED CHURCH REVIEW

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## I.

### THE FACTS OF THE PAST AND REFLECTIONS THEREON.<sup>1</sup>

A. E. TRUXAL.

It was our sainted Dr. Harbaugh who said "To forget the past is to forget our mercies, and to forget our mercies is to forget our God." We cannot well overestimate the truth of this statement. Under the providence of God various and innumerable blessings come to us from the past both near and remote. We are what we are and enjoy the things we possess largely because of what the past was and accomplished. We know this as a general truth; and while we can clearly trace some of the forces set in operation in the past which have aided in producing the present, yet we are to a large extent unable to unravel the tangled mass of influences that have come down to us from the life and experiences of past generations and have materially affected the people and the conditions of the present day; so that we know not what stuff we are made of.

This however is not the whole truth. If it were we would be the subjects of fate. There are two other forces which

<sup>1</sup> A paper read at the twenty-fifth session of the Spiritual Conference at Lancaster, Pa., July, 1915.



operate in producing the individual and determining his course of action—these are present conditions which are new in every age, and individual personality. However these do not fall in line with our present consideration. In regard to the relation which the different periods of time sustain to each other we may say that “the past exists for the future, and we can believe that the future will explain the past and justify the present.”

To-day we are to fix our attention on the past. We are not to forget it. It is the part of wisdom for man, individually and collectively, to stop at times in his career and view the course by which he has come; for only by so doing can he intelligently and wisely determine his course in the present. Otherwise he will walk in the dark.

Prompted by this general truth the Spiritual Conference, assembled in its twenty-fifth session, decided to take recognition of its more than a quarter of a century of existence. It had reached such a position that it was highly proper for it to take a retrospective view of its past labors, experiences, and accomplishments, in order that it might gain a vision of its future mission and enter upon it intelligently and efficiently.

#### THE SPIRITUAL CONFERENCE.—ITS ORIGIN.

In the spring of 1887, Rev. A. S. Weber, of Westminster, Md., paid a visit to his friend and brother Rev. D. B. Schneder, of Marietta, Pa., and in their communications with one another they discussed the desirability of an annual “retreat” for ministers and elders of the Reformed Church, and before separating, laid plans for inaugurating such a movement. They associated with themselves Rev. D. A. Souders, of Union Bridge, Md., who consented to act as secretary for this self constituted committee of three. They issued a circular letter and mailed it to the ministers east of the Alleghanies and published an explanation of the proposed conference in the *Messenger*. In their letter they expressed a felt

want on the part of some of the young ministers in the Church for such an assembly and quoting from a public journal said, "The long continued and uninterrupted exercise of the pastoral and homiletic offices tend toward hardness, mechanism and professionalism in the work of the ministry. And it is a thing very much to be desired that clergymen should absent themselves from the work at times to view it in the perspective; to recall their ordination vows; to get a deeper sense of the magnitude of their work; and to revive their spiritual lives by devotions and instruction in things in which they do not minister but in which they are interested." They solicited the opinion of their ministerial brethren on the subject. Thirty-five of them responded favorably to this letter. Consequently a call was issued and a program prepared for such a conference to meet August 5, 1887, at Mercersburg, Pa. Nineteen ministers and one elder, Wm. Heisler, of Chambersburg, attended the first conference. At the opening session Rev. M. H. Sangree preached a sermon on the words: Come ye ourselves apart into a desert place and rest awhile. The persons who took part in the program were Rev. Wm. Rupp, D.D., Prof. George L. Staley, D.D., Rev. S. N. Callender, D.D., Rev. C. F. McCauley, D.D., Rev. A. C. Whitmer and Rev. A. S. Weber. Eight of the ministers in attendance at this first meeting and Elder Heisler have since passed to the world beyond.

A constitution was adopted which gave the association the name of "The Assembly for Spiritual Conference of Ministers and Elders of the Reformed Church in the United States," and which stated that "The objects of the association are to afford its members opportunity to retire from their active labors for rest and for mental help in the study of the Bible and for the consideration of such topics as may fit them for the better discharge of their duties in the Master's Vineyard." An organization was effected by the election of Rev. M. H. Sangree president, Rev. H. Ditzler secretary, and Rev. D. A. Souders treasurer.



## MEETINGS.

The Assembly met annually for a period of six years, twice at Mercersburg and four times in the chapel and society halls of Franklin and Marshall College. The last of these meetings, however, was so poorly attended that no call for a conference was issued the following four years. At a meeting of the Alumni Association of the Theological Seminary in 1897, Rev. E. N. Kremer, D.D., Prof. J. C. Bowman, D.D., and Rev. C. E. Schaeffer were appointed a committee to call and arrange for a meeting of the assembly to be held during the summer or autumn of that year. The committee performed the duty assigned to it, and the Spiritual Conference has met annually since then; six times in Santee Hall of the Seminary; four times at Mt. Gretna; once at Pocono Pines; once at Asbury Park; and now seven times at Franklin and Marshall Academy.

## OFFICERS.

The officers have been elected or re-elected annually. The presidents have been M. H. Sangree, A. S. Weber, W. C. Schaeffer, Henry Mosser, T. J. Hacker, P. A. Delong, George W. Richards, C. E. Creitz, F. C. Seitz, H. W. Bright, Paul S. Leinbach, E. E. Kresge, and T. F. Herman. The secretaries, H. Ditzler, D. W. Gerhard, C. E. Schaeffer, H. H. Ranck, P. A. Delong, J. G. Rupp, Thomas H. Krick, W. F. Delong, Floyd R. Shafer, and Karl H. Gramm. The treasurers, D. A. Souders, J. C. Bowman, Thomas W. Dickert, and E. O. Keen.

## MEMBERSHIP.

The first meeting of the Assembly was attended by nineteen persons; the second by sixteen and the third by sixty-two. But the sixth sessions were so poorly attended, the record not giving the number present, that the meetings were discontinued for the time being. When in 1897 the meetings were revived the attendance was larger and it increased from year

to year, especially since they have been held at the academy. The highest mark was reached in 1913, when one hundred and thirty names were enrolled. During the past twenty-five years no less than from four to five hundred different persons from various sections of the church attended the conferences. The defects in the records prevent us from being more definite in these figures. But from the data at hand we are persuaded that with the meeting of 1915, the number of five hundred was fully reached. A considerable number of ministers have been present at the majority of the meetings held. And while those in attendance usually came from sections within easy reach of the meeting place, persons at times from more distant localities were also present. In the minutes of the meeting of 1890 we find this record: "As will appear from the names recorded the following institutions of our Church were represented: Franklin and Marshall College, Lancaster; Ursinus College at Collegeville; Heidelberg University at Tiffin, Ohio; Mercersburg College at Mercersburg; Palatinate College at Myerstown; Allentown Female College at Allentown." Among those who have attended the meetings and taken part in the programs were persons who were attached, by connection and sympathy with, to these different institutions, who cherished various phases of theology and were governed by different religious conceptions. Among the instructors have been the leaders in the theological, philosophical and scientific thought of the Church. The helpful influences that have gone forth from these meetings from year to year cannot be estimated. Comfort and encouragement, and inspiration to study and investigation, to devotion to the Lord and His Gospel and to faithfulness in the ministerial calling were given in greater or less degree to those in attendance from time to time. The brethren who inaugurated this spiritual enterprise and those who have been instrumental in maintaining it have accomplished more good than they or we are able to realize fully.



## THE PROGRAMS.

We found the reading of the programs rendered from the beginning until now exceedingly interesting. The subjects of the papers and the topics discussed pertained to theology, philosophy, science and the spiritual life. Papers were read on the leading questions of dogmatic theology, biblical theology, exegesis, old testament and new testament criticism and church history; on all phases of practical theology, such as cultus, homiletics, ethics and missions; on biology, heredity, environment and personality; on the relation of the Church to education, politics, and the social problems of the day; and on the spiritual life of ministers and people. These papers as a rule were scholarly and thorough. Those which were published in the REVIEW ranked among the best articles in that high grade journal. In our opinion it is to be regretted that copies of all of the productions of this conference were not properly scheduled and carefully preserved in the library of the seminary. A digest of them would have furnished an appropriate and interesting paper at the twenty-fifth anniversary of the organization of the conference. Nearly all of the leading men of the Church took some part in the programs of the past years. No one lent a larger service to the conference in its early history than the late Rev. William Rupp, D.D., who read two scholarly papers at the first meeting and one at each of the second, fourth, seventh and eleventh conferences. It needs to be noticed yet that the devotional feature of the conferences has always been made prominent. No less than thirty or more sermons have been preached to the brethren assembled, and much attention given to bible study.

In 1891 a motion was made that the word spiritual be omitted from the title of the assembly. After some discussion the question was laid on the table until the next annual meeting. It seems, however, that it was not taken up again. It was argued by the opponents to the term that the word spiritual in the title was misleading, that it ignored the intellectual and scholarly phase of the association and suggested sub-



jectivism and superficiality. On the other hand it was claimed that knowledge and scholarship were not opposed to spirituality; that spirituality ought to pervade not only our religious devotions and bible study but also the investigation and study of the profoundest subjects of humanity and divinity. This view evidently prevailed; and correctly so. Some of the most learned men in all ages of Christianity have been noted for their spiritual piety and devotion. Dr. John W. Nevin, held in sacred memory by all who knew him, was one of the most profound scholars of his day and at the same time was exceedingly spiritual in his devotions and pure and pious in his life and character. It is true that knowledge has its temptations; but ignorance has more and greater ones. It is therefore altogether proper for this assembly, while giving the spiritual and devotional element due prominence in its conferences, to employ also for the benefit of its members all of the learning and scholarship at its command.

#### FREEDOM OF THE CONFERENCES.

One of the characteristic features of the conferences has been the absolute freedom accorded to every man on the program and on the floor to express his conceptions and convictions fully and freely. The only standard to which anyone is held amenable is *truth*. Every speaker is given the liberty to utter what he conceives to be the truth in regard to any subject before the assembly. As a consequence many and various views have been expressed at these conferences, and as a second result the annual proceedings have been a fair index of the unrest in the theological and scientific spheres, of the changes that are taking place in men's minds and of the various tendencies of thought in the world at large. It is accordingly befitting to the present occasion that we should look out and beyond this conference itself and note the movements and developments that have taken place the past twenty-five years in the Church and the world at large.



## GENERAL VIEW.

During the last half century the Reformed Church in the United States was very active in the spheres of theology and philosophy; but the only specific theology which was developed by it is that known as Mercersburg Theology. This system covered a period of fifty years. Its origin may be dated with the advent of Dr. Phillip Schaff to the Church of this country in 1844, and its final formal expression with the publication of the "Institutes of the Christian Religion," by Dr. E. V. Gerhart, in 1894. The founders of the system were Dr. F. A. Rauch, Dr. J. W. Nevin, and Dr. Phillip Schaff. Dr. Rauch furnished the philosophical cast for Mercersburg Theology, Dr. Schaff gave to it its historical feature and Dr. Nevin formulated its doctrines and became the expounder and defender of the system.

These original founders gathered around them a large body of students, ministers, and laymen who studied theology with a great deal of zest and who found in their system a marvelous charm. It was exceedingly satisfying to their minds and hearts. For many of them it was the *ne plus ultra* in theology. The ministers preached theology; the laymen talked theology; and the weekly and quarterly issues of the *Messenger and Review* were filled with theological and philosophical articles. No other church produced so many theologians among its ministers and laymen as did the Reformed Church of that period according to its size.

The main features of Mercersburg Theology may be briefly stated as follows—The Christian Church is an historical institution. As developed throughout the ages from the Day of Pentecost to the present time, it is constituted of all its present branches and of all the different stages through which it passed. No branch is to be conceived of as being severed from the general body, and no period in its history as not belonging to it. The apostolic church, the ante-nicene church, the post-nicene church, the church of the middle ages, the Greek and Roman churches, and the Protestant church with



all of its various divisions, all of these taken together constitute the Church of Christ in the world. This position was stoutly contested by some persons at the time especially by those who regarded the Roman Church as anti-Christ.

The Church has been established among men according to the law of Historical Development. The Church of no period nor any branch of the Church can spring forth immediately from the Bible. In each case it grows out of the Church that preceded it and out of the general life of the Church. Positive and negative forces are at work in each period which produce the succeeding period. In order therefore to attain unto a comprehensive and correct view of the Christian Church it is necessary for the person in the study of the subject to take into consideration the meaning and purpose of every age and every division of the Church and study it in its relation to the body as a whole.

Mercersburg Theology was Christo-centric. In the study of theology it did not begin with the transcendent God, but with God incarnate. In the light of the life, character, works, and words of Christ it studied the character, disposition and works of God. And in order to learn the true nature and mission of man it did not begin with the study of Adam in the garden of Eden, but with the study of the Second Adam, the Word made flesh. Christ is central for the study of God and of man. True theology must be Christo-centric.

The Mercersburg system was also Christological. It sought first of all to form a correct conception of the Person of Christ. It made due account of the Incarnation of the Son of God. Christ was God and man or rather the God-man; he was divine and human—or rather divine-human. The expounders of the system laid perhaps more stress upon the divine than upon the human in the person of Christ. And in the mystical union of the two natures in one person they found the principle for the regulation of all their conceptions of the various means and processes of salvation.

True to their principle the Scriptures as the Word of God



were regarded by them as also being divine-human. God spoke in the persons and words of men. The Mercersburg theologians magnified the divine element in the Word of God and minimized the human.

The Church is the body of Christ in which dwells the life and spirit of the Lord Jesus Christ. The Church is the bearer of life and salvation to them that believe. She is the home of the presence and power of the Holy Spirit continually among men, and hence ordinarily there can be no salvation separate and independent of the Church.

It follows necessarily then that Baptism, the Lord's Supper, ordination and confirmation partake of the same nature; they are the organs for the body of Christ: grace bearing and grace communicating ordinance. They constitute the media by which the subject is brought into union and communion with the life and spirit of Christ.

Governed by such conceptions the supporters of this system would regard the worship of the sanctuary not as religious exercises but as divine services in which both the sacramental and sacrificial elements should obtain; and this idea would at once suggest the liturgical as the proper form of worship; and the demand would follow that church architecture and the appointments of the sanctuary should also be in keeping with these conceptions.

In regard to the doctrine on man the Mercersburg Theologians held with Augustine and Calvin over against Pelagius and Arminius. They maintained the idea of the total depravity of human nature. Man is in a hopelessly lost condition; he is from below and cannot by any power inherent in himself raise himself up to a higher state. Man cannot lift himself up by his boot straps. It is necessary for him to be apprehended by powers from above mediated by the Church, and be translated out of the Kingdom of darkness into the Kingdom of God's marvelous light.

Educational religion was emphasized over against the subjectivism and emotionalism which prevailed so largely in nearly all of the Protestant churches at the time. Catechetical

instruction which had in many places fallen into disuse was again brought to the front and its essential value insisted upon. Baptized children were regarded as members of the mystical body of Christ and consequently as they grew in years were to be instructed and indoctrinated in the faith and practice of the Christian religion.

Mercersburg Theology made much of the mystical—the mystical union of the two natures in the person of Christ; the Church as the mystical body of Christ; the mystical union of the divine and human in the Word of God and the ordinances of God's house; and the mystical union of the believer with Christ. It manifested a strong faith in the supernatural but limited its operations to the Church as representing the Kingdom of God.

The best embodiment of Mercersburg Theology in concise form is found in the Order of Worship for the Reformed Church.

#### OPPOSITION.

This system of theological thought and practice however did not commend itself to every one in its day. There was opposition to it both from within and from without the Reformed Church. In 1848 Dr. Charles Hodge, of Princeton, took exceptions to it which led to a learned controversy between himself and Dr. Nevin; and later Dr. Nevin found it necessary also to defend it against the *Brownson Review*, a catholic publication, and against some criticisms by Dr. Charles Krauth, a Lutheran professor; which he also did to the complete satisfaction of the Mercersburg School.

A large number of ministers and people of the Reformed Church were also opposed to it because they believed it to contain fundamental errors and dangerous tendencies, and they set up against it the Reformed theology of the sixteenth century, mainly that of Ulrich Zwingli and Zacharias Ursinus. They appealed to the Heidelberg Catechism as the standard for the government of our theological thinking. Their aim



was to maintain what they claimed to be the original and historical theology of the Reformed Church. To which the advocates of the Mercersburg system, who believed in the law of historical development, replied that the position of their opponents was not historical, but largely an effort at repristination. And repristination they regarded an historical impossibility.

Whatever may be said pro or con for Mercersburg Theology in our opinion it was the means by which the Reformed Church was preserved as a distinct religious body in the United States.

#### MODIFICATIONS.

“Our little systems have their day,  
They have their day and cease to be;  
They are but broken lights of Thee:  
And Thou, O God, art more than they.”

During the past fifty years revolutions have taken place in our country and in the world, in business, politics, science, philosophy and religion. By means of the telegraph, cable lines, railroads, and steamboats the different peoples of the world have been brought close together. They are studying each other's history, religion, customs and modes of life. They are learning to know each other as they never knew each other before. The nations of the earth are beginning to look each also on the things of the others. No one nation would for a moment contend that all of the interests of mankind are lodged in it, and no branch of the church would claim the possession of all of the gospel truth. Men are led to take world-wide views of things in every sphere of social interest. The nations of the world belong to one mankind. The people of the earth are bound together by fundamental elements into one body and are all of them under the merciful and gracious government of the one God of heaven and earth. In the wake of these conceptions the doctrine that the Lord is God over only a small portion of the human family is fast breaking down. He is not

only the God of Ancient Israel and modern Christians, but of the world. He is felt to be in a very important sense the father of all men and the ruler of all nations whether they own Him or not. It is no longer affirmed or implied that the Christian world belongs to the Lord and the non-Christian world to the devil. God is regarded as working among all men everywhere, according to the measure of their capacity and ability, for the accomplishment of His wise and gracious purposes. Conceptions of this kind have been fast taking hold of the minds and hearts of men.

Astronomy has given the children of men a vision of the greatness and unity of the physical world and of the immensity of space that is overwhelming in its effect, while geology and biology have opened up vistas into the past that reveal the ages upon ages consumed in the long processes of creation.

The theory of evolution in one form or another is governing the thinking of the majority of learned men. This demands the readjustment of numerous former views and conceptions. The idea of evolution interferes with many assumptions in former systems of theology and constitutes a disturbing element among traditional views. It destroys one's confidence in the static. Does anything anywhere remain fixed forever? In the language of "The Open Door"<sup>2</sup> we say: "Everywhere we are touching not dead inert mass, but living, moving force. Everywhere we are dealing with something pliable and plastic, with frontiers that shift and can be shifted. The world we inhabit is not a rigid thing with changeless boundaries and fixed limits." Consequently our thoughts and convictions need to be revised continually.

In the sphere of Christianity much more value is attached to man than was formerly the case. The human nature of Christ and His life as a perfect man is receiving more consideration. The human element in the Scriptures is being set forth more fully and is more strongly emphasized. The

<sup>2</sup> By Hugh Black, p. 12.



Bible has become for many persons a different, more living and more interesting book than it had been. The contributions of the human to the operations of religion are recognized. Much is said and written on the psychology of religion. The charge of humanitarianism does not carry the odium with it that was once attached to it. The divine element is not indeed ruled out or ignored; but it is not limited to such narrow spheres as formerly, nor made so absolute in those spheres. The operations of the supernatural are given wider scope. God works all around, above and beneath. The distinction between the sacred and profane has been largely obliterated.

The basis for authority has been shifted. For the modern mind authority is vested alone in the Truth. It alone compels obedience. And it finds the truth in the Bible as interpreted in the light of experience and of present day knowledge in general. Creeds and confessions are not regarded as of binding force simply because they were once accepted as true. The question is, are they true now? Tradition does not carry authority with it solely because it is tradition. The truth must authenticate itself to the minds and hearts of men and women in accordance with the light which they possess, if it is to command their obedience. Out of this spirit grows the tendency in various denominations, to let go of non-essentials which are divisive and to hold fast only to the essentials which tend to unity. Hence the thought of church union prevails very generally in the Christian world today.

Any system of theology that does not take sympathetic account of these changes and conditions will fail to commend itself to the modern mind and can be maintained only by the support of the bigoted few.

#### THE PERMANENT.

Our little systems have their day and cease to be, but the truth they contain will not perish; it will assert itself in other relations and under new forms. What then remains of



Mercersburg Theology in the conceptions and practices of the present day?

That the Christian Church is the historical religious institution extending in unbroken succession from the day of Christ down to the present day and including in it all of the divisions and branches of the church; and that the church has been established in the world according to the law of historical development are positions that are now accepted by practically every one. Both had been contested. The Christo-centric principle governs present theological thought to a large extent. The cry "back to Christ" undoubtedly means that His life and teaching are to be made the key to our knowledge of God and of man individually and collectively, and of the Christian's duties and privileges. The Christological principle is also very generally accepted; however the conceptions of the person of Christ and of His mission have changed considerably and that change has carried with it also a modification of all the soteriological processes. The Church is viewed as a divine human institution, though it is regarded as a means to an end rather than an end in itself. The Mercersburg conception of the atonement is as satisfactory as any other theory. The sacraments and sacramental ordinances are held to be instrumental means of grace but not in as high a sense as in the early days. There is much less aversion to liturgical worship today than formally and it is practiced to a greater or less extent very generally, not only in the Reformed Church but in other denominations as well. The same is true of educational religion. In the early days Mercersburg was called upon to do battle for its retention and practice. Today the principle of it is generally acknowledged and religious instruction is resorted to on all sides, not only by means of the catechetical class, but also through the Sunday school, the missionary and young peoples' societies and the various laymen's movements. Religious education seems to be the order of the day.

We find accordingly that Mercersburg Theology has been largely conserved, in one form or another, in the doctrines and



practices of the present day, and it continues to exert a widespread influence upon the thoughts and convictions of the teachers and preachers in our church. More so, in our opinion, than any other system. And yet as a system it is no longer held or taught in its entirety and purity. Nevertheless as seen above its conceptions, spirit and life have been assimilated to a great extent by the thoughts, feelings and practices of a large body of ministers and people in the Reformed Church, and outside of it too.

#### DEVIATIONS.

The successors to the Mercersburg theologians and others in the Church have looked upon the changes and revolutions that have taken place in the theology, philosophy, science, and general practices of the world with open minds and hearts, and have been largely influenced by them. As a consequence some of the former positions have been abandoned.

The conception of the Bible has changed. The Bible has been studied as literature. The human side has been fully brought out. The writers are not regarded simply as amanuenses of God or pens of the Holy Spirit. Plenary inspiration is held by few. It is not the Scriptures which were inspired but the writers according to the measure of their several capacities to be inspired. The Scriptures are creditable and reliable but not in every particular infallible. Such views prevail largely in the Church and they are radically different from the former positions.

The doctrine of total depravity is not generally held. A larger or smaller element of goodness is conceived to be in the possession of every one. There is a tendency to evil and sin in him; in some cases stronger than in others. But there is also a tendency in each one to goodness, and righteousness; in some cases very weak, in others perhaps imperceptible, but in other cases it is prominent. Man is not believed to be corrupt from the crown of his head to the soles of his feet.

Our first parents are not viewed as occupying such a high

moral position as had been accorded to them. If they had been morally strong they would not have disobeyed God. The fact that they were so easily led astray is an unmistakable evidence that there was a weakness in their moral constitution. Besides many do not believe that the children of men are so fatally involved in Adam's sin as the doctrine of total depravity assumes.

The sins of fathers affect their descendants in greater or less degree but not so necessarily and thoroughly and fatally as it was supposed the children of Adam were affected by his transgression. And further the law of the world seems to be that nothing begins on a high plane and then drops to a much lower plane of existence; hence the assumption that mankind pursued the exact opposite course is seriously questioned. Much stress is now laid upon the human in Christ, the human in the Word of God, and the human in all of the means and processes of Salvation. From the doctrine of eschatology as embodied in the Order of Worship there is a decided departure in the thoughts and convictions of many of the ministers and people of our Church. Because of the foregoing we make the statement that the Mercersburg Theology of twenty-five years ago no longer exists as a complete and consistent system.

#### MODERN THEOLOGY.

The theological confusion which exists so largely today in our Church has been caused by what is known as modern theology, which in one form or another is found almost everywhere. It would exist to a considerable extent in the Roman Church if it were not suppressed by the iron heel of the Pope of Rome. In Germany, France, Great Britain and America new fields of theological and Biblical investigation and study have been opened and men have been led to new points of view. This has given rise to what is called modern theology, which however is not a system but consists of conceptions of various biblical, theological and religious subjects that are at variance with many traditional views. These have gradually entered



the Reformed Church to a considerable extent. Prof. F. A. Gast, D.D., was the first of our professors to follow their leading and introduce them into his department of the seminary. It will however be admitted by all who are conversant with the case that no one was instrumental in the spread of modern theology among the ministers of our Church to the same extent as the late Dr. William Rupp, who for years proclaimed the new views by his sermons, learned addresses, published articles and lastly by his lectures and teaching in the theological seminary. Many students and ministers of the Gospel have been led to view theological questions in the light of modern knowledge and experience and form convictions which are at variance with numerous traditional doctrines. A considerable number of professors and ministers of our church, however, do not accept the positions of modern theology.

If we were asked to define the theology of the Reformed Church in the United States today, we would candidly confess our inability to do so. Various kinds of theology are taught in our several seminaries and a large variety of theological conceptions are held by the ministry of our church.

Negatively we might say that our theology is not that of the Roman Church, nor that of the Lutheran Church, nor that of the Presbyterian, or of the Methodist Church. But we find it impossible to bring the variety of views held within the limits of a definite positive description.

New ideas in theology and philosophy arise from time to time and they are very variously received. Hugh Black says of the idea of evolution: "Many met it with fear, and opposed it with hatred, and tried to kill it with cheap ridicule. Some examined the proof of it candidly and accepted it as a further fact. Fewer still were willing to follow its leading into the wonderful and beautiful world to which it led. Even now we do not candidly and courageously accept its implications. It is too dynamic for the static universe we love to conceive ourselves as inhabiting. It shatters too many illusions and compels too radical reconstruction of our intellectual world."<sup>3</sup>

<sup>3</sup> "The Open Door," p. 21.

The same is true of any new idea in the religious sphere. As a consequence the Reformed Church partakes of the same theological unrest and turmoil which prevails so largely in the Church at large at the present time. It is true, the Heidelberg Catechism is the standard for the faith and doctrine of the Reformed Church; but we doubt whether there be a single minister who accepts its teaching in every particular. Some are opposed to its doctrine of total depravity; others to its perseverance of saints; others to its doctrine of the atonement; others to its doctrine of the Sacraments; others to its doctrine of conversion; and others perhaps to some other particulars in its teaching. We say this not by way of disparagement, either of our church or of our professors or of our ministry. In our judgment it is well that it is so. It indicates life; earnest, living thought on the part of the teachers and preachers of our church. But this fact is a confirmation of the statement already made, that confessions have lost the authority for the minds of students of theology which they once possessed.

#### CONCLUSION.

In view of the complex conditions existing in the Church and the world as indicated by the foregoing it seems evident that this Conference has not yet by any means accomplished its mission finally. New problems are arising every day out of the social relations of men—business, politics and diplomacy, ethics and religion—questions in regard to which the Church is challenged to act the part of prophet and teacher. These questions are multiplied and made more intricate by the millions of immigrants that are annually coming to our shores from the different nations of Europe and Asia, representing every degree of social standing and every shade of religious belief. Ministers of the Gospel will need all the knowledge and wisdom, piety and devotion, and all the encouragement, inspiration and consecration, which they can possibly acquire and develop, in order to meet faithfully and effectually the increased responsibilities thus placed upon them.



The unparalleled conflict in the warring nations of Europe is most perplexing to every thoughtful mind. What changes not only in the boundaries of nations but also in the thoughts of men it presages no one can at this stage surmise. No doubt this appalling struggle will in the end be in many ways far-reaching in its results—results that will affect not only the people immediately involved, but the entire world. And the responsibility will rest upon the ministers of the Gospel to apply the Word of God to the changed and changing conditions that seem to be at hand. The Christian world must be converted from its evil ways and led to renew its allegiance to the Lord and His Kingdom. And possibly the keynote to which the message of the preacher must be pitched will be: Repent ye for the Kingdom of Heaven is at hand.

The kingdoms of this world are in a very unsettled state. Every nation is longing and looking for the arrival of a better condition. There is unrest in every department of human society. And a sound is heard in the tops of the mulberry trees indicating that something extraordinary is about to happen and that it is time for the minister to bestir himself.

“ We are living, we are dwelling,  
In a grand and awful time;  
In an age on ages telling,  
To be living is sublime.”

And to be a preacher of truth and righteousness is a glorious privilege. He is challenged to engage in a work that will redound to the welfare of his fellow-men. Business, politics, statescraft, and the worldly professions are calling upon the best and strongest young men to enter their spheres, promising them great rewards in riches and honor. But the present condition of our country and of the world calls more loudly still for young men of ability and integrity to devote their lives and talents to a much greater and nobler cause—the cause of bringing order out of confusion; of establishing proper relations between the different classes of men; of enhancing

justice, mercy and truth in every human activity; and of raising the children of men physically, morally, and religiously to higher planes of life, thus preparing them for the enjoyment of the life to come. And the reward promised is the sweet consciousness of having benefited the world, the happy experience of peace before God and man, the loving gratitude of their fellow-men, and the blessed assurance of divine approval.

To see the things that we see, and hear the things that we hear, and to handle the things of our day and generation is a blessed privilege. "Every thoughtful observer knows that we have a vast program ahead of us. Even to the most casual eye, the race is on the threshold of a change greater than yet known." The world has drifted away from its moorings. Therefore to meet our responsibilities *with hope and joy* we will need all the intellectual and spiritual equipment that we can possibly acquire. And it will be helpful to us in many ways to come apart in a desert place annually for a season of rest; to sing the songs of Zion, to engage in prayer with one another, to study the Word of God and discuss the questions of the day to which the Gospel ought to be applied.

MEYERSDALE, PA.



## II.

### MIRACLES AND CHRISTIANITY.<sup>1</sup>

RAY H. DOTTERER.

When the secretary of this conference requested me to prepare a paper on "Miracles and Christianity" his letter contained this sentence: "This being the twenty-fifth anniversary we have in mind the change in theological conception during these years." I have not interpreted these somewhat cryptic words as a suggestion that I restrict myself to an historical discussion of the fortunes or misfortunes of the doctrine of miracles in the last quarter-century; for we are all so well aware of the Copernican revolution which has come to pass in the views of thinking Christian men with regard to miracles and their relation to theology that it is not necessary to go into details in an attempt to describe it. To put it briefly, not very long ago miracles were Christian evidences, and the apologist appealed to them as such in his endeavor to convince men of the reality of the supernatural; now these same miracles are problems for the apologist, burdens for which additional supports must be provided. Formerly a few men here and there, usually stigmatized as "infidels" or "atheists," questioned the miraculous element in Christianity; in our generation almost all thinking persons have become at least a little skeptical as regards all narratives of miracle, and even in the case of those who retain the traditional belief, the concept of the miraculous has passed from the center to the circumference of their religious thinking.

And yet, in my opinion, this is not the whole story. One cannot be quite sure whether the movement away from miracles

<sup>1</sup> A paper read at the Spiritual Conference, Lancaster, Pa., July, 1915.

is a part of the main current, or only an eddy in the stream of thought. For, while this truly remarkable change has been in progress in the attitude of theologians and other Christian men, there has been a change almost as great, but in the opposite direction, in the attitude of philosophers and men of science. While religious leaders have been completing their adjustment to a science and philosophy which knew no miracle, the "intellectual climate" has grown less unfavorable to belief in the miraculous. When philosophers like William James and Henri Bergson can defend indeterminism and "new beginnings," when biologists like Hans Driesch and William McDougall<sup>2</sup> are advocating vitalistic conceptions of organic phenomena, when Josiah Royce can seriously suggest that natural laws are valid only in the same sense as the formulas of the statistician,<sup>3</sup> a dogmatic denial of the occurrence of miracles is no longer possible; although we may be as far as ever from a satisfactory demonstration of the historicity of any particular miracle-story.

It will not do, therefore, for us to take very much for granted. So far as time may permit, I shall try to be, in the proper sense of a much abused word, radical. A general idea of the scope and method of my discussion may be given by saying that it will be an attempt to answer three or four questions; such as, Do miracles happen? Can we establish the historicity of particular miracle-stories? Can we establish the historicity of all or some of the narratives of miracle found in our sacred Scriptures? and What is the effect on our Christian belief of our attitude toward miracle in general and the scriptural miracles in particular?

It may be well to point out at this stage in our discussion

<sup>2</sup> For the position of Driesch see his Gifford lectures entitled "The Science and Philosophy of the Organism." The views of McDougall may be learned from his book called "Body and Mind."

<sup>3</sup> See Royce's article on "The Mechanical, the Historical and the Statistical," *Science*, April 17, 1914, which is professedly a development and elaboration of certain speculations found in the concluding passages of Clerk Maxwell's "Theory of Heat" in the light of theories broached by Charles Peirce in the *Monist* in 1891 and 1892.



that our first two questions are quite distinct. To ask whether miracles happen, and to ask whether the historicity of a particular narrative of miracle can be established, are entirely separate, though of course not unrelated, inquiries. The former may be answered in the affirmative and the latter in the negative without any real inconsistency.

Without committing myself, then, to either the acceptance or the rejection of any given miracle-story, I proceed to discuss the fundamental general problem of the occurrence or non-occurrence of events which may properly be said to be "miraculous."

## I.

Up to this point I have been content to use the word "miracle" in a loose and vague way. Now it is necessary to define the term; for much confusion has resulted from the failure to distinguish the different senses in which the word has been employed. Leaving to the dictionaries the task of cataloguing the various meanings sanctioned by literary usage, we may classify them under two or three heads.

Passing by, as too obvious to require discussion, and as not very likely to occasion confusion, the elliptical use of "miracle" in the sense of a narrative or story of miraculous occurrences, one typical meaning of the term is *an event which is supernaturally caused*. In prescientific ages almost everything was supposed to be directly produced by Deity. With the rise and progress of science, one class of phenomena after another was found to be capable of explanation in terms of law. Thus arose the idea of Nature as opposed to the Supernatural. Some phenomena were thought of as natural, others as supernatural, and the two categories were held to be mutually exclusive. The natural scientist and the theologian divided the world between them. What could be explained in terms of law, or might readily be supposed to become explicable with the advance of science, was the work of nature; what seemed incapable of scientific explanation was the work of



God. With the extension of scientific knowledge the domain of Nature grew larger and larger, and the domain of God became smaller and smaller, until only events remote in time, and the most extraordinary of contemporary events, were still held to be, in the significant phrase which has come down to us from early legal usage, "acts of God."<sup>4</sup>

Thus in David Hume's famous polemic against miracles he was only speaking in the language of his age when he defined a miracle as "a violation of the laws of nature," or, in more accurate terms, as "a transgression of a law of nature by a particular volition of the Deity, or by the interposition of some invisible agent."<sup>5</sup> Now, as even Huxley insists in his friendly exposition of Hume's philosophy, "The definition of a miracle as 'a violation of the laws of nature' is, in reality, an employment of language which, on the face of the matter, cannot be justified. For 'nature' means neither more nor less than that which is; the sum of phenomena presented to our experience; the totality of events past, present, and to come. Every event must be taken to be a part of nature, until proof to the contrary is supplied. And such proof is, from the nature of the case, impossible."<sup>6</sup>

As Huxley claims all for nature, so the enlightened theist claims all for God. The deistical conception, which prevailed so long in Christendom, was the natural consequence of a peculiar situation. It was a compromise between science and theology. But as time passed science was seen to have much the better of the bargain. Geology demanded the beginnings of things as a part of its territory. Next biology claimed to explain organic phenomena, even the origin of the various species of plants and animals, even the origin of man, without having recourse to the assumption of any divine creative fiat.

<sup>4</sup> Compare the witticism of Strauss that the "sphere of religion is being narrowed by science as the territory of the Red Indian is being narrowed by civilization." See Bruce, "The Miraculous Element in the Gospels," p. 72.

<sup>5</sup> "Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding," Section X.

<sup>6</sup> Huxley's "Hume," "English Men of Letters" series, p. 129.



And now in these latter days the new psychology, with its rather successful attempt to get along without the soul, and its more recent and also somewhat more dubious endeavor to get along without the notion of consciousness, and to explain human and animal behavior as merely the reaction of very complicated structures to appropriate stimuli,<sup>7</sup> seems to be about to complete the expulsion of Deity from the universe of enlightened men.

The case would indeed be desperate if enlightened men continued to hold the deistical notion of God and to think of Nature and the Supernatural as mutually exclusive. Long ago, however, enlightened theologians foresaw the necessity of turning away from the conception of a God outside the world, and of adopting, or readopting the old Greek conception of God as dwelling in the world. For this new-old theism, accordingly, there is no chasm between the natural and the supernatural. A miracle, then, cannot be defined simply as a supernatural event, because, on theistic assumptions, *all* events are supernatural. To differentiate the particular class of phenomena called miracles, it will not do to appeal to divine agency, which is equally the cause of all phenomena.

Another typical meaning of the term miracle is that of a *wonderful event*. The event is wonderful, partly because it is unusual, partly because it is believed to be inexplicable. The victorious march of science, however, has transferred one thing after another from the category of the wonderful to that of the explicable and commonplace. This fact has not been overlooked by those who would define the miraculous as the wonderful. Indeed, they have made much of it. Thus it is often said that the phonograph, the electric motor, wireless telegraphy, the aeroplane, the submarine, etc., would have been miracles a hundred years ago, and are miracles today in the eyes of the people of unenlightened countries.<sup>8</sup> But this is

<sup>7</sup> For the position of the "behaviorists" see Professor John B. Watson's "Behavior: An Introduction to Comparative Psychology," 1914.

<sup>8</sup> Archbishop Trench attributes this theory of "relative miracles" to Schleiermacher ("Notes on the Miracles," p. 78). Trench calls them



not satisfactory as a sober scientific definition. For, says Dr. William Newton Clarke, if miracles are regarded as "acts performed by the use of some natural force not understood at the time, though liable to be discovered afterwards," this amounts to the denial of "the miraculous elements in such events entirely, and defends the miracles in question by explaining them away. The explanation expressly affirms that the events are natural, and have been accounted miraculous only because of human ignorance. If this is all there are no miracles."<sup>9</sup>

One might add that, "if this is all," our problem is no problem; for no one denies that there have been and still are wonders which even the wisest of men are unable to explain. And, besides, if we should accept this definition of a miracle, it would then be necessary to seek for some other term by which to designate the class of conceivable events which at least some careful writers have been wont to call miracles.

Like the definition of a miracle as an event that is supernaturally caused, the definition of a miracle as a wonder is, of course, not without some justification. Usage sanctions it, and, in a loose popular, or rhetorical sense, a miracle may be said to be a wonderful event; or, combining the two types of definition that we have found insufficient, a wonderful act of God. But for purposes of exact thinking we need a definition more precise and free from ambiguity. Perhaps such a definition may be reached in a round-about way by inquiring as to our meaning when we say that a given event is *not* a miracle. The world of natural science is by hypothesis non-miraculous; and what sort of world does science postulate?

Says Wilhelm Ostwald, "The prophecy of future events based upon the knowledge of the details of recurring events is

"miracles for those in regard of whom they were first done but no miracles in themselves, being in fact but the anticipation of discoveries in the kingdom of nature," and concludes that, "however it may be sought to disguise the fact, the miracle does thus in fact become no miracle."

<sup>9</sup> "The Christian Doctrine of God," p. 206.



called *science*.”<sup>10</sup> In other words, the purpose of science is to formulate “propositions of the following form: When you have such and such experiences, you will have such and such other experiences.”<sup>11</sup> Now the forecasting of the future is possible only on the assumption of a uniform order of which all events are held to be a part. Any event which can not be included in this uniform order has no place in the scheme of science. Now such an *unorganizable* event I propose to call a miracle; and a miracle may, accordingly, be defined as *an event that is experimentally non-predictable*.

The event itself may be experimentally recognizable; *i. e.*, by physical tests of the sort employed by natural science. But it is either (at least in part) uncaused, or else it is caused (at least in part) by some ‘non-perceptual’ agent; “so that the ‘perceptual’ conditions alone do not furnish unequivocal determining factors for what occurs.”<sup>12</sup> The doctrine that such non-predictable events occur implies, accordingly, a theory of “experimental indeterminism.”

When we say that a miraculous event is ‘non-predictable,’ we, of course, mean more than that it can not be predicted in the present state of human knowledge; for with the progress of science the range of prediction is continually being enlarged. We mean that a miraculous event is non-predictable *in principle*. That is to say, its non-predictableness is not, like that of some other events, a consequence of human ignorance; but, even supposing human knowledge to increase without limit, such an event would remain forever an alien in the commonwealth of science.

## II.

Our first question—whether miracles happen—resolves itself, accordingly, into the inquiry whether such unique, or non-predictable, events do in point of fact occur.

<sup>10</sup> Ostwald’s “Natural Philosophy,” by Seltzer, p. 13.

<sup>11</sup> *The American Naturalist*, 1913, p. 393.

<sup>12</sup> See “Doctrines Held as Vitalism,” Prof. H. S. Jennings, *The American Naturalist*, 1913, p. 390.

As we have seen, the purpose of science is to predict; to gain such a knowledge of the customary order in which events occur as to be able, on the basis of what has been, to say what will be. Now prediction is possible only so far as the future of the universe is like the past, or, more generally, the unknown like the known, the unexplained like the already explained. Orthodox science, therefore, postulates that the order of events is absolutely uniform, and that even those phenomena which have hitherto resisted explanation are in principle explicable in terms of natural law. In other words, it suits the purposes of natural science to assume that there are no interfering wills and no chance occurrences, that all events are subject to an iron law of necessity.

Now it is hardly necessary to insist that this convenient assumption is *only* an assumption. It cannot be justified by an appeal to experience, for it is evident that the appeal to experience presupposes what is to be established; and there is no *apriori* reason for it, no reason in the nature of things why, for example, the customary succession of day and night should continue, or why bodies, having hitherto attracted other bodies inversely as the square of the distance, should not begin from this time forth to repel one another in the same or in some other ratio. No one, to be sure, is worried on account of such theoretical possibilities, which would involve the complete destruction of the universe as we know it; yet the mere statement of such extreme illustrations helps one to realize that even natural science is founded upon faith—upon faith in the uninterrupted uniformity of nature.

The most that we have a logical right to say for the fundamental assumption of science is that it has “worked” remarkably well. No one, of course, holds that all things have actually been explained on mechanistic principles; but such wonderful progress has been made in this direction that we are urged to believe that all things are thus explicable *in principle*.

The first great triumphs of predictive science were won in



the domain of astronomy, and for that reason the methods employed in this science early came to be regarded as normative for science in general. Kepler, indeed, had imagined that the regular movements of the planets were due to their governance by personal wills, with which he assumed them to have been endowed by the Creator. But the researches of Newton proved conclusively that such an assumption is not required; and since his day astronomy has made use only of such concepts as mass, distance, and acceleration. This method of viewing phenomena having come to be the method *par excellence* of science, most scientists, accordingly, postulate as the foundation of science in general, a necessitarian system, a rigorously determined universe; and many scientists hold that science ought to seek as its ultimate goal the complete explanation of all phenomena, organic as well as inorganic, in terms of "matter and motion."

The most famous statement of the creed of orthodox science is, no doubt, the formula of the celebrated mathematician Laplace. Filled with enthusiasm by the rapid strides of astronomy and the brave beginnings of physics and chemistry, he declared that, if the configuration and acceleration of all the material particles in the universe were known for a given instant of time, all subsequent history would in principle be calculable.<sup>13</sup>

In recent years, however, scientists seem to have experienced a measure of disillusionment. The fact of the matter is that, although science has explained a multitude of phenomena, yet, like the child in pursuit of the end of the rainbow, it is as far as ever from its goal. Indeed, it seems farther from the goal today than it seemed in the days of Laplace. Every discovery has opened up new fields for exploration; every solution has posed new problems.

This is well put by Dr. J. S. Haldane in his presidential

<sup>13</sup> See McDougall, "Body and Mind," p. 90. The Laplacian formula is differently stated by different writers.

address to the Physiological Section of the British Association.<sup>14</sup>

"If in some ways," says Dr. Haldane, "the advance of physiology seems to have taken us nearer to a physico-chemical explanation of life, in other ways it seems to have taken us further away. On the one hand we have accumulating knowledge as to the physical and chemical sources and the ultimate destiny of the material and energy passing through the body: on the other hand an equally rapidly accumulating knowledge of an apparently teleological ordering of this material and energy; and for the teleological ordering we are at a loss for physico-chemical explanations. There was a time, about fifty years ago, when the rising generation of physiologists in their enthusiasm for the first kind of knowledge closed their eyes to the second. That time is past, and we must once more face the old problem of life."

"Twenty years ago," said William McDougall, writing in 1911, "the scientific world was oppressed by the sense of the finality of its own dicta. The indestructibility of matter, the conservation of energy, and of momentum, the eternal sameness of the chemical atoms, the inevitable extinction of all life on the earth by loss of heat from the solar system, the never-ending alternation of evolution and dissolution of material systems, all these had become "axioms" whose rejection was said to be impossible for any sane mind. It was felt that little remained for science to do save the working out of equations to further decimal places."<sup>15</sup>

But now all is changed. New discoveries have opened up new vistas. Some things that seemed self-evident have become doubtful. The assumption that all phenomena are capable of a mechanistic explanation is rejected by not a few competent thinkers as a mere "dogma of science"; and, especially in biology, men like Driesch and McDougall are convinced that mechanism cannot suffice, but must be supplemented by the

<sup>14</sup> "Reports," 1908.

<sup>15</sup> McDougall, "Body and Mind," p. 216.



assumption of some 'non-perceptual' agency, which may be called an "*anima*" or "entelechy."

Not only has there been a revival of "vitalism" in recent years. The scientific reaction has entered the domain of the inorganic, and doubt has been thrown upon the accuracy of the "laws" of even physics and chemistry. It has been suggested that even they are only approximately valid; true only on the average when a sufficiently great number of cases is considered.<sup>16</sup> This conception of laws of nature as statistical formulas may be thought of as a reversal of a familiar argument against the "freedom of the will." If a sufficiently great number of cases is taken, it is possible to predict with a very close degree of approximation the percentages of murders, suicides, marriages, etc. Now these are typical "voluntary" actions. Hence the conclusion is drawn that all "voluntary" actions are in point of fact determined, that the will is not "free," but that human conduct is necessarily exactly what it is. Men may seem to choose; but, so the argument continues, since their actions are in the mass predictable, there was really in each individual case no alternative, and each could not have done otherwise than he did. The answer to this argument is, of course, that, since it is only average conduct, and not a particular act of any given individual, that can be predicted, the success of the statistician does not prove that the individual is not free; for, even if we assume that every man is capable of true spontaneity, and that his actions are wholly non-predictable, yet, if a sufficiently great number of men is taken, individual peculiarities will neutralize one another, and the average conduct of the group will be predictable.

Instead of men and women, let us now think of molecules, atoms, electrons, or whatever we assume the ultimate units of the physical world to be. It is evident then that the empirical uniformity of the material world does not necessarily disprove the possibility of a fundamental indeterminism. Although sensible matter obeys discoverable laws, and its behavior may

<sup>16</sup> Cf. Professor Royce, "The Historical, The Mechanical, and The Statistical," *Science*, April 17, 1914.



consequently be predicted with a very high degree of accuracy, the atoms of which it is composed, if we may still speak of atoms, may nevertheless be true individuals, each differing from every other, and the actions of each being non-predictable.

Determinism, it seems to me, derives much of its plausibility from a failure to remember that we are not compelled to choose between a thoroughgoing determinatism and a thoroughgoing indeterminism. By thoroughgoing determinism I mean the theory that *all* events are *completely* determined; i. e., in experimental terms, are accurately predictable. By thoroughgoing indeterminism I mean the theory that *no* events are in any sense or degree determined. Now it hardly needs to be said that no indeterminist is a thoroughgoing indeterminist, although many determinists seem to be thoroughgoing in their determinism. The issue is, accordingly, between thoroughgoing determinism on the one hand and some form of limited or partial determinism on the other. All that the so-called indeterminist maintains is that *some* events are not determined; or, perhaps, only that some events (and may be all) are but partially determined.

This conception of *partial* determinism is, I think, of sufficient importance to be given a little further consideration. It is, as will appear, perfectly compatible with the theory that a law of nature is merely a statement of average behavior. Just as the experimental correlate of thoroughgoing determinism is accurate predictability, so that of partial determinism is approximate predictability. An event is approximately predictable, when it has, to employ mathematical terminology, a definite "locus" of possible occurrence; while, if its locus is a mathematical point, the event is accurately predictable.

One is tempted to illustrate by contrasting the "accurate predictability" of an eclipse with the notoriously approximate predictability of the weather. But the illustration is not a good one, inasmuch as no intelligent person will seriously question that the weather could be predicted with a degree of accuracy equalling or exceeding that of astronomical predic-



tion, if our forecasters had a complete knowledge of the relevant data and a perfect understanding of the method of interpreting them. On the other hand, even in astronomy, mundane predictions are not perfectly accurate; but as instruments are made ever more delicate and precise, and the calculus of prediction is more and more clearly understood, astronomical prediction approximates more and more closely to perfect accuracy. The question remains, and this illustrates very well the meaning of partial as contrasted with thoroughgoing determinism, whether, as the technique is assumed to improve without limit, the error would continue to decrease without limit, or whether a maximum of possible accuracy would finally be attained, short of perfect accuracy; in other words, whether there is, even in the case of astronomical phenomena, a limit to the progress of science, due not merely to the finitude of the human mind and the imperfection of instruments, but due to a genuine unpredictability inhering in the phenomena themselves.

This view, which may be called indifferently either partial determinism, or partial indeterminism, is not incompatible with the *science that is*, although it is incompatible with the *ideal science*, which is sometimes regarded as in principle attainable. In this connection a few words may be quoted from William James, the great apostle of indeterminism. He is discussing more specifically a deterministic theory of the will, but his words illumine the general problem. "I do not see," he says, "how anyone can fail to recognize the fascinating simplicity of some such view as this. Nor do I see why *for scientific purposes* one need give it up even if indeterminate amounts of effort really do occur. Before their indeterminism science simply *stops*. She can abstract from it altogether, then; for in the impulses and inhibitions with which the effort has to cope there is already a larger field of uniformity than she can ever practically cultivate. . . . Psychology will be Psychology, and Science Science, as much as ever (as much and no more) in this world, whether free-will be true in it or

not. Science, however, must be constantly reminded that her purposes are not the only purposes, and that the order of uniform causation which she has use for, and is therefore right in postulating, may be enveloped in a wider order, on which she has no claims at all."<sup>17</sup>

But what has all this to do with miracles? Much more, perhaps, than may at first appear. If this theory is true, there is room for miracle even in the universe of natural science; we can believe, in a *nature* such as science must postulate, and at the same time in a *supernatural* transcending, yet immanent in and controlling nature.

### III.

I do not maintain, of course, that the considerations adduced in favor of partial indeterminism establish the actuality of miracles. We have not proved that miracles happen; still less that miracle-stories, or any of them, are historical. All that we have a right to affirm is that miracles *may* happen; that, for all we know, or can know to the contrary, they may be happening continually.

In our search for a sufficiently exact definition of a miracle, we found that not all "wonders" are miracles. Now it is necessary to add that not all miracles are wonders. Assuming that the human agent is "free," the voluntary acts of men and women are by definition miraculous. They are non-predictable. They cannot be completely accounted for in terms of natural law.<sup>18</sup> But they are not "wonders." For the greatest marvel becomes no marvel, if repeated every day for a fortnight. Moreover some miracles can not be wonders, because, while we may infer their existence, they are too refined for direct perception. In the very nature of the case, miracles which are compatible with natural laws conceived as approximate statistical formulas,—miracles which, as I have suggested may be happening all the time, are not wonders. They

<sup>17</sup> "Psychology," Vol. II, p. 576.

<sup>18</sup> See Bushnell, "Nature and the Supernatural," Chap. 2, pp. 58 ff.



are events, or elements of events, which ordinarily and in the present state of science defy detection; and, if they could be detected, they would be too frequently perceived to be wonderful.

There are then two classes of putative miracles. Miracles of the first class, if they occur, would also be wonders. Because of their exceptional character they would excite surprise. Men would say of them, "So here!" "So there!" Miracles of the second class "come not with observation." They are too common to occasion surprise; or else they are not within the range of human perception. It is evident that the miracles, or alleged miracles of literature and tradition belong to the first class,—the class of wonder-miracles. An inquiry into the historicity of particular miracle-stories is, accordingly, an investigation of the genuineness or non-reality of alleged events, which, if they actually occurred, were both miraculous and wonderful.

Now as regards all alleged events this principle holds: *The more wonderful, the less probable. The burden of proof is against the historicity of the exceptional.*

This principle—that the unusual is probably untrue—enters into the very warp and woof of our mental life. For example, in ordinary perception, experiences which are exceptional or extraordinary are rejected as illusory and deceptive. And the only difference between genuine perceptions and such pseudo-perceptions is that the former fit in with the rest of our experiences, while the latter do not. In the laboratory, too, no new phenomenon is verified by but one experiment. The experiment must be repeated again and again. And the scientific world usually declines to accept a new discovery until it has been confirmed by a number of independent investigators.

Hume was, of course, mistaken in declaring that no amount of testimony is sufficient to prove a miracle. But he is surely right in maintaining that much more is required to prove the historicity of an unusual than of a usual event. When we

read in Josephus that the Romans burnt all the places "round about the holy house," and a little further on in the same chapter that "a heifer, as she was led by the high priest to be sacrificed, brought forth a lamb in the midst of the temple,"<sup>19</sup> although the evidence for both statements is exactly the same, we are not guilty of inconsistency, if we believe the former, and disbelieve the latter assertion. We are not logically required to disbelieve all that Livy tells us about the wars of the Romans, because we refuse to credit the prodigies which he narrates. As I have pointed out, our whole mental life is founded upon the principle of the improbability of the unusual; and it is by the application of this principle that we sift all narratives, and separate the true from the false.

#### IV.

I presume none of us would scruple to apply this principle to the stories of miracle related in the literature of the Greeks, the Romans, the Hindus, or the Chinese, or in the literature of mediaeval Europe. Shall we make an exception in the case of the literature of the Hebrews and of that produced and canonized by the early Christian Church? A generation or two ago, almost all Christian men would have answered this question in the affirmative. They would have insisted that in our Bible we have an exceptional literature; that the fact that a given narrative of miracle is contained in our canonical scriptures creates a presumption in favor of its historicity sufficient to overcome the presumption which ordinarily holds against the marvelous. But here is the great "change in theological conception" since the first meeting of this Conference. Most of us have given up the miracle which is logically fundamental to all the miracles of Scripture. We have ceased to believe in the miraculous correctness of the Bible; and this miracle having been given up, all the miracle-stories naturally pass from the domain of sober historical narration to that of myth and legend.

<sup>19</sup> Josephus, "The Wars of the Jews," Book VI, Chap. V.



In the case of the Old Testament the application of the principle is especially clear. If it be granted that the biblical writers are not miraculously preserved from error in matters of historical narration, it follows that their reports of marvelous events have no better claim to be regarded as historical than similar narratives in other literatures. True, it is not *illogical* for those who still believe in the miraculous correctness of all the narratives of sacred scripture to prefer Genesis to Geology and Joshua to Astronomy, to believe, in defiance of all the ordinary canons of probability, that the iron floated, that the shadow moved backward upon the dial, that the dead man revived when he touched the bones of Elisha; but it is *illogical*, in my opinion, for one who has accepted the modern view of the origin, or rather growth, of the books of the Old Testament, to continue to believe in the "miracles" of Hebrew literature, while rejecting those recorded in the other great literatures of antiquity.

When we turn to the New Testament the case against the historicity of stories of miracle is, at first sight, not so clear. In the case of the Old Testament it is obvious that there was plenty of time for legends to grow. Consequently we are somewhat disposed to over-emphasize the rôle of time as a factor in the origin of narratives of the marvelous, and to conclude that in the case of the "miracles" related by New Testament writers, the interval from the date of the event until the date of the book in which it is recorded was too short for any legend to have arisen. But, to my mind, this is sheer dogmatism. As a matter of fact, studies of the lives of the saints show that a period of a generation or two affords ample time for a complete legend to grow.<sup>20</sup> The apparently sudden rise

<sup>20</sup> Many examples might be adduced. An interesting case is the well-known account of the martyrdom of Polycarp in the epistle of the church of Smyrna to the church of Philomelious (Eusebius B. IV, Ch. XV). Another is the "Miracle of the Baptism of a Jewish Impostor" related by Socrates ("Ecclesiastical History," VII, 17). For a discussion for and against the appearance to Constantine of the cross with the inscription, "In this conquer," see Newman, "Ecclesiastical Miracles," Chap. V, and



of legends of miracle is in part explained by the transference of stories of marvelous happenings from one hero to another; but in certain periods and in certain countries there has also been an overdevelopment of the "will to believe," which has produced a positive demand for marvels.<sup>21</sup> Thus in the pages of mediaeval historians narratives of miracle seem to require no time for growth, but Athena-like to spring full-panoplied into being;<sup>22</sup> and, even in modern times, miracles are attributed to the saints of Islam while they are still alive or very soon after their death.<sup>23</sup>

It would, of course, be very foolish to declare in a dogmatic fashion that *no* story of miracle is historical; and it is quite possible that *some* marvelous and truly miraculous events occurred substantially as they are related in the Bible and in other writings; nevertheless, in my judgment, we can not attain reasonable certainty of the historicity of any particular miracle. Although, in my opinion, miracles of what I have

Abbott, "Philomythus," Chap. VII. Andrew D. White's account of the growth of the legend of St. Francis Xavier is also illuminating. See "Warfare of Science with Theology," Vol. II, Chap. XIII.

<sup>21</sup> "What even a great theologian can be induced to believe and testify is seen in St. Augustine's declaration that the flesh of the peacock is incorruptible. The saint declares that he tested it and found it so (see the *De Civitate Dei*, XXI, c. 4, under the passage beginning *Quis enim Deus*). With this may be compared the testimony of the pious author of Sir John Mandeville's "Travels," that iron floats upon the Dead Sea while feathers sink in it, and that he would not have believed this had he not seen it." From a footnote to the chapter of White's "Warfare" to which reference is made in the preceding note.

<sup>22</sup> "If we pass from the Fathers into the middle ages, we find ourselves in an atmosphere that was dense and charged with the supernatural. The demand for miracles was almost boundless, and the supply was equal to the demand. . . . Nothing could be more common than for a holy man to be lifted up from the floor in the midst of his devotions, or to be visited by the Virgin or by an angel. There was scarcely a town that could not show some relic that had cured the sick, or some image that had opened and shut its eyes, or bowed its head to an earnest worshipper." Lecky, "Rationalism in Europe," Vol. I, p. 157.

<sup>23</sup> See an article on "Les Saints dans l'Islam," *Hibbert Journal*, July, 1909. Also "Mohammedan Parallels to Christian Miracles," *Open Court*, November, 1909.



called the second class, that is events which are in principle not capable of explanation in terms of uniform laws of nature, but which "come not with observation," are continually occurring, and, although even what I have called "wonder-miracles" may happen now and then, the probability that a given alleged "wonder-miracle" did *not* happen is immeasurably great.<sup>24</sup>

## V.

This rejection of the prodigies commonly called miracles is not necessarily a rejection of the supernatural, or even of miracle in the proper sense of the term.

All is supernatural. "Every day the sun"; says Emerson, "and, after sunset, night and her stars. Ever the winds blow; ever the grass grows. Every day men and women, conversing, beholding and beholden."<sup>25</sup> These are as significant of Deity, we may agree, as the most extraordinary event could be. Marvels are not needed as signs of the presence of God when all nature speaks of him.

This, as I understand him, is the position of Dr. George A. Gordon in his "Religion and Miracle." He does not seek to prove either that miracles happen, or that they do not happen; but is "concerned to show that, where miracle has ceased to be regarded as true, Christianity remains in its essence entire."<sup>26</sup> "The miraculous," he says, "means the contradiction of the customary order of the world. The mechanical is the ordinary way of bringing things to pass. Both refer the mind to an indispensable antecedent,—the Eternal God. The fading of miracle, therefore, does not mean the vanishing of God from the life of the world."<sup>27</sup>

<sup>24</sup> "The line is broad which separates belief in a general possibility from belief in a specific alleged event." *The Guardian* (London) quoted by the *Literary Digest*, July 31, 1915, in the article on "Angelic Intervention at Mons." The story illustrates very strikingly how easily a legend can get started, and constitutes a modern parallel to the legend of the appearance of the cross to Constantine.

<sup>25</sup> Emerson, "The American Scholar."

<sup>26</sup> Preface, p. x.

<sup>27</sup> Pp. 47 f. (condensed).

A recent article<sup>28</sup> by Dr. William Adams Brown is, to my mind, susceptible of a similar interpretation. He defines a miracle as "an exceptional event, or quality in an event, in nature or in human life, the significance of which religious faith finds in the self-revealing activity of Deity"; or, more briefly, as "a strange fact with a divine meaning." In pre-scientific thinking the event is regarded as supernatural, *because* it is exceptional; that is to say, the divine meaning of the fact is an inference from its *strangeness*. But with the advance of scientific habits of viewing the world, and under the influence of the ethical spirit of Christianity, religious faith gradually comes to lay less stress upon the arbitrary or exceptional quality in events, and learns to recognize even the usual and commonplace as divine. "The permanent significance of miracle for religion" does not, then, necessarily imply an abiding belief in the reality of events which the scientist or the metaphysician would call miracles, or depend upon the continued acceptance of any particular cycle of miracle-stories; but may mean no more than an abiding propensity on the part of a believer in a personal God to see in nature itself "the self-revealing activity of Deity."

This is, I think, a fair interpretation of Dr. Brown's language. And it is indeed a valid and helpful method of approach. Indeed, if such a distinction is tenable, it may be considered as the specifically religious, as contrasted with the scientific or metaphysical point of view. If we think of miracle primarily as an awe-inspiring or wonder-provoking quality of particular events or of the world-order as a whole, a quality which to the Christian is significant of the presence of Deity, then miracle is certainly of permanent significance.

However, if one has in mind the scientific or metaphysical conception of miracle, as well as the distinctively religious, he is likely to wonder whether this is all that ought to be said. Dr. Brown's references to James and Bergson, it is true, and

<sup>28</sup> "The Permanent Significance of Miracle for Religion," *Harvard Theological Review*, July, 1915.



his speaking of "the creative aspect of religion" and of the bringing to pass of "new things," suggest more; but his exposition of this aspect of the problem is not so clear as one could wish, and I am not sure that he has really sought to incorporate these elements into his theory of the supernatural.

Whether or not Dr. Brown has done so, we, I think, may make the attempt to build upon a foundation of partial indeterminism. While fostering a healthy skepticism as regards the alleged miracles of all literatures, we may at the same time, and, as I think, without inconsistency, cultivate a healthy faith in the ultimate reality of the miraculous. Put in the form of a paradox, the position of this paper might be concisely described as *belief in miracle* combined with *disbelief in all or most of "the miracles."*

As I have already sufficiently insisted, natural science can not disprove the reality of miracle, and there is no reason why it should try to do so. True, it must proceed *as if* miracle were impossible. It must live by its particular kind of faith. *Within its own domain* it must assume the absolutely unbroken uniformity of nature. But science need not assume that its domain is without limits. Before the fact of miracle, science, to employ an already quoted phrase of William James, "simply stops."

Science, then, can not veto the belief in miracle; and, in my judgment, belief in miracle, in the sense in which I have defined the term, is a necessary implicate of belief in the God and Father of our Lord Jesus Christ. An absolutely determined universe is the metaphysical correlate of a "cosmic theism"<sup>29</sup> which is hardly to be distinguished from pantheism. If the course of events is absolutely necessitated, so as to be in principle predictable from eternity to eternity, we may still believe in God; but our concept of God must then be so pale and thin, so lacking in practical significance that one could almost say that it doesn't matter whether we believe or not.

<sup>29</sup> The position of John Fiske, which is conveniently summarized in the preface to his well-known book, "The Idea of God."

The belief in miracle deepens and supplements our theism, and enables us to assimilate the immanent God of "cosmic theism" more nearly to the Father-God of Christian tradition.

Our Father-God manifests Himself in nature, but is not limited by nature. He is the source and ground of nature, *and of much more than nature*. All that is natural is also supernatural; but not all that is supernatural is natural. The two categories are neither identical, nor mutually exclusive; the one includes the other, and, as the logician would say, the *extent* of the one is greater than the extent of the other. This difference in the extent of the two orders is the permanent domain of the miraculous.

We need not, then, think of all history as determined in the manner assumed by Laplace. Providence is not Fate. There is evolution, to be sure; but it is a "creative evolution," which our Father-God controls, and in which we have a part. There is at every step something "new under the sun," and each of us helps to decide what the next step shall be.

BALTIMORE, MD.



### III.

## MODERN DOGMATICS.<sup>1</sup>

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The title of my paper is somewhat infelicitous and unprecise. Dogmatics is a good word that has kept bad company and whose reputation consequently is not without blemish. The use of it suggests a temper and an attitude toward truth which quite misrepresent the science which it denotes. But the word has an ancient place in the republic of letters. It is brief and compact. Moreover, it should not be denied an opportunity to cleanse its tarnished name. Again, the term "modern dogmatics" is manifestly vague and indefinite. But, such as it is, I chose the term myself. Nor could I find a better one when at the request of your executive committee I agreed to carry out an idea which I had suggested to them as a desirable feature of our program. My idea was that this twenty-fifth anniversary meeting of the Spiritual Conference, our silver jubilee year, furnished a suitable occasion for an *historical* sketch of the rise and growth of modern dogmatics.

The use of the word "modern" implies, of course, no depreciation of the past in things theological. It is simply a candid recognition that there is a dogmatics that is new, in its principles, its methods, and, measurably, in its teachings. And my purpose this morning is to bring before you in rapid review the genesis of this new science, to describe its spirit and aim, and to sketch its present status. There are three related aspects of the general topic that would be of interest to us, namely, the historical, the critical, and the constructive. The first would show us *how* modern dogmatics has come into being; the second, *why* it has arisen; and the third, *what* it has come

<sup>1</sup> A paper read at the Spiritual Conference in Lancaster, Pa., July, 1915.

to be. My first thought was to present these three aspects conjointly in this paper. But I found it impossible to do that within my time limit. Hence I shall confine myself chiefly to the historical aspect, which, as I said, seemed to form a suitable topic for this twenty-fifth meeting of our conference, and I shall refer to the critical and constructive phases only in passing.

Modern dogmatics is a great religious movement. Not a dead monument of learning built in cloistered retreats, but a vigorous movement of life whose flow is manifest in history and whose force is astounding. It is so varied, that volumes would be required to describe it adequately. It is so far-reaching, that, in this transition stage, no one is competent to estimate its laurels or enumerate its victories. Its records include many brilliant names and they chronicle numerous notable achievements. But vast and varied though it is, the movement may be surveyed rapidly and accurately in the persons of its outstanding leaders.

Modern dogmatics begins with F. D. E. Schleiermacher. It was born in the first quarter of the nineteenth century. The three centuries intervening between the Protestant Reformation and the beginning of modern dogmatics, so far as dogmatics is concerned, belong to the dark ages. During that long span of time, no Moses led Christian theology out of the darkness in whose mist it had tarried since the time of St. Augustine and before; no prophet arose to proclaim the emancipation of divine truth from the shackles of scholastic bondage. In its essence, dogmatics for three centuries after the Reformation remained precisely what it had been during the ages preceding it. In principle, in method, and very largely in its conclusions, it passed unchanged, if not unchallenged, from Catholicism to Protestantism, and in Protestantism, with minor divergencies, to all its constituent branches. It was contraband in the Protestant communion, foreign to its spirit and hostile to its life. But no one suspected that, least of all the great Reformers themselves, who, as theologians, were



mediæval to the core, without exception. This is not said in derogation of the men, nor in disparagement of the movement. It is mentioned simply as an historical fact, which has been ignored or obscured to our own hurt. Again, this statement does not deny the presence of so-called specific and distinctive Protestant doctrines in the various Reformation and post-Reformation systems of Christian doctrine, such as the universal priesthood of believers, justification by faith, or the normative authority of the Bible. But these distinctive tenets of the Reformation either remained foreign elements in essentially mediæval systems of doctrine, or, gradually, they were construed in conformity with the ruling spirit of the whole. The former alternative is seen in the doctrine of the universal priesthood of believers, while the latter is illustrated by the doctrine of justification by faith. The tenet of the universal priesthood was the incarnation of the very spirit of the Reformation. It embodied experiences and principles which, directly or by necessary inference, were subversive of the central dogmas of Catholicism. And, in the domain of life, its effect has been little less than revolutionary. But no correspondent change, due to its pervasive influence, may be traced in the sphere of thought. It remains an unassimilated, yea unassimilable, element in systems of doctrine based upon mediæval premises and principles. On the other hand, the doctrine of justification by faith soon became a debased counterfeit in the theological marts of Protestantism. On the lips of the early Luther it had been the affirmation of a vital religious fact, but in the creeds and catechisms of Protestantism it became the formula of a theological fiction. Instead of transforming the body of Protestant teaching with its own native vigor, it became conformed to the spirit of Rome that lurked beneath the Protestant garb.

I repeat, therefore, that no trace of modern dogmatics appears in the age of the Reformation or in the centuries subsequent to it. The doctrinal systems of Protestantism, from the *Loci Communes* of Melancthon to the end of the eighteenth



century, remained mediæval in spirit and in form. Their anthropology was Augustinian; their soteriology, Anselmic; their Christology, Chalcedonian; and their theology, using the word in its narrower sense, was abstractly metaphysical. And, most significant of all, the universally accepted conception of dogma was that its subject matter consisted of a sacred deposit of truth supernaturally communicated to man and inerrantly preserved in the Bible. The sole function of dogmaticians was to extract this truth from the sacred record, to formulate it systematically without addition, subtraction, or mutilation, and to defend it against all adversaries, chiefly by an appeal to the supernatural manner in which it had been conveyed to man.

The Reformation marked a turning point in human history. It requires no apologist and no eulogist. But its real glory as a religious and an intellectual rebirth will in no wise be diminished by a candid recognition of its limitations. Great and beneficent as were the changes wrought by it, in religious thought, belief, and life, there are some things which it left unchanged. And chief among them was dogma. This is not to deny that the new creed which it formulated was, as a matter of fact, much more correspondent to the truth than the old had been. But the fundamental and primary fact is that the Reformation left the main stress of emphasis and of obligation where it found it, namely, upon correctness of intellectual belief. What Principal Workman has said of Luther himself—that “as he grew older his conception of faith became more and more intellectual, till at last it comprised little beyond the assent of the mind to the articles of an orthodox creed”—may be fairly said of the Reformation movement as a whole. “When the creative fire of the tremendous upheaval had died down, what had been accomplished in dogmatics was the substitution of a fresh for an old reading of certain doctrines which professed to convey the significance of a revelation given long ago, and to declare the methods whereby the benefits of that revelation might be appropriated. Corrupted



doctrine had been restored to its pristine purity; human accretions had been eliminated from the body of divine truth. But Christian doctrine continued to be viewed as a series of propositions, supernaturally revealed, which claimed the assent of the human mind. The accent was not shifted from belief in doctrinal propositions to faith in a person, but only from wrong belief over to right belief." Which is to say that in and after the Reformation movement Christianity was taken to be a doctrinal system still, though a system whose doctrine had been corrected and made pure.

It was Schleiermacher who opened a new era. He became the founder and father of modern dogmatics. Few men as great as he have appeared in the ranks of theological workers; and, perhaps, none greater. In him head and heart, vast learning and simple piety, were fitly framed together, each contributing its share toward the strength and beauty of his work. With Paul, John, Augustine, Clement, Origen, Athanasius, and Aquinas, he belongs to the small group of epoch-making theologians. No Protestant theologian since his time has escaped his influence. The creative impulses and the formative influences which he imparted to theology, after the lapse of a century, after tests by friends and trials by foes, are still vigorously operative. The greatness of Schleiermacher does not lie in any addition, subtraction, or alteration of specific Christian doctrines. In those respects, indeed, his theological system shares the obscurities, contradictions, and imperfections of all other systems in which men have attempted to set down the facts of our faith in an orderly manner. The surpassing service of Schleiermacher to theological thinking consists in the new conception of religion, and conversely, of theology, which he states, applies, and defends as teacher, preacher, and apologist of the Christian faith. It was here that he broke with mediæval dogmatics and blazed the way for modern dogmatics. According to Schleiermacher religion is not a system of thought or a series of propositions claiming the intellectual assent of man, but a life, growing out of a



fundamental experience and resulting in abiding convictions. This fundamental experience, which lies at the very basis of every religion and forms its palpitating heart, is, in Schleiermacher's phrase, "the feeling of absolute dependence on God." And, again, this sense of absolute dependence on God is not the result of reflection. It wells up in human consciousness with inherent and inevitable necessity. It forms a fundamental constituent of our nature. "The consciousness of man, for Schleiermacher, is driven back, step by step, from the world's single agencies and separate parts to the world as a whole, wherein all single phenomena inhere. Then, from the total universe, still running backwards, it lights at last upon the Absolute behind all the single phenomena and behind their totality. There human consciousness is silent, passive, receptive. It gazes up "the great altar stairs that slope through darkness up to God." It feels its personal contact with, and absolute dependence on, the ultimate Source of everything that is. It is then in the grip of religion." Observe carefully that this primary religious experience involves no intellectual element. It imparts no information and it yields no knowledge of God in a speculative sense. That must be sought for afterwards, if it is to come at all; and it must flow from the sense of dependence as its source. But the primary religious experience itself contains no slightest jot or tittle of speculative knowledge. It is a life, experience, feeling of dependence as Schleiermacher would say, pure and simple, and from beginning to end. And in the presence and the persistence of this feeling, religion's essential characteristics lie.

The *Christian* religion, accordingly, is that experience of God, that consciousness of absolute dependence on God, which Jesus Christ personally possessed and which he creatively imparts to believers on him through the mediation of the Church. In Christianity, that feeling of dependence on God which forms the basis of religion in general, is developed and deepened to the point of perfection. Jesus Christ himself lived, moved and had his being in that sense of dependence at



its highest. He possessed the full unalloyed God consciousness without let or hindrance, and He communicates it to his disciples, as the ages pass on, through the mediation of the Church. So he redeems men from sin, which to Schleiermacher denotes the prevalence of the sensuous nature of man over his spiritual nature, into that complete selfhood which loses itself and finds itself again in God. This redemptive Christ is not immediately given in the consciousness of the present day Christian. But starting with the Christian experience and passing back to its source, Schleiermacher maintained, you are brought up finally against a Christ in the main like the Christ of the New Testament. Because the present experience of the Christian man required the previous appearance in history of an archetypal Christ in whom that experience was perfect and out of whom it passes to the race.

Thus ran Schleiermacher's thought. It was an epoch-making scheme. It signaled an entirely fresh beginning in theological thinking. Hitherto the Church had held that the essence of Christianity is a set of doctrines supernaturally revealed. Schleiermacher held that it is a consciousness inspired and created primarily by the person of Jesus Christ. Hitherto the Church had taught that the substance of faith is intellectual assent to a program of speculative propositions. Schleiermacher taught that it is the experience of redemption from sin through Jesus Christ. And the foundation of this saving faith is not the Scriptures, certainly not ecclesiastical creeds, but the inward experience itself. From this primary fact, given in human consciousness, result all biblical records, all theologies and liturgies, all ecclesiastical institutions and politics. They are records of Christian experience and products of Christian consciousness. And this Christian consciousness itself, the secret of human strength and blessedness, is the effect in us of the impulse and influence of Jesus Christ, created organically through the medium of the Church. Its genesis within man is in full accord with the psychological and moral laws of his being, and its growth depends upon the exer-



cise of his free will; but its ultimate ground is in Jesus Christ, who occupies the central place in Schleiermacher's system, and the supreme position in history, and who has an absolutely unique significance in the history of revelation. To Schleiermacher, "the person of Jesus Christ was a moral miracle in the midst of the life of our humanity, of an order to be explained only by a new spiritually creative act of God."

Schleiermacher's system has been charged with many sins of omission and commission; and it certainly is not without defects. But it may well be said of him that even his shortcomings are the defects of noble qualities. If in his earlier works there was a passing denial of the immortality of the soul, it was in the interest of a present experience of abundant and endless life and against the crude conception of an eternity of selfish bliss that was generally held in his time. If his thought of God in all of his writings remains vague, verging on pantheism, it was due to his mystic sense of God as filling the whole universe with his presence and power. Whatever demerits one may find in Schleiermacher's system, either in its substance or form, they are immeasurably overbalanced by its merits. It is he who rediscovered and restated the immediacy of religion, its independence of rational argument, of historical tradition, or institutional form. It is he who proclaimed that the subject matter of Christian theology consists not of a-priori propositions containing supernatural information, but of abiding convictions that grow out of the Christian revelation and can be verified in Christian experience. This is his permanent contribution to theology. It thrilled the hearts of men in the first quarter of the nineteenth century, when the Berlin professor flung it out in impassioned speeches in answer to the challenge of a contemptuous rationalism. And it became, so to speak, the Magna Charta of a new science of dogmatics. It would be interesting, were there time for it, to trace somewhat in detail the fate of Schleiermacher's system in the two generations immediately following the life of the master. Such a survey would lead us to two conclusions. On



the one hand it would show that the influence of Schleiermacher was strong upon many theologians in Germany and elsewhere. These men may be called disciples of Schleiermacher's, in greater or less degree, because they had learned his primary lesson that it is in the Christian consciousness a Christian theology must begin. But, on the other hand, it would also become apparent that during this period no theologian appeared who made Schleiermacher's constructive principle the basis of a system of Christian doctrine. That is to say, Schleiermacher's influence was effective in many minor ways, but the quickening impulse which he had imparted to theology did not at once become its controlling spirit. The reason for this failure was twofold—the rise of Hegelianism and the rally of conservatism. To speak first of the latter, it was inevitable that Schleiermacher's theological construction should arouse the earnest protests of those whose theology consisted of ecclesiastically warranted propositions. They felt that he had destroyed the very foundation of Christian faith and, under the leadership of Hengstenberg, they put up a vigorous fight to save the old formulas. But far more significant than this conservative reaction was the dazzling success of Hegel, whose wonderful system of philosophy captivated Europe and diverted theology into the very paths of speculation out of which Schleiermacher had led it into safer and saner ways. During its brief regnancy, Schleiermacher was crowded from the center to the circumference of theological thought. Even today men debate the question whether Hegel overthrew essential Christianity or defended it with his brilliant dialectic, as he undoubtedly supposed himself to be doing. But there can be no debate concerning the relation between Schleiermacher and Hegel. They differ fundamentally in their viewpoint. Schleiermacher is inductive. He starts from experience. In psychology and in history he seeks to come to a rational understanding of the moral and religious meaning of the universe, and of man's transcendental relations. In the finite he finds the infinite. Hegel reverses the



process. He is a-priori and inductive. His starting point is infinity. With a boldness equaling that of Thomas Aquinas himself, and with a skill never surpassed, he affirms the existence of but one Absolute. History is the mighty process through which this one infinite reality comes to expression and self-realization. Thus Hegel started with a philosophical construction of reality. He used life to illustrate his logic. He searched history in order to verify his philosophy. Anyone who has studied Hegel can easily understand the charm and explain the vogue of this heaven-storming and earth-conquering monism, which seemed to hold the key to all knowledge and mysteries. Philosophy rejoiced because it restored to reason that primacy which Kant had destroyed. It broke down the barriers between the noumenal and the phenomenal and reaffirmed the right of the mind to explore the universe from center to circumference. Confessional theologians rejoiced because Hegel's philosophy gave new sanction to dogma, which Schleiermacher had discredited. So far from being an external and transient expression of religion as Schleiermacher had declared, Hegel represented dogmas to be the very essence of religion. He maintained that the study of dogmas is the highest task of the Church.

Thus the issue between Hegel and Schleiermacher was clear cut. The one attempted to establish Christianity on a purely philosophical basis, while the other sought to ground it firmly on historical and psychological foundations. And for the length of a generation the voice of Schleiermacher, new, if not still and small, was all but drowned by the stentorian clamor of Hegel's followers, who declaimed, for the last time, let us hope, the ancient delusion that man by searching can find out God. Then, about the middle of the nineteenth century, came the collapse of Hegelianism. There is, perhaps, no phenomenon in the history of philosophy more striking than the sudden downfall of this marvelous system, unless it be its startling rise. Yet, the reason for it is not far to seek. It is due not only to the fact that the beautiful river of Hegelianism, after starting



in the highlands of speculation, had, in some of its turns and windings, lost itself in arid deserts of sceptical denials; while in others it had become a muddy stream of crass materialism. The chief reason was that the age of Plato or of Aquinas was gone forever. A new age had dawned whose great prophet, after Kant, was Schleiermacher. It placed life before logic; it preferred history to philosophy; it ranked experience above speculation. Hegel had taken this sober-minded age unawares. He had captivated it with the magic of his words. He had beguiled it with the symmetry of his system. Thinkers and scholars took a brief holiday, as it were, and rioted and reveled in abstract metaphysics. But the holiday was brief. Directly the age returned to sobriety and, weary of its folly, it voiced its disgust with its brilliant seducer in the Positivism of Comte.

It was thus in the latter half of the nineteenth century that Schleiermacher came to his own. Comte claimed to be the spokesman for the ripe manhood of mankind, who had passed through the infantile and juvenile stages of theological and metaphysical symbolism to the stage of science, which dealt with facts and discarded all the crude fancies of theological and philosophical speculation. But there was a riper manhood than that reported by Comte. It shared his profound respect for facts, and his scientific passion for historical reality, but it also discerned facts of a higher order than those that claimed the interest and attention of scientists and historians. It rejected both the idealistic monism of Hegel and the materialistic monism of Comte. And it returned to the quasi-dualism of Kant with its two spheres of reality, the noumenal and the phenomenal, interpenetrating one another, forming a rational and moral unity, and yielding their secrets to the rational and moral faculties of man working conjointly, each in its own precinct and according to its own nature. "With Kant it held, as against the rationalism of Hegel, that not reason *per se*, but reason acting upon experience is the true source of knowledge; and, as against the empiricism of Comte,



that knowledge comes not from experience flung down upon a passive mind, but from experience acted upon by mind." Schleiermacher the great spokesman of this riper manhood had learned Kant's lesson well—not only the lesson taught in his *Critique of Pure Reason*, that we cannot get behind mere phenomena, know ultimate realities or things-in-themselves, or prove God, immortality, or the freedom of the will, but also the lesson taught in his *Critique of Practical Reason*, that the reason which could not *prove* these things could not *disprove* them either, and that "moral" faith in them was not only justified, but as sound and obligatory as any "rational" faith could be. Indeed, Schleiermacher had learned Kant's lesson so well that he transcended it. He passed with Kant beyond the bounds set by the *Pure Reason*, but he passed further beyond them, arriving not at a mere morality for which the *Practical Reason* called, in the interest of a perfect world and of a completed happiness of mankind, but at a religion experienced and affirmed in man's inner consciousness, and which, being so experienced and affirmed, was to be accepted as one of the world's basal facts.

And now, after the lapse of a generation or more, Schleiermacher came to his own, mainly through the labors of Albrecht Ritschl who is the only theologian of modern times entitled to be compared with Schleiermacher in the depth of his insight and in the breadth of his influence. His coming means the beginning of the second era in the history of modern dogmatics. "Generally speaking, there never was an age when theology was more discredited, and when the task of the theologian to formulate Christian doctrines and to establish their validity was more difficult. The collapse of Hegelianism had created a widespread distrust of speculation in general. Disenchanted by the failures of philosophy, men sought solace in science which was then asserting a unity of nature and an unbroken continuity of law, in the name of evolution and with the fervor of neophytes, that seemed to leave no room for religion's dearest traditions or for theology's most cherished



beliefs. Moreover, the strongholds of the Christian Church were being assailed from within and her defensive power against external foes was impaired by historical criticism. Even the traditional Christian piety no longer passed unchallenged as representing the ideal human character, for the age was slowly shifting its emphasis from the individual to society and it demanded a religious piety that furnished the principles and supplied the sanction of social redemption. This was Ritschl's age. And his great merit as well as the measure of his extraordinary powers, is seen in his recognition of the situation and in his response to it. He met the increasing hostility of science and philosophy to the Christian faith, not by a futile frontal attack of denunciation and denial, but, like Schleiermacher himself, by a differentiation of the respective precincts of science and of religion. He disarmed historical critics by conceiving the object of Christian faith in such a way that it was indifferent to the results of their investigations. He satisfied the social need of the age by making the evangelical idea of the kingdom of God the center of the Christian message and ministry."

In Ritschl, then, theology returned to the path which had been blazed for it by Schleiermacher. The younger theologian is at one with his older and greater forerunner in starting theological construction not from dogmatic propositions but from the experience of the Christian. In that essential point they are in hearty accord, whatever minor differences may exist between them. A glimpse at Ritschl's epoch-making book, *The Christian Doctrine of Justification and of Reconciliation*, will show us the meaning of Christian experience to Ritschl and the use which he made of it in constructive theology. Though a monograph in name, the book really contains a complete system of theology. But Ritschl completely reverses the method pursued by the traditional systems. Instead of starting with an abstract idea of God and proceeding thence to Christ and man, to sin and redemption, as was their wont, he began with certain concrete facts of life which together consti-



tute the experience of salvation. "These facts are sin, the consciousness of forgiveness, awareness of restoration to the will and power of goodness, the gift of love, and of a spirit which feels itself victorious and triumphant amidst the ills of life and in the presence of death. This Christian experience of salvation from sin is a present fact in the lives of individual men and it has been a fact in the lives of masses of men for many generations. Hence this central and fundamental fact of the Christian experience has a psychology and a history from which reflection and speculation must take its departure. And Christian theology is the science which ascertains and states this and other facts of the Christian consciousness, traces them to their source in history, explains their genesis in experience, searches into their ultimate significance, and relates them to other facts of human experience."

This, in simple language, is the theological method pursued by Ritschl. Its point of departure was the Christian experience. In human consciousness and in history he found the data for his theology. Instead of reasoning a-priori from an abstract notion of God and a forensic plan of salvation, he began with the concrete, vivid facts of the religious life that owed its creative impulses to Jesus Christ. Here his agreement with Schleiermacher and his dependence upon the older theologian are obvious. But now we must note an important difference between Schleiermacher and Ritschl. Both maintained that the starting point of theology must be the Christian experience, but they differed in their conception of the content or nature of the Christian experience. To Schleiermacher its essential was the consciousness of the dependence on God which was peculiar to the Christian believer, but to Ritschl the essence of Christian experience was Jesus Christ himself, not a mere feeling but a peculiar life in its fulness. The effect of this distinction is far-reaching. If the primary fact of our Christian experience is a feeling, as Schleiermacher held, whose cause is not immediately proclaimed in our consciousness, then its creative cause must be sought by an independent process of



historical research or philosophical speculation. That is precisely what Schleiermacher did. He groped his way back from the Christian experience of dependence on God to Christ, who had been its archetypal possessor and who was its creator. But in following this line he was brought into contact inevitably with that speculative thought from whose thralldom he had sought escape. For Ritschl, Schleiermacher's problem did not exist. Christian experience and the historical Christ are given us together. To be a Christian means not to possess a feeling of dependence on God, mediated somehow by Christ, but to be conscious of an inward correspondence of our life with Christ as he stands in history. And this vital correspondence, this Christ born in us, is far more than a feeling of dependence on God. It is rather a consciousness of freedom and victory over the world, of deliverance and uplift into a spiritual realm, of self-identification with the society which Christ has set up, namely, the kingdom of God, in which both the individual and the race have their ultimate destiny.

Ritschl died in 1889, but being dead he yet speaketh. And I am persuaded his voice will never cease to be heard. He left no academic school but many devoted disciples. Like Schleiermacher, he influenced even those who dissented vigorously from his principles and conclusions. He constructed no theological system in which his principles are consistently wrought out in detail. Here again he resembled Schleiermacher in that the execution of his scheme left much to be desired. But these short-comings are insignificant. They simply mean that the task essayed by Ritschl was too great to be accomplished by one man in one generation. That task was nothing less than the reconstruction of the whole dogmatic edifice of the past. Ritschl's contribution to it consisted in his clear apprehension of the problem to be solved, namely, his conception of Christian doctrine as practical convictions growing out of life instead of theoretical propositions dropped out of the sky; and in his courageous and complete reversal of the ancient a-priori and deductive method. It is this Ritschl-



lian method of procedure from the known to the unknown, from the historical to the eternal, from the human to the divine, from the practical to the theoretical, from religion to theology, that constitutes his permanent contribution to theology. Modern dogmatics appropriates this method. Its point of departure is the historical Jesus, his known humanity and his practical religious efficacy as the redeemer of mankind. With Schleiermacher and Ritschl, it regards him, on the one hand, as the product of history, and yet, on the other hand as an issue from eternity; as a genuine man in whom the absolute God manifested his nature and his purpose. With the aid of modern philosophy it seeks to ground the historical Jesus in the heart of the eternal God and to explain the relation of the Christlike God to the universe. By means of psychology and history it attempts to explain the continued presence and power of Jesus in mankind. Faith it regards as trust in Jesus and in the God whom he reveals—trust enough to test his principles and try his life in loyal obedience. Religion it regards as personal and spiritual communion with God; not magical communion through mechanical ordinances, not mystic communion through ineffable visions and incommunicable raptures, but communion of person with person; of the finite will, heart, and mind with the infinite purpose, love, and wisdom as revealed in Jesus Christ. Theology, it holds, consists of those abiding convictions concerning God and man, sin and salvation, heaven and earth, which grow out of this vital communion with God and which verify themselves in the experience of mankind.

H. B. Smith said of Schleiermacher, "that he led German Christianity in its returning course to our Lord." To an even greater degree that is true of Ritschl. He and the thinkers adopting his theological method have laid universal Christianity under heavy obligations by their recovery of the person of Jesus Christ. They have opened our eyes to the difference between the Christ of metaphysical speculation and scholastic definition and the Jesus of history. They have helped us to



see him, not as a remote theological figure, standing for a little while on the hill-tops of Palestine to carry out a fixed program, a divine transaction for men, and then disappear into the clouds whence he had come, but to see him as he lives in the pages of the New Testament, as he moves through the aisle of history, as he dwells in the hearts of men, instinct with life and power, initiating a new process of salvation *IN* men, not for men, in which their sorrows are assuaged, their sins forgiven, and their hopes and aspirations satisfied. Modern dogmatics has but one constructive principle, viz., the christological. But the Christ from whom it derives its revealing light on God, the world, man, sin, salvation, etc., is not the *λογος*, the image and expression of a transcendent metaphysical deity, but the historical Jesus, in whom dwelt the fulness of the Father, full of grace and truth. And its faith in Christ does not rest upon any metaphysical fact connected with his person, but upon his spiritual supremacy and moral lordship.

In this connection I wish to call attention to Dorner, to his relation to Schleiermacher and to his relation to the Mercersburg theology. Dorner's great book, *The History of the Doctrine of the Person of Christ*, was an attempt to preserve Schleiermacher's essential basis, and at the same time, to give fresh security to the historical Christ and to the doctrines gathered round his name. With others who dwelt in Schleiermacher's camp, Dorner felt that the person of Christ and the traditional Christology were not sufficiently safeguarded in Schleiermacher's system. This feeling was strengthened by the negative criticism of Biedermann, Strauss, Bruno Bauer, and Feuerbach, working from the Hegelian direction, which had swept the historical Christ away. "Schleiermacher, in seeking a rational and historical explanation of the Christian consciousness, had been borne on to a Christ who corresponded in the main to the historical Christ of the Scriptures and the Church; but he had not been borne on to the specific formulas wherein the doctrine of Christ's preexistence, of the trinity, and of other mysteries had been enshrined—nor, for that mat-



ter, to any other formulas in substitution for these. Thus Schleiermacher's abbreviated creed left many empty spaces where formerly great doctrines had stood. "Dorner could not rest content with that. He says in his *Glaubenslehre*, "when the enlightened Christian mind is in harmony, by its faith and experience, with objective Christianity, which faith knows to be its origin, and which is also attested by the Scriptures and the scriptural faith of the Church, then such a faith has to justify and develop its religious knowledge in a systematic form." That is to say, Dorner held that theology must extend in a speculative direction Schleiermacher's historical process of obtaining religious knowledge. When the Christian consciousness has uttered its last word, then theology makes philosophy its handmaiden in order to ascertain what more there may be to say concerning the objects of faith, a position which is thoroughly sound and sensible. And this is what Dorner sought to do. Given the Christ, whom the Christian consciousness demanded and whom history attested, he sought to show what must be said of him from the speculative side. This, of course, meant grounding him in the eternal nature of things. It involved a doctrine of the incarnation, and thus Dorner came to write his great history of Christology and later his *Glaubenslehre*, in which his own Christology is contained. Dorner's Christology is justly famous, for it marks the point of transition from the metaphysical Christologies of the past to modern ethical Christologies. Before Schleiermacher you have the Christology of Chalcedon, which interprets the historical person of Jesus in terms of an ancient dualistic philosophy. In Schleiermacher, you have Christ but no effort to explain him. In Dorner, you have the person of the historical Jesus and a new method of explaining his relation to God and his appearance on earth. Dorner regarded the incarnation of God in Christ not as an altogether exceptional and singular manifestation of God, a departure from all his former ways of self-manifestation, which had no historical antecedent and no historical consequent, but as the last step in an age-long process



of revelation, as the complete realization of that which had been God's plan and purpose from the beginning. This gradual self-impartation of God to man was a vital, historical process beginning in eternity and culminating in Christ. Its necessity lay not in the exigency of sin, though sin of course vitally affected and changed the character and course of the incarnation, but in the character of God and in the supreme need of man to know God and to come into fellowship with him. Moreover, the great mystery of the incarnation of God in Christ was not the union of two incompatible and mutually exclusive natures in one person. No impassable gulf existed between the divine nature and the human which had to be bridged by the majestic and merciful device of the incarnation, as the Greek philosophers had falsely supposed. The two natures were akin. The human was closely related to the divine, because God had made man in his image. Both were essentially moral and rational personality. Hence human nature had an ineradicable capacity for receiving and expressing the divine nature. God could dwell in Christ without the renunciation of his essential deity and Christ could reveal God without the destruction of his essential humanity. The incarnation of God in Christ was the realization of the ideal relation between God and man.

Thus ran Dorner's Christology. It means a distinct advance over all former efforts to explain the person of Christ, in its emphasis on the immanence of God in history and on his kinship with man. It is true that Dorner departs from the path marked out by Schleiermacher and followed later by Ritschl, and "still moves in a region of abstract metaphysics when he explains the person of Christ as resulting from the union of the *λογος*, with an impersonal human nature. It is true also that modern theology refuses to follow Dorner into this region of abstract metaphysics which represents the philosophical conceptions of former times. It sees more clearly than did Dorner that such a term as *λογος* is merely a philosophical label for the person of the historical Jesus but not an



independent entity that explains the mystery of the incarnation. It contends that such a term as "impersonal human nature" may have had a vital content in scholastic realism, but has absolutely none in the minds of men trained in the concrete methods of modern science. Modern psychology has made it perfectly meaningless to speak of an impersonal human nature, as a substratum of personality." But these limitations of Dorner's Christology do not lessen its importance. It marks a milestone in the efforts of men to give a rational interpretation of the mystery of the incarnation. Dorner stands at the point of transition from ancient to modern Christology and points the way in the right direction. Those who preceded him started with the metaphysical deity of Christ in the bosom of the eternal Godhead and found the marks of the divine nature of the historical Jesus in his possession of the abstract attributes of deity, such as omnipotence, omniscience, and omnipresence. Those who came after Dorner took their departure from the humanity of Jesus and found his divinity in the perfection of his spiritual and ethical nature. The former build their Christology on the preexistent Christ in God; the latter construct theirs on the manifested God in Christ. Both find God in Christ reconciling the world unto himself. But in the old Christologies this God, after the incarnation as before, remains a metaphysical being, essentially unknown and unknowable. He sends his son into the world to perform a divine transaction and to publish the plan of salvation. The record of these things is found in the Bible, and their substance is taught in those doctrines which Christian theology presents to man for his acquiescence. But God himself, his essential character, remains hidden in the shadows of the universe. Salvation is grounded in his divine will, which Jesus had performed and proclaimed, but not in his essential character and being. On the other hand, in the ethical Christologies proceeding from the self-manifestation of God in the person of Jesus, the Christlike God came to his own. Not what God was in himself, not the inner nature of the eternal



Godhead, not the metaphysical aspects of deity, which no man can fathom and no mind apprehend—not these abstruse and abstract speculations were made central and fundamental, but what God was seen to be and experienced to be in Jesus Christ. His appearance in history, his redemptive love and power manifested in Christ, rather than his existence in eternity, his decrees and plans, became the center of theological thought and the principle of theological construction.

The effect of this transformation in our Christian thought of God is simply immeasurable. I believe that the tragedy of Christian theology in the past has been the obscuration of the Christian idea of God which began almost at the beginning of Christian history and continued to our time. Perhaps, instead of obscuration, one should say lack of appreciation. Christ showed man the Father, but it is a vain and futile endeavor to look for this Father God in the systems of theology produced in past ages. God as Metaphysical Substance, as Omnipotent Power, as Arbitrary Will, as Inexorable Law, these are the conceptions of God that we find regnant. But the God of Christlike character who manifested himself in Christ for the redemption of the world, has never yet been made the constitutive and constructive principle of a system of Christian Theology. This God continued to live and work in the practical religion, in the simple piety and fervent faith of the Christian centuries, but not in the theoretical thought of the Church. The historical reasons for this failure of the mind of the Church to give an adequate Christian interpretation to the Christian experiences of her heart are clear to us all. Historically and humanly speaking this long-continued process of obscuration was perhaps inevitable. But though inevitable in the past, it is no longer justifiable in the present to let a God of metaphysical speculation usurp that central place in our dogmatics which belongs to the God of the Christian revelation. I said, above, that modern dogmatics has but one constructive principle, viz., the christological. But this principle denotes the method, rather than the substance, of



modern theology. Christ is indeed central and fundamental, but Christ as the revealer of God. Through Christ we have access to the Father. In him we find the final self-manifestation of God. And it is this Christ-like God, revealed in the life of Jesus, who stands in the center of modern dogmatics. It is christo-centric in method, but theo-centric in substance.

And those of you who are familiar with the Mercersburg theology, or who have sat at the feet of Dr. Gerhart and remember his Institutes of the Christian Religion, will recognize the influence of Dorner upon the Christian doctrine that was taught in this seminary in former days. It was Dorner's conception of the incarnation which was made the reproach of the Mercersburg theologians by those who were not in touch or harmony with the advancing Protestantism of Europe, and which, in our judgment, constitutes their glory. Our fathers and teachers were fellow-pilgrims with us on the path that leads from Schleiermacher through Dorner to Ritschl. We should have stood where they stood a generation ago, had we been their contemporaries. Perhaps, we may affirm, also, that they would today stand shoulder to shoulder with us in loyal adherence to the principles and methods of modern dogmatics which are but the continuation and completion of their own. Like them we are christological in principle and christo-centric in method. It is the method which arrives at God through Jesus and which uses the knowledge so gained as the final principle for the interpretation of life, for the understanding of the meaning of the world in which we live, and the end to which we are called. And if we differ from them, it is not in the substance of our Christian faith, but in its form. If we no longer call Jesus "the *λογος*," we still call him "Saviour and Lord." If we no longer regard him as the incarnation of a transcendent metaphysical deity, we still see in him the incarnation of the Father, whose immeasurable love he revealed and whose eternal purpose he manifested. And if we have advanced beyond the positions and conclusions held by them, we have not been led away, either by higher criticism, by evo-



lutionary science, or by immanental philosophy, from the one great Christian fact that in and through Jesus Christ the absolute God is redeeming the world from sin.

When the eighteenth century closed, the world faced more than one acute crisis. The chaos that threatened to engulf the existing political order of the world was no greater than the trouble and turmoil in the sphere of religion. Here two tendencies stood opposed to one another in an apparently irreconcilable conflict, the mediæval and the modern. Both had a long history. They had tested their mettle in many a skirmish, before and since the Reformation. But now the crisis had become acute. It was seen that these two tendencies grew inevitably out of two world-views which were diametrically opposed. Compromise or conciliation between them was impossible. It was one or the other. "Either a mediæval man and a Christian, or a modern man and a sceptic—this seemed to be the sole alternative as viewed by many of the clearest headed thinkers of the day. Mediævalism or irreligion was the choice offered and accepted by consistent evangelicals and by consistent rationalists."

The same choice is still offered and accepted by many of both schools. There are those who tell us that no man can live in an age whose foundations were laid by Copernicus and Galileo, by Kant and Darwin, and remain a Christian. And there are others who say that no man can be a Christian and accept the conclusions of modern science and philosophy. This crisis is even more acute today than at the end of the eighteenth century, for in the course of the last century the contrast between mediævalism and modernism has been wrought into clearer form and sharper expression. It stands before our eyes today in startling relief, to the dismay of many earnest souls who fail to see how one can pass from the world of the middle ages into our evolutionary, democratic era and save one's faith in God and Christ.

But their dismay is causeless. Mediævalism or irreligion has ceased to be the only alternative. The future belongs to



neither of them. Eighteenth century rationalism has failed to meet the religious needs of mankind, even as eighteenth century pietism has failed to satisfy their scientific temper. Both have been superseded by a higher faith which is Christian and modern. It is Christian because it is based simply and solely upon the historical self-manifestation of God in Jesus Christ. It is modern because it regards this revelation of God, not as a series of doctrines, but as a life which fulfills, and at the same time interprets, the meaning of all the forms and facts of life that have appeared in the endless evolutionary ages. It is Christian because it finds God in his universe. It is modern because it remands the investigation of this universe itself, in all its parts, to science. What science investigates and reports, faith interprets in the light of the Christian revelation. It is Christian because in God it finds redemption from sin and salvation. It is modern because it holds that this divine redemption is not primarily a transaction between God and individuals, but a racial and eternal process grounded ultimately in the heart of the Eternal, and running progressively through the ages towards its consummation. It is Christian, finally, because it holds that this consummation of God's eternal purpose is bound up inextricably, mysteriously if you will, with the person of Jesus Christ. It is through the spiritual apprehension and appropriation of Jesus Christ, through growth in his grace, through fellowship in his service and sacrifice that this world will ultimately be reconciled to God.

We still call the dogmatics "modern" that sets forth these Christian convictions in scientific form, because it still stands contrasted with mediæval dogmatics. But the time will come when men universally will call it by its true name—Christian Theology. "Christian," because it is based not upon human speculations whether Greek or Roman, Scholastic or Protestant, but upon Christian revelation. "Christian theology," because it accepts this revealed knowledge humbly and trustfully, as the truth concerning the Invisible God. This Christian Theology



will derive its sanction neither from an Infallible Church nor from an Inerrant Book, but from the truth which it teaches and presents to men. It will gladly submit this Christian truth to the rational and moral nature of mankind, confident that it will be accepted because it interprets the mysteries of life, satisfies its deepest mental and moral needs, and voices its noblest hopes and aspirations.

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## IV.

### EVANGELICAL PIETY.<sup>1</sup>

W. D. HAPPEL.

Piety means devotion to God. To some people the word suggests devotion to God as that comes to expression in religious acts. The pious person accordingly is the one who is scrupulous in the observance of private and public devotions, religious rites and ceremonies. But the word piety is used by others in a much broader sense to denote not simply devotion to God as that comes to expression in acts of devotion, but especially in acts of obedience, conduct, and character. Because the word piety is used often to denote religious fervor, when character is conspicuously absent, the word has passed into disrepute and we feel uncomfortable in being called pious. It suggests cant and hypocrisy. The trouble lies in emptying the word of its ethical contents. It was because the piety in Isaiah's day was devoid of character which is the major part of piety that God through the prophet condemned it saying: "What unto me is the multitude of your sacrifices? saith Jehovah. I have had enough of the burnt offerings of rams, and the fat of fed beasts: and I delight not in the blood of bullocks or of lambs or of he-goats.

"When ye come to appear before me who hath required this at your hand, to trample my courts? Bring no more vain oblations, incense is an abomination unto me; new moon and sabbath, the calling of assemblies,—I cannot away with iniquity and the solemn meeting. Your new moons and your appointed feasts my soul hateth: they are a trouble unto

<sup>1</sup> A paper read at the twenty-fifth session of the Spiritual Conference at Lancaster, Pa., July, 1915.



me: I am weary of bearing them. And when ye spread forth your hands I will hide mine eyes from you; yea when ye make many prayers I will not hear; your hands are full of blood. Wash you, make you clean; put away the evil of your doings from before mine eyes, cease to do evil; learn to do well; seek justice, relieve the oppressed, judge the fatherless, plead for the widow."

In this article the word piety is used to denote especially the ethical side of the religious life. It will be used in the sense of moral goodness. Jesus said: "If ye love me keep my commandments."

Let the subject be considered in the first place in its source. It has a principle, a source from whence it comes. Piety does not originate in the efforts of the human will. Ethical culture societies, no doubt, help the will to some extent in its efforts after the realization of the good, for man is moral, has a moral nature that is independent of religious influences. But the piety that is the result of the mere training of the will is defective. By the help of others the paralytic may walk after a fashion, but it is a poor kind of walking. It is mechanical. When Jesus said to the paralytic: "Arise, take up thy bed and go unto thy house," the sick of the palsy arose and went to his house. Jesus through his word which conveyed the life that was in him—for his words are spirit and they are life—gave a power to the paralytic that made him autonomous, that enabled him to walk by a power that was now resident in his body. Christ is the source of piety to every one that believes. Our faith unites us to him and we share in the life that is in him. Through the operation of the Holy Spirit new life and power from Him are infused into our souls and we become new creatures. We receive enabling power from him to live a pious life, to live a good life, to be good. The new life that Zaccheus received from Christ through accepting him as the Saviour showed itself in the pious acts of restoring to those whom he had defrauded fourfold and of giving the half of his goods to feed the poor. We

trace evangelical piety to God who is the fountain of living waters through faith in Jesus Christ. "Other foundation can no man lay than that which is laid which is Jesus Christ our Lord."

The pattern of Evangelical piety is the thought to be considered next. We are perhaps disposed to say that the rule of piety is the law of God. The law of God most certainly does serve as a rule of life. But it is in Christ that the Christian finds his pattern. "My dear Redeemer and my Lord! I read my duty in thy word; but in thy life the law appears drawn out in living characters."

Is it the life of Jesus then as that was lived while he was on earth and portrayed in the Gospels that is the model after which the lives of those are to be fashioned who would be good, who would be pious, who would be saints? Did Sheldon "In his Steps" or "What Would Jesus Do?" give us the real pattern?

It is not so much what Jesus did as what he was that constitutes our ideal. Back of the deed is the thought; back of the life is the mind, the disposition. The passage which says: "Let that mind be in you which was also in Christ Jesus" presents the ideal. Liberty of course may be taken to interpret the passage not simply in the narrow sense of humility, but as characterizing the spirit that was back of his whole life. It is the mind, the spirit, the disposition of Christ that is our pattern. We must view things from his angle; we must sympathize with the things he sympathized with. We must feel as he felt. We must above all love as he loved. Then doing as he did will be a natural consequence. "As a man thinketh in his heart so is he." "Keep thine heart with all diligence, for out of it are the issues of life." There is such a thing as imitating the life of Christ without having his mind, but it will be only a poor imitation. But if the mind, the disposition, the inclination of Jesus be in us, the pious life will be the result.

Let it further be said that evangelical piety is a growth, a



development. We do not instantly reach the perfect man, "the measure of the stature of the fulness of Christ." It is a gradual process, Jesus said: "So is the kingdom of God as if a man should cast seed upon the earth and should sleep and rise night and day, and the seed should spring up and grow, he knoweth not how. The earth beareth fruit of herself; first the blade, then the ear, then the full corn in the ear." Peter tells us "to grow in grace and in the the knowledge of Jesus Christ." In the parable quoted the new power within us is likened to life, vegetable life. Life of any kind is an indefinable something but we do know its characteristics and one of the characteristics of life is growth. It is one of the characteristics of that kingdom within us which is righteousness and peace and joy in the Holy Ghost." Piety, sainthood is a growth.

This leads to another thought, namely, the conditions of growth. Certain conditions are necessary in the case of growth of any kind. Piety flourishes under the benign influence of Christian culture. Piety which is essentially ethical needs the culture afforded by the Christian religion. As it springs from Christ as its source so it needs Christianity as its environment if it is to develop. What was it that upheld the character of Joseph in the hour of temptation? Religion. He said: "How can I do this great wickedness and sin against God?" The fear of God a religious something, sustained moral goodness. Whenever the people of Israel were faithful to their God there was manifest a high degree of character among them. When they yielded to their besetting sin of falling away from the one true and living God, when the fires of religion died away there was a marked decline in their piety as this expresses itself in conduct and character. The aim of Jesus was morality as is evident from the sermon on the mount, but he achieved it by quickening the distinctly religious in man. That is, piety in the sense of moral goodness would develop just in the degree that people lived a life of communion and fellowship with God. In the opening part of the epistle to the Romans Paul tells us that as long as the people,



heathen people, lived up to the religious light that they had morality was sustained. But when they ceased glorifying God as God and were no longer thankful and became vain in their imaginations and their foolish heart was darkened, when they changed the glory of the incorruptible God into an image made like to corruptible man and to birds, and to four-footed beasts, and creeping things it was then that God gave them up to uncleanness through the lusts of their own hearts. When religion declined, piety in the sense of moral goodness declined also. Before the Reformation the fires of genuine religion had to a large extent died away. As a result of this immorality was prevalent in the church among clergy and laity. Zwingli felt the need of a religious reformation because of the prevailing immorality. The work of the reformers was primarily a religious movement, but wherever their influence was felt, there was a quickening in morals, in better living, in piety which is the real expression of one's devotion to God. We are told that Voltaire and Rosseau sowed the seeds of infidelity in France and after them came the deluge of immorality. All these incidents are given to show that piety needs for its development the culture of the Christian religion. In the book of Ecclesiastes we read: "Hear the conclusion of the whole matter; Fear God and keep his commandments for this is the whole duty of man"—"Fear God" is religious—"Keep his commandments" is ethical. They are stated in proper order. It would be a mistake to say: "Keep his commandments and fear him." The religious is first in the unfolding of the ethical. The ethical develops under religious conditions.

Again, Evangelical piety has as its place of existence the world. This is contrary to much that people have thought and done. Multitudes have thought that in order to be good they must withdraw from the world. At the time of Christ the Essenes and Nazarites and other sects withdrew from the world and led ascetic lives. In the early ages of Christianity many Christians prayed that God might take them out of the



world through death that they might escape its evils. Others betook themselves to mountain fastnesses and caves. In the Middle Ages the cloister and convent system flourished in which those who wanted to be good abandoned natural relations and hoped to escape from the evil that is in the world. This idea prevails among Christians of all classes to some extent today. An aged Christian on retiring from the activities of life expressed the hope that now he could make better progress in goodness, freed as he believed he would be to a large extent from the evils that are in the world. Parents sometimes bring preceptors into their homes in order that their children may be shielded from the world. People still divide the world into the sacred and the secular. He who wants to be good does well according to this conception of things if he has as little as possible to do with the secular. A certain minister would not use any illustrations in his sermons except such as were taken from the Scriptures. A person who held an official position in Christian work doubted the wisdom of reading works as secular as Shakespeare's. The Platonic teaching that evil inheres in matter which came into the Christian religion and influenced its theology accounts in part for this practice which to a greater or less extent has existed during the ages of Christianity. But this kind of piety is not Evangelical. We have not so learned Christ. The teaching of Jesus is expressed in his farewell prayer when he says: "I pray not that thou shouldest take them out of the world but that thou shouldest keep them from the evil."

The teaching of Jesus is that through the sanctifying power of the truth we might become so strong as not to be overcome by evil, but that we might overcome it, that we might not flee from natural relations such as give rise to individual ownership, such as underlie the family and the state, but that we might sanctify them. It is in the world that piety flourishes. Goethe says: "A talent develops in solitude, but character in the stream of life." A hothouse plant lacks hardiness. The tree that is shielded from storms will not be able to stand in a



real storm. The body that lacks exercise loses the strength that it has. But the person who exerts himself physically, who attacks the objects that resist him in the world develops bodily strength and skill. The same is true of the mind. Aristotle said: "The mind is perfected by activity. The mind that wrestles with difficult problems and solves them is the mind that becomes strong and vigorous. It is not the person who withdraws from the world and flees from natural relations and the evil that is in the world that will become strong in character, but the person who lives in the world and who through the sanctifying power of the truth sanctifies natural relations and overcomes the evil that is in the world. James says: "Count it all joy my brethren when ye fall into manifold temptations knowing that the proving of your faith worketh patience. And let patience have its perfect work, that ye may be perfect and entire lacking in nothing."

Again, the same Apostle says: "Blessed is the man that endureth temptation; for when he hath been approved, he shall receive the crown of life which the Lord promised to them that love him." Not only does living in the world strengthen character, develop piety, but it exalts Christ and Christianity. If the Christian in order to be good must flee from the world, it would show that Christ and Christianity are impotent in enabling a person to use the world temperately and overcoming the evil in the world. But if through the power of Christianity the Christian is able to live a good life in the world that will exalt Christ before the world. The three Hebrews were cast into the fiery furnace heated to seven times its ordinary heat, but through the protecting hand of God they came out of the furnace unhurt not a hair being singed. Thereupon Nebuchadnezzar issued a decree saying: "Blessed be the God of Shadrach, Meschach, and Abednego who hath sent his angel and delivered his servants that trusted in him." Through his saving power God was exalted in the eyes of the heathen. If people are enabled by his power to live good lives in the midst of the evil in the world it will redound to his glory.



Another thought on Evangelical piety is that it is social. The ethics of the individual may not be individualistic only. The suggestion of this is already found in the question propounded by Cain: "Am I my brother's keeper?" to which everybody gives an affirmative answer. In the passage already quoted from the prophet Isaiah the individualistic and socialistic sides of goodness are found side by side as complementary. "Wash you, make you clean; put away the evil of your doings from before mine eyes; cease to do evil; learn to do well" says the prophet. In these words the personal nature of goodness is expressed. The socialistic phase is found in the words: "Seek justice, relieve the oppressed, judge the fatherless, plead for the widow." James teaches us that pure religion and undefiled before God and the Father is not simply to keep one's self unspotted from the world but also to visit the fatherless and the widow in their affliction. Clearly then those who would be saints have as an important sphere in which to manifest their goodness this evil world from which some would flee and which others view with indifference and still others with hopelessness. A man declared that he was so interested in his heavenly citizenship as to have lost all interest in his earthly citizenship. Many good people we know do not exercise their right to vote because they regard politics as corrupt. The lamentable thing about it is that they do not feel that they as the salt of the earth ought to participate in political matters to save politics from utter corruption and redeem this sphere of life.

A United States Senator once remarked that the ten commandments and the golden rule have no place in politics.

Recently one of the most influential ministers of an old and well-known denomination declared that he preached the Gospel fifty-two times in a year and had no time to bother about local option. This was approvingly quoted by a brewer who is a member of another congregation of the same denomination. The idea back of this is that it is the duty of the Christian to save individuals as brands from the burning and let the world con-



tinue to lie in the evil one. But people are beginning to realize more and more that the Son of God was manifested to destroy the works of the Devil and to establish the kingdom of God not simply as a leavening power in the heart of the individual but in the great heart of humanity and that the person who would be good must cooperate with Jesus in realizing the purpose of his coming and the program of his life. The pious must feel and manifest interest in the social problems of the day. He must be active in delivering human society from poverty. There are good women who endeavor to relieve poverty whose husbands promote the causes that produce poverty. He who would be good may not be satisfied with total abstinence from liquor which has been shown to be a poison and therefore injurious to the body but must use his influence to destroy the institution that produces drunkards. Good people have not done their whole duty by holding an occasional service in the county jail and occasionally redeeming a criminal. They must endeavor to remove the causes of crime. If the moving picture show by its suggestions produces criminals, if its exhibitions teach laxity in regard to marriage and divorce then good people must insist on its being rigidly censored. The good have here a negative and a positive duty. They must eliminate what produces poverty, disease, drunkenness and crime and strive for the purification of our social institutions such as the family, the community, amusements, our schools, our industries, our civil and political life. The creation of such a favorable environment will do two things. It will help Christians in the working out of their salvation. It will also make easier the conversion of those who are not yet Christians, for we must bear in mind that favorable social conditions are not a substitute for the regeneration of the individual. How will a favorable environment help in the conversion of the masses of mankind? In at least three ways. It will convince them for one thing of the sincerity of good people in their efforts to lead them to Christ, if these same people strive to bring about favorable conditions of life and the Christian life. It will also make the



Christian life easier in prospect. When a woman pleads with a mayor to have thirty days in jail instead of ten that she may be helped to break up the drinking habit by an environment that is favorable to such an effort it shows two things. One is that there is good in her that is struggling to assert itself. The other is that there must be a prospect of the success of a good life to encourage people to enter upon it. A favorable environment will also unconsciously lead people to practice many of the precepts of Christianity. When the world and its institutions are permeated by the spirit of Christianity people will unwittingly adopt in practice much that is Christian. And when people already practice Christianity in their lives, it is an easy transition to a conscious profession of it. Ordinarily we say that we must profess our faith in Christianity before we live it. But the reverse is also true. Paulsen says that people first live their creed and then profess it. The psalmist says the same thing when he says: "The fool hath said in his heart there is no God." The fool is not the simple but the wicked person who first lives a godless life and then says there is no God. A certain man was loud in declaring his infidelity. Another person said, "I would like to know his past life." On the other hand when a person leads a good life, consciously or unconsciously, practices much of Christianity it is an easy step to the conscious profession of Christianity itself. "Blessed are the pure in heart for they shall see God." Thus may the good, the pious be instrumental in establishing the kingdom of God on earth. An important characteristic of piety then is its social obligation and the performance of the same.

Finally, let a word be said about the motive, the end of piety. It is not the hope of reward as is the case with Christianity that is not evangelical. The motive is love to Christ who first loved us and gave himself for us. The motive is thankfulness to God for his goodness to us in providing for us redemption in Christ. The end is the glory of God. "Whatsoever ye do in word or deed do all to the glory of God."

## V.

### WHY I BELIEVE IN CHRISTIANITY.<sup>1</sup>

E. E. KRESGE.

My talk to you this afternoon will be on the order of a personal testimony rather than a sermon or an address. I want to tell you, in a few simple words, why I believe in Christianity;—why I believe in the Christian religion rather than in any other religion, or any system of philosophy, or any code of ethics. And so as to avoid misunderstanding I want to say in the beginning that by Christianity I mean the fundamental principles in the life and teachings of Jesus Christ as recorded in the simple Gospel narratives. Historical Christianity has been true only as it squared in spirit and in fact with the Christianity of the Gospels. I distinguish between the church and the Kingdom which Jesus Christ came to establish on earth exactly as I do between education and educational institutions. Just as the schools exist to further the purposes of education, so the church is a means, divinely appointed and humanly instituted, to establish the Kingdom. As such the church is a sacred institution and of the highest importance to society. But the church, like the schools, may be true to her task or she may depart from it. I distinguish clearly in my own mind between the life and practice of the church, which sometimes becomes mere “churchianity,” and the life of the Kingdom, which is Christianity. In the Christian religion, thus defined, I believe for three specific reasons.

#### I.

And, first of all, I believe in the Christian religion because of my faith in its founder, Jesus Christ, the Prophet from

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Nazareth, of Galilee. Among all the millions of the sons of the earth, Jesus Christ, the founder of our religion, stands absolutely *alone, unique, and supreme*. "God has given him a name that is above every name," whether among men on earth or among angels in heaven.

The founder of our religion stands absolutely alone *in the sinless perfection of his character*. "Which of you convicteth me of sin?" is his bold challenge to the world. For any other man to say that would be stupid folly, or arrogant blasphemy. With meekness, but without fear, he addressed this question to his closest friends and to his bitterest enemies. He challenged the members of his own family to convict him of sin. But those who shared his own flesh and blood, who ate with him from the same table, and were sheltered under the same roof for thirty years, knew of no sin that he had committed. In the end, every member of the family, in spite of his flesh and blood kinship with them, believed in his Messiahship, and two of the brothers sealed their faith in him with their blood. The challenge was addressed to the disciples, to those men, who, for two and a half years, associated with him on terms of closest intimacy. They were with him under pressure, and they were with him during his unguarded moments. They were with him when he was happy and when he was sad, in the hours of his triumphs as well as on the occasions of his defeats. And every one of these men who knew him best was loud and bold in declaring to the whole world his sinless perfection. On the other hand, Jesus issued this bold challenge to his bitterest enemies. He addressed it to those who did their utmost to find something whereof they might accuse him, but found nothing. Judas, the traitor, came back with the remorseful cry: "I have betrayed innocent blood." The Jewish authorities charged him with Sabbath breaking, with intimacy with Publicans and sinners, and stigmatized him a glutton and a wine-bibber. But no one then or since believed their charges. On the night of his arrest they hired men to witness against him, but neither they themselves nor anybody



else believed the contradictory witness. Thus the founder of our religion stood acquitted of all sin before both his most intimate friends and his bitterest enemies.

This same challenge: "Who convicteth me of sin?" has been addressed to the enlightened consciousness of the world for two thousand years, and Jesus stands acquitted before the court of history as well as before the inner circle of his disciples. There have indeed not been wanting Scribes and Pharisees who have accused him of certain offenses, but not one of their charges has had the slightest weight with the intelligent judgment of mankind. Thomas Huxley, in a public address, once charged Jesus with a crime against the right of personal property when he drove two thousand swine into the lake. But the second time the wise Huxley delivered that address a lead pencil mark was drawn across the reference. Herbert Spencer on one occasion said that Jesus Christ would have conferred a greater blessing upon mankind by inventing the sewing machine than by preaching the sermon on the mount. But Herbert Spencer said that only once. The fact is that the enlightened conscience of the civilized world, for a period of two thousand years, has studied the life and teachings of Jesus Christ as nothing else has ever been studied, and the unanimous verdict is like that of Pontius Pilate: "I find no fault in this man." We find some fault with everybody and with everything, save Jesus only. Even intelligent skeptics and free-thinkers, men who deny his divinity, are well nigh unanimous in giving Jesus the first place among all the prophets and teachers of history, and all the benefactors of the human race. Such is the unsolicited testimony of Spinoza, Rousseau, Voltaire, Kant, Schelling, Strauss, Renan, and John Stuart Mill.

Such has been the verdict of men, and such is the verdict of history itself. History has produced many great men, men who tower above their fellow men in the might of their intellects and the excellency of their character. But history has not produced one other man whose character can stand in the



most distant comparison with that of Jesus Christ. The sinless Jesus is the incomparable man. Other men have been founders of religions whose devotees still greatly outnumber those of the Christian religion, but none of these men can be compared with Jesus of Nazareth without sacrilege. Gotama, the founder of Buddhism, and Kung-foo-tsze, the founder of Confucianism, were both great and good men, but their morality is of the negative type, and their influence has meant stagnation rather than progress. Great and good as these men were, their philosophic religions have inspired few great men and have produced no desirable civilization. Mohammed, the founder of Mohammedanism, stands reproached in the light of his own base deeds, and self-condemned by his pitiful death wail. His last broken words were: "O God, pardon my sins—yes—I come."

During the fifteen centuries of Hebrew history some truly splendid characters were developed, but not one can compare in moral excellence with Jesus of Nazareth. Abraham, "the father of the faithful," could tell a lie for expediency's sake as readily as you and I. Moses, the great law-giver, and the man who developed a nation from a horde of slaves, could not control his temper, and had human blood dripping from his fingers. Elijah, the fore-runner of the prophets, could call fire upon his enemies. David, the great organizer and empire-builder, was lying in the dust, after his crime with Bathsheba, crying: "Behold I was shapen in iniquity, and in sin did my mother conceive me." Jeremiah, the pious soul who mourned for the sins of his people like Rachel weeping for her children, cursed the day of his birth. And Isaiah, the greatest of all the prophets, said: "I am a man of unclean lips." Among them all there was not one like Jesus of Nazareth. No wonder the multitudes said: "What manner of man is this?"

The Greeks, during their brief history, developed more men of first magnitude, philosophers, poets, painters, sculptors, historians, scientists, and soldiers, than any other race of men for a similar period of time, but we look in vain for a single



one among all these celebrities whose character is altogether above reproach. All their great moralists bewail the fact of human imperfection. Medieval and modern times have produced a glorious galaxy of great men, but as Martin Luther so beautifully said: "compared with Jesus Christ, they are all but as dew drops upon the head of the Bride-groom, lost in the glory of his hair." Among all the sons of the earth, Jesus Christ, the founder of our religion, stands alone, majestic in his sinless supremacy, the one incomparable man.

But Jesus stands alone and supreme, not only in the sinlessness of his character, but also *in the universality of his influence*. Jesus is the only sinless man, and also the only cosmopolitan man. Every other great man has been limited by the place and time of his birth. Many other great men have influenced future ages and other people more than their own. Men like Plato and Aristotle among the Greeks, and Moses and Isaiah among the Hebrews, have lived in the lives and thoughts of many people of many ages, and yet they are clearly limited in many respects by the age and the people that produced them. Their heredity and their environment, their training and their personal traits of character, have circumscribed their influence and limited their audience. They could never become universal men. The very greatness of their intellects, and the strict logic of their methods, limit the influence of a Plato or an Aristotle to a select few. But Jesus Christ is not held in bondage by place or time. He suffers from no limitations. He is the one universal and eternal man. His influence is as fresh in the Twentieth Century as it was in the first, and he is at home among Greeks and Romans as well as among Judeans and Galileans.

To him all nationalities have come and have been morally and spiritually satisfied. The cultured and beauty-loving Greeks, the blood-thirsty and licentious Romans, the wild and barbarous Goths, the philosophic Germans, the proud Frenchmen, the arrogant Englishmen, and the hurrying, materialistic Americans, have all found their highest moral satisfaction and



their peace of mind in this meek and lowly man from Galilee. To him have come all classes and conditions of men, the learned and the unlearned, the high born and the low born, the rich and the poor, the good and the bad, and have found their respective needs answered. On the one hand the aristocracy of learning, the profound philosopher, the exact scientist, and the wise historian; and on the other hand, the most uncultured and unlettered people, the woman who sweeps our kitchen, and the man who blackens our boots, have come to Jesus, and all alike have been satisfied. He has been "all and in all," to all races and classes of men, in all climes and times.

This universality of his influence, this superiority to the laws of life which have held all other men in bondage, is all the more marvellous because of the limiting and restricting circumstances under which he was born and reared. Born a Jew, heir to all the prejudices and the narrowness of his race; having never been to a school other than the Synagogue school that was domineered by the bigotry of the Pharisees; having never been more than twenty miles away from the little sectarian land of his birth, and then only for a little physical rest, who would not expect him to be as narrow as the people who gave him birth, and the land that nurtured him. Yet this man burst the shackles of heredity and environment, and has become the universal man, whom no people, no country, and no age can claim as its own. He belongs to the world and to eternity, rather than to a particular people and a particular century.

These marks of extraordinary supremacy are "the nail-prints" in his hands into which I put my finger of faith, and like Thomas of old, fall down at his feet and exclaim: "My Lord and my God." In all my seasons of temptation and trial, in all my moments of joy and aspiration, in life and in death, I will say with Peter at Philippi: "Lord to whom else can we go? Thou alone hast the words of eternal life." The religion inspired by such a Personality challenges the most ardent faith, and the most devoted homage.



## II.

In the second place, I believe in the Christian religion because of its contents. As its founder stands unique and supreme among men, so the religion that he has inspired stands unique and supreme among the religions of history.

Some time ago I read a very interesting little book entitled: "A Comparative Study of Religions." The author is a professor of science, and he approached his subject in the cold-blooded spirit of the scientist. He came to this new subject with an unbiased mind. He studied these religions exactly like he would study minerals, or bird's eggs, or some rare plants. He patiently analyzed them all, first carefully selecting what he considered the good qualities of each one. Next he carefully selected what he considered the weaker qualities of each one. Then he compared the good and the weak qualities of each one with the similar qualities of the others. And when all this was done he picked out one and said: "this one is infinitely superior to all the others." And that one was the Christian religion.

I have made this same comparative study for myself, and I have found the contents of the Christian religion vastly more satisfying to me than any other religion, or than any system of philosophy, or any code of ethics. The contents of the Christian religion satisfy the head and the heart of man, both the demands of reason and the needs of life, as nothing else that history has produced does. The contents of the Christian religion are vastly superior to any other in at least three fundamental respects.

The Christian religion ranks first *in its conception of God*. It can be truthfully said of Buddhism that it has no conception of God at all. At heart it is a withering atheism. Max Mueller says Buddha taught "that there is no God, no creation, no Creator,—nothing but mind minding itself." In the Buddhist world fate takes the place of divine Providence in the Christian world. Confucius, too, carefully avoided the



subjects of God and immortality. The only worship in Confucianism is that of ancestors about whose existence Kung-foo-tsze himself was doubtful. The God of Mohammed is a blood-thirsty and licentious tyrant, whom no intelligent man can love or reverence; while in the prevailing systems of modern philosophy God is declared to be infinitely wise without knowing anything,—achieving wonderful results without being conscious of himself or of his achievements. Beautiful and inspiring indeed is the conception of God in the Christian religion compared with these pagan conceptions and these philosophic platitudes.

The Hebrew conception of God, which is a life-giving oasis as compared with these arid deserts of paganism, prepared the way for the teachings of Jesus. The Hebrews had taught that Jehovah is the Creator and Governor of the universe. And the Jehovah of the Hebrews is Righteous, Just, and Holy. Some of their prophets conceived of him as a God of love and mercy, and as a Father to the chosen family. Jesus rejected none of these teachings of his predecessors, but emphasized anew the Fatherhood of God. While the Hebrew teachers had presented God as the Father of Israel, Jesus said he is the Father of the whole human race, and of each individual child of the race. This universal and individual aspect of the Fatherhood of God is new, and it is as beautiful and as inspiring as it is new. The God of Jesus Christ is the Father of Jews and of Gentiles, of white people and black people, of the good and of the bad. Jesus said to the loving John and to the sinful Mary Magdalene: "God is your Father." The great Being, who, through infinite wisdom and power, created the universe, who works on scales infinitely great and infinitesimally small, the holy and righteous Judge, is my Father, who loves me and cares for me as no earthly parent can. The man who believes this with all his heart, mind, soul, and strength, will feel in his soul "that peace of mind that passeth all understanding," while at the same time he will receive inspiration for noble living such as can come from no other source. The whole per-



spective of life, for time and for eternity, becomes radiant with hope and courage under the inspiration of such a vision of God.

The Christian religion is also vastly more satisfying than any other religion, or any system of philosophy, or any conclusions of science, *in its conception of man*. In Buddhism man is only the ghost of weary rebirths and endless metamorphoses, finally to end in blank annihilation. In Confucianism man lives as best he can, and after death he may become a demi-god, or a demon, or just cease to exist. After a life of animalism here, Mohammedanism offers man a heaven of base licentiousness. In certain systems of philosophy man is a concrete mode of an Absolute Life, of the World-Soul, and after death he will again be absorbed into the Absolute. In materialistic science man is considered an animate clod of earth. Life is defined as a balance between certain up-building and certain down-breaking processes that are ever going on within us; and when the down-breaking processes will overbalance the up-building processes we sicken and die, and return to the inanimate dust. Under the shadow of such conceptions it is not possible to live life at its highest and best.

In the literature of the Norwegians is an old legend which beautifully illustrates the limits of scientific and philosophic diagnosis. A certain king, so runs the legend, made a great banquet, and to this banquet he invited all the learned men of his kingdom. The subject for discussion was: the meaning of life, with special reference to its *whence* and its *whither*. The learned men freely divulged their theories. It was a dark and stormy night. It was past midnight when the king arose to speak. Before he had spoken a word, a little bird flew in through the Eastern window, and frightened by the light and the noise, it rose to the ceiling and dropped to the floor, it bruised its wings against this object and against that, and finally found its weary way out of the Western window into the dark again. Then the king solemnly said: "Gentlemen,



this little creature from we know not where, has summed up all our science and philosophy. Like this little bird that came out of the darkness into this lighted room, and went out again into the darkness, so is our life. We come from whence we know not. Here in this life, where it is daylight for a little while, we toil and we struggle, we rise and we fall, we bleed and we die, and then pass out again into the night."

That little legend sums up the conclusions of science and philosophy today as well as it did in the days of the unknown king of the Norwegians. Science and philosophy have wonderfully broadened and deepened our life. These studies have added much to the triumphs and the happiness of life, but have shed only a feeble light upon the essence and the purpose of life, and have left us altogether in the dark as to its *whence* and its *whither*. Into this semi-darkness came Jesus, the prophet from Nazareth, with a new philosophy of life. Calmly, without hesitation and without fear of contradiction, he said: "I know whence I came, and whither I go." And then, with the confidence of one who speaks with authority, he tells us *whence* he came and *whither* he is going. "I came forth from the Father, and am come into the world; again I leave the world and go to the Father." Life is not born out of the dark, but is from God. Here in this world we may rise and fall like the little bird of the legend. We may pass through Gethsemane like Jesus himself, and then make our exit; but it is not into the dark, but back to God. Such is the teaching of our Christian religion, and the man who believes this with all his being,—the man who believes that there is something divine in him,—that he is a creature worthy of an endless duration, destined some day, somewhere, to live with the great God, becomes inspired to live his life nobly and well. And the man who believes this same thing of his fellow man receives an inspiration for social service that nothing else could give him. Jesus told us plainly and repeatedly that man is a child of God. This means that man is a being who is respected, honored, and loved by God. And it means much



more than this;—it means that man is a creature of infinite possibilities for growth and development. If sonship means anything, it means the possibility to become like the father. Man is born with the possibilities to grow into the moral likeness of the great God. And to grow into the moral image of our Father, God, implies endless progress onward and upward. It clearly implies man's immortality. Such inspiration for noble and triumphant living is offered only by the Christian religion. Though trials come thick as October mists, though temptations come lurid from the infernal regions, the man who believes that God in heaven is his Father, and that he is concerned about the issues of his life, will not be defeated.

And, finally, the religion of Jesus Christ is superior to any other religion, or to any system of ethics *in its simple conception of religious practice and every day morality*. Religious service, according to Jesus, is much more than a monotonous round of ritualistic ceremonies, or the soulless repetition of creeds. On its God-ward side it is the life of a child, and on its man-ward side it is the life of a brother. True religious service expresses itself in a filial trust, obedience, love, and devoted service for God, and in a fraternal service for our needy neighbor. Man's mission on earth is not to get all out of life that he can for himself, but rather to realize his own moral self in all its divine fulness, and to help others realize themselves. The mission of man on earth is to make his own life and that of his fellows as full and as rich, as holy and as happy as possible. Such then are the essential contents of our Christian religion. They satisfy, not only the demands of our reason, but also the deepest needs of our life.

### III.

I believe in the Christian religion, in the third place, because of what it has done for the world. It not only interests the mind, comforts the heart, and ennobles the life of the individual, but it also enriches and ennobles the life of the world



in which he lives. Christianity is a religion that works. I believe in it because I have seen its fruits.

We people in Christian lands are so familiar with the blessings of Christianity that we fail to appreciate, or even to recognize them. Many, if not most, of the social blessings whose origin we owe directly to the influence of our religion have long ago been handed over to the Christianized community, while the Christian church, which represents our Christianity, has moved farther on, and is setting up new standards and creating new ideals higher up. To appreciate what Christianity has really done for our individual and social life we must either go back in history prior to the advent of Jesus Christ, or else go to some desolate spot in the pagan world which has not yet felt the influence of Christian civilization. To do this with an open mind and heart will strengthen our faith in the great religion of the great Christ. The reference in song and story to "the lands that in darkness had lain" before Christ was born is only too sadly true. Moral twilight and spiritual darkness had settled over the vast Roman Empire before "The Star of the East" had arisen. Mention can be made of only a few things that the influence of Christ's life and teaching accomplished for the world of that day,—blessings which had their beginning then, but which have been moving on down the avenues of history with ever increasing momentum.

The first thing that we should note is that the influence of Jesus Christ liberated and elevated the individual who had long been lost beneath the debris of decaying empires. The influence of Jesus Christ burst the shackles that had bound his hands and his soul for centuries in the great pagan world. Throughout the vast Roman Empire the masses, stigmatized even today as "the common people," were degraded slaves without the legal right to life, limb, or the pursuit of happiness. The "common man" did not enjoy as much liberty or privilege as did the nobleman's horse or dog. Roman historians tell us of a nobleman, who lived in Rome while Christ was



preaching in Capernaum, who had his slaves butchered and ground up to feed his fish during a meat famine. Another one of these "noblemen" built the foundations of his private mansion upon the quivering corpses of his murdered slaves just to show his authority. Even so great and noble a man as the elder Cato, a man whom Cicero regarded as the ideal of his people, had no scruples to kill his slaves when they became old and useless in his service. Throughout that great empire there was neither statute law nor public sentiment against such awful practices. The population was broadly divided into free men and slaves, or into the nobility and the masses. Idling and dissipation was the privilege of the nobility, while grinding toil was the lot of the masses. There was no such thing as paid labor, and no such thing was dreamed of as the working man's right to the fruits of his toil. Into this moral and social darkness came the light from Judea. Into this putrescent mass of paganism the disciples of Jesus put the leaven of his ennobling and revolutionary individualism. They taught that each individual man, whether bond or free, was dear to the great God, and infinitely valuable in his sight. This Christian individualism began slowly to eradicate class distinction, and to loosen the shackles from the hands of the slaves. Whatever elevation, and whatever freedom the masses in Christian lands enjoy today, they owe in large measure to the revolutionizing individualism in the teaching and practice of Jesus. Whatever class distinction there is in Christian lands today; and whatever enslavement to industrial and social conditions there exists among us now cannot be charged against true Christianity. The fault is that we have failed to apply our Christianity, or that our religion has been degraded into a pseudo-Christianity. The Christianity of the Gospels has in it the power that matures in a democracy of enlightened and ennobled individuals.

And not only were the masses denied the legal right to happiness and life, but they were denied the privilege of education, and the means of self improvement. Throughout the



great throbbing Roman world there was no such thing as schools for the common people. The children of the nobility were educated, often under the care of private tutors, and at great expense, while the children of the poor were kept "neighbor to the ox." But the influence of Jesus Christ brought light to the minds as well as life to the souls of men. Wherever its message has been declared Christianity has inspired schools and colleges, seminaries and universities. The fact that public schools in Christian lands are now conducted by the community must not deceive us to the fact that in the beginning, almost without exception, schools and colleges were built and maintained by the Christian church, and that the sons of the poor were as welcome as the scions of the rich.

Even today, in most countries where the influence of Christian civilization has not yet been felt, woman is degraded,—a beast of burden, or the tool of man's passion and lust. But the influence of the man who spoke to the woman of Sychar, who saved Mary Magdalene, who ministered to the woman of Syro-Phonicia, and who pitied rather than stoned "the woman taken in adultery," has so elevated woman-kind that in Christian lands woman is loved and revered, and the equal of man in all essential respects. And not only is woman degraded, but children are neglected in the darkness that has not yet been dispelled by the light that is in Christ Jesus. A returned missionary, who travelled all through Central Africa, and through large sections of India and China, said that throughout those vast and desolate regions, with their countless millions of little ones, he had never heard a child sing. He had heard crying that would make a Herod weep, but no singing. The reason is plain. In lands where the common use of soap is unknown, doctors and medicine unheard of, there is no occasion for singing, but only for crying. But the influence of him who took the little children of Galilee into his arms and blessed them, wherever it has come, has brought joy to the hearts and songs to the lips of the children. In Christian homes in Christian lands, parents live first and foremost for



their children. The choicest morsels and the softest beds in every Christian home belong to the children. No wonder that the air in Christian lands is made melodious with the happy voices of children. Jesus of Nazareth has made it so.

In the sections that have not yet felt the impact of Christian civilization, the physical body is neglected. Doctors, nurses, hospitals, and medicine are unknown. But he who healed sick bodies, opened deaf ears, and made the lame walk in Galilee, has taught men to care for their bodies, and to alleviate physical pain and mental anguish wherever they are found. The first doctors, the first nurses, the first hospitals, the first asylums, and the first charitable organizations of many kinds were founded, and for many years maintained, by the Christian church. It is only since the community has become inspired and equipped to do this benevolent work that the church has relinquished it. And even today, and right among us, the Christian church more than any other institution of society inspires men to continue this ministry of mercy.

Christianity, through its benevolent work in the world, has indeed fulfilled the prophet's vision of "The River of Salvation." The prophet Ezekiel had a vision of a river of salvation that would flow from the Temple gate. It would begin as a small stream trickling from underneath the Eastern gate, and becoming broader and deeper as it swept on through the arid deserts of the world, it would carry healing and cleansing in its waters, and upon its banks the tree of life would grow. Christianity has been such a stream of life-giving power flowing through the world. The only morally and spiritually white spots on the world's map today are those that have been washed white in the cleansing stream that had its insignificant source in Bethlehem of Judea. The only places where life is worth living are found on the banks of this regenerating stream. Thomas G. Carlyle said: "There is not a spot on the face of the earth ten miles square, where husbands love their wives and wives love their husbands, where parents live for their children and children love their parents, where man is a brother



to his fellow man, where woman is respected, where pain and suffering are alleviated, where life is clean and on the whole worth living, where the influence of Jesus Christ has not yet come." Only prejudice or stupidity would attempt to deny this. It is only in Christian lands, or in lands that have been unmistakably effected by Christian civilization, that people live in warm and clean houses, with plenty of air and sunlight, and with proper sanitation. It is only in these lands that people have known how to utilize their natural resources of mineral wealth, of soil, and of water power. It is only in these lands that the working class, in any measure, enjoys the fruits of its labor. It is only in these lands that plague, and famine, and pestilence scourge and kill no more. Desirable conditions of living have been contemporaneous and coterminous with the influence of Jesus Christ in the world.

There are those in our day, and they are not a few, who charge Christianity with failure to solve our social and economic problems. They tell us that Christianity has failed to prevent the war that is devastating Europe. They tell us that the Christian civilization of Europe has collapsed. They tell us that Christianity has failed to eliminate class distinctions from our American life, and that it has failed to render justice to the wage earning class. I fully appreciate the conditions in society that goad on our critics; and I think I understand the reasons for their criticism. They have failed to distinguish between the church and the Kingdom of God on earth. They have indentified "churchianity" with Christianity, and then have charged Christianity with failure to solve our problems. The church has not always correctly represented Christianity. The life and practice of the church has not always been identical with the life and practice of Jesus Christ. The church has had her shortcomings. She has often failed to do her full duty. This failure is perhaps nowhere more evident than in her indifference to social and economic problems. But this will not warrant any one to conclude that Christianity has failed, or that it must ultimately fail. It is my profound con-

viction that the simple teachings of Jesus Christ contain the solution of all social ills, if only we would have the wisdom, the goodness, and the patience to apply them. It is not that Christianity has failed to solve our problems, but that we have failed to apply our Christianity. If we would apply our Christianity to the affairs of government, and to our international relationships, there would be no wars. But we have not done this. Our international life still gravitates around racial antipathy and national selfishness, and for these pagan practices we have never seriously tried to substitute the Christian principles of universal brotherhood and cooperation. It is only that element in European civilization that is not Christian that has collapsed, and it is only that element here in America that is in any danger of collapsing. If Europe would have applied the principles of Jesus to all the phases of her life there would have been no collapse at all. And if we would apply our Christianity to our social and industrial problems here in America; if we would really be Christians in politics and in business as well as in the church and the prayermeeting, many of the problems from which we now suffer would speedily disappear. We ourselves are to blame in large measure for the failure, wherever there has been failure, and not Christianity.

It is my conviction that true Christianity is just as much concerned about a saved society as it is about saved individuals. I sincerely believe that Christianity implies a society in which every individual shall receive justice and be unhindered in the pursuit of his happiness. I believe that it is just as much the work of the church to help establish such a society as it is to increase the census of heaven. But it is my conviction, furthermore, that if some political or economic scheme could be devised through whose alchemy all our social ills could be cured, and our temporal problems solved, there would still remain a want in the human heart which nothing could answer but the religion of Jesus Christ. If we could live in a perfect society; if every individual would own his own home, and



could always be sure of his job; if his coal-bin would be full of anthracite, and his wardrobe full of woollens; if he could afford porter-house steak for breakfast, dinner, and supper; if there would be peace in the community, and peace and cooperation between the nations, there would still be unsatisfied wants. A human soul has needs which no material things can satisfy. There is a hunger in a living soul which nothing but the God of Jesus Christ can fully satisfy. The ancient Psalmist saw deeper into the regions of the human soul than any political economist or experimental psychologist when he said: "I shall be satisfied when I awake in Thy likeness." Nothing short of this divine likeness as an ideal before us and as a realizable possibility within us will ever satisfy a growing soul.

There is living indigenously in the human soul an eternal hope which no material comfort or discomfort can altogether quench, and which nothing but the resurrected Saviour can adequately confirm. About four years ago I called on a man for the purpose of interesting him and his family in my church and Sunday-school. I knew him to be a good, honest, hard-working man. But I failed miserably in my first attempt to interest him in church. The man was endeavoring heroically to support his wife and five children, all of them of school age, on \$450 a year. It was a cold winter evening when I called, and he pointed me to the second oldest girl, whose toes were protruding from her shoes, and said with scorn: "Would you want her in your Sunday-school?" He pointed to his wife, a noble, honest-looking woman, and said bitterly: "She has had no new hat for two years; would you want her to come to your communion table?" He told me that the church is not interested in justice in government and in honesty in business. He reminded me of the fact that the church is more concerned about building up herself than she is about building up the life of the people. He made me feel chilly under the censure which I knew only too well to be true. I left that evening with a feeling of defeat. I failed to convince him that the



Christian religion is concerned about equity in government, and about honesty and justice in business, because all he knew about Christianity was what he saw, or thought he saw, from the practice of the church. About four weeks after that visit the undertaker rang my door bell and asked me to call at the home of this man. The second oldest child, the little girl whose toes were bare that other evening, had died during the night of acute indigestion. The meager breakfast was on the table untasted; and it would have been untasted that morning if it had consisted of porterhouse steak served on haviland china. There was burning in the honest, noble soul of the father, a want that no material plenty could satisfy and a feeling which his undeserved poverty had not quite eradicated. There was lingering in his heart the half quenched hope which nothing but Jesus Christ could again fan into an illuminating and comforting flame. He took me by the hand and, with pitiful sobs, begged for the assurance that the child was not lost to him forever. Nowhere but in the Christian religion can the answer to that father's question be found. Nothing but the Christian religion can adequately confirm that eternal hope which lives indigenously in the human soul.

What rational man, who desires to be good, will not believe in the religion with such a message from such a Personality like Jesus of Nazareth, and with such a record of service rendered for two thousand years to a needy, sin-ridden world? I may have said nothing in this address that is new to you, nothing that you did not all know before as well as I know it. But I trust that I may have refreshed in the minds of some of you the faith that you already possessed, and that together we will appreciate anew this great religion of the great and blessed Christ. I will say, in conclusion, that I have not only reviewed the Christian religion historically and tested it critically, but that I have also tried humbly to live it, and have found it to be, not only the sustaining comfort in my sorrows, but also the greatest dynamic in my weak efforts to be a true



man and a faithful servant of my fellow man. *The final test is a personal one.* "If any man willeth to do his will, he shall know of the teaching, whether it be of God, or whether I speak of myself."

ALLENTOWN, PA.

## VI.

### APPLICATION OF THE DOCTRINE OF MORAL AND PHYSICAL EVIL.<sup>1</sup>

PAUL J. DUNDORE.

#### I. MORAL EVIL.

1. This part of our study of the problem of moral evil is destined to be more practical than the previous studies. In the construction of our doctrine we emphasized God's relation to His creatures as being both immanent and transcendent, man's social relationship to his fellowmen, the origin of evil having its seat in the will of man, the free determining power of man, and moral evil as a possibility in the moral development of man. All these truths we have to bear in mind as we strive to make a practical application of moral evil as it exists to-day.

The reality of moral evil is unquestioned because we have gained knowledge of it through our experience. The experience St. Paul expressed in the words, "For the good that I would I do not; but the evil I would not, that I practice" (Rom. 7:19), is our experience. Evil is present with us. There is present a sort of a dualism, a mixture of good and evil. Sometimes the good predominates, sometimes the evil. From the human viewpoint the lusting of the flesh against the Spirit and the lusting of the Spirit against the flesh may be compared to a burning building, where the supply of water is scarcely equal to the demand. Sometimes the fire yields to the well directed stream and then again it breaks out with

<sup>1</sup> This article is a continued study of the article printed in the last number of the REVIEW (Vol. XIX, No. 3) under the title "The Philosophy of Evil."



renewed fury and defies the efforts of those who would arrest its progress.

But the struggle should not lead to despair. Moral evil is not at the heart of life and does not belong to the real purpose of things. The world as the product of the Creator has the capacity of containing evil; but this contingency lies at the periphery and it only becomes a reality when we, of our own free will, choose the evil in preference of the good. Human freedom makes evil possible in our experience. If God had made man as a mere machine it would be difficult to see how evil could arise and how responsibility could be placed. But God is not a mechanic but a creator and as a creator He created creators when He created man. Man as a free agent has the choice between good and evil as God had His choice. Evil was not created by God, but came into the world as a possibility and developed in the process.

In making application of the problem of moral evil we must view man as a developing being and not as a being fully developed. Man is reaching forward to the goal. In this development there is a warfare between the lower self and the higher self, between the animal impulse within him and the voice of God which speaks to the soul. When the lower gains predominance over the higher we have sin, and when the higher subordinates the lower we attain unto godliness.

Evil finds its way into the heart of man in a perfectly natural way. Usually people choose the evil as good. They choose what seems an inferior good for a higher good. Evil is chosen as good, as something ministering to their immediate joy and thereby they become ensnared. Anyone who chooses evil as evil is satanic. Such a choice implies the dethronement of the ideal, the utter ejection of the good and substituting for it wickedness and sin. This is the unpardonable sin. The Spirit is wholly quenched and the soul is on a rapidly downward progress with no likelihood of redemption. This satanic spirit on the part of man is exceptional. Moral evil does not arise merely by choosing a lower good for a higher



good, but it becomes evil when we rebel against the ideal good and voluntarily reject what we recognize at the same time we ought to choose as our true good.

2. *Moral evil finds its lodgment within us in various forms.*

(a) *Aberration.*—There is ever present this contingency to deviate from the right course, to wander away from the ideal. When this contingency becomes actual then evil has originated and becomes a reality. Moral evil becomes fascinating in that often it follows, at the moment, the line of least resistance. When Christian with his companions came to the Mount of Difficulty, as portrayed in Bunyan's "Pilgrim's Progress," Christian went up the steep and narrow way, but the other two wandered away from the true course. One took the way of Destruction, the other the way of Nature. Both ways led around the mountain and were the paths of least resistance. Both these companions were lost and not heard of afterwards throughout the allegory. So sin is often a following of the lines of least resistance, an aberration, a wandering away from the right course.

(b) *Obsession.*—Evil often arises through influences exerted from without. Other personalities may lead us on or an idea may vex or confuse us. We become compassed about with the thought of evil and soon we make it our willful choice. Man becomes obsessed with evil. He is confused with ideas and finally rushes on to the abyss and plunges into it.

(c) *Degeneration.*—Evil is possessed with a degenerative principle. Evil grows by what it feeds on and adds evil to evil. In sinning there is no cure for sin. Evil has no staying, no constructive power. Gravitation is always downward. Good is progressive if it is truly good and evil also does not stand still but drags a soul downward. When one compromises with evil he entangleth himself in a network of circumstances which make him a helpless servant of sin. It would not be so bad if a man could get drunk but once in his life, but by getting drunk the degenerative process starts and soon the man will be a hopeless drunkard. Evil thus arises



in a natural way and we can account for it thus in a system that is good and rational. It results from a perverted will.

What should be our attitude towards evil? We could not agree with the Leibnitzian theory that evil is good in the making. Evil is something with which we have to combat. Our attitude towards evil must be that of opposition. Evil can not be transmuted into good but is a foe of the good and must be suppressed and subdued.

It is wrong to suppose one to achieve goodness by doing evil. Sin is merely a possibility in this world, and its possibility helps us to realize the worth of the good. We do not need to experience sin to appreciate the good. Nor do you need to experience sin in order to gain knowledge of its horror and enormity. Man can know sin with its bad effects better by not participating in it than he can by bringing sin into actual experience. The sinner has a perverted conscience, is spiritually blinded, and fails to see its enormity and foulness. People who keep clear of sin have a sound judgment, an unclouded vision and are enabled to see the blackness and the contemptibleness of sin better than the one who participates in it. The sowing of wild oats, considered by some as a stepping stone to moral good, is a false assertion and mere sentimentalism. You can not translate evil into good. Our attitude towards moral evil must be that of opposition. We must be vigilant and not permit a possibility to become an actualization.

3. *The resources at hand whereby we may overcome Moral Evil.*

(a) *Stoicism.*—The Stoics said, overcome evil by bracing yourself up, by hardening your will and face the evils of life. "What cannot be cured must be endured." Be heroic, lead a hard willed and strenuous life, and manifest a cold indifference towards the evil that is present with us. Stoicism gives us some valuable suggestions as regards the exercise of the will of man, but the burden Stoicism places on the will and spirit of man is too crushing, and Stoicism overlooks the prof-

ferred divine aid. It relies too much on its own strength and the thought of divine help is lost sight of. Stoicism cuts itself off from the greatest resources of power available in our combat with evil viz.: God.

(b) *Epicureanism*.—Epicureanism presents another solution. The Epicureans represent a pleasure loving people, follow the line of least resistance, go through life without giving evil any serious attention, and are seemingly unaware of its existence. Their foremost aim is pleasure. Epicureans are at fault in that they fail to fit men for an heroic and strenuous life. Its principles have a tendency to weaken the will, lead to a sensuous life, fail to awaken the sense of duty, and lack the incentive that leads to a progressive life.

(c) *Christianity*.—In the life and teachings of Christ we find the only solution whereby we may overcome evil. Evil can only be overcome by the incorporation of the divine life into the human life. The divine life must become a supplement to the human. It is when we draw on the divine springs of power that we are able to triumph over moral evil.

God, who finds His fullest expression in His creatures, has not only given us a conception of Himself but has revealed Himself in concrete form in the person of Christ. Here we have the perfect embodiment of His love and righteousness. To realize that ideal brought to us in the person of Christ is to transcend the evil present in the human life. The good is attained by bringing the self in harmony with the ideal Man and by willing what is in consonance with the divine will. God has not only communicated Himself to man by bringing Christ to earth in the flesh, but by His Spirit He continues to communicate Himself to us. It is His nature to communicate Himself to His creatures, whom He loves with an eternal love. In the measure man responds to His love and realizes in his life the self communicating Spirit of God he is able to resist the evil and receive forgiveness of sin wherein he has done amiss. There is not yet a perfect reconciliation for man



is developing but the indwelling Spirit helps us to attain the end "to which the whole creation moves."

## II. PHYSICAL EVIL.

1. The doctrine constructed on physical evil gives us an approximate solution of the problem and also shows many solutions offered as an explanation as wholly untenable. The doctrine as stated leads us to apply it to a few of the solutions advanced.

(a) *Materialistic*.—The doctrine that views evils like disease, tempests, enemies, fires, as mere natural phenomena, and disconnects God with the activity of nature goes by default. We have seen that God is the immanental ground of nature and what this theory terms phenomena is a part of reality itself.

(b) *Disciplinary*.—The disciplinary doctrine of evil does not satisfy. This views evil as a means to an end. Surgery is distasteful and repelling but it is a means to recovery. Surgery may be justifiable but one is concerned with the disease. To look at evil as medicinal or disciplinary does not get to the cause. Such explanations trade on borrowed capital. It is not satisfactory to say that an evil exists to ward off some other greater evil in the future. Such a doctrine is too superficial. We want to get to the real cause, to the World Ground, who is the intelligent, acting agent of nature.

(c) *The Punitive Theory*.—The punitive theory will not suffice. This theory asserts that man has freedom. Such free agents can offend. When free agents offend the divine justice of necessity pursues such offenses with attendant evils. Here physical evils are the effects of sin. Eliphaz declared to Job that, "man is born to trouble as the sparks fly upward." By this I do not understand Eliphaz to mean that trouble comes as surely to man as the sparks fly upward, for as a matter of fact sparks do not always fly upward. He rather declared his conviction that wherever sparks are seen, they

demonstrate the fact of fire. Even so when you see men suffer you may be assured there is reason for it. As sparks flying upward demonstrate the fact of fire, so the suffering in man demonstrates the fact of sin. The hard dogmatist sees in suffering the punishment for sin. Job rebelled against this theory and rightly so.

Such a system results in great evils. In the first place it has a tendency to create pride and self-satisfaction with those who are exempt from suffering; it would lead to uncharitable judgment towards the ones afflicted; again, it would bring the spirit of hopelessness and despair to the afflicted.

The punitive theory involves the innocent with the guilty. In the earthquake in Italy many children suffered who were guiltless. But the exponent of this theory is equal to his task and reminds us that the soul doomed to pangs unearned, sinned of old, in some previous state of existence. This is the old Hindu theory. But by this doctrine, the free will exponent of the source of evil destroys free will in its very heart and centre.

Again, this punitive theory is defended by the doctrine of total depravity. Men are utterly depraved and all are deserving of the most cruel punishment physical evil can inflict. The reason why we, in western Pennsylvania, were not subjected to the calamities suffered by the people in southern Italy is due to God's sovereign mercy. But the doctrine of total depravity does not teach utter depravity. The doctrine of total depravity was formulated with the purpose of combating a certain heresy which maintained that sin had its seat only in the flesh. The exponents of the doctrine of total depravity maintained that sin had its seat in the totality of man's nature. It never taught utter depravity. If a soul is utterly depraved redemption is impossible. We have to dismiss this punitive theory as wholly unsatisfactory in its endeavor to solve the problem.

(d) *The Dualistic Theory.*—The dualistic theory is handed down through the ages. Its exponents tell us that the calami-



ties coming upon us come not from God but from the devil. The devil is seated upon his throne and is the dispenser of these calamities. God is the bestower of blessings, and the devil confers misery and suffering. Here we have two opposite forces in the world which lead us to a dualism in which we have two gods. If such is the case the devil has much power and where is God's supremacy? We thought of God as the World Ground but according to this theory God would not be the complete reality, the one intelligent, acting agent. Here we have two equal powers contending with one another for authority and where is God's sovereignty? The theory is untenable.

(c) *The Pseudo-Philosophy of Christian Science.*—This school of philosophy also has its interpretation as regards physical evil. Its exponents deny the existence of evil. It seems strange, however, that they even attempt to deny the reality of nothing; for their very denial tacitly admits the existence of that which they deny. Evil is not a mere illusion. It is a matter of experience and is very real. To say, "The source of evil and the seat of evil are only the errors of the mortal mind," one only changes the problem. If evil is only an error, the error would still be the evil and the mere change of name does not solve the difficulty nor lessen the horror of evil in this finite world.

It is a mistake to treat pain or evil as an illusion. As to whether pain, or evil is real, we would say that all things are real so long as you do not take them for more than they are. Such who view evil or pain as illusions say, "that if we knew everything and could feel everything we should feel and see that there was no evil at all." We rather believe that if we knew everything and could feel everything we should feel and see what pain and evil mean and how they play a part in perfection itself. We count it absurd and insulting to tell a man in pain that there is no such thing as pain whilst, on the other hand, we do not deem it absurd or insulting to try to let him feel that with each of them something great and precious can



be made. The pseudo-philosophy of Christian Science is contrary to experience.

2. Physical evil in its relation to God, Society and the Individual.

(a) *Physical Evil in its Relation to God.*—In our previous study we found a place for pain and suffering in the doctrine of the Divine atonement. Suffering and pain are not God-sent but God uses them for our advantage. Calamities are not an expression of His wrath. Wars do not take place according to God's will and purpose. War exists because man has the freedom of choice and uses this freedom often contrary to the will of God. Had there been the manifestation of true brotherhood and a willingness on the part of the strong to bear the burden of the weak, no war would have been declared between the North and the South. God had planned such a spirit of brotherhood and sacrifice but His plans were frustrated by human agents. War was declared and great bloodshed followed. But the immanent and ever-present loving God did not forsake his people. His first plans were frustrated but He laid new plans and caused the fearful calamity to turn out to our advantage. He caused the wrath of men to praise Him.

The European war is a fearful catastrophe. Here His plans also were frustrated. God is not the author of that awful conflict. Human agents, unmindful and indifferent to God's plans and purposes, started the cruel carnage. Yet we believe God is watching the movements of battle and is guiding the destinies of these belligerent nations. If the war succeeds in opening the Dardanelles, crushing Prussian militarism, removing the envy and jealousy so apparent upon the thrones of Europe, eliminating the liquor curse, the cause of Christianity will receive a mighty impetus in its forward march in the home and heathen lands, and posterity will think of the blessings gained as being fully commensurate with the sufferings involved. Again, the wrath of men will be made to praise God.

God's relation to the sorrow and pain in this world may



often seem mysterious, but in the midst of our mental perplexity we have the assurance that God is the immanent, active, intelligent agent of this world and as such causes suffering and pain to promote the good. The hard dogmatist dismisses the problem of evil by ascribing suffering to sin. The Stoic is indifferent to both pleasure and pain, but to deny the existence of pain and suffering is to falsify facts. The fatalist says, all suffering is a game of chance like bombs shot in the air that may strike somewhere. The Dogmatist, the Stoic, the Fatalist are wrong. The Fatalist blasphemes against an all-wise, immanent and all-ruling God. The Stoic becomes the philosopher of mist and moonshine and deprives the soul of the divine help essential to the carrying of one's burdens. The hard Dogmatist errs by making God the author of evil. Sickness is no punishment; calamity, no retribution; death, no judgment. God is not our tormentor, but our refuge; not the author of confusion but of peace. God suffers with us when disappointments and misfortunes befall us and sufferings are not the expression of His wrath.

God's relation to these physical sufferings is akin to ours. If God has created creators then analogically we may read back from the creature to the Creator. God also suffers, and the sufferings of God are even more intense than the sufferings we experience when misfortunes overtake us. We permit our emotions to overwhelm us but God's emotions are above excitement. Human emotion may be compared to a "red heat" which permits the sparks to fly. The emotion of God is more like unto the "white heat" where, though the heat is more intense, there is a calm. The dynamo running at full speed, seems to the spectator as standing still, but by touching it, he gets a shock. God's sufferings and emotions are intense and we are apt to think that He is without emotions but like the dynamo running at full speed, they escape our attention.

In experiencing our pain and suffering, let us realize that God is suffering with us and be assured that all will work out

to our advantage though we may not wholly understand the process.

The assurance of having such a compassionate God, suffering with His children, should stimulate within us a most robust faith and a willingness to put our trust in God to the end. We can boldly face life's calamities with such a God and say with Browning:

Then, welcome each rebuff  
That turns earth's smoothness rough,  
Each sting that bids nor sit nor stand but go!  
Be our joys three-parts pain!  
Strive and hold cheap the strain;  
Learn, nor account the pang; dare, never grudge the throe!

(b) *Physical Evil in its Relation to Society.*—Society bears a vital relation to all the physical evil in the world. In various ways the calamities and misfortunes of life contribute to the perfection of the moral-world-order. Goethe said, "I never had an affliction that did not turn into a poem." Even so the calamities that befall us God uses for the welfare of society and for the fuller development of the moral-world-order. Earthquakes, volcanic eruptions, famines, and floods are used for good purposes in the hands of God. Just how these calamities are brought about will remain a mystery to a very large degree. Many of them are the direct effect of misadjustments to God's laws. Nature, acting according to fixed laws, brings forth some of these calamities in a natural way. But whilst we do not understand all God's plans and laws we do know that these calamities do not visit us in the way the exponents of the materialistic, punitive, dualistic, disciplinary, and the fatalistic theories would have us believe. Such teachings have given rise to much of the scepticism and unbelief so rampant in the world to-day. Men will always believe in a just and reasonable God, though they may not always understand His ways. The writer recalls the remarks of a certain minister of the gospel who helped him officiate at a funeral of a young child, the only child of his parents. The minister, endeavor-



ing to comfort the parents who were not professed Christians, told them that God visited their home with the hand of death because He desired to punish them for their spiritual indifference. The remark seemed very cruel to the writer then, and after giving the subject further thought, the cruelty of the assertion became all the more apparent. We do not have such a heartless God.

Physical calamities come in the process of the world's history and our loving Father converts them into merciful visitations and causes them to minister to the good of humanity. Again, the writer recalls an incident of his ministry before his completion of the seminary course. He was called to officiate at a funeral of a child, also the only child in the family. The writer had put forth strenuous efforts to have the father make a public confession of faith in our blessed Saviour but all effort seemed in vain. Now their child died, and the writer at first thought the funeral occasion would be an appropriate time to present the matter of salvation with renewed emphasis to the neglectful father and lead him to understand that God had visited him with this deep affliction as a punishment for his spiritual neglect. Before leaving the seminary for the funeral the writer asked a professor for advice, stating the conditions and also the message he had thought appropriate. The professor cautioned him not to say anything concerning the death of the child that would leave the impression that the death was a punishment for sin or even a discipline on the part of God, but simply preach a comforting sermon and strive to bring comfort and consolation to those bereaved hearts. This advice was followed to the letter and ere we turned away from the open grave the father came to me of his own accord and asked to be admitted into the fellowship of the Christian Church. Men believe that God is good, and we do Him a great wrong and also undermine the faith of our people in a just and reasonable God when we ascribe these calamities to His authorship.

The earthquake, the flood, the martyrdom of Belgium, all



these afflictions and calamities, our loving Father uses for the good of humanity though He is not directly the author of the turmoil and discord. Pain, suffering, and sorrow are a part of the social fabric and help develop a larger social consciousness. Great disasters have awakened the sense of human brotherhood and have called forth from human hearts the spirit of sympathy and helpfulness for the suffering and needy ones. Without these sufferings these hearts might have remained listless and selfish. Suffering is an inherent law in the development of society. A garden where all was roses would cease to attract. Each rose has its thorn. We need shadows and darkness to appreciate light. The artist puts a shadow on a painting to give it a background which will help throw the painting itself into greater prominence. Even so evil, the shadows of life, in a world pervaded by the spirit of a loving, immanent, and intelligent God will be made to serve a noble purpose for society. Some one has said, there is enough suffering in a single street in London to prove that there is no God. But to judge evil by the present is to misjudge it. Clouds that shut off noon-day light often gather for a beautiful setting. Even so the sufferings of life, though often overwhelming us in their intensity and horror, will be used by an all-wise God for the welfare of humanity, for the perfection of the moral-world-order.

(c) *Physical Evil in Relation to the Individual.*—The individual is confronted with pain and suffering. Due to this physical suffering so common in every life the question has been asked, from Greek times downward at least, whether it is better to be born or not to be born? The question does not mean to raise the thought whether we experience more pleasure than pain but rather whether a soul is better for undergoing or having undergone the life on earth with its accompanying sufferings, whether our knowledge, our morality, our love of beauty, laboriously won in our conflict with pain, seem to have a value which could not be attained without them. Does the soul profit by sufferings experienced on earth or no?



Pessimism as taught by the Schopenhauerian school answers decisively that it would be better if no one were born. Schopenhauer maintained that we become aware of our own reality only in will, and of the reality of other things by finding that they offer resistance to our will. He resolves this thought into a metaphysic of the universe and views will as the essence of the world, the true thing-in-itself. According to Schopenhauer we are possessed with a will to live, prompted by an unreasoning impulse to self-preservation, which manifests itself in pleasure and pain, hope and fear, love and hatred. The will is absolute.

The will-to-live manifests itself in the vegetable, animal, and human life and is essentially a combative impulse. As forms of existence come in one another's way there arises an inevitable struggle, and there is manifest a struggle for existence. To will involves suffering for the will proceeds from the unceasing desire after an unattainable satisfaction. Pleasure only is a momentary relief of pain and is negative, while pain which is predominating, is positive. This metaphysical doctrine that finds its only realities to be unreason, caprice, chaos and irrationality of the world becomes, when carried into the ethical sphere, the ground principle of Pessimism.

Pessimism does not deny that there are reason and order in the world, but these are late comers, and they find that unreason and caprice have been beforehand with them, and have sat, as it were, as the privy councilors of the Creator. The world is conceived as springing out of an irrational and chaotic root. Its tendency to maladaptation, to the production of misery instead of happiness, chaos instead of law, confusion instead of order, is, therefore, constitutional, chronic and incurable.

Pessimism leads to a very gloomy aspect of life and cannot see how the soul can profit by any earthly experience. If Leibnitz was right in claiming this to be the best possible world God could make, Schopenhauer would state that no world would have been the better alternative. Schopenhauer

says "Life is a path of red-hot coals with a few cool places here and there." Evil is thought to lie deep in the will to live, and only the suppression of this will by means which take a form akin to art, morality, and religion can put a stop to the vicious circle of the wheel of life. The Nirvana of Buddha is the one supreme escape from suffering. Pessimism as taught by Schopenhauer says it would be better if no one were born.

We cannot agree with such a conception of evil—a conception which makes suffering and pain positive and good negative. We err when we conceive finiteness and infinity as being antagonistic to one another. The rather let us think that finiteness is essential to true infinity, and that the two are continuous and interwoven, not exclusive and antagonistic alternatives. It is a mistake to hold as obvious truth, that merely to annul the finite is to affirm the infinite. The finite and the infinite are interwoven and it is from this point of view that we must adjust our conceptions of suffering and its relation to the individual. We need to emphasize the immanence of God as well as His transcendence. Man, though finite, is approaching perfection and the infinite, immanent in the finite, aids the finite in the attainment of perfection. Man is developing, and the things of earth, including pain and suffering, may be used as positive instruments that help further this process of development.

We can see the relation pain and suffering bear to the individual in this process of development. Science has proved that this law of suffering prevailed on this planet during the countless ages preceding the advent of man. There has always been a struggle for existence; the survival of the fittest and the law of the natural world is also the law of development and progress in human life. Man, the crown of creation, has capacity for great joy but with such a capacity is linked the possibility of sadness. The organ builder can create a thousand possibilities of melody but with it there come a like possibility of a thousand discords. The greater



possibility of discords brings with it an increased possibility of melody. Even so in life a large capacity of suffering brings with it an increased possibility of joy and happiness. God is love, but love implies suffering. His love is commensurate with His suffering.

It is a very evident truth that the more we move down the scale of animal creation, from the throne of man where intellect and sympathy dwell, the more the capacity of suffering diminishes and eventually disappears. By taking a place at the bottom of organized life, and looking upon the worm and the jelly-fish, we almost find ourselves at the point of vanishing suffering. When man journeys away from the life of insects, beasts, and birds, he also leaves behind their exemption from pain and suffering. The more sympathetic, yea, the more God-like we become, the more sensitive we are to suffering. Suffering is a law interwoven with the life of God and man and has its place and function in the development of the human soul.

Some may be anxious to live without the experience of suffering. Seemingly, a soul can escape some sorrows of life if he cuts the wings of every soaring purpose, deprives himself of a resoluteness of will and permits himself to be shaken as a reed by the wind or to drift through life as the drift-wood with which the currents sport, but eventually he adds a multitude of sorrows, sorrows both physical and spiritual. We gain nothing by trying to evade all suffering. It is true, a man may cultivate deafness and he will be saved from the horrors of discord. He may cultivate blindness and thereby escape the sight of the ugly and by lessening his life he may lessen his sorrows in a sense. But the reverse is also true. As we lessen our sufferings we also lessen our joys. By cultivating deafness, we may escape the discords, but we also lose the harmonies of life. By cultivating blindness we may escape the sight of the ugly, but we also lose the inspiration of the lovely. Experience convinces us that by enlarging our lives, and by

being sensitive to suffering we also increase our joys and our sensitiveness toward God.

This world with its pain and suffering is the world best fitted for us as we go forward in the process of development. As Christ was made perfect through suffering even so we shall approach more and more unto the perfect ideal. "All chastening seemeth for the present to be not joyous but grievous; yet afterward it yieldeth peaceable fruit unto them that are exercised thereby, even the fruit of righteousness" (Heb. 12: 11). God is just, reasonable and good and with the assurance of His divine immanence and guidance we have every reason to cherish the hope of the final triumph of the good. The words of Tennyson, portraying his simple faith, furnish a fitting conclusion to this study.

Oh yet we trust that somehow good  
Will be the final goal of ill,  
To pangs of nature, sins of will,  
Defects of doubt and taints of blood;

That nothing walks with aimless feet;  
That no one life shall be destroyed,  
Or cast as rubbish to the void  
When God hath made the pile complete;

That not a worm is cloven in vain;  
That not a moth with vain desire  
Is shriveled in a fruitless fire,  
Or but subserves another's gain.

Behold we know not anything;  
I can but trust that good shall fall  
At last—far off—at last, to all,  
And every winter change to spring.

LATROBE, PA.



## VII.

### THE NEW APOLOGETIC.

GUSTAV R. POETTER.

There is a distinction between apology and apologetic. While an apology is a particular defence of the Christian faith with reference to a definite attack, apologetic is the science of apology, or the defense of Christianity reduced to system. Historically apologies came first. They were called forth when Jesus began his earthly ministry. In the New Testament accordingly we already find apologetic elements. Jesus was the first Christian apologist. Bruce points out while "reticent in what related to Himself, Jesus was copious in apology in reference to the nature of His mission, and of the Kingdom whose advent He proclaimed." The writer of the epistle to the Hebrews deserves to be placed next to Jesus. His epistle is a remarkable writing, owing its origin doubtless to the author's desire to remove what was a *σκανδαλον* to the Jews—the crucifixion of their Messiah. As an elaborate apology this epistle endeavors to defend the cross which Jesus bore, and then the cross which came to Christians when they professed their faith in the Crucified Master. Paul's epistles, of course, contain apologetic elements, "but they are only occasional and undeveloped thoughts."

In the history of the early Christian Church apology again occupied a prominent place. And that was inevitable. Christianity as a system of belief and practise had to give a reason for its existence. Its adherents were called upon, sometimes under the pressure of opposition and more often under the pressure of bitter persecution, to produce reasons for its necessity and to convince their enemies that Christianity not only had a right to exist, but was the highest form of religion and

worthy of the acceptance of all men. Greek culture at once with its different systems of philosophy became a formidable foe of Christianity. Its opposition voiced itself powerfully in the writings of five distinguished men—Lucian, Celsus, Porphyry, Hierocles, and Julian. They could not reconcile their philosophical assumptions with the fundamental doctrines of Christianity. What was the nature of their opposition? Celsus is usually taken for an example to point out their objections. His objections to Christianity may be placed under two heads, his philosophical prejudices and his main argument. Among his philosophic prejudices was, first, his decided distaste to the simplicity of the Gospel, then the prominence given to faith, and more violent still the interest taken by Christians in the sinful and miserable. In his main argument he assailed the incarnation. It degrades God by subjecting Him to change, it unduly exalts man, and then it has in view an unattainable end, the redemption of man. Origen wrote an apology in reply to this particular attack. Chronologically the skepticism and unbelief which arose in the Middle Ages followed. This naturally came as a result of the revival of learning in the fifteenth century and the study of Greek and Roman classics. Later in the seventeenth and eighteenth century there arose what is called, “Free Thought in the Eighteenth Century.” It was born in England and there received the name Deism. In Germany it was called *Aufklärung*, Illuminism. And in France it resolved itself into infidelity. English deism was, in a word, a protest against the idea of a special supernatural revelation. French infidelity added nothing to the philosophical thought of English Deism. Terry says, “It took on such low forms of satire and ridicule and displayed such obvious hatred of all religion that it may be compared to the bitter intolerance of early pagan assaults upon the Gospel.” In Germany, however, this Free Thought resolved itself into a philosophical rationalism which was more dignified and far more subtle and profound than was to be found in English Deism or French Infidelity. And



then comes the Free Thought in the present day. This is different from that of the last century. We live in a different period. We are now related to a new environment. Science has made striking advance, new philosophies have arisen, biblical criticism has been at work, and comparative study of religion has become a science. All these periods have produced their apologies. Each one needs its particular kind to meet the special tendencies and wants. But it was only during the last century that apologetics came into existence as a distinct branch of theological study.

Now the idea of apologetic has been differently defined. Drey defines it as the philosophy of the Christian revelation and of its history. Lechler makes apologetic the scientific demonstration of the Christian revelation as the absolute religion, the exclusively and ideally true. Ebrard defines the subject as "that science which deduces from the nature of Christianity itself what classes of attack generally are possible, what different sides of Christian truth may possibly be assailed, and what false principles lie at the bottom of these attacks." Bruce defines apologetic as dealing with anti-Christian prejudices that Christianity may get a fair hearing, that it is an aid to faith, "a preparer of the way of faith," against doubts arising from philosophy and science. He thinks it should avoid dogmatic unbelief and partisanship with dogmatic belief. That apologetic we think supplies the wants and tendencies of our age.

The attacks upon Christianity come from three different sources at present: philosophy, biblical criticism, and comparative study of religions. The philosophical conflict that gives the greatest concern is the one that comes from the postulates of evolution. Some theologians and many Christian ministers look upon the whole theory as inconsistent with the biblical doctrine of creation and inimicable to the Christian faith. How are the theologians and apologists going to deal with the doctrines of evolution? One way is to say that the new fangled theory is preposterous, false in philosophy,



and contrary to the Scriptures. That is what was done by those who refuted the Copernican theory and the law of gravitation and the doctrines of geology. They claimed that they had either to give up those theories or give up the Bible and the Christian faith. That is not the spirit of the new apologetic. It takes this theory of evolution and leaves it open to full and free discussion. It maintains that if the doctrine of evolution be false, we can safely leave it to the searching tests of free investigation and debate. If untrue, it will sooner or later come to naught. But if it be true, no one can overthrow it. To fight it, as it were, would be to fight God. Generally it is claimed by its opponents, that, "Evolution contradicts the biblical record of creation by the word of God." It has been pointed out that that is a matter of interpretation. To quote Milton S. Terry, "There are more ways of explaining the first chapters of Genesis than there are of setting aside the facts and arguments of science. Where is the scholar who now holds to the literal interpretation of the first chapter of the Bible?" Then he gives the geological and cosmological explanations, the restitution theory of Chalmers, John Pye Smith's hypothesis of a local creation, the poetical interpretation, and then adds, "These numerous theories show that it is much easier to adjust the biblical record to a scientific hypothesis than it is to refute the hypothesis. We know that unique literary compositions are capable of various explanations, but we cannot so easily twist the testimony of the solid rocks." And so with the creation of man. The theistic evolutionist declares that Genesis 2:7 admirably accords with his theory. What then does the new apologetic conclude as the best method for the spirit and attitude of the true apologist? Here is Professor Bruce's observation: "It is very important to grasp the truth that modern agnosticism and the doctrine of evolution, though often associated in fact, are by no means inseparable. An impression to the contrary might readily mislead the advocate of Christian theism into a precarious policy of uncompromising antagonism to prevalent scientific views con-



cerning the origin of the world, as if to refute these were a matter of life and death. I, for my part, have no sympathy with such a view of the apologist's present duty. I feel no jealousy of the doctrine of evolution, and see no occasion for cherishing such a feeling. I do not profess competency to pronounce on the scientific pretensions of the doctrine; but I am very sensible of the grandeur of the view which it presents of the universe, and I am not indisposed to accept it as truth, and to acknowledge the obligation thence arising to adjust our whole mode of thinking on religious questions to the new situation."

We next come to Biblical Criticism. Before the advent of Jesus biblical criticism was born. It is as old as the biblical canon. In the rabbinical schools before and after Christ there were biblical critics. In the history of the early Christian church Eusebius records the doubts existing as to the genuineness of the epistle of James, Second Peter, Second and Third John, and the Book of Revelation. Dionysius, Bishop of Alexandria, was one of the leaders of the higher critics in his day. We make a grave mistake then if we regard biblical criticism as a product of modern times.

Now then the extravagant claims which are sometimes made for the Bible have provoked the opposition of criticism. This is particularly true since the Reformation. Protestants began to exalt the Scriptures and declared them to be the only and infallible rule of faith and practise. This led to the position that they must needs be perfect and infallible. Then it had to be affirmed that the sacred volume was equally inspired, which required that every word and letter and even the vowel points were inspired of God. Teachings like these and others inevitably lead to bitter controversy. Scholars soon, in the light of their studies and investigations, discovered the unreasonableness of these claims. Soon critics began to attack the New Testament Greek, then came the contest about the inspiration of the vowel points, afterwards an attack was made on the ground of immoralities alleged to be sanctioned by the



Bible, later other attacks were based upon the alleged discrepancies of the Bible and so on. What are to be done with the inroads of criticism? Does the new apologetic say: "Away with your science! Away with your criticism! You are tearing my dear old Bible to pieces!" The new apologetic does not avoid the demands of scientific criticism. It does not ignore or keep still about the whole subject. It will not wage open warfare against all of its results. It recognizes that warfare is clearly out of place. The new apologetic aims to get a definite and rational conception of what the Bible is. And in so doing, it discovers that the extreme supernaturalism for the Bible itself is not claimed by it and is responsible for half the attacks made against it. Furthermore it is not alarmed to pronounce the Bible a very human book written by men of like passions with us, and having all the marks of variety in styles of thought and expression characteristic of different writers. And besides it will take pains to *examine* all critical questions of date and authorship and composition.

Finally the new apologetic does not overlook the study of comparative religion. It does not start out with the assumption that Christianity is the only religion and that all other religions are false. Nor does it make use of the old distinction of natural and revealed religion. It passes by all these and other distinctions and does not hesitate to state that there are many great truths in non-Christian religion which truths are as certainly from God as are the same truths when accepted by Moses, Isaiah, or Paul. It takes these great truths and shows that the religion of Jesus Christ contains all these and presents them in more perfect and commanding form than any other faith, and also supplements them with most important truths unknown to other religions. After the superior claims of the Gospel are pointed out and proven, then the new apologetic can go further and point out the notable defects and failures of the other religion to meet all the religious wants of man.



## VIII.

### THE PLACE OF SOCRATES IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF PHILOSOPHICAL THOUGHT.

PHILIP VOLLMER.

The Greek thinker Socrates (B. C. 469–399) holds an important and unique place in the development of philosophical inquiry among his own people as well as among the thinkers of the following ages down to the present time. Of this fact no reasonable doubt can exist in the minds of those acquainted with the history of philosophy. The tradition is unanimous among the ancients that he produced a revolution in philosophical thought. For this reason they regard him not only as the initiator of a new epoch in the history of philosophy, but as the real founder of Greek philosophy in the strict sense of the word.

#### *Universal Testimony to the Greatness of Socrates.*

Beginning with his immediate pupils, there is an unbroken testimony which pays tribute to the exalted personality, the originality, and the importance of Socrates. A few of the many testimonials will suffice to substantiate this estimate of the wise man from Athens. First of all let us listen to his immediate pupils and contemporaries. The mere fact that Cicero can enumerate no less than ten distinct groups of philosophers which go under the honorable name of "*Socratic Schools*" proves by itself the deep impression which Socrates made upon the world of thinkers.<sup>1</sup> Cicero's remarkable explanation of this fact is as follows: "*Socratis multiplex ratio disputandi, rerumque varietas et ingenii magnitudo, . . . plura*

<sup>1</sup> Ueberweg, "*Hist. of Phil.*," I, § 34.

genera effecit dissentientium philosophorum.”<sup>2</sup> Plato, the most illustrious of the disciples of Socrates, calls his teacher “the best, the most sensible, and the most just man,” and he never tires of praising his simplicity, his moderation and his control over the desires and demands of the senses. He represents him as imbued with the deepest religious feeling in all his doings, as devoting his whole life to the service of the gods, and dying a martyr’s death because of his obedience to the divine voice.<sup>3</sup> Xenophon, the “faithful and true,” has this to say of Socrates: “No one ever heard or saw anything wicked in Socrates; he was so pious that he did nothing without consulting the gods, so just that he never injured any one in the slightest degree, so self-controlled that he never preferred pleasure to goodness, so sensible that he never made a mistake in deciding between what was better and what was worse. In a word he was the best and happiest of men.”<sup>4</sup> Aristotle asserts: “There are two things of which Socrates must justly be regarded as the author, the inductive reasoning and abstract definitions.”<sup>5</sup> The tribute paid by the aristocratic Alcibiades to his revered teacher is especially touching and exquisitely beautiful: “My tears are poured out as Socrates talks, a thing I have seen happen to many others besides myself. I have heard Pericles and other excellent orators, and have been pleased with their discourses, but I suffered nothing of this kind. He alone inspires me with remorse and awe; for I feel in his presence my incapacity of refuting what he says, or of refusing to do that which he directs. I escape therefore and hide myself from him, and when I see him, I am overwhelmed with humiliation because I have neglected to do what I have confessed to him ought to be done; and often have I wished that he were no longer to be seen among men. But, if that were to happen, I well know that I should suffer far greater

<sup>2</sup> Cicero, “*De Oratore*,” III, 16, 61; also in his “*Tuscul. Disp.*,” V, 4, 11.

<sup>3</sup> In the concluding part of his dialog, “*Phædo*.”

<sup>4</sup> Xen., “*Memorab.*,” I, 1, 11; and IV, 8, 11.

<sup>5</sup> *Metaphys.*, XIII, 4: τοὺς τ’ ἐπακτικούς λόγους, καὶ τὸ ὀρίζεσθαι καθόλου.



pain; so that where I can turn or what I can do with the man I know not. . . . Many other and most wonderful qualities might well be praised in Socrates, but such as these might simply be attributed to others. But that which is unparalleled in Socrates is, that he is unlike and above comparison with all other men, whether those who have lived in ancient times, or those who exist now. To such a singular man as this both himself and his discourses are so uncommon, no one, should he seek, would find a parallel among the present or the past generations of mankind; unless they should say that he resembled those with whom I lately compared him; for assuredly he and his discourses are like nothing but a Sileni and a Satyr."<sup>6</sup> Even the general public in Athens held him in high estimation. "It is commonly agreed," says Plato,<sup>7</sup> "that Socrates, in some respects, excels the generality of men."

This cloud of witnesses, singing the praises of Socrates, is not confined to his contemporaries, but increases as the centuries roll on. Cicero, e. g., says:<sup>8</sup> "I can never read without tears the cause of his condemnation inscribed in the temple of Cybèle: "Socrates, son of Sophroniscus, is guilty of not recognizing the gods whom the state recognizes, and of introducing unknown divinities."<sup>9</sup> He is guilty also of corrupting the youth. The penalty is death." St. Augustine, in his admirable review of Greek achievements in philosophy, says of Socrates: "Illustrious, both in his life and in his death, Socrates left very many disciples of his philosophy who vied with one another in the desire for proficiency in handling those moral questions which concern the chief good, the possession of which can make a man blessed."<sup>10</sup>

Erasmus, the eminent humanist of the Reformation period,

<sup>6</sup> Plato, "Symposion," 350.

<sup>7</sup> Plato, "Opal.," 23: δεδογμένον γέ ἐστι τὸ Σωκράτη διαφέρειν τινὶ τῶν πολλῶν ἀνθρώπων.

<sup>8</sup> "Nat. Deor.," I, 3; also, "Tuscul.," I, 47.

<sup>9</sup> This accusation was based on the fact that Socrates occasionally used the singular when speaking of the divine being—ὁ θεός, τὸ θεῖον, τὸ δαιμόνιον.

<sup>10</sup> "De Civitate Dei," VIII, 3.

exclaims in ecstasy:<sup>11</sup> "How noble that spirit that could breathe this prayer: 'give me the interior beauty of the soul.' When I read some things of this great man, I can scarcely refrain from saying 'Sancte Socrates, ora pro nobis.' " Moses Mendelssohn, the German philosopher, opens the introductory chapter to his famous "Phædon" with this declaration:<sup>12</sup> "Socrates is the wisest and most virtuous of the Greeks." Hamann, the Magus of the North, says of him:<sup>13</sup> "Wer den Socrates unter den Propheten nicht leiden will, den muss man fragen, wer der Propheten Vater sei." Hegel pays this tribute to him:<sup>14</sup> "He is not only a figure of supreme importance in the history of philosophy, perhaps the most interesting of all among the ancients, but is a world-historic person. For he represents a turning point of the human spirit in upon itself in the manner of philosophical thought." The most widely used textbook of the eighteenth century says:<sup>15</sup> "Both on account of his abilities as a moral preceptor and on account of his personal merit, Socrates unquestionably deserves to be ranked in the first order of human beings." Renouvier says:<sup>16</sup> "All is human in Socrates while he lives, all reveals a god at his death." The profound veneration in which Socrates is held by the world of scholars is also attested by the fact that he is the only philosopher who to this day is frequently compared with Christ.<sup>17</sup> It is also reported<sup>18</sup> that the Roman emperor, Alexander Severus (A. D. 222-235), put his bust in his Lararium beside those of Christ, Abraham, Orpheus and Appollonius of Thyana.

<sup>11</sup> "Erasmi Opera," II, 5.

<sup>12</sup> Mendelssohn's "Phædon," Introd., VIII.

<sup>13</sup> Hamann's "Schriften," II, 42.

<sup>14</sup> Hegel, "Vorlesungen ueber die Geschichte der Phil.," I, 93.

<sup>15</sup> Brucker's "Historia Critica Philosophiæ," p. 65.

<sup>16</sup> Renouvier, "Philosophie Ancienne," p. 107.

<sup>17</sup> One of the ablest attempts made in this line is the thesis of the author's revered teacher, Prof. G. C. Seibert, Ph.D., D.D., "Socrates und Christus." See also, Ernst von Lassaux, "Des Socrates Leben, Lehre und Tod," p. 99; also Justin Martyr's "Opus Major," I, 46.

<sup>18</sup> Lamprid, "Alexander Severus," c. 43.



*The Reason for the High Veneration of Socrates.*

The fact of the almost universal admiration of Socrates being thus established, the question arises as to the cause of it. A partial explanation of this phenomenon may no doubt be found in the exalted personality of this philosopher. His charming presence, his penetrating judgment, his profound ideas and his liberal spirit, united with the exemplary integrity and purity of his character—judged by the standards of his time—account to some extent for the generous tribute, which, as our references have shown, the philosophical world has so unanimously paid to him. The very fact that his disciples record so many excellent personal traits of the man, shows that he impressed them as deeply as he did, not by his philosophy alone, but also by his life and character, and that he stamped the image of his exalted personality ineradicably on their minds and affections. As Zeller truly says:<sup>19</sup> “There is no instance on record of a philosopher whose importance as a thinker is so closely bound up with the personality of the man as it was in the case of Socrates. Every system, it is true, as the work of a definite person, may best be viewed in the light of his peculiarities, culture, misfortunes, and circumstances; but yet in many cases it is well to separate the fruits of genius from the actual stock on which they grew. The doctrines of schools can indeed generally be received and handed down by men of very different characters; but in the case of Socrates this is not nearly so possible. He had far less to do with definite doctrines which might be equally well embraced by different men, than with giving a peculiar turn to life and thought, a peculiar character to philosophy, and a new method to scientific inquiry.”

It would, however, be a great mistake to suppose that this high tribute was paid to Socrates mainly because he was a good man and a successful teacher of morality. This explanation would do justice to but one aspect of this remarkable man,

<sup>19</sup> “Socrates and the Socratic Schools,” p. 68.



and would not bring into prominence those elements in his personality which have most deeply influenced mankind. "If," as Schleiermacher observes,<sup>20</sup> "Socrates has done nothing but discourse in a purer and loftier strain on subjects within those limits which are never passed in the 'Memorabilia' of Xenophon, it would be impossible to understand how the charm of his speech could have emptied the market-place and the workshops, the public walks, and the schools of Athens for so many years; how he could have satisfied so long men like Alcibiades and Critias, Plato and Euclid; how he could have played the part assigned to him in the dialogs of Plato;—in short, how he could have been the founder and type of the philosophy of Athens."

It is, therefore, neither from the excellence of his precepts nor from the virtue of his life—though both were essential features in his personality,—that he derives his peculiar title to fame, but from the new aim of his philosophy and his truly scientific method which he employed in pursuing this aim. The new aim of the Socratic philosophizing was to reach "conceptual knowledge" and the peculiar Socratic method consisted in the dexterity by which he succeeded in exciting scientific impulses in the minds of men by way of stirring up and forcing the germ of inquiry in their minds.<sup>21</sup> These two great achievements, inseparably blended with an admirable and unique personality, account sufficiently for the unmeasured praise, bordering close on deification, which past generations have bestowed upon "the father of philosophy."

#### *General Characteristics of the Pre-Socratic Schools.*

But scientific method like everything else is a growth, a gradual development, an evolution, not a spontaneous immediate creation. In that long chain of thinkers who endeavored to develop a truly scientific method the Socratic achievements

<sup>20</sup> Schleiermacher's "Werke," III, 2, 295.

<sup>21</sup> On the peculiarity of the Socratic method see the essay of the author on this subject, published in a previous issue of the REF. CH. REVIEW.



are therefore only one link, though a large, important and conspicuous one. The wise man of Athens did not appear on the stage of philosophical progress as a kind of *Deus ex machina*; "Socrates did not grow out of the earth like a fungus," says Hegel,<sup>22</sup> "but stands in definite continuity with his time." Consequently, if we wish to estimate correctly his peculiar achievements and his unique contributions to human progress it will be necessary to take a brief survey of the attempts to work out a truly scientific method in philosophy made by his predecessors, as well as to study the further development of the Socratic method by his pupils, Plato and Aristotle, down to Bacon, the reputed "father of the inductive method."

The Greeks were the first who gained sufficient freedom of thought to seek for the truth respecting the nature of things not in religious tradition, as the Oriental nations did, but in the things themselves. Consequently it was among them that a strictly scientific method, a knowledge that follows no laws except its own, became first possible. The ancients are generally agreed in ascribing the first serious attempt at a truly scientific method of philosophizing to Thales (about 640 B. C.).<sup>23</sup> With him philosophy left the state of infancy, the fabulous Orpheic age, and passed from traditional opinions and sententious wisdom to more accurate speculations and closer reasonings. Keen observation and orderly reflection is the Rubicon which he first crossed.

The following are a few prominent characteristics of the philosophical aims and methods, common to all those pre-Socratic schools which followed in the wake of Thales. To begin with, all of them study nature rather than man. This is what one would expect, for the reason that with primitive thinkers the objective precedes the subjective. They are all devoted to physics, not to psychology. The Ionians based their speculations on the phenomena of nature, and were de-

<sup>22</sup> "Vorlesungen ueber die Geschichte der Phil.," I, p. 90.

<sup>23</sup> Aristotle, "Metaphysics," I, 3, says: *Θαλῆς ὁ τῆς τοιαύτης ἀρχηγός φιλοσοφίας*. Comp. also, Cicero, "De Nature Deorum," I, 10.



voted to physical science; the Pythagoreans based theirs on relations, and were devoted to mathematics; the Eleatics based theirs on pure being and were devoted to metaphysics and crude dielectics; the Sophists based theirs on the individual man and were devoted to rhetoric and the subjective. Even when the inquiry of the Pre-Socratic philosophers incidentally carried them into other spheres, the standard which they applied being originally from natural science, remained foreign to those spheres.<sup>24</sup> Engaged in profound speculation about nature they overlooked man and they contented themselves with simply admiring virtue and extolling virtuous action, without taking pains to establish scientific principles of sound morality. The merit of correcting this error is to be ascribed to Socrates. A second characteristic of all the Pre-Socratic schools is their diligent search for the "first principle,"<sup>25</sup> i. e., the cause of all being. Their chief object in this line of speculation seems to have been to reduce to unity the manifold plurality and variety of natural phenomena. Thirdly, all early Greek thought moved wholly in the region of what Hegel<sup>26</sup> calls "*die Vorstellung*." There is always before their minds, not an idea, but a sensuous picture. Like children and uncultured people, they reason by means of images. Also in their methods of investigation we find common elements. They all employed a sort of dogmatic and constructive reasoning and their aim was merely to generalize phenomena. They were "intuitionists," instead of speculative thinkers. A strictly scientific method, consciously conceived and applied, was entirely foreign to their minds.

<sup>24</sup> Dr. Geo. Fullerton, on p. 81 of his "*Sameness and Identity*," has clearly shown that even the Eleatic "*One*" was merely a thing and not a spiritual essence, distinct from the sensible, like the Platonic "*ideas*." Parmenides, *e. g.*, describes "*Being*" as a substance which fills space. See Aristotle, "*Metaphysics*," V.

<sup>25</sup> By "*principle*" they meant the underlying reality, the *ἀρχή*.

<sup>26</sup> Hegel's "*History of Philosophy*," p. 83.



*Specific Characteristics of the Pre-Socratic Schools.*

A careful study of the different Pre-Socratic schools exhibits some sort of development and advance, as to their aim as well as to the methods followed. The *Ionian Phycisists*<sup>27</sup> made close observation their point of departure. This method of inquiry allowed sensation an important part in determining the result. They were empiricists, pure and simple, drawing from the observation of such phenomena as fell within the circle of their limited experience the supposed principles and laws of the formation of the universe. Though the method was common to all the Ionians, the principal masters of this school reached very different conclusions. For instance, close observation led Thales to the fact that in the sphere of observation no production takes place without pre-existing matter. According to his manner of procedure, he generalized this observation and thereby inferred that the formation of the universe presupposed a primary uncreated matter which he conceived to be water. How that first philosopher came to this particular hypothesis, while others, by the same method, believed air or fire to be the principle of all being, cannot now be exactly determined. He was probably led to it by the observation that moisture constitutes the germ and nourishment of things. Aristotle at any rate thinks so.<sup>28</sup> "Of those who first philosophized, the majority assumed only material principles for elements; Thales, the originator of such philosophy, taking water for his principle. He was led to this, pobably, by the observation that the nutriment of all things is moist, and that heat itself is generated by moisture, and living things live by it; but that by which anything is generated is its principle; further, by the observation that the seed of all things is naturally moist; but the principle in virtue of which the moist is moist is water."

The Pythagoreans,<sup>29</sup> on the other hand, followed a method

<sup>27</sup> Ueberweg, "History of Phil.," I, 11.

<sup>28</sup> Aristotle, "Metaphysics," I, 3.

<sup>29</sup> Ueberweg, "Hist. of Phil.," I, 16.

the reverse of this empirical process of the Ionians, setting out with the most general ideas and proceeding by the method of deduction. Their tendency is wholly towards the consideration of abstractions, as the only true materials of science. So we may in some sort comprehend what Pythagoras meant when he taught that numbers were the principles of things. Aristotle says,<sup>30</sup> "Since numbers are by nature prior to all things, in numbers they thought they perceived greater analogies with that which exists and that which is produced than in fire, earth or water. So that a certain combination of numbers was justice; and a certain other combination of numbers was reason and intelligence, and a certain other combination of numbers was opportunity, and so of the rest." Thus the principle of things with them is absolute unity—the Monads—synonymous with the originating being or God. From this unity proceeds multiplicity which is the universe, wherein that which exists in the Monad in a state of unity is produced by separation. Their method, consequently, is not empirical, but a pure rationalism."

The Eleatic School<sup>31</sup> was in its general tendency pre-eminently dialectic, supersensible, transcendental, as we should now term it, carrying out yet further the trains of inquiry started by the Pythagoreans, it being itself, in some measure, the result of that school. They brought out more distinctly the differences between reason and the senses, giving the preference to the former. In this way they established a duality of matter and mind which was a great gain to philosophical speculation. The reason, not the senses, is the criterion of truth. The highest manifestation of this dialectical method (of course applied in a different way from that in which it was employed by Socrates) appears in Zeno.

<sup>30</sup> Aristotle, "*Metaphysics*," I, 5.

<sup>31</sup> Ueberweg, "*Hist. of Phil.*," I, 17.



*The Sophists form the Connecting Link between Pre-Socratic and Socratic Speculation.*

The Sophists must also be classed with those empiricists, for they neither had a true principle underlying their philosophizing, nor did they follow a distinct scientific method. With them the end of philosophy was not universal truth, but individual success. Their method was, therefore, individual jugglery. Devices were constructed whereby, irrespective of the truth or falsehood of the subject matter, a favorable vote in the public assembly or a successful verdict in the courts might more readily be procured. Thus philosophy (if such an exercise of wit may be called by that name at all) became a search not for the real amidst the confusions of the seeming but a search for the seeming and the plausible to the detriment or at least to the ignoring of any objective truth at all. Persuasiveness was the only wisdom. It was the boast of Protagoras: τὸν ἥττονα λόγον κρείττονα ποιεῖν. Nothing was of any consequence in itself save only for appearance sake, and the gain to come of it. By the mere pomp of words these men made a magnificent display of wisdom upon a slight foundation of real knowledge. They taught a false method of reasoning by means of which they were able in argument "to make the worst appear the better course." As Wigger says:<sup>32</sup> "These men, descendants of the Eleatic School, exerted their utmost power to shake the foundations of knowledge, to unsettle the ideas of right and wrong, to confound the moral power of judgment by dialectical illusions and to declare a thing to be right at one time and wrong at another, as their interest dictated. Instead of being teachers of wisdom they were mere dialectic quibblers, who made no man wiser or better; and who by the spirit of quibbling which they diffused among their disciples paralyzed the power of the moral feelings."

But in spite of all that must be charged against the Sophists,

<sup>32</sup> "Life of Socrates," p. 15.

they accomplished a most important mission in the progress of philosophical speculation. They were the first who abandoned the exclusive study of nature, the crudely objective, and considered with some care the subjective, that is, man:—his perceptions, opinions, desires and will. Their aim was universal culture. Thus by transplanting speculation from nature to man, they created interest in logic and psychology and thereby raised the whole question of the origin and validity of knowledge. True, they could not, from their standpoint, give a satisfactory explanation to all the problems which they touched upon but they at least stated the questions which later Socrates and the Socratic schools endeavored to answer. And putting important questions is to some extent also a positive achievement. Zeller therefore truly observes:<sup>33</sup> “The inquiries of the Sophists contained little and yet, did not the Sophists, notwithstanding their being so much engaged with empty cavils, impart an almost electric shock to their age, simply and solely because a new power and a new method of reflection—travesty of thought though it was—had dawned upon the Greek mind.”

But when all has been said in favor of the Sophists, it remains true that the influence of their teaching was subversive of the true aim of philosophy. For they systematically and intentionally destroyed faith in the possibility of finding objective truth and thereby discouraged serious investigation of any subject. True, they declared man to be the measure of all things, but they understood by man merely the individual in the various contingencies of his opinions and endeavors, not the universal essential thought of mankind, as a group, which must be sought out scientifically. Consequently, we repeat, they have not been able to inaugurate a new positive, healthy, vigorous scientific tendency. Their only achievement besides the above conceded change of subject is negative and consists in the destruction of the dogmatism of the earlier Pre-Socratic schools. In its very nature their principle and method are

<sup>33</sup> Zeller, “Socrates and the Socratic Schools,” p. 97.



rather the end of all true philosophy, because they destroy all philosophical effort in admitting no other criterion than the personal advantage and caprice of the individual. Scepticism is the term that characterizes the spirit common to the different schools of Sophists. All of them in some way or other maintain that there existed and could exist for man no absolute and objective truth, but only relative and subjective opinion. This scepticism was not, however, with the Sophists the gloomy despair of reason, which suicidally destroys itself; it was frivolous levity and sneering contempt. Assuming the honorable name of σοφισταί (teachers of wisdom), a title which their conduct brought into disrepute and has made a term of reproach down to our own time, they used reason only for sport and personal gain. Philosophy, as an analysis of the data of perception, degenerated with them into a social, moral and scientific chaos.

*Stern Antagonism of Socrates to the Sophists.*

This frivolous attitude of the Sophists explains sufficiently the uncompromising antagonism to them on the part of Socrates and his pupils. Socrates himself never tires of heaping scorn and ridicule upon those, "who have the seeming and conceit of knowledge without the reality";<sup>34</sup> Xenophon reports him as saying that "men who sell their wisdom for money to any that will buy are called Sophists, or, as it were, prostitutes of wisdom."<sup>35</sup> "An appearance of wisdom where there is none," is Aristotle's idea of Sophistry.<sup>36</sup> "Men who philosophize for the sake of display or gain" is Cicero's opinion of them.<sup>37</sup> To cite instances from Plato to the same effect would fill a volume. The best description of a Greek Sophist of the time of Socrates, as viewed with Platonic

<sup>34</sup> A phrase which he is said to have constantly used against the Sophist. See "Theæt.," 68.

<sup>35</sup> Xenophon's "Memorabilia," I, 6: καὶ τὴν σοφίαν ὡσαύτως τοὺς μὲν ἀργυρίου τῷ βουλευμένῳ πωλοῦντας Σοφιστὰς ἀποκαλοῦσιν.

<sup>36</sup> Arist., "De Sophist. Elench.," I, 11.

<sup>37</sup> Cicero, "Academia," II, 23.

eyes, is given in Plato's dialog, "Protagoras," from which the following passage is often referred to as a proof of the shamelessness of the Sophists: "To teach immorality and openly to avow that it is immoral, is the office of the Sophists."<sup>38</sup>

In order to dissipate the fascination which these pretenders to wisdom had spread over the minds of men, Socrates daily employed himself in perplexing them with questions which were ingeniously contrived to expose their ignorance and convince the public of their dishonesty. When any of their disputes happened to rest upon a single point or proposition it was difficult to overthrow them in argument. They had, as we have seen before, so many evasions and subterfuges, so many plausible fables, figures of rhetoric and glittering generalities at their command, that their hearers were outwitted and imagined themselves convinced. A general applause, therefore, usually followed. Socrates, on such occasions, applauded them too; but, at the same time, put some slight indirect questions to the speaker, which the latter perhaps considered to be the effect of his dulness of comprehension, and answered out of pity. By multiplying questions Socrates came nearer to his aim, gradually cutting off from his adversaries any opportunity of wandering into long-winded harangues. Thus they were obliged to define their ideas accurately, to admit just explanations, and to allow absurd conclusions to be drawn from their false premises. At length they found themselves driven into a corner, became impatient and answered in anger.

In the following dialog with the Athenian Anytus, Plato puts into the mouth of that man the disdain which Socrates himself entertained of the Sophists.<sup>39</sup>

S. If we wish your son Meno to become a good physician, should we not send him to the physicians?

A. By all means.

<sup>38</sup> Plato, "Protagoras," 59.

<sup>39</sup> Plato, "Meno," 360.



S. And if we wish to make him a good currier, should we not send him to the curriers?

A. To be sure.

S. Is it not clear then that if we want him to become virtuous that we should send him to those who profess to be teachers of virtue and publicly proffer themselves common to any one of the Greeks desirous to learn, after fixing the price and making it a matter of business.

A. Of what person, Socrates, are you speaking?

S. You surely know that these are they whom men call Sophists.

A. By Hercules! Speak fair words, Socrates. On none of my relations or family or friends or fellow citizens or foreign guests may ever such madness seize as to go and be spoiled by them. For those fellows are clearly the bane and corruption of their associates.

### *Defenders of the Sophists.*

In recent times the Sophists have found able defenders, who try to represent them as a most unjustly maligned class of men and who attempt to trace the whole venom back to Plato, whom they represent as an incompetent witness, he being the prejudiced arch-enemy of Sophistry. George Henry Lewis writes in their defence, as follows:<sup>40</sup> "The Sophists are a much calumniated race. In raising our voices to defend them we are aware of the paradox; but looked at nearly the paradox is greater on the side of those who credit and repeat the traditional account. On the Sophists we have only the testimony of antagonists; and the history of mankind clearly proves that the enmities which arise from difference of race and country are feeble compared with enmities which arise from difference of creed. Plato had every reason to dislike the Sophists and their opinion; he therefore lost no occasion of ridiculing the one and misrepresenting the other. Plato

<sup>40</sup> "Biographical History of Phil.," p. 112.

and those who followed Plato misrepresented the Sophists as in all ages antagonists have misrepresented each other." This novel view of the position and character of the Sophists is supported by Grote in his "*History of Greece*,"<sup>41</sup> where that well-known erudite and thoughtful writer brings his learning and sagacity to the most thorough elucidation of this question. Grote thinks he can reduce the offensiveness of the principle of Protagoras, "to make the weaker side appear the stronger," by remarking that the same principle had been attributed to Isocrates and even to Socrates, but that they denied the allegation. Obviously, this is changing the ground. It was not attributed to Protagoras falsely, but he avowed it himself and explained it by saying that a teacher of eloquence could not meddle with the ends for which his art was employed, but must help towards the attainment even of wicked ends.<sup>42</sup> Of course, a teacher of rhetoric cannot be answerable for the abuse of his art; but it is one thing to teach an art which may be abused, and another thing to teach pupils how to abuse it. Grote also appeals to the fact that a lawyer is not blamed for helping the wrong side as well as the right side with his eloquence. "We can send a paid advocate to quibble for us," Grote asserts. But this is not altogether true. A lawyer is bound to say the best that can be said for a criminal, but if he were to make it his profession always to help the wrong side he would be rightly called a perverter of justice. It was Hegel who first gave currency to these new views on the Sophists. He also tried very hard to vindicate the Sophists of much that is traditionally said against them.<sup>43</sup>

But the evidence in favor of the traditional judgment of the Sophists is too strong to be thus set aside. One may try to exonerate them from many things unjustly imputed to them, and in reading the writings of the philosophers of the

<sup>41</sup> Grotius, "*Hist. of Greece*," VIII, 489.

<sup>42</sup> Compare the view taken of Rhetoric by Plato in "*Gorgias*" and "*Phædius*" and by Aristotle, in "*Rhet.*," I, 1.

<sup>43</sup> "*Vorlesungen über die Geschichte der Phil.*," I, 93.



Socratic schools it must not be forgotten that they had imbibed from their master a profound hatred of the Sophists and may consequently have now and then been rather too severe in their remarks upon them; yet after all due allowance so much is sure and beyond successful contradiction that they misled the Athenian youth, corrupted their principles and tastes, and in their schools inculcated a deceitful reasoning supported by a false dialectical method. It is therefore perfectly safe to subscribe to the estimate of so careful a writer as Wigger,<sup>44</sup> when he says: "Socrates discovered the irretrievable injuries inflicted by the Sophists on intellectual advancement and morality, and witnessed the distressing results of it among his contemporaries. Filled with vain pride they persuaded themselves that they had discovered the most recondite truths; they thought themselves unequalled in the art of disputing, and were constantly seeking opportunities of displaying their subtleties. Thus they wandered from the only path of true wisdom, the knowledge of themselves. But the instructions of the Sophists given to the youth of Athens were still more injurious, since, by their defending what was wrong, those moral principles, which are the supports of public peace and happiness, were artificially undermined."

*Socrates the Savior of Greek Philosophy.*

If this state of mind, characterized by the infatuation which the Sophists excited, had long continued in Greece, philosophy in the true sense of the word would have perished. But it had strength enough to triumph at this critical period, and the reaction which followed produced the most brilliant development of Greek speculations. At the opening of this period of reaction appears Socrates, the great discoverer of the new philosophical method which has held the field to this day. We have little so-called "Socratic philosophy"; his mission was merely to mark out the real object of all true philosophy

<sup>44</sup> Wigger, "Life of Socrates," p. 17.

which is to seek objective reality. In so doing he discredited the subjectivity of the Sophists, and gave impulse and a new method to scientific investigation. With Socrates the acquisition of truth is the ultimate end.<sup>45</sup> Socrates alone bore in himself the germ of a new life and thought. He therefore became by his new philosophical principles the reformer of philosophy. Hermann<sup>46</sup> goes as far as saying that the importance of Socrates for the history of philosophy must be gathered from his personal opposition to the Sophists and not from the general resemblance to them. For the Sophists differed from Socrates just in the most important thing—they lacked a fruit-bearing germ and a scientifically valid method.

CENTRAL THEOLOGICAL SEMINARY,

DAYTON, OHIO.

<sup>45</sup> As Prof. Geo. Fullerton, in one of his inspiring lectures, on March 30, 1893, in the presence of the author said: "Socrates had all the quibbling of the Sophists, but behind all that there was a deep moral earnestness, while the Sophists were flippancy incarnate."—See Plato's "Rep.," I, where the term *ἀμεινον ξην* gives rise to a dispute worthy of a first-class Sophist.

<sup>46</sup> "Plato and Socrates," p. 97.





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## CONTENTS OF JANUARY NUMBER

---

- ARTICLE I.—The Cross . . . . . I  
**R. LEIGHTON GERHART**
- “ II.—Germany and the Formative Forces of the  
Great War . . . . . 19  
**RICHARD C. SCHIEDT**
- “ III.—The Rationalistic Element in American Literature  
Previous to 1860 . . . . . 49  
**CHARLES EDWARD MEYERS**
- “ IV.—Modern Life and Pastoral Work . . . . . 71  
**FREDERICK A. RUPLEY**
- “ V.—A Comparative Study of Ancient and Medi-  
æval Missions . . . . . 80  
**LEONARD L. LEH**
- “ VI.—A Review of “The Problem of Christianity” . . . . . 109  
**RAY H. DOTTERER**
- “ VII.—Can We Know God? . . . . . 125  
**HENRY GEKELER**
- “ VIII.—The Church and the Social Order . . . . . 130  
**THEODORE F. HERMAN**
- “ IX.—Notices of New Books . . . . . 148  
PENNSYLVANIA IN SONG: *Pennypacker*: The Snow Shoe Trail  
and other Poems; *Pennypacker*: Pennsylvania, The Keystone  
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